It was in this amazing state of comfort that I looked down at the ground as I climbed through about 5,000 feet and realised that I was seeing pathways with the clarity needed for over-border recce. I should have known this before but, being a typical creature of habit, I had stuck to the level I first thought was right. From that day onward I never flew recce in Mozambican territory below 5,000 feet.
At about 8,000 feet radio contact was established with the Army relay station on the high Mavuradona mountain inside Rhodesia. I told the operator that I had sustained damage but expected to make it back to Centenary safely. I could see my left main tyre and knew it was fine but I was prepared for difficulties if the nose or right tyres had been punctured. Fortunately there was no problem on landing and I taxiied into dispersals to find Peter Cooke and a couple of TF soldiers waiting for me with a stretcher. I recall FAF 3 being almost deserted because Mount Darwin and Mtoko had become the operational focal points.
I had set off on this flight from Bindura where I received a briefing from an SB officer who wanted more details on Chifombo. My reason for recovering into Centenary was that I knew there were spare beds there. But I cannot say why Peter Cooke was also there because he had left FAF 3 when operational activity moved east with Centenary passing into the care of a VR Camp Commandant. He may have been helping out as a (retread) helicopter pilot because I do not recall seeing another pilot for the only helicopter parked next to my Trojan. Anyway there were certainly no 4 Squadron personnel or aircraft around.
Initially I declined to lie on the stretcher but the sharp fragments in my legs made walking so painful that I was forced to accept the lift to an Army medical tent. Having the bits and pieces removed without any anaesthetic by a very young TF medic was an unpleasant experience made easier by slugging neat whisky. I was very sore, stiff and covered in bloody dressings when Flamo Flemming, and I think Jungle Forrester, came to me in the medical tent with a request. “Boss PB, please come with us to your Trojan. We want you to explain something to us.” With the foreign bodies removed and being somewhat anaesthetised by whisky I was able to limp along with them.
Using long ‘spear grass’ that grew along the airfield fence line, these two technicians had lined up all the bullet entry and exit holes. There were 123 strikes of which four were from heavy-calibre rounds that had failed to explode (guns too close to target), yet not one had struck the fuel tanks or any other vital part. This in itself was a miracle but Flamo wanted me to explain why I was not dead considering one bullet’s path appeared to have gone through my left flank.
One length of spear grass ran from the port side of rear cabin through the backrest of my seat and into the instrument panel. Not bothering to prove to myself that the bullet line was correct I foolishly choked up and simply pointed heavenward. When I regained composure I was able to tell of my terror over Chifombo and how God’s powerful presence had overwhelmed me.
This incident persuaded me to turn back to Christianity. I had abandoned the Anglicans at age twenty, swearing never to return to a church that laid emphasis on the pomp and ceremony I had experienced as an altar server. Now, some eighteen years later, I decided to find a church that practised biblical Christianity. This led Beryl and me to the Methodists in Waterfalls, simply because Beryl preferred we go to the pastor she had watched on TV. He was Reverend Gary Strong who, in his youth, had been a rough and tough ‘Main Street Cowboy’ biker.
New offensive trials
OUR ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOUTH African Air Force strengthened over time and much of the increased helicopter effort in 1974 had come from the SAAF in the form of machines and aircrews. This was as much for SAAF’s benefit to gain ‘on the job’ experience as it was for Rhodesia. It was for this reason too that Captain Kapp was sent to fly recce with me to assess the value of sending other pilots at a future date. Captain Kapp must have turned in a good report because SAAF sent four young pilots for recce training in 1975.
Whilst I was instructing Captain Kapp, Chris Weinmann and Brian Murdoch continued to find CT camps inside the country and had initiated air and ground operations on them; but not once were terrorists in residence, all camps having been freshly vacated. The CTs had obviously become wise to the fact that the Trojans they saw flying in their area of operations were the same ones that brought trouble to their camps. This forced us to rethink tactics.
I decided to try flying offensive low-level battle formations with four armed Provosts to see if we could catch CT groups in the open. By setting propeller speed to 2200 rpm, the Provost was very quiet and sufficient boost could be employed to ensure adequate flying speed for the undulating terrain in northeast Rhodesia. Flying this configuration, it was possible to come to within less than 500 metres of people on the ground before they heard the aircraft.
Our flights were flown along random routes since we had no way of knowing where terrorists might be. Numerous bases discovered during recce were over-flown too, yet none of these flights produced any result. On one particular sortie I picked up a man on the horizon carrying what appeared to be a weapon over his shoulder. He was so close that it was too late to select guns and the man was not yet aware of my presence, so I manoeuvred to kill him with the left undercarriage. At the last moment he heard me, and as he turned, I realised that his ‘weapon’ was a simple badza (hoe). Only he and his laundry woman knew what a fright he received as I passed inches above him.
Beginning of Black Month
BACK IN MOZAMBIQUE AGAIN, I picked up two new bases and returned to New Sarum to give briefings for two jet-strikes. It was decided to use a Vampire in which Hugh Slatter and I would mark one base at 1100B for the usual four Hunters and two Canberras. After that strike, I was to fly a Trojan from New Sarum directly to the second base for a routine FAC controlled strike at 1500B.
This time Hugh let me handle the Vampire until the attack dive was established and then took control to fire four 60-pound rockets. I had no orientation problems this time and Hugh placed the rockets exactly where they were needed. The rest of the aircraft struck as planned.
Following a short debrief back at New Sarum, I took off in my Trojan and headed for the SAS Tac HQ at Macombe then continued on for thirty kilometres northward to commence the southward orbits that would place me over the target. This base lay twelve kilometres north of the Zambezi River. I had just located a brand-new base in hills to the north of the target we were about to attack when the Hunters checked in. I put this base aside for the moment and continued towards the assigned target.
A small, typical and easy-to-see FRELIMO-cum-ZANLA staging base. The markings on the photograph are by JSPIS. The vehicle track on the left proved FRELIMO’s presence but was unusual for bases far from primary roads.
This particular attack marked the beginning of what became known to Air Force as ‘Black Month’. Flight Lieutenant Don Donaldson constructed this Canberra Air Strike Report:
PLANNING. This sortie was planned as an FAC directed Hunter/ Canberra air strike on a terrorist base in Mozambique (TT 856799). Marking was carried out by Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer (A4) in Trojan using white smoke SNEB. The main strike component to be four Hunters (Red Section) leading two Canberras (Green Section).
BRIEFING. Main target briefing was given by Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer at New Sarum at 0800 on Thursday 4th April. OC 1 Sqn and both Canberra crews attended the briefing. Photography (OP JUNCTION) supplied by JSPIS. A combined attack pattern using SOPs was agreed between RED and GREEN Sections.
TACTICS. RED to operate out of Thornhill using 18lb RP and 30mm front gun. GREEN to operate from New Sarum using 96 x 28lb FRAGMENTATION. Sections to meet at IP Delta (UT 115619). Bombing height 1200 ft AGL. Control on Channel 3. After mark the Hunters to put in RP attacks on central area, the Canberras following with minimum time delay on single run releasing full weapon load. Hunters to re-attack after Canberras clear.
SORTIE. GREEN Section airborne at 1420 aiming for IP 1452. Contact made with IAK and IZP on route. Red and GREEN joine
d as planned at the IP and RED leader made contact with marker aircraft A4 who began positioning for his attack. The combined formation with Canberras on the starboard of the Hunters left IP at 1456. A4 marked on time and called “on target”. I positioned Green Section for a final attack heading of 240 deg. M turning left as the Hunters pulled up into Perch position. GREEN 2 was briefed to be about 1000 yds behind me. The bomb run was normal and the target identified by white marker smoke and Hunter RP strikes. Bombs were seen to leave and the strike detonations heard clearly. I continued straight ahead as planned. A4 then called to say that GREEN 2 had exploded over the target. This was confirmed by RED LEADER. No parachutes were seen and it was obvious that both crewmen had died in the initial explosion which was reported to have been a large fireball. I searched the area after the Hunters had completed their re-attack. Several areas of burning wreckage were visible. YELLOW section then began trooping into the area and I returned to base after establishing that there were no survivors. REMARKS. The SOP HUNTERS/CANBERRAS worked well and with a minimum of fuss. Briefing was adequate but although we had the benefit of a very full description of the target by A4, I am certain we could not have identified the target without the very good marking we had.
(Signed) Flight Lieutenant I.H. Donaldson
It will be helpful to clarify a few abbreviations in the sequence Don used them:
OP JUNCTION was the codename for the photographic coverage of Mozambique to upgrade poor-quality Portuguese mapping.
JSPIS—Joint Services Photographic Interpretation Services.
SOP—Standard Operating Procedures.
1AK and 1ZP as written, ONE ALPHA KILO and ONE
ZULU PAPA as spoken, were the callsigns of JOC Hurricane at Bindura and FAF 3 at Centenary.
YELLOW section was the callsign of helicopters based at the SAS Tac HQ, Macombe.
GREEN 2—Canberra flown by Air Sub-Lieutenant Keith Goddard with Air Sub-Lieutenant Bill Airey as navigator.
RED Leader was Rob Gaunt, leading Hunters flown by Don Northcroft, Danny Svoboda and Paddy Bate.
The 1 Squadron’s (unsigned) report, probably by Rob himself, followed by Wing Commander Tol Janeke’s remarks as OC Flying Wing Thornhill, are typically low-key.
1. The sortie to the IP was SOP. At IP ‘Delta’, Green Section was located and after join up, Red and Green Sections left the IP for the target area on a heading 313 deg M. The FAC aircraft Alpha 4, was sighted and target marking and identification was carried out.
2. The first aircraft on target were four Hunters firing 18-pound 3-inch RP’s, the second aircraft on target were two Canberras dropping frag bombs.
3. On the downwind leg of Red Section’s next attack, Red leader observed a large ball of fire falling towards the target area and was informed by Alpha 4 that it was the number two Canberra that had exploded in mid air. The scattered wreckage of the aircraft landed 500 yards to the north of the target.
4. The third and fourth attacks were carried out by four Hunters with 30mm. After the last attack Red Section joined up and on climbing away, Red lead gave an in-flight report to One Alpha Kilo giving details of the attack and the Canberra. Red Section recovered to Thornhill and the remaining Canberra to Salisbury.
(Unsigned)
Comments by OCFW
This strike was well co-ordinated with No 5 Squadron and the FAC aircraft. The only incident that marred an otherwise good strike was the fatal Canberra accident.
Weather at Thornhill on recovery was poor with low cloud and intermittent drizzle. It was apparent on speaking to the crews after the sortie that the loss of the Canberra had had a marked effect on them. It is to the credit of the junior pilots on this flight that the recovery in bad weather was well handled.
(Signed) Wing Commander F.D. Janeke
My perspective of this airstrike was quite different considering I watched each aircraft as it attacked. Rob Gaunt’s rockets were exploding on target before my marker rockets were down. As usual I tensed up until I saw the Hunter pass under me. Once the fourth Hunter passed through target I looked up to watch Don Donaldson’s bombs appear out of the bomb bay at the very moment I expected to see them. The bombs ran the full 950-metre length of the target before I saw a number of men running in many directions within the base. I looked up for the second Canberra, hoping its bombs would reach target quickly.
Keith Goddard was too far behind and still turning onto his attack line. With my own motion this gave the impression that the Canberra was skidding sideways against the beautiful backdrop of bluish purple hills. When on line, the Canberra made a couple of sharp corrections in response to the bomb-aimer’s instructions. At the very moment I expected to see the bombs falling, there they were but, as they reached about one-fuselage depth below the aircraft, the graceful Canberra disappeared in an orange fireball of enormous dimension. I knew immediately that a bomb had detonated prematurely setting off the full bomb load. Moments later the loud bang and pressure wave came to me through the open window of my Trojan.
Rob Gaunt asked, “What the hell was that?” I told him Green 2 had exploded. Rob then asked if it had been Strela to which I answered, “I saw no trail. I think it was a premature detonation setting off the whole bloody frag load.”
In a fraction of a second the fireball had increased in size and changed to a mixture of deep-red flame billowing out of dense black smoke with a tongue of orange flame spewing out of its centre and curving downwards. This was the flaming forward section of the fuselage that tumbled slowly leaving a trail of white smoke and unburnt fuel along its long path to ground. Both engines passed the fuselage throwing up showers of soil and red dust as they impacted. By then the fireball had given way to dense black tumbling smoke from which sections of wings, tail and other wreckage left many trails of light grey and white smoke as they descended at varying velocities. Like falling leaves the wings and large bits of wreckage wafted down slowly.
By the time the last piece of wreckage reached ground the smoke ball had become brownish grey which reduced in density as the wind took it westwards past numerous columns of smoke rising from the sparsely-treed ground, some 500 metres to the north of the target.
Rob Gaunt had not missed a beat and ran the four Hunters through the target a second time as if nothing had happened. I was only vaguely aware of these strikes low on my left side because my attention was fixed on the awful drama I have described. When the Hunters cleared I switched over to the SAS radio frequency and moved over to the crash site where I noticed Don Donaldson’s Canberra orbiting above me.
The SAS on the ground at Macombe, just fifteen kilometres away, had heard the explosion clearly. Four helicopters were heading for the target, at last to check out air strike effectiveness. However they witnessed the disaster and headed directly for the Canberra’s nose section. In moments confirmation was given that both crewmen were dead and that their bodies were intact. Having heard this, I returned to the airstrike frequency and gave Don Donaldson the bad news.
Flight Lieutenant Al Bruce in the meanwhile was airborne out of Macombe and met me over the crash site preparatory to an attack on the small base I had located just before the jet strike. We made our strikes and were well clear of target when the SAS troops at the Canberra crash site reported hearing a large explosion from the position we had just struck.
I landed at Macombe to collect the bodies of the Canberra crew and flew them back to New Sarum. On arrival there, well after dark, I was feeling very depressed by events and for having to carry the bodies of two fine young men, whose deaths I had witnessed.
In spite of the fact that I was extremely tired and had not had anything to eat or drink all day, members of the Board of Inquiry into the Canberra incident insisted on taking my evidence right away. This was because they planned to fly to the crash site first thing next morning. By the time my statement had been recorded and answers given to many questions, I was too clapped-out to fly back to Centenary and stayed over at New Sarum.
O
peration Marble
NEXT MORNING I WAS ABOUT to return to the operational area when called to the secrephone (telephone that scrambles and unscrambles voice conversation). Group Captain Dicky Bradshaw instructed me to return to Thornhill, as I was required to proceed on a top-secret mission next day, 6 April. His signal to Thornhill would fill me in on the details.
In his Flying Wing HQ office at Thornhill Wing Commander Tol Janeke handed me two signals to read whilst he and Rob Gaunt chatted. The first was an Operational Order for Operation Marble. It required a small team of recce pilots to position at the Portuguese Brigade HQ at Estima Air Base close to the hydroelectric construction site of Cabora Bassa.
The task was to locate FRELIMO targets for a Portuguese assault force. Rob Gaunt was to be the Ops Commander of a temporary FAF at Estima Air Base with all necessary equipment and communications. I was to lead a team of four recce pilots to provide targets for offensive operations by Portuguese heli-borne troops and helicopter gunships.
The second signal advised that presidential confirmation had been received for me to receive an award that made me a Member of the Legion of Merit (Operational). The congratulations I received from Tol and others went straight over my head because I was already too preoccupied with my fear of the forthcoming recce flights. These would be over areas in which I knew FRELIMO forces possessed many Strela missiles.
Winds of Destruction Page 53