Fifty kilometres before reaching the Victoria Falls we could already pick out the vertical pillar of spray from the falls illuminated by the setting sun. Once over the Falls, M José was amazed by the sight of this great wonder and took many photographs as we made one wide orbit. I have no idea how well the photographs turned out because the sun had just set below the horizon.
Even before we reached the Falls I heard the seventh and eighth aircraft broadcast that they were leaving Victoria Falls on course for Salisbury. Only then did I realise that both of them had passed me in the cloud, because of my flap selection error.
The Rhodesian weather forecast received before take-off warned of the ITCZ storm-line we could see running eastwards from Wankie. I had no desire to fly the direct route to Salisbury in such rough weather. Instead I chose to fly to Sinoia in clear skies, and then turn southwards for the shortest possible run through bad weather to Salisbury.
Eastern half (Zambian side) of Victoria Falls with part of the Main Falls (left) and famous road–rail bridge bottom left.
M José and I flew just south of the Zambezi Gorge to the headwaters of Kariba Lake, which was barely visible before it became totally dark. Flying conditions were smooth with absolutely nothing to see below us. M José pointed to the sky and my schoolboy French recognised sufficient words to understand that he had never seen so many stars in his life. The conditions were perfect and I had to agree that the brilliance and multiplicity of the stars was awesome.
Whilst we were enjoying our smooth ride and admiring God’s heavenly firmament, we listened to transmissions between the other pilots who were having a very rough ride down the ITCZ storm-line that we could see continuously illuminated by rippling lightning flashes way off to our right. Why the other pilots had not taken our ‘soft option’ route I cannot say, but I know that flying Trojans had taught me a thing or two about avoiding bad weather whenever possible.
All the other aircraft had landed by the time we eventually entered the bad weather about ten minutes’ flying time from Salisbury. We passed over the city in cloud and rain that was illuminated all around us as we descended towards the airport. Salisbury Airport controllers had no idea of the aircraft types arriving that night because one of our Air Force ATC officers, I think it was John Digby, sat with them to assist with what he had said was ‘the recovery of 4 Squadron aircraft returning from an operation in the Wankie area’. Approach Control expressed some concern because no one had heard from my aircraft until the last of the others had landed.
My French companion had been completely lost without the ILS-VOR assistance he relied on wherever he flew in Europe. On the other hand, I had never used such aids before. Under his guidance I learned how to interpret the instrumentation that brought us in for a bad weather landing which was so smooth it surprised me. After such a good let-down and smooth landing, M José made it clear that he was sure I had lied to him about never having used ILS-VOR or flown a Cessna 337 to before.
When we taxiied into dispersals at Air Movements Section, there was not a single Cessna 337 to be seen. M José and I climbed out of our machine into soaking rain and ran for the Air Movements Section. As I entered the building I looked back and saw our aircraft being towed away to a top-security hangar where the other aircraft already stood dripping water onto the concrete floor.
Inside Air Movements Section, Air Marshal McLaren and his senior staff officers were celebrating with the other crews. Eight Cessna 337s were home. Ten to go!
For the second ferry, Chuck Dent’s special HF aerial was erected at New Sarum to provide communications for Wing Commander Keith Corrans and Squadron Leader Mike Gedye.
Mike Gedye, Eddie Wilkinson, Len Pink and Keith Corrans, photographed at Ruacana.
This is Keith’s account of the second ferry:
The second ferry comprised 10 aircraft (2 sections of 5 aircraft led by Mike Gedye and me, the only Rhodesian pilots on this route). To minimise the risk of compromise Mike and I had been “kept back” as even the most simple en-route immigration official might have wondered, from our passports (false as they were) why we had been in West Africa, heading south, only 10 days or so before we were in their area heading the same way. The second, but shorter, route down through central Africa was, as a result, largely rejected to ensure additional distance between East and West Coast ‘tom toms’. In retrospect the ploy worked and we routed across North Africa and down the East coast departing Europe on 27 January 1976. The first leg to Las Palmas (3 hrs 40) was a ‘swan’ although we left departure point a little hurriedly ahead of an oncoming snowstorm. Leg 2 (6 hrs 30) was east across the Med and the foot of Italy (intercepted by a section of Italian Air Force F104s) and on to Ikaklion in Crete after an unplanned 1-hour dogleg to avoid a weapons range on the west coast of the island.
The next legs were to be the longest and potentially most dodgy. We departed Ikaklion before dawn on leg 3, penetrated Egyptian airspace west of Alexandria, routed up the Nile to Aswan and were provisionally flight planned to land at Port Sudan, assessed to be potentially the highest-risk location. Fortuitously, by cruise climbing to Flight Levels around 120 we were able to pick up a favourable tail-wind and, by “rationing” 6 1/2 hrs oxygen to cover an extended flight time, managed to stretch the leg for eventual landing at Djibouti in Afas Isas (formerly Somalia in the late 1950s). It would seem that the in-flight destination change (plus perhaps the number of aircraft in the 2 section ‘gaggle) generated “agitated” RT. transmissions from Ethiopian Military ATC (all totally and studiously ignored) who seemed to be attempting to drum up aircraft to intercept us. As the leg had been intentionally planned for Saturday, and it was late afternoon, they did not really have time to get their act together and we departed the area hastily, descending to low level on the Red Sea Coast somewhere near Massawa Island. After a 10 hrs leg we eventually arrived at Djibouti after dark in the “Mother” of all thunderstorms, and had a most magnificent meal at a local Shebeen in the town square (probably camel steaks) with copious quantities of Stella Artois and French wine, before kipping in primitive conditions—on bare mattresses—in a local downtown Djibouti/Somali “hotel”.
Leg 4 was to Mombassa, the next high-risk point. After a flight of 6 hrs 30 east and across the Somali Desert to the coast (Indian Ocean) and then south, at a comfortable altitude down that attractive coastline, we landed (in old stomping grounds) and were surprised by most efficient and courteous arrival procedures. Overnight accommodation was at a superb coastal/tourist hotel; we did however have to wait until almost midnight for the resident German/Scandinavian tourists to vacate the rooms and catch their flights north before we could take occupation! And then we found that the water supplies to the hotel had been on the blink for about 2 weeks and there was no hot or cold running water and the toilet had to be flushed by bucket using water stored in the bath! The breakfast next morning on the verandah did however partially offset the hassle and the lack of sleep.
The next leg started in superb weather; the scenery down the coast was fantastic. The colour of the water on the coral at Pemba and Zanzibar Islands has to be seen to be believed; shades of Bazaruto and Paradise Island, Mozambique. And then one of the French crews, who had consistently failed to maintain any semblance of formation discipline—dropping out of formation to low-fly down the “mile-long” beaches, declared an emergency/instrument panel fire and made a precautionary landing at a disused airfield a little north of Mtwara on the south-eastern border of Tanzania. Sods Law! The ant bears had got there before them and the landing path was pitted with holes! Exit one Cessna prop, nose wheel and wingtip! After 2 or 3 circuits of the scene it was obvious that there was little or nothing “we” could do to assist and the 2 French crew had to be left to their own devices (with ferry tanks there was no room in any aircraft to rescue them).
Although the Frenchmen were stranded they were unhurt, so Keith wished them well and promised to send help as soon as possible. The welcoming party in Salisbury was somewhat damp
ened. Even with seventeen Cessnas safely home and tucked away out of sight, there was deep concern for the one lying damaged in hostile territory. Fortunately, Keith Corrans knew its precise location and had the necessary details of the damage sustained.
Local tribesmen took the two Frenchmen into their care until FRELIMO officials arrived from northern Mozambique and, fortunately, no Tanzanian officials showed up. The Frenchmen did a first-class con job using language difficulties to maximum effect. This was matched by the senior French pilot in Salisbury who telephoned Maputo direct from Salisbury to ask for FRELIMO’s permission to mount a recovery operation for the ‘French-owned’ aircraft. He explained that the downed aircraft had been flying to Malagasy when it suffered engine problems. This had forced the crew to land on an airstrip on Tanzanian soil very close to Mozambique rather than risk the long over-water leg to Malagasy. FRELIMO’s authorities were assured that this was a purely civil aviation matter in which Rhodesian civil aviation authorities had agreed to give full technical assistance to the French.
FRELIMO, still new in government, took the Frenchman at his word and made no attempt to contact the Governments of Tanzania or Malagasy to verify a request emanating from ‘hostile Rhodesia’. Approval was given for the use of a Rhodesian-registered aircraft to fly Rhodesian personnel in to effect necessary repairs for a one-time flight. They agreed also that the Cessna 337 would need to be flown to Beira for fuel and then on to Salisbury for final repair work before undertaking the long flight to Malagasy.
Group Captain Charles Paxton had been earmarked to become the Commander of the Rhodesian Air Force but he opted for early retirement instead and was then flying for a civilian charter firm. His current employment and Air Force background made Charles the ideal person to conduct the recovery operation. This had to be done rapidly for fear that FRELIMO might establish the true ownership of the damaged aircraft. It meant getting to site immediately, performing the barest minimum of repair work and departing with minimum delay. In the meanwhile the French crew and FRELIMO had arranged for the holes in the runway to be filled in by the locals. The plan worked well. The rear engine was replaced, the nose wheel was jacked up and bolted into place, the front propeller was replaced and engine checks were conducted. A large box of goodies for FRELIMO and the locals ensured full co-operation without interference. Both aircraft then departed for Beira.
Since the Cessna had to fly with undercarriage down, the flight to Salisbury via Beira was a long one. Charles Paxton escorted the Frenchmen all the way for a night arrival at Salisbury. The Cessna was wheeled off to the security hangar and a third celebration marked the conclusion of the second ferry with all eighteen aircraft safe on Rhodesian soil.
With one aircraft requiring major repairs and five others awaiting camouflage paint, the Air Force defiantly rolled out twelve camouflaged Cessna 337s into the open for the whole world to see. It felt and looked great, and the new war-machine became known as the LYNX!
All that remained to be done was to modify the aircraft for their armed role. Work on this started the day after the first flight arrived. Mainplanes had been especially stressed during manufacture to cater for increased ‘G’ loads. Under-wing pylon mountings were installed at New Sarum to allow for the carriage of SNEB rocket pods, bombs, Frantans, flares and teargas. Within a week all 4 Squadron’s pilots had been converted onto type. Fitment of machine-guns had been considered but this was held over for the moment. It is a great credit to all participating technicians and pilots that these aircraft did a marvellous job for the Rhodesian war effort. The Lynx came at the right time and its selection had been a good one.
Charles Paxton.
The first record of a Lynx accompanying Fireforce was on 7 March 1976, though Flight Lieutenant Ed Potterton did not use weapons on that occasion. Fitment of guns came later.
Fireforces back in action
ZIPRA, HAVING BEEN DEALT A few severe blows by SAS inside Zambia in late 1974, and again during 1975, did not seem to be ready to rush into any major offensive actions simply to keep up with ZANLA. Nevertheless its existence necessitated ongoing patrolling in the west. All of ZANLA’s effort was concentrated in the east.
Following their return in January 1976, ZANLA groups moved with great caution into their original sectors Nehanda, Chaminuka and Takawira taking pains not to draw attention to themselves before they were re-established amongst the locals. By early February the game was on once more. ZANLA’s intention to launch on all three fronts had been delayed as previously mentioned, but their presence just across the mountain border near the Mozambican town of Espungabera brought the newly formed Chipinga Fireforce, led by Mike Litson, into its first action on 7 February. Two months later, penetrations in the southernmost sector meant the RSF was tied up along the entire Mozambican border.
Back in the Op Hurricane area, Wing Commander Tol Janeke had anticipated that his Fireforce might be called to action in the rough terrain of the Zambezi escarpment some thirty kilometres northwest of Mount Darwin. So on 6 February, with the concurrence of his Army counterpart, he moved the whole Fireforce to Stacey’s Farm to cut down reaction time.
To help follow the ASR below, the helicopter pilots were Flight Lieutenant Rob McGregor flying K-Car; Yellow 1, 2 and 3 were, respectively, Air Lieutenant Jo Syslo, Air SubLieutenant Venter (Op Polo) and Flight Lieutenant George Sole.
Tol Janeke (left) and Rob McGregor (right).
Air Lieutenant Norman (Bambam) Maasdorp, N4, flew the Provost. The Police Reserve Air Wing pilot, Copper 08, was Hamie Dax whom I have already identified as the most successful of the PRAW recce pilots. The abbreviation PATU stands for Police Anti-Terrorist Unit and c/s is the abbreviation for callsign.
Rob McGregor’s illustration, cut from a 1:50,000-scale map is reproduced to assist the reader in following his ASR. It reads:
On Fri. 6 FEB 76 at approximately 1030B Fire Force Mt. Darwin was tasked to position at Stacey’s Farm in support of a PATU stick c/s BX who was on tracks of approximately 10 terrorists at TS 983757 (A on map). After positioning at the farm, PRAW aircraft c/s Copper 08 got airborne to establish communications with BX and attempt to track the terrorists from the air. At the same time N4 was airborne in a Provost in order to provide armed support if required. After making contact with BX, Copper 08 was able to track the terrorists to position C where a very distinctive path was picked up and followed down the mountain to the valley floor. At the bottom a hut was seen at position B and movement was observed in the vicinity of the hut.
It was then decided to put two sticks with trackers in at position B to attempt to pick up tracks. This was done and at the same time K-Car got airborne to give cover. The trackers were unable to locate any tracks of any significance at position B. Copper 08 and N4 then talked K-Car back up the line to position C. It was noted that the tracks were very distinctive from position C to D but then tended to break up so it was decided to bring in 2 more sticks (c/s 23/25) with trackers and to drop them on tracks at D. They were to track down towards the hut where the initial sticks were left to act as stop groups. At this stage K-Car and Yellow formation returned to Stacey’s Farm and left N4 as top cover.
Tracks were followed to point E where it was decided to leapfrog c/s 25, 23A and the trackers to catch up time. This was done by Yellow 3 to point F. About fifteen minutes later at 1545B c/s 25 called contact. Fireforce immediately proceeded to the scene from Staceys. On arrival in the contact area c/s 25 reported he was being mortared and that the line of flight of the terrorists was down the river-line towards position B. He estimated he had contacted a group of 20 terrorists (8 were killed in the initial contact). K-Car then saw 3 terrorists at position H and engaged them. They ran into thick bush on the river-line where further terrorists were seen and engaged. At this time the K-Car came under heavy fire from the ground. K-Car then called on N4 in the Provost to carry out a strike into the area of the K-Car attack to attempt to flush the terrorists out. N4 carried out 2 attacks with Sneb and Frantans
and strikes were observed to be in the area of the target. (5 dead terrorists were later found in the area of K-Car and Provost air strikes.)
During this time c/s 25 had followed up and killed a further 2 terrorists in the riverbed. Very little movement could be seen from the air and K-Car instructed Yellow 1 to carry out dummy drops to the east and west of the river line to attempt to keep the terrorists in the river line and force then towards the stop groups at position B. Shortly after this c/s 23 in the stop group reported contacting one terrorist who was killed. c/s 23 also reported movement in the area of position G which appeared to be terrorists attempting to break over the ridge line. Yellow 1 was then instructed to fire into the thick bush in that area to attempt to flush out anyone who may be there. The following day it was reported that Yellow 1 came under fire but at the time he had heard nothing and the ground forces had not reported anything.
Rob McGregor’s illustration, cut from a 1:50,000-scale map.
The light was now fading fast and follow-up and mopping-up operations continued until last light with no further contact with terrorists.
Wing Commander Janeke’s report reads:
a. This is a splendid example of success resulting from first class cooperation between air and ground forces. The entire operation lasted over a period of eight hours. At no time was there any unnecessary confusion or delay. A total of 17 out of a probable 22 ters were accounted for.
b. The decision to move the Fireforce with air support to Stacey’s Farm was a wise one as it reduced reaction and ferry time to less than ten minutes.
Winds of Destruction Page 63