In wintertime Guam is an ideal vacation spot. However, we didn't execute a max effort deployment to sit around for days waiting to complete our mission. Boredom and frustration became strong emotions to us. During those two weeks, things became routine. On base there was a tight, nine-hole golf course that had been hacked out of the jungle. Golf was good recreation, but we broke the evening routine by going to the open air theater to watch thrillers like Errol Flynn in his swash-buckling movies. We had to remember to carry our raincoats because in the middle of the movies there always seemed to be a shower. That was normal tropical weather in Guam. After sunset the air rises over the warm landmass dragging in moist air from the ocean producing showers. The brief showers cool the landmass stopping the whole process for a short period. The good news was the movies were free!
On March 3, 1964, we received orders to bypass Clark and proceed directly to South Vietnam. Our detachment was located at the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Base located at Bien Hoa, some 30 miles northeast of Saigon. The base had a beautiful, new 10,000-foot concrete runway, ramp and taxiway but no hangar space. The rest of the base was rather primitive. Bien Hoa was a widespread piece of real estate that housed not only VNAF operations but also a number of small stores, residences and a club.
Before our departure for Vietnam, every one of us was required to receive the necessary inoculations—plague, cholera, etc. Again our threesome, Jim Rogers, Bob Spencer and I, flew the U-2s into Bien Hoa AB on the morning of March 4. Because of our scheduled flights the next morning, we couldn't receive inoculations before leaving Guam. When we landed at Bien Hoa, the local USAF Flight Surgeon was waiting for us. As soon as we got our arms out of the sleeves of our flight suits, we were hit with the needle.
The USAF at Bien Hoa flew B-26s and the A-1Es, a multi-place ex-Navy attack aircraft. The B-26 had been grounded for some time due to a wing problem. This boded well for us because the only air-conditioned quarters were the B-26 pilots’ alert trailers. They were located near the flight line which was quite a hike from the US cantonment area where the mess hall, operations, club, etc. were located. At first, we thought we had hot showers and flush toilets in the trailers, but it was not to be. We were told the water was potable, drinking water only. Back to the open-air showers.
The flight line operations were constricted and primitive. Remember, we were not yet at war and the US was there only in an advisory capacity. US military dependents still lived in Saigon. We had to share crowded flight line facilities with the USAF A-1s. Their ramp and maintenance area consisted of a wide patch of asphalt with a lane along the edge reserved for a taxiway with a number of rows of A-1s parked perpendicular to the taxiway. A sort of nose dock building ran the length of the parking area behind the aircraft. It was more of a “lean-to” and just deep enough for the nose of an aircraft. The U-2s couldn't park in line with the A-1s. The A-1s had propellers and when they cranked up, their propellers shot off dust and rocks that would have damaged the fragile skin of the U-2s. We commandeered three of the nose dock spaces. The U-2s had to be pushed into the nose dock between the rows of A-1s. The rows of A-1s were not quite far enough apart for the U-2 wingspan. One U-2 wingtip would just miss the tails of the A-1s on the left while the other wingtip went under the nose of the A-1s on the right. The large, four-bladed prop on the A-1s had to be rotated as the U-2 wingtip parked under the nose. We did not bring our Mobile Control to Vietnam so another primitive aspect of our flight operations was the WWII weapons carrier truck. It was equipped with a UHF radio that we borrowed from the Vietnamese for our Mobile Control chase vehicle.
We got off to a good start after our arrival in Vietnam. The weather cooperated and on the third or fourth day, under perfect weather conditions, we launched two aircraft to photomap the entire country of South Vietnam and several missions over NVM and Laos.
Colonel DesPortes summoned me with a message indicating that I was to return home as soon as possible. I learned that Lockheed was ready to evaluate the second of two new autopilots built specifically for the U-2. These autopilots were installed in one of the Agency's U-2Cs. I had been selected for the first evaluation the previous December. I had just returned from Barksdale AFB and the Cuban operation where we flew U-2Cs borrowed from the Agency. Lockheed wanted the same three pilots who flew the original evaluation to fly the second for comparison purposes. I jumped on a T-39 that same evening that was transporting our exposed film from that day to the photo lab at Clark. I caught a military charter flight from Clark to Travis AFB, California where I was picked up by one of our Wing's C-123s for a late night arrival back at Davis-Monthan.
When I arrived at Edwards AFB North Base for the evaluation, I learned I was the only one of the original three pilots returning for the second evaluation. I came back from halfway around the world for this evaluation. The other agencies, the CIA and Systems Command, didn't think it was important enough to send their pilots.
I hadn't finished my original tour in Vietnam, so I returned for a 90-day tour in late July 1964. The detachment had been reduced to a two-aircraft operation. Two of us incoming pilots ferried two “A” models into Bien Hoa and the two remaining “E” models were ferried by rotating pilots back to Davis Monthan.
Things had changed a lot since I left the detachment in March. We now had a Ford station wagon as one of our regular Mobile Control units. General Thomas Powers, Commander-in-Chief of SAC, had sent some surplus property from the deactivated Bomber Wing at Biggs AFB, El Paso, Texas. The alert facility at Biggs included several air-conditioned, three-bedroom house trailers. They were flown to Bien Hoa on a C-130 and installed adjacent to the US cantonment area. The trailers were connected to the area electricity, water and sewer systems. Two of the trailers were used for crew quarters and one for Operations. The fourth slightly smaller trailer was designated for Physiological Support equipment and quarters for our detachment Flight Surgeon. Compared to what we had when I left, this was almost like a country club.
Flight line security was provided by the Vietnamese military prior to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964. We armed our own personnel to provide security for our flight line operations. There had been a report that a Viet Cong infiltrator was on base for the express purpose of sabotaging the U-2s. As a result of that information, security procedures at Bien Hoa changed drastically.
A squadron of B-57s from Clark was deployed to Bien Hoa. The squadron required night weather formation penetration. One plane crashed in a mid-air collision. The next morning an F-100 squadron was deployed from Clark. The weather still required an instrument approach. After one of the F-100’s broke out on final approach, he was shot down. The large, concrete ramp was now pretty well congested. I wrote to my wife that I felt the safest while flying; the approach to landing was the hairiest part of the flight.
With these recent events, SAC determined a three aircraft operation was in order. Bob Powell arrived a few days later with the third aircraft. During his debriefing, he said he felt sorry for one guy who transmitted several times that he was under missile attack. Later, Ed Perdue returned from his mission into the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North Vietnam. From Ed's debriefing, he heard about Bob's comments. Ed yelled, “You SOBs. That was me!” Ed had started a turn when missiles came at him, and he saw two “telephone poles” go by and detonate above him.
After my return to Davis Monthan in late October 1964, the Command Post asked me if I remembered the combination to the safe in Operations at Bien Hoa. When I was at Bien Hoa, Operations was manned 24 hours a day and there had been no need to ever lock the safe.
Consequently, the combination was never passed on. A while later the base came under mortar attack. Everybody hit the trenches and the safe was locked for what was probably the first time. The Navigator was the only casualty during that attack; a piece of shrapnel caught him in the derriere.
Michael (Mike) Horochivsky
Lompoc, California
Wife: Machi
I was a member of th
e 4080th SRW from May 1963 to November 1964 and was assigned to the Wing Laboratory Branch. In June 1963 I was assigned to the 2nd RTS Photo Lab at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana in support of precision processing of the photos taken over Cuba. In February 1964 I was assigned as Chief, Wing Laboratory Branch and went TDY to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, Vietnam to support Operation “Dragon Lady.”
As a symbol of our high esprit de corps at the Photographic Processing Center (PPC), all PPC members had obtained modified “Aussie slouch hats,” also known as “Gung Ho hats,” embellished with a red, white and blue ribbon, the 4080th SRW emblem patch, the Vietnam and Tan Son Nhut patches. After about two weeks in country, the PPC Commander, Lt. Col. Jacobs, called a meeting. I recalled his face was quite pale as he informed us that the Viet Cong had placed bounties on all members of the 4080th SRW, $10,000 for officers and $5,000 for enlisted personnel, dead or alive. That was a sobering thought, so we put away our “Gung Ho Hats” and anything that referred to our unit. Apparently, our mission had made quite an impact on Viet Cong operations.
The US Navy provided military buses as transportation for all military in the Saigon area. The buses had meshed steel bars over the windows as protection from periodic shelling from the Viet Cong. The photographic personnel from the PPC were allowed to sleep in air-conditioned hotels in Saigon. It was necessary because of their long working hours and primarily to always be alert in their precision photo processing activities. It rained almost every day while I was there; when it was not raining, it was very hot and humid. The buses would pick up our personnel either at their hotel or at specific locations within Saigon. After work, buses returned our personnel to their hotels.
Michael (Mike) Horochivsky.
We had a long bridge to cross over a river whenever traveling between Saigon and Tan Son Nhut AB. Vietnamese National police dressed in white uniforms guarded the entrance of the bridge at each end, 24 hours a day. The GIs labeled these police as “White Mice” because they “always happened to be missing” if something was about to happen there. This would be primarily during the dark hours when most incidents occurred. There was a common expression at that time: “Vietnamese in the day time, Viet Cong at night.” Several times at night the “White Mice” were missing; when the bus crossed the bridge, everybody was sweating, and it was not due to the weather.
About a week after my arrival at the PPC, I noticed 42 AR-15 rifles in one of the closets. It appeared as if nobody took care of them. The firing mechanisms in some of them were frozen. I asked the commander why these weapons were in the closet. He said they were for our protection. After informing the commander of the condition of the rifles, I was assigned to clean and maintain them. It took about two weeks for our lab personnel to clean the rifles in their “spare time.” I then asked the base Security Police where the firing range was located and they told me on the northeast perimeter of the base. My immediate response was, “Wait a minute. Isn't that the same location where we hear the “boom boom” sounds of Viet Cong mortars firing every evening?” The reply from the Security Police was, “Yes, we secure it during the day and the Viet Cong operate there at night!” I went back to the PPC Commander and informed him that we would not fire the AR-15s at the firing range after all.
Occasionally, the Viet Cong used powerful plastic explosive bombs to destroy buildings in Saigon. I remember two such incidents. The first one occurred in May 1964 before I arrived at the PPC. The PPC operated out of the same building as the permanent party Reconnaissance Technical Laboratory. In fact, some photographic equipment was shared between both units. An American captain, a photo interpreter, was assigned to the permanent party laboratory. He worked along with a Vietnamese major who was an intelligence officer. All during the captain's one-year tour, the Vietnamese major offered to show the captain some of Saigon. The American captain was skeptical about going into Saigon at all, especially at night. Finally, a couple weeks before his scheduled return to the States, the major talked the captain into going into Saigon. Their destination was a small nightclub. That night the Viet Cong blew up the nightclub with a plastic explosive bomb. Four people were killed immediately and another 16 were wounded. The American captain was evacuated to the Philippines for surgery to remove a piece of shrapnel in his wrist. The Vietnamese major lost one of his legs and died a couple of days later.
Gung Ho hat briefly worn by Michael Horochivsky in Vietnam.
The second incident involved the plastic explosive bombing of the third-story cafeteria in a seven-story hotel that housed American military and civilian personnel. Our PPC Commander, Lt. Col. Jacobs, had just finished eating lunch there and had exited the building when the entire third story was completely demolished by a plastic explosive bomb. It was about 1:00 p.m. with a light rain settling on the area. I was a couple of blocks away at a bus stop, waiting to catch the Navy bus to go to Tan Son Nhut. I heard a loud explosion somewhere off base. Lt. Col. Jacobs arrived at the bus stop and we sat together on the ride to the base. I noticed that Colonel Jacobs was extremely pale and shaking, and I asked him if he was sick. He then told me about the explosion and that he had just two weeks remaining before rotation to the States. His quarters were at Tan Son Nhut and he said he would never again go into Saigon. He was one very nervous individual during his last two weeks at the PPC.
Shortly before Lt. Col. Jacobs’ departure, Lt. Col. Daniel R. Orlitzki arrived from the States to assume command of the PPC. I knew him when we were assigned to the 8th RTS at Westover AFB from 1959 to 1961. Because of our previous acquaintance, I was selected to meet him with a staff car upon his arrival at Base Operations. After he briefly met with Colonel Jacobs at the PPC, he decided to go to a hotel in Saigon. I urged that he consider remaining on base. There had been angry, political, mob demonstrations in Saigon for the past three days. All American personnel working at Tan Son Nhut were advised to stay on base until these demonstrations were over. Despite the warnings, Colonel Orlitzki insisted on going into Saigon. Both of us sat in the rear seat of the staff car and I placed an AR-15 rifle on the floor. The weather was hot and muggy and the car had no air conditioning so we opened the windows. After we crossed the bridge into Saigon, we were immediately surrounded by an angry mob. We quickly rolled up the windows and started to perspire profusely. I mentioned to all in the car not to look anyone in the eye, so we kind of looked down and occasionally peeked out the windows. I felt that it was likely the mob would break the windows and attack us. They shouted and shook our car. Four hours later, we finally arrived at Colonel Orlitzki's hotel, a trip that would normally take 30 minutes. I returned to the base by another route, but it still took three more hours. Lt. Col. Orlitzki came to work the next day with all his luggage; he had decided to stay on base until the demonstrations ceased five days later.
For anyone who has ever been in Southeast Asia or near the equator, the taste of “swamp” water is a unique experience. We were fortunate at the PPC. We had to manufacture distilled, pure water at the lab for precision photo processing. Soon the word was out and many people on base learned about our water. They would come at specified times with gallon containers and we would provide them with “the best water in Vietnam.” I filled a gallon jug with this water every day and froze it at the lab. Then I took it back to my quarters and drank it as it thawed out. Every morning I drank two glasses of water mixed with orange Tang. After two months, I swore off Tang forever.
During my entire tour of duty at Tan Son Nhut, I only went into Saigon three times. The good hotels built by the French also served outstanding French cuisine. The one meal I remember was a filet mignon dinner. It started with a large shrimp cocktail followed by a filet mignon about five inches in diameter, three inches thick surrounded by bacon covered with a tasty mushroom sauce. The steak was served on a hot, sizzling metal plate embedded in a wooden plate with French fries, enough to serve four people and a fresh vegetable salad with French dressing. The dinner was accompanied with a large bottle of “Ba-Mi-Ba” beer (Vietna
mese for 33). What did that delicious feast cost? It was a mere 95 cents!
I purposely did not include any stories about work at the photo lab. However, I would be remiss if I did not mention that all the photographic personnel did an outstanding job. On average, they worked 12 hours per day. There were days, however, when the team worked non-stop for 24 to 40 hours. It was a pleasure to work with such dedicated men.
Charles W. Kern
San Antonio, Texas
Operation Black Box
Background
Following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the Western Allies continued to regard each other with suspicion and distrust. The Berlin Blockade (June 1948 to May 1949) was the most significant international crisis that led the old enemies to a new dimension, the Cold War. Beginning in 1948 SAC B-52s were on “Alert” and/or flying “around the clock” missions with nuclear weapons aboard, their potential targets deep inside the Soviet homeland. There was well-founded concern about the survivability of a major portion of the SAC strike force when inevitably confronted by the formidable Soviet Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) defense.
Enter the U-2
The “13” came into U-2 operations practically unannounced and unknown, at least to us drivers, but that was not unusual. We had a very basic briefing on its purpose, and how it was supposed to perform. It didn't take a genius to make it work; the equipment performed as programmed without the U-2 driver's interference. However, a major issue was the lack of printed Tech Data available for drivers and maintainers that led to significant future problems. But I'll explain that a little later.
Remembering the Dragon Lady: The U-2 Spy Plane: Memoirs of the Men Who Made the Legend Page 41