The Mount Darwin Firforce deployed and a Z-Car pilot, Lieutenant Francis, was wounded before he had a chance to land the RLI stick he had on board. In a very calm manner he advised the K-Car pilot, Roger Watt, that he had been shot and was putting down south of the terrorists’ location. Only when he was on the ground, and under CT fire, did he let Roger know that his knee was shattered. His technician, Sergeant Knouwds, lifted him out of the helicopter into cover whilst the RLI stick moved out into all-round defence and directed the K-Car onto the spot where the CT fire was coming from. The K-Car cannon then suppressed CT fire, resulting in the safe recovery of the Z-Car and the capture of one wounded CT.
Then on 23 December a South African Police callsign met with tragedy after its OC received a written invitation to meet one of ZANLA’s senior commanders, Herbert Shungu, to discuss surrender terms. Seeing opportunity to shake Rhodesia and South Africa and wishing to shatter the ceasefire, Shungu selected a hiding place on the south bank of the Mazoe River not far from an SAP camp that was also sited south of the river. His message to the SAP commander stated that he was ready to discuss surrender terms as set out in the leaflets. His selection of SAP was deliberate.
On a bridge spanning a remote section of the Mazoe River, the SAP stopped their Land Rover on the south side when they saw a handful of apparently unarmed ‘friendly terrorists’ waving and approaching them from the northern end of the high-level concrete bridge. Totally off guard, four unarmed South African policemen debussed and strode forward to meet the CTs in the middle of the bridge. They had not taken many paces towards the men they expected to meet in peace when machine-guns opened up from the hidden force behind them.
The four white policemen died but one black soldier survived. He was an N’debele member of RAR who had been allocated to the SAP as an interpreter. He did not trust the Shona and had held back slightly, walking against the railing of the bridge. Though wounded in the initial burst of fire, he managed to dive into the water far below the road deck. A long wait in the crocodile-infested water worried him because of his bleeding, but his instinctive actions had saved his life. The terrorists had hurried away from the murder scene without waiting to ensure that everyone was dead. When the survivor eventually got back to his base, he told the story of what had happened.
The sight of their slaughtered companions and the theft of arms, ammunition and grenades from the empty Land Rover angered the SAP and sent ripples of resentment throughout South Africa. So much for the Vorster’s ceasefire that had been forced on Rhodesia! So much too for the instruction to leave CTs alone! For us the ceasefire was over. Nevertheless everything went quiet again.
Firelighters
WHENEVER I VISITED CSIR in Pretoria, I called in on engineers Dr John de Villiers and Vernon Joynt because they were great men and always had something new and interesting to show me. In 1974 they introduced me to small delayed-action flame generators. Each unit came in the form of a 100mm-square sealed plastic packet containing potassium permanganate powder. To activate the powder, a small quantity of glycol, deliberately dyed red, was injected by hypodermic syringe into the packet. The liquid migrated rapidly through the white powder turning it pink. For about forty seconds nothing changed until the packet swelled rapidly, then burst into flame and burned fiercely for about eight seconds.
I asked Vernon if 1,000 of these packets and an appropriate quantity of dyed glycol could be prepared and sent to me in Salisbury. He agreed and a large cardboard box duly arrived at Air Movements addressed to me. My interest in these little flame generators was to establish if it was possible to burn large tracts of Mozambican grass and bushveld in the hope of destroying minor crops, thatching grass and the overhead cover upon which FRELIMO and the CTs depended.
One night during the 1975 dry season I flew a ten-kilometre radius route around the Mozambican side of Mukumbura to initiate a burn-line that was expected to run inwards to Mukumbura and outwards as far as the fire would go.
The rear door of my Cessna 185 had been removed and two technicians sat facing each other behind me with the box of plastic bags between them. As fast as they could, they injected fluid into the bags and tossed them out into the black. By the time we completed our circular run, all 1,000 packets had made their long drop to ground and had set off the line of fires that clearly marked our passage. Initially it looked as if our objective would be realised, but when I flew over the area the next day, long fingers of burnt grass stretched outward through countryside that was 90% unscathed.
Although this did not work for us in savannah country, it is interesting to note that Canadian fire-fighting helicopters use a similar method to initiate back-burning lines when combating large forest fires. For this, the powder is encased in ping-pong balls that are automatically injected with glycol as they pass rapidly through a very fancy automatic dispenser.
Quiet times
MY AIR STAFF POST AS Ops 1 suited me nicely and it was wonderful to go home every evening and have weekends off. The workload was low with very little associated stress at a time when operations in the field were virtually at a standstill. However, we had no doubt that the war would resume and we used the break to prepare for this.
Ian Smith had been given a Beech Baron twin-engined, propeller-driven executive aircraft, I think by a lady in America who greatly admired our Prime Minister’s stand against communism. The PM passed the aircraft to the Air Force for its own use providing it was always made available to him to fly on regular visits to his farm ‘Gwenora’ near Selukwe.
Having been a fighter pilot himself, Ian Smith always flew his aircraft and favoured Flight Lieutenants Bob d’Hotmann or Ivan Holshausen to fly with him. On two occasions I flew passenger in the back of the aircraft sitting next to the PM’s friendly wife who talked a great deal. Janet never once entered into a non-political discussion and asked many searching questions to test my opinions on Rhodesia’s political affairs. I do not believe she found me wanting.
Ian Smith at the controls.
In addition to Ian Smith’s Baron, the squadron acquired four Islander light-transport aircraft that came into the Air Force inventory in an unexpected way. First one, then another, then two more Islanders arrived unannounced at Salisbury Airport carrying Portuguese families evicted from Mozambique in FRELIMO’s erroneous drive to rid the country of whites. The owners of these aircraft, like all those being evicted from their homes and businesses, had lost all they possessed, so they brought their machines secretly to Rhodesia to sell for money to start new lives.
The Islander was ideal for light communication work and came at a good price. A fair amount of hard work was needed to bring them up to Air Force standards and to regularise equipment and fittings before entry into regular service. Later more Islanders were added to the fleet.
Islander.
What the Air Force really needed at the time was a replacement aircraft for 4 Squadron’s ageing Provosts and the underpowered Trojans. I was tasked to make an assessment of light civilian aircraft that, if modified for weapons delivery, would meet our needs. We really wanted an aircraft specifically designed for our type of war but, though there were plenty on the international market, none could be sold to Rhodesia because of the UN mandatory sanctions. This gave us no option but to identify a standard ‘civilian’ aircraft that we could buy, preferably from France, for operational upgrade. The French, more interested in commerce than in UN restrictions, had been good to us. In spite of sanctions, France had helped to increase our helicopter fleet from eight Alouettes to more than double that number, even with losses taken into account. How this was done and how we acquired 20mm cannons and other matérial was not for me to know.
The most suitable of the fixed-wing aircraft available inside the country appeared to me to be the American-designed twin, in-line, push-pull Cessna 337 with retractable undercarriage. Of importance was the fact that this aircraft was built under licence in France. The owner of the only available 337 and Wing Commander Bill Smith handle
d the machine whilst I looked on from the back seat. I was satisfied that the aircraft possessed the power, lift capacity and speed we needed and, like the Cessna 185, it was well suited to recce.
Orders were immediately placed with the Reims factory in France, then manufacturing Cessna 337s under licence from USA. My greatest pleasure in the initial exercise came from an instruction to decide what aids and comforts must be incorporated into these brand-new machines. Having done this, my list was strongly criticised by some Air HQ officers, mainly technical, who could not justify the added expense of aids and comforts we had been doing without for so long. Not one of the critics had any idea of the difficulties, dangers and discomforts our pilots endured in the field, so it was pleasing that the Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Mick McLaren, ruled in favour of operational pilots.
Although most CTs had exited the country, a few groups remained, some leaderless. Many of these were LTTs who had grouped together, fearing to venture into Mozambique because, for them, it was unknown ground. Measuring the activity level from Air Strike Reports, only four occurred in January (the same number as occurred on the day before the ceasefire) and only one produced any result. This was an over-border Fireforce action initiated by a Selous Scouts recce team, which accounted for seven CTs killed. From the beginning of February to 24 July only seventeen ASRs were recorded, most inside Mozambique with minimal returns.
On 14 June 1975 I was appointed OC FAF 5 at Mtoko because the regular OC, John Digby, was going on overseas leave. In the absence of any offensive action, my time was spent improving the campsite and finishing off building the pub John Digby had started. Gordon Wright, who was OC FAF 1 at the time, assisted by finding a good N’debele thatcher. This man did a great job of thatching the pub roof despite his continuous complaints about the ‘poor quality of Shona grass’.
The ‘Chopper Arms’ was a great success for deployed Air Force personnel and became a happy watering hole for Army, Selous Scouts, Police and surrounding farmers. It was officially opened on three separate occasions.
When I had run out of things to do around the camp, I became agitated by the lack of action and spent much of my spare time on air recce. I submitted this report to Air HQ:
1. I was OC FAF 5 during the period 14 June to 26 July 1975. Prior to this period I had visited Mtoko and learnt that all flying, other than casevac, relay changes and courier flights, had been in response to terrorist activities. No intelligence had been forthcoming to allow aggressive planning to be made and only one terrorist had been killed in the Mtoko area in a chance encounter during 1975. Selous Scouts were not providing any up-to-date intelligence at that stage.
2. In response to my request, A/D Ops and SO Ops agreed that I could use 4 Squadron’s Cessnas for reconnaissance at FAF 5, as the squadron was not using these aircraft. The object of wanting to recce was essentially to try to provide intelligence that would allow pre-emptive rather than reactive planning against any of the few terrorist gangs remaining in the Hurricane area.
3. It was also agreed that 4 Squadron would provide selected pilots for recce training whilst I was at FAF 5. These were to be Sqn Ldr White, Flt Lt Bennie and Air Sub-Lt Boulter. Sqn Ldr White did not deploy to FAF 5 and Air Sub-Lt Boulter was killed (in a flying accident at Thornhill) just before he was due to undertake recce training. Flt Lt Bennie’s training was cut short after the first flight due to Operation Newton. However, he managed to fit in two days of training some days later. Flt Lt Bennie also arranged for Flt Lt Graaf and Air Lt Benecke to undertake short periods of recce training but all three pilots require further instruction.
4. I was current on Trojans and was given a refamil on Cessna by Flt Lt Bennie. During the first four weeks of recce in the Mtoko area I located in excess of 200 ter bases and feeding places. However, the dry conditions made ageing of these points very difficult. Therefore it was only in the last two weeks that I was providing up-to-date information when bases found had not been plotted previously. One of these was considered suitable for air strike in conjunction with the Fireforce, as it was miles from any Army callsign. OC Air Det Hurricane confirmed by signal that I could mark the target with smoke rockets as my weapons categories had lapsed. The Fireforce action was routine but unsuccessful and the base, though in current use, had been vacated by LTTs just prior to FF arrival. They seem to have developed a taste for orgies with the local girls. ASR 04/75 refers.
5. There can be no doubt that 4 Squadron will be in need of good recce pilots when ZANLA returns and cannot afford to await the event. However, I must request that serious thought be given to keeping the few pilots who show any interest and ability in recce on 4 Squadron. Not one of the useful recce pilots I taught 1972- 4 remains on 4 Squadron and I am disheartened by the negative attitudes of the pilots I have instructed.
Clever intelligence work by the Selous Scouts Intelligence Officer deduced that ZANLA’s remaining leaders would be meeting in the vicinity of a particular contact man’s village during the latter part of June. A force of regular troops cordoned off a large area around this village in northern Kandeya Tribal Trust Land. Unfortunately there were too few soldiers to box in the terrorists who gathered, as predicted. Out of about thirty terrorists only six were killed and one was captured. So far as I recall, this was one of the reasons many survivors chose to leave for Mozambique. Those who remained had their minds changed six weeks later.
Upon his return from leave, John Digby resumed command of FAF 5 and I remained there with him to continue teaching recce to 4 Squadron pilots and PRAW crews. It was a difficult and extremely boring task because there were very few CTs around, particularly after a flurry of successful actions involving Cocky Benecke. This will be covered shortly.
Brown Jobs versus Blue Jobs
AS IN THE YEARS BEFORE and in those to come, the Annual Army versus Air Force rugby match was a great occasion. Being a much larger force, the Army should have beaten the Air Force every time but, for the most part, the Air Force thrashed the Army. The rivalry that built up was good-spirited and the commanders of both forces always sat together to rib each other throughout each match.
In 1975 the big contest was held in Salisbury on the main rugby field in the BSAP sports grounds. With five minutes to go before kick-off, four Hunters flew over in perfect formation. As they did so, automatic gunfire, simulating anti-aircraft action, opened up from behind tall gum trees to the left of the main stands. The noise frightened a number of crows from the trees and, as they flew past the grandstands, the Air Force pointed at them shouting, “Army flypast!—Army flypast!” Next moment an Army wrecker vehicle appeared in the grounds carrying the twisted remains of ‘the destroyed aircraft’. But the outcome of the rugby contest was less of a joke for the Brown Jobs because the Blue Jobs beat them—again!
Doctored radios and ammunition
FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS Provosts and Trojans had been taking off at sunrise in search of VHF signals from portable radios that had been passed on to some CT groups. Doctored radios, known a ‘road-runners’, came into existence because CTs were known to be listening in to Rhodesian broadcasts and Mozambican stations, particularly during early morning.
Special Branch produced a number of road-runners which, when switched on, emitted a VHF signal on one of our least-used air channels. Trials showed that the low-powered signal could be detected from as far as ten kilometres and, using Becker Homers, it was possible for a pilot to identify the position of each doctored radio with reasonable accuracy. The radios were given to individuals who knew how to get them into CT hands or were prominently displayed on outlying store shelves, madly overpriced, knowing the locals could not afford them and that CTs would steal them.
This system of detecting CTs might have worked from the beginning had each VHF transmitter been programmed to remain on for a few minutes after a radio was switched off. As it happened, pilots homed in on signals that cut off before they reached the radios’ locations. The sound of any aircraft obviously caused CTs to sw
itch off the radios to allow them to listen and watch for the high-flying planes. This weakness was rectified later.
Doctoring of CT ammunition produced positive results. When standard Russian and Chinese equipment was located in CT arms caches, the standard ammunition was substituted with ‘doctored’ ammunition. Cordite propellant in standard rifle rounds burns at a relatively slow rate to drive a bullet down a rifled barrel at progressively increasing speed without risk to the weapon handler. When, however, cordite was substituted with any one of a number of plastic explosives in a ‘doctored’ round, instant over-pressure in the combustion chamber shattered it into a shower of lethal shrapnel that killed the weapon-handler and others near him.
In the case of ‘doctored’ mortar bombs, they exploded immediately on launch, and hand-grenade delay fuses were exchanged for instantaneous ones that made them function immediately the firing handle was released. Though these foul devices produced excellent results the practice of doctoring ammunition ceased when every item of captured equipment was needed for SAS and Selous Scouts operations.
Cocky Benecke
ALONG WITH MANY OTHER 4 SQUADRON pilots, Cocky Benecke had flown recce with me before. Like most, he had shown little interest and became thoroughly bored within an hour. On 11 August I flew with him on further training at the request of his OC, Cyril White.
There had been no complaints when he had flown with me in July but, just before we got airborne on this particular day, Cocky said, “ Sir, I am not cut out for recce. This is a job for old men with patience, like you.” I was not yet forty and took exception to being referred to as an old man by this cocky young pilot. He received a bit of a blasting for the ‘old men’ bit, but much more for using age as the reason for his disinterest in recce.
Winds of Destruction Page 59