Nietzsche

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by Roy Jackson


  Nietzsche argues that the language we speak seduces people. When people use terms such as ‘mind’ or ‘soul’, it is so embedded within our language that, as Nietzsche says, we would rather break a bone in our body than break a word. Most of our language is based upon humankind’s early use of language, upon a more primitive psychology that we therefore cannot escape from because of our use of everyday language. When we use a word, we still remain attached to the common-sense view that the word actually refers to something, rather than it being the product of humankind many generations ago.

  ‘What, then, is truth? A manoeuvrable army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms – in short, a summation of human relationships which have been poetically and rhetorically heightened, transposed, and embellished, and which, after long use by a people, are considered to be solid, canonical, and binding: truths are illusions whose true nature has been forgotten.’

  ‘Of Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense’

  Our attachment to our language is so strong that we could not readily do without the fictions it describes. Nietzsche also believed that even the language of physics is a fiction, an interpretation to suit us. He talks of the concept of atoms as a useful tool to explain the nature of the universe, but that is all that they are. However, Nietzsche’s perspectivism goes much further than this, for it is not just theoretical entities such as atoms but all entities that are fictions. All bodies, lines, surfaces, concepts of cause and effect and of motion; these are all just articles of faith but do not in themselves constitute a proof.

  Nietzsche asks why it is necessary to believe in such concepts as cause and effect. He does not entirely accept the Kantian view that we have ‘human spectacles’ and that we therefore have no choice but to perceive the world in a certain way. Rather, we have learned through harsh experience that the way we perceive the world is the most suitable for survival. There may well have been many people who have seen the world in a different way but, as a consequence, have perished. The view of causality that Nietzsche presents is not very different from David Hume’s. Hume argued that we arrive at the concept of cause and effect not because causality actually exists in nature, but because, through habit, we conjoin one event with another. Therefore, causality is a product of the mind, but a necessary product nonetheless. For Nietzsche, they are conventional fictions that are useful for communication.

  There have been philosophers and scientists who have also rejected the world of common sense, but Nietzsche asserts that they then make the mistake of creating another world that they consider to be real. Despite Nietzsche’s charity towards science, he does not accept that it has brought us any closer to reality because, for Nietzsche, there is no reality to get close to. Since the time of Galileo in the seventeenth century it has been the practice of scientists to present theories that conflict with the contemporary common-sense view of the world, such as the view that the earth revolves around the sun or that humanity evolved from other species. This has resulted in often-radical transformations in our understanding of the world and led to a new common-sense view. For the scientist, these theories are usually regarded as allowing us to get closer to how the universe really is. For Nietzsche, despite their pragmatic application, they are still nonetheless a fiction. They are no more real than the previous world view.

  Nietzsche could never persuade himself to adopt the absolute idealist stance that there is no world outside the mind. This is because he believed, like Kant, that there is a world out there, but a world so different, so unwilling to be tied to our desire for an ordered and structured universe, that it is impossible to even so much as conceive of this world, let alone talk about it. Nietzsche, therefore, does not entirely escape from Kant’s clutches. As he grew older, Nietzsche speculated more about this real world. Inevitably, however, as soon as one attempts to talk about the real world we are immediately tongue-tied by the limitations of our language. Because we have no other language, we are sucked into using metaphysical terms that tie us to our world view.

  Although we may not have any other language, we can perhaps play with language. Certainly, Nietzsche’s aphoristic style, his clever play on words and his confrontational and controversial idioms, force us to question and think. Not unlike mystical traditions that employ poetry, riddle, koans and so on, in an attempt to describe the indescribable, Nietzsche is also compelled to use similar methods. This may well give his philosophy a mystical quality, but perhaps this is unavoidable.

  Spotlight

  Nietzsche is not a sceptic about knowledge, although – rather like Hume – he may be considered an ‘academic sceptic’: someone who in an academic context is sceptical about whether we can really know anything with certainty, but nonetheless on an everyday basis (outside academia) lives life on the assumption that certain things are ‘true’.

  Does Nietzsche’s perspectivism help to provide us with a clearer understanding of the Superman? Nietzsche’s Übermensch would not be deluded into believing in a reality that can be attained or comprehended, nor would he look to religion or philosophy for salvation. He would be less concerned with stating what is true than in telling what is false, yet he would also need to be tied to a common-sense perspective if he were to survive; the extreme sceptic would not be able to get out of bed in the mornings. However, this should not prevent daring experimentation in seeking a new language and philosophy. Would Nietzsche go so far as to suggest a physical change also? Is he pre-empting the advances in genetic engineering? This, one suspects, would be giving the German philosopher too much credit.

  Key ideas

  Coherence theory of truth: the view that beliefs are considered ‘true’ to the extent that they cohere with other beliefs, although there may be no absolute truths

  Correspondence theory of truth: the view that when we talk of things being ‘true’, we are referring to things that actually exist in reality; when you point to an object and say ‘it is there’, then it really is there.

  Epistemology: the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of what we can know

  Perspectivism: the view that we perceive the world according to our perspective, although this may not be as the world actually is

  Pragmatic theory of truth: the opposite of the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ – something is only ‘true’ to the extent that it is practical to believe in it

  Things to remember

  • Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. In philosophy, it is the study of what we can know, and what we mean by ‘knowledge’.

  • Nietzsche is critical of the correspondence theory of truth: that statements about things actually correspond to things in the real world.

  • Nietzsche is perhaps closer to the coherence theory of truth – that truths are ‘true’ so long as they cohere – but even this does not entirely describe Nietzsche’s perspectivism.

  • Nietzsche’s perspectivism is that we see the world from a collection of perspectives, although these do not necessarily correspond to how the world actually is.

  • Nietzsche’s nihilism is not a rejection of common sense as such, but rather a refusal to accept that common sense is ‘true’ (i.e. that it corresponds to the way the world is).

  • Nietzsche is not an anti-rationalist, but he is critical of the view that only reason can provide us with a true picture of the world.

  • For Nietzsche, we are ‘seduced’ by our language and to change our beliefs we also need to change what we mean by our words.

  • Nietzsche is not an idealist (in the philosophical meaning of the term) but he does not go so far as Kant in asserting that there are ‘noumena’.

  • Nietzsche may be a philosophical sceptic, but he also accepts that we need ‘workable fictions’ in order to survive.

  Fact-check

  1 What does the term ‘epistemology’ mean?

  a Theory of knowledge

  b Theory of art

  c Theory of life

  d Theory of love
/>   2 Which one of the following is a definition of the correspondence theory of truth?

  a A statement is ‘true’ to the extent that it coheres with other beliefs

  b A statement is ‘true’ to the extent that it refers to an actual state of affairs

  c A statement is true if someone says it is true

  d There are no true statements

  3 Which one of the following is a definition of the coherence theory of truth?

  a A statement is ‘true’ to the extent that it coheres with other beliefs

  b A statement is ‘true’ to the extent that it refers to an actual state of affairs

  c A statement is true if someone says it is true

  d There are no true statements

  4 Which one of the following best describes Nietzsche’s views?

  a Nihilist

  b Anti-rationalist

  c Perspectivist

  d Rationalist

  5 Which one of the following would not be called a philosopher?

  a David Hume

  b Ludwig Wittgenstein

  c Bertrand Russell

  d John Maynard Keynes

  6 Who said, ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world’?

  a David Hume

  b Ludwig Wittgenstein

  c Bertrand Russell

  d John Maynard Keynes

  7 Which one of the following is not a work by Nietzsche?

  a Beyond Good and Evil

  b Twilight of the Idols

  c On Truth and Perspectivism

  d ‘Of Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense’

  8 Which of the following best describes the attitude of Nietzsche’s Superman?

  a Someone so sceptical about knowledge as to be unable to function

  b Someone who would not seek for ultimate truth, but would adopt a common-sense perspective

  c Someone who would embrace God as truth

  d Someone who would look to science for all the answers

  Dig deeper

  Steven Hales and Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010)

  Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Of Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense’ (available in various editions and translations)

  Peter Vardy, What is Truth? (New South Wales: UNSW Press, 1999)

  9

  Nietzsche and religion

  In this chapter you will learn:

  • about Nietzsche’s ‘religiosity’

  • the effect his Lutheran upbringing had on his philosophy

  • about Nietzsche’s ‘religious experience’

  • why Nietzsche valued religion

  • about the importance of myth

  • about the role of religion in the state

  • about Nietzsche and Islam

  • about Nietzsche and Buddhism.

  Nietzsche has often been described as an atheist, and his declaration ‘God is dead’ would seem to support such a view. Yet an essential appeal of his philosophy is his use of religious language, metaphors and symbols; in addition, Nietzsche did not escape entirely from his Lutheran upbringing. Further, Nietzsche was specifically addressing an audience at a specific time and place (that is, the coming new century in Europe) and what Nietzsche perceived to be an important turning point for Europe: the dawn of a new age in which the old God was dead and society was confronted with increasing secularization. An understanding of Nietzsche’s ‘religiosity’ needs to be seen within the context of his lack of faith in the secular order to provide humanity with any meaningful existence.

  This chapter explores how Nietzsche’s Lutheran background influenced his views about God and religion – Islam and Buddhism as well as Christianity. It also looks at other key themes: his criticism of modernity and his idea of the philosopher-king.

  Nietzsche’s religiosity

  ‘I have a terrible fear I shall one day be pronounced holy… I do not want to be a saint, rather even a buffoon.’

  Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Am Destiny’, 1

  Some scholars of the past have acknowledged that Nietzsche has religiosity. For example, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) called him ‘that passionate seeker after God and the last German philosopher’. More recently, the British essayist Erich Heller (1911–90) said of him: ‘He is, by the very texture of his soul and mind, one of the most radically religious natures that the nineteenth century brought forth…’

  More recent writers such as Alistair Kee and Giles Fraser have argued that Nietzsche is very much a religious philosopher, as summed up in the following quotes:

  ‘Nietzsche came to describe himself as an atheist, but we should not try to understand him within that long tradition of philosophers who have joined battle with theologians over the traditional proofs for the existence of God… his position is so much more profound and complex that to describe him as an atheist, while not false, is liable to mislead.’

  Alistair Kee, Nietzsche against the Crucified (Norwich: SCM Press, 2009), p. 27

  ‘I will want to argue that Nietzsche’s atheism is not premised, either intellectually or emotionally, upon a denial of the existence of God. This is not to say I believe Nietzsche did after all believe in God. Clearly he didn’t. Nietzsche was unquestionably an atheist – my question is going to be: of what sort?’

  Giles Fraser, Redeeming Nietzsche: On the Piety of Unbelief (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 22

  Nietzsche as a ‘sort’ of atheist

  Nietzsche may not be an atheist in a traditional sense because, while not believing in God, he at the same time was not lacking in religiosity. At the very least, Nietzsche did declare himself a devotee of the Greek god Dionysus and Nietzsche’s Lutheran upbringing cannot be totally disregarded. Although Nietzsche may not be concerned with the existence or otherwise of God – and does not bother to engage in any of the standard arguments for or against the existence of God – he nonetheless deals with, in the words of the theologian Paul Tillich, what is of ‘ultimate concern’: how are we to be ‘saved’? By ‘saved’ this need not require the baggage of theological teachings related to salvation, for it is enough to conceive salvation as a concern for the future of the human race on this earth. Nietzsche’s concern is to replace what he perceived as a pathologically sick belief in a Christian God with a new life-affirming framework for salvation.

  An important reason why Nietzsche uses Christian imagery and ideas, even though ‘God is dead’, is that the death of God does not bring theology to an end, rather to a fresh beginning: the death of God is what makes salvation possible. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche remarks, ‘We deny God; in denying God we deny accountability: only by doing that do we redeem the world.’ To do this, Nietzsche reaches for Christian imagery.

  Nietzsche the Lutheran

  ‘It was only out of the soil of the German Reformation that there could grow a Nietzsche.’

  Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (Norwich: SCM Press1955), p. 71

  A number of factors contribute to Nietzsche’s religious outlook: the tight-knit Lutheran background, the influence of his father – a pastor – his piety as a child, the key places of his upbringing all being at the geographical centre of Lutheranism, and enrolment to study theology at the University of Bonn. In fact, Nietzsche saw Luther as one of his heroes up until the time he split with Wagner, and Nietzsche is deeply indebted to Lutheran Pietism, the movement that was prevalent in the time and place of Nietzsche’s upbringing. Pietism is essentially anti-rationalist, indifferent to theological speculation and concerned more with instinct – with engaging with Christ on a personal rather than an intellectual level. This emphasis upon instinct is central to Nietzsche’s philosophy, as this quote from The Anti-Christ highlights:

  ‘It is false to the point of absurdity to see in a “belief”… the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian: only Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the Cross lived, is Christian… Even today such a life is possible, for certain men
even necessary: genuine primitive Christianity will be possible at all times… Not a belief but a doing…’

  The Anti-Christ, 33

  Nietzsche is not of course against rationalism as such (see Chapter 8), but he considered it more important to trust your instincts and to be led by your passions. He wrote to his friend Peter Gast: ‘I have a taste, but it rests upon no reasons, no logic, and no imperative.’ In the case of religion, it is our ‘taste’ that decides whether we engage with it or not, rather than reason. Nietzsche’s pietism has been associated with his amor fati (see Chapter 7): to hate life is blasphemous.

  While Nietzsche has been called a nihilist, Nietzsche himself sees Christianity as nihilistic, as life denying and depraved, in which life can have meaning only by reference to some otherworldly realm. With the death of God, this nihilism is unmasked and Europe is faced with apparent hopelessness, devoid of salvation. At this point – the point which Nietzsche believed existed in Europe during his time, the post-moral period – Nietzsche sees the opportunity to address the question of whether humanity really needs redemption from the divine: cannot human life be self-affirming? Throughout Nietzsche’s philosophy there is a sense of urgency, a recognition that there existed in his time a very brief window of opportunity. He believed that the power of ressentiment, of self-hatred (a potent use of the will to power), would quickly regroup under another guise with new prophets. One reason why Nietzsche is so widely read today must be due to the recognition that these new salvations have come under such brands as communism, nationalism, capitalism and other ‘-isms’.

 

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