Some of the few CTs that came out of cover after the rainstorm can be seen lying on the ground. Less easy to see are those lying or running through the scrub on the left side of the photographs. Note the dirt thrown up between trees top left of nearest barrack block in top photo followed by early stage of detonation in lower picture. Note also the wide spread of Alpha bomblets where dirt showers appear in the bottom photos after the full detonation to the left of the upper line of barracks in the upper photo. Note: Single round white marks at left centre of photographs are filing punch holes.
The Canberras opened up into battle formation remaining low level for a while before climbing. The three SAAF aircraft pulling ahead because of their superior thrust and were soon lost from sight. Two Zambian MiG 19s that had searched the southwestern skies of Zambia for ‘enemy aircraft’, were already back on the ground and all Canberras reached base safely. One of the 1,000-pound bombs had failed to release over target but had detached itself later with quite a bump as it fell onto the closed bomb-bay door. Once on the ground the bomb-bay doors were opened gently, sufficiently to get a hand in to make the fused bomb safe. Thereafter, with the aid of acquired army and police mattresses, the bomb was allowed to fall free.
Unfortunately for us, the inclement weather had driven many CTs into buildings, giving fair protection against those Alpha bombs that did not actually come through their roofs— many did.
At my request, one of the Canberras had been fitted with a camera in its bomb bay to record its own strike. The resultant photographs revealed battle tanks, row upon row of barrack buildings and swastika-like figures of men running for cover or lying down with bomblets bouncing and bursting around them.
According to ZAPU’s briefing to the Pan African Conference in Tanzania, ZIPRA’s casualties were 174 killed and 533 seriously wounded. They mentioned fourteen civilian cooks and bottle-washers killed and three wounded, but said nothing about the SAANC and Cuban casualties or the loss of large quantities of explosives and equipment that we knew (from radio intercepts) had been inflicted.
Considering the weather situation and the size of the formation, the Canberra boys had conducted a fantastically cool-headed strike. At the time they did not recognise the degree of disruption they had caused, nor could they guess how this action would set ZIPRA’s plans back sufficiently to cost them dearly in time to come. Back on the ground, Ted Brent was heard to say, “Fear I knew not; but terror, yes.” He was commenting on his participation during downloading of the 1,000-pound hang-up. For armourer Warrant Officer Bill Brown, this was just another potentially dangerous situation requiring a cool head and technical expertise gained over many years in the RAF and in Rhodesia.
Vanduzi Circle
BACK IN MOZAMBIQUE, ZANLA HAD recovered from their late-September mauling in the Chimoio Circle and had moved closer to FRELIMO’s Chimoio town into a new site we named the ‘Vanduzi Circle’.
From captured CTs who had been at this location during the early stages of its construction, we learned that the many camps making up the entire ZANLA complex lay between two easily identified hills. Photo-reconnaissance confirmed the existence of the new base area but from photos alone it was impossible to determine key points. To find this out, the SAS was tasked to go in to gain a clearer picture. This was necessary at the time because the Fireforces were reaping such important rewards in securing the internal Vital Ground that there could be no question of withdrawing them for another joint-force operation in Mozambique. If the SAS could pinpoint worthwhile and clearly definable targets within the Vanduzi Circle, jets would have to take them on to help keep ZANLA off balance.
After an aborted first recce attempt, the SAS broke from their four-man team to test the viability of using just two lightly loaded men to move into the intensely active enemy base area. Whereas a total of six men were deployed in early March 1979, four established a secure base from which Richard Stannard and his companion, ‘Jungle’ Jordan, worked forward.
These two men succeeded in scaling the difficult feature Monte Bassa, one of the two features between which the Vanduzi Circle lay. From a lofty position they watched a great deal of ZANLA activity just below their OP. For two days they monitored all movements until they were sure they had the place they had been sent to find. Hunters, Canberras and K-Cars moved in. The jet strikes were over when the helicopters arrived and drew fire from many heavy AA positions the SAS had not seen because of the density of the bush. This proved that the base was much larger than they had thought.
When everything was quiet FRELIMO turned up, as had been expected, and for which the Hunters were busy rearming back at Thornhill. Richard and ‘Jungle’ Jordan, still unnoticed in their lofty hide, watched ZANLA’s dead and wounded being loaded onto a large truck whilst an armoured personnel carrier with FRELIMO troops prowled around.
When the Hunters returned, Richard was able to direct them onto the personnel carrier, which was taken out along with most of the FRELIMO troops surrounding it. As this happened a Strela missile was launched unsuccessfully, again at Vic Wightman who whipped around and blasted the launch point.
Having suffered losses due to the return of Hunters, FRELIMO realised there must be Rhodesians close by. Their radio messages were picked up in Rhodesia, passed to COMOPS, and relayed through SAS HQ to Richard who commenced his move-out after dark.
Unfortunately the two-man team was spotted next morning and a hot pursuit by angry ZANLA resulted in Jordan being wounded and having to call for hot extraction. Not long after this Richard Stannard was back on Monte Bassa from where he again directed jet-strikes and, again, he called Hunters back to strike ZANLA and FRELIMO whilst they were gathering casualties from the first strike.
Thanks to Richard’s successes, ZANLA was forced by FRELIMO to move away from them. The Vanduzi Circle of bases ceased to exist and it would be four months before we would find ZANLA’s new location close to our border.
Cost comparisons
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM COMOPS, Wing Commander Dag Jones, acting for General Barnard, instructed MID (Military Intelligence Department) to conduct a survey on the cost-effectiveness of internal versus external operations. By the time this lengthy study was completed much had changed. Nevertheless, it served as a rough guide for planning.
The MID assessment used the months January and February 1979 from which to draw figures and make comparisons. The task was difficult because they were trying to compare apples with oranges, except where costs were concerned. These are condensed details of Fireforce (FF) versus external operations, for what they are worth:
INTERNAL:
Fireforce Army Unit Deployments Kills Areas of Operation
Considering that January and February had been very quiet months between major external offensives, MID’s choice was hardly an ideal time frame for comparisons. Besides, there had been considerable internal movements of forces into the Vital Ground, adversely effecting Fireforce activities in which 60% of calls proved to be ‘lemons’ because bush cover was at its thickest.
In these two months only 262 CTs had been killed in Fireforce actions, according to physical body counts that is. The cost per terrorist killed translated into high expenditure in Rhodesian terms. (I do not remember the actual cost comparison but can recall that it was in the order of one tenth of the American figure for Vietnam.)
EXTERNAL:
On the other hand, according to FRELIMO radio intercepts, 103 ZANLA CTs were killed in Mozambique by jet-strikes and landmines previously laid by Special Forces. In Angola 174 ZIPRA were killed with 533 seriously wounded. Since we did not have these figures at the time, they were not included in the cost-comparison study.
Ignoring those dead and wounded CTs in Mozambique, about which we knew nothing, the cost per terrorist killed externally (according to the study) was in the order of onethird of the internal cost. Within the next ten months this would reduce to less than a quarter in spite of greatly improved internal successes.
Externa
lly things were going to hot up and prove just how seriously political restraints had increased costs and greatly expanded CT numbers.
ZIPRA plans revealed
DURING MARCH 1979, ACTING ON intelligence from their agent in Botswana, the Selous Scouts mounted an ambush on the main Grove Road linking Botswana with Zambia. This road ran close to Rhodesia’s western border where the Scouts established their ambush position. Their targets were two wellknown, high-ranking ZIPRA officers.
One was Dumiso Dabengwa (the ‘Black Russian’), second only to Nkomo and head of ZIPRA Intelligence. The other was Elliott Sibanda (the ‘Black Swine’), ZIPRA’s senior intelligence officer for the ‘Southern Front’ whose office was in Francistown, Botswana. These two men were transferring brand-new ZIPRA vehicles, purchased in South Africa, to Zambia.
When the Selous Scouts sprung its ambush, Dumiso Dabengwa escaped unharmed but Elliott Sibanda was seriously wounded and captured. Following stomach surgery that saved his life, Elliott Sibanda willingly gave the most important information we had received to date concerning ZIPRA’s future plans and dispositions.
We knew that ZIPRA indulged in a mix of conventional and irregular training and that the larger proportion of men had been preparing for conventional war. However, until Elliott opened Pandora’s box, we thought ZIPRA’s low level of activity was largely due to our external ops. Sibanda disabused us of such comforting thoughts.
Nkomo’s Russian advisors had persuaded ZIPRA to retain a limited force of active irregulars to keep Rhodesian eyes off the main intention, which was to invade Rhodesia. When the moment was right, the irregulars were to commit defined acts of sabotage in conjunction with a full-scale invasion by regular forces, supported by armour and air, in two drives via Victoria Falls in the west and Chirundu in the north.
Beira fuel refinery
WHILST SIBANDA’S INFORMATION WAS STILL being digested, the Selous Scouts were actively attempting to assassinate the elusive Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka and the SAS embarked on a daring operation to boost the MNR’s growing image by destroying the enormous fuel storage facility in Beira.
During Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland days and continuing for three months after the imposition of economic sanctions on Rhodesia, crude oil had been pumped from Beira to the Rhodesian fuel refinery at Feruka just west of Umtali. For this, Beira’s fuel storage capacity had been increased well beyond its original requirement, which was to service central Mozambique and Malawi. In consequence the target was huge.
In happier times it had taken only three hours for Rhodesian holidaymakers to motor from Umtali to the popular seaside resorts of Beira town. The Canberra that carried the SAS commander on a night reconnaissance to check the refinery’s lighting arrangements took a mere forty minutes from Salisbury. For the SAS and MNR attack group it took many days along a very circuitous route. Nevertheless they reached their target and, in a spectacular action, ignited the fuel tanks, severed the main fuel transfer line to spill crude into the docks and cut off the main electrical power-lines serving Beira town. They had completed their noisy job before FRELIMO defences woke up to what was happening.
During a running withdrawal under heavy FRELIMO gunfire, one MNR man was killed outright but was left where he lay. His body, plus many MNR leaflets and paraphernalia deliberately scattered around, convinced FRELIMO that the attack had been a purely MNR affair. The effects of this action really frightened the FRELIMO Government, which until now had been confident that the MNR was not powerful enough to target vital installations, particularly in built-up areas. In truth they were not; the SAS was responsible for the planning and its own specialists made up more than 90% of the attack force. All the same the world was awakened to the MNR’s existence and South African fire-fighters had to come to Mozambique’s aid to put out the raging inferno.
Assassination attempts on Joshua Nkomo
BACK IN RHODESIA, DETAILED INTELLIGENCE given by Elliott Sibanda made it clear that ZIPRA’s invasion plan had to be stopped in its tracks—urgently.
A host of possibilities were discussed in COMOPS HQ. The courses to be taken were broken into four categories—assassination of key men—destruction of ZIPRA’s concentrated weapons holdings—attacks on ZIPRA regular force bases and—destruction of Zambia’s communication lines. It was clear that all of these things would have to be done, but priorities had to be established.
Consideration was given to eliminating ZIPRA’s Russian advisers who were all known in detail, including their home locations. However this was discarded as the benefits to be gained would be short-lived and the consequences to Rhodesia potentially damaging. Joshua Nkomo’s early demise made much better sense as it would cause major disruption to ZAPU’s leadership and profoundly affect morale, thereby giving us more time to produce detailed dossiers on all other targets.
Even before Elliott Sibanda’s information had come to hand, Selous Scouts had attempted to assassinate Nkomo using a car bomb. But, no matter where it was positioned, Nkomo always followed another route home; so another option was adopted. This was to kill the ZIPRA leader in his home, which necessitated having a Selous Scout in Lusaka to watch for the right moment. This was no easy matter as Nkomo spent a great deal of time on overseas and local travel. Once home however, he would remain there for the night. But, since there was no certainty he would be in his high-security house the following night, action had to be taken immediately Nkomo was known to have returned home. Three times Ron Reid-Daly received the codeword sent from Lusaka via a contact man in South Africa to say Nkomo was home, and three times the assassination group launched into Zambia.
The first group went in by helicopter for a night walk-in approach to RV with the agent. But the agent failed to turn up with transport to take them to target. This was because heavy rain had washed away a vital bridge between Lusaka and the assault group.
On the second occasion, the Scouts assault team was helicoptered to a drop-off point much closer to Lusaka. However, they encountered such heavy jesse bush that they were unable to reach the agent and his Toyota Land Cruiser, this time waiting at the RV point. Instead, the assault force found itself in the middle of a Zambian Army exercise and had to make a hasty retreat for helicopter recovery.
The third attempt probably gave the Scouts their best chance of success. This was a parachute descent onto the same road the agent had been using, but very close to Lusaka. Following their para-descent, which was to be controlled from the ground by the Scouts agent, the Dakota was to mask the purpose of its presence by flying straight on to drop pamphlets onto a known ZIPRA base.
Unbeknown to the Scouts, however, their agent had been arrested by Zambian police just after he had passed the codeword that launched the assault force into the air. In consequence, with nobody at the drop-zone, the troops had no alternative but to remain aboard the Dakota for the leafletdrop and an unhappy ride home.
Though certainly not for want of trying, Selous Scouts had experienced such unbelievable bad luck in their attempts to kill Nkomo that our COMOPS planning team recommended to General Walls that he should pass the task to the SAS. The general agreed.
When he learned of this decision, Ron Reid-Daly burst into COMOPS in a rage. He took the COMOPS decision as an insult to himself and his men. He could hardly be blamed for believing that the Selous Scouts were being badly rated by COMOPS, or for worrying about the profound effect this would have on the morale of his force. So it was with some difficulty that General Walls assured Ron that his COMOPS planning staff had simply recognised that such a run of bad luck had to be broken and a fresh start made.
When Ron had calmed down, he suggested that Selous Scouts should be given one more try. He advocated flying the assault team directly to the golf course that lay just over the road from Nkomo’s home. This was an intriguing idea which, being so utterly crazy and brazen, would almost certainly have worked—but considering the Scouts’ run of bad luck, Nkomo would probably be away on his travels anyway. “No, Ron,” sai
d General Walls, “the SAS have the task—and that is final!” But the Selous Scouts’ commander would not let go.
In an endeavour to reach some sort of compromise, Ron asked the general to let the team he had sent to Zambia participate with the SAS. This was flatly refused but, recognising Ron’s deep desire to have some level of Scouts’ inclusion, General Walls decided that SAS would take one white Scout who knew Lusaka backwards, he having been the agent with the car bomb. In addition, a black Scout who could speak Zambian languages would also join the SAS team to do any talking, should this become necessary.
The SAS were already in an advanced stage of planning when General Walls ordered them to include these two Scouts. To say that the SAS officers were incensed by this instruction would be understating the case. I recall that they were as mad as hell at such high-level interference in specialist planning that already included a navigator for Lusaka. The black Scout seemed a good idea but this, it was felt, should have come to them through Brian Robinson as a ‘useful suggestion’. But then, orders are orders!
Two SAS men were dropped from an operation considered by some to be ‘an exciting opportunity’. However, the men whose names were taken off the list had no idea of this because the plan was only known to a handful of officers right up to the moment the operation was launched.
Whilst this was happening, the Canberras were tasked for a second raid on ZIPRA’s Mulungushi camp. It was supposed to be another offset bombing raid in which Schulie would be setting up the RAMS flares. As it happened, Schulie called Ron Reid-Daly at Selous Scouts HQ late in the day to say the attack should be postponed because he had only seen a few ZIPRA in camp. Air HQ received this message but, with COMOPS concurrence, decided the raid should go ahead because the moon conditions were favourable for a visual attack. Ron Reid-Daly was unable to pass this decision to Schulie who had switched off his radio for the night and had set off for an even closer inspection of the target.
Winds of Destruction Page 85