82 He asked Dionysius for money, and the tyrant replied, “But you said that the wise man would not be at a loss.” Taking him up, Aristippus said, “Give me some, and let us consider the question.” And when Dionysius had given him money he said, “Do you observe that I have not been at a loss?” And when Dionysius said to him:
He who traffics with a tyrant becomes his slave,
Though he comes to him a free man;
Aristippus replied,
If free to come, he is no slave.189
83 This is reported by Diocles in his work On the Lives of Philosophers; others attribute the remark to Plato. Though incensed with Aeschines, Aristippus soon said, “Shall we not reconcile and give up talking nonsense, or will you wait until someone reconciles us over the wine-cup?” To this Aeschines replied, “I’d be glad to reconcile.” “Remember, then,” said Aristippus, “that I, though older, approached you first.” And Aeschines said, “Well and rightly said, by Hera! Your venture was far better than mine; for I started a quarrel, you a friendship.” These are the remarks attributed to him.
There have been four men named Aristippus: the first was our present subject; the second the author of a book about Arcadia; the third, known as the Mother-Taught, was the grandson of the first Aristippus by his daughter; and the fourth a philosopher of the New Academy.
To the Cyrenaic philosopher are attributed a history of Libya in three books, sent to Dionysius, and a volume containing twenty-five dialogues, some written in Attic, others in Doric, including the following:
84 Artabazus
To the Shipwrecked
To the Exiles
To a Beggar
To Lais
To Prorus
To Lais, about the Mirror
Hermes
A Dream
To the Toastmaster
Philomelus
To His Friends
To Those Who Reproach Him for Acquiring Old Wine and Courtesans
To Those Who Reproach Him for Dining Extravagantly
A Letter to His Daughter Arete
To One in Training for the Olympic Games
A Question
Another Question
An Anecdote Addressed to Dionysius
Another, on the Statue
Another, on the Daughter of Dionysius
To One Who Considers Himself Dishonored
To One Who Undertakes to Offer Advice
Portrait of Aristippus in a roundel, from a 1692 edition of Diogenes Laertius published in Amsterdam.
Some say that he wrote six books of essays; others, including Sosicrates of Rhodes, that he wrote none at all.
85 According to Sotion (in his second book) and Panaetius, his writings include the following:
On Education
On Virtue
Exhortation
Artabazus
The Shipwrecked
The Exiles
Essay, six books
Anecdotes, three books
To Lais
To Prorus
To Socrates
On Fortune
He declared the goal to be the smooth motion that results in sensation.
86 Since we have written his life, let us now go through the philosophers of the Cyrenaic school that started with him, although some call themselves Hegesiacs, some Annicerians, still others Theodoreans.190 We should also go through the followers of Phaedo, whose leaders formed the Eretrian school.191 The succession runs thus: Aristippus’ disciples were his daughter Arete, Aethiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. The student of Arete was Aristippus, nicknamed the Mother-Taught; Aristippus’ student was Theodorus the Godless, later nicknamed God.192 Antipater’s student was Epitimides of Cyrene; Epitimides’ was Paraebates; and Paraebates’ were Hegesias, the “Death-Persuader,”193 and Anniceris, who ransomed Plato.194
87 Those who followed the way of life of Aristippus and were called Cyrenaics held the following views. They supposed that there were two states, pain and pleasure, the latter being a smooth motion, the former a rough one.195 Pleasure does not differ from pleasure, nor is one thing a greater source of pleasure than another. Pleasure is agreeable and pain repulsive to all living beings. But bodily pleasure, which for them is the goal, as Panaetius says in his work On the Philosophical Schools, is not the sedate pleasure that follows from the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort that Epicurus196 accepts and claims is the goal. They also hold that their goal is different from happiness. For the goal is a particular kind of pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of the particular pleasures, among which they count both past and future pleasures.
Silver-gilt attachments, fourth to third century BC, Greek. It is believed that these heads—two of horned Pan, two of helmeted Athena—served as decorative elements to an object such as a vase.
88,89,90 The particular pleasure is to be chosen for its own sake, whereas happiness is not to be chosen for its own sake, but for the sake of the particular pleasures. The proof that pleasure is the goal is that from childhood we are instinctively drawn to it, and that when we obtain it we do not seek for anything more, and we avoid nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it results from the most shameful conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Philosophical Schools. For even if the action is inappropriate, the pleasure that results from it is to be chosen for its own sake and is good. But the removal of pain, which has been discussed in Epicurus, does not seem to the Cyrenaics to be pleasure; no more than the absence of pleasure seems to be pain. For they regard both pleasure and pain as consisting in motion, whereas absence of pain or absence of pleasure is not motion, since absence of pain is like the condition of one who is asleep. They maintain that some people, whose judgment has been perverted, are capable of not choosing pleasure. Not all mental pleasures and pains result from physical pleasures and pains. For example, one rejoices in the simple prosperity of one’s country just as one does in one’s own prosperity. But they hold that pleasure is not derived from memory or the expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. For the motion of the soul is dissipated over time. They hold that pleasures do not result from merely seeing or hearing. At any rate, we listen with pleasure to those who imitate funeral dirges, but without pleasure to those who chant actual dirges. They called the absence of pleasure and the absence of pain the intermediate states. Yet they regard bodily pleasures as far superior to mental pleasures, and bodily pains as far worse than mental pains, which is why the guilty are punished with bodily pains. For they assume that pain is harder to bear, and that we find pleasure preferable. They therefore pay more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, though pleasure is to be chosen for its own sake, they hold that the things that produce certain pleasures are often painful in nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that the accumulating of pleasures that don’t produce happiness seems to them exceedingly troublesome.
91,92,93 They do not assert that every wise man lives pleasantly, and every worthless man painfully, but that this is generally the case. It is sufficient to enjoy, one by one, the pleasures that come our way. They say that practical wisdom is a good, though it is not to be chosen for its own sake, but for its consequences; that a friend is a good by reason of the benefits he affords us, just as we cherish a part of the body as long as we have the use of it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that physical training helps one to acquire virtue; that the sage will not be susceptible to envy or lust or superstition, since these feelings spring from empty opinion. But he will experience pain and fear; for these feelings are natural. Wealth also produces pleasure, though it should not be chosen for its own sake. They hold that the affections are comprehensible. (They mean the affections themselves, not their causes.) They eschewed the study of nature because of its apparent incomprehensibility, but applied themselves to logic for the sake of its usefulness. But Meleager, in the second book of his work On Opinions, and Clitomachus, in the first book of his work
On the Philosophical Schools, say that the Cyrenaics regarded both natural philosophy and logic as useless. For once a man has learned the theory of good and evil, he is able to speak well, to be free of superstition, and to escape the fear of death. Nothing is just or beautiful or ugly by nature, but only by convention and custom. The man who is eager for the good will do nothing wrong, since he will be deterred by the prospect of punishments and disrepute; and he is the wise man. They allow for progress in philosophy and in other fields. They hold that one man’s pain may exceed that of another, and that sensations are not always trustworthy.
94,95,96 The so-called Hegesiacs197 gave their attention to the same objects, namely pleasure and pain. They held that there is no such thing as gratitude, friendship, or beneficence, since we do not choose these things for their own sake but for the advantages they afford us, apart from which these things do not exist. They held that happiness is wholly impossible, since the body is infected with many sufferings, and the soul shares the body’s sufferings and is disturbed by them, and fortune disappoints many of our expectations; consequently, happiness has no actual existence. They held that both life and death may be equally desirable. They assumed that nothing is pleasant or unpleasant by nature. It is due to lack or novelty or surfeit that the same things are pleasant to some, unpleasant to others. Poverty and wealth count for nothing when it comes to pleasure, since the wealthy and the poor do not experience pleasure differently. Slavery and freedom are equally irrelevant when it comes to measuring pleasure, noble birth is as irrelevant as low birth, good reputation as irrelevant as disrepute. To the fool life is advantageous; to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will do everything with an eye to his own interests, since he regards no one else as equally deserving. For even if he appears to reap the greatest advantages from someone else, these do not compare with what he himself contributes. They also rejected sense perceptions, because they do not yield accurate knowledge. They held that one should do everything that appears reasonable and that faults should be pardoned, since no one errs willingly, but only under the constraint of some passion; and that we should not hate others, but rather teach them better. The wise man will not have as great an advantage in his choice of goods as he will in his ability to avoid evils, since he makes it his goal to live without pain or grief. This is the advantage enjoyed by those who remain indifferent with regard to the sources of pleasure.
Marble statue of a wounded Amazon, Roman copy of a Greek bronze of c. 450–425 BC.
97 The Annicerians agreed with them in all other respects, but allowed for friendship, gratitude, respect for parents, and duty on behalf of one’s country. Hence, if the wise man suffers torments, he will be no less happy, even if only a few pleasures accrue to him. The happiness of a friend is not preferable in itself, since it is imperceptible to his neighbor. Reason is not sufficient to instill self-confidence or to render us superior to the opinion of the multitude. One must form habits, taking into account the bad predispositions that have been cultivated in us over the years. One should cherish a friend not only for his usefulness (for if that fails, we would not associate with him), but for the goodwill for the sake of which we will even endure hardships. Yet though we make pleasure our goal and are vexed when deprived of it, nevertheless we willingly endure this out of affection for our friend.
The so-called Theodoreans derived their name from Theodorus, whom we wrote of earlier, and adhered to his doctrines. Theodorus utterly rejected beliefs about the gods. We came across his book On the Gods, which is not easy to despise.198 It is from this book, they say, that Epicurus borrowed most of what he said on the subject.199
98 Theodorus also studied with Anniceris and Dionysius the dialectician, as Antisthenes of Rhodes says in his Successions of Philosophers. He considered joy and grief to be ends, the former of wisdom, the latter of folly. He regarded wisdom and justice as goods, their opposites as evils, and pleasure and pain as intermediate states. He rejected friendship because it exists neither among the foolish nor among the wise. In the former case, when the need disappears, so does the friendship; as for the wise, they are so self-sufficient that they have no need of friends. He says that it is reasonable for the earnest man not to destroy himself for his country, since he would not throw away his wisdom to benefit the foolish.
99,100 He said that the world was his native land; and that theft, adultery, and sacrilege were permissible on occasion, since none of these is shameful by nature, once the conventional views about them (which exist only to constrain the foolish) are dispelled. Openly, and without any embarrassment, the wise man will engage in sexual relations with those he loves.200 This was why he advanced some of his arguments by interrogations of this kind: “Would a woman skilled in grammar be useful insofar as she is skilled in grammar?” “Yes.” “And would a boy or a young man
He seems to have been called God after the following exchange with Stilpo:201 “So are you, Theodorus, what you claim to be?” And when Theodorus nodded assent, Stilpo said, “And do you claim that you are god?”202 When Theodorus assented, Stilpo said, “Then you are god.” When Theodorus gladly admitted as much, Stilpo laughed and said, “But by this argument, poor fellow, you would acknowledge that you are a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”
101 One day, when Theodorus was sitting beside Euryclides the hierophant,203 he said, “Tell me, Euryclides, who are they who violate the Mysteries.” And when the man replied, “Those who reveal them to the uninitiated,” Theodorus said, “Then you violate them too, since you explain them to the uninitiated.”204 And yet he would hardly have escaped being brought before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phalerum had not protected him.205 Amphicrates, in his work On Illustrious Men, says that Theodorus was condemned to drink hemlock.
102,103 Residing for a time at the court of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, Theodorus was once sent by Ptolemy as an ambassador to Lysimachus.206 When he expressed himself with great frankness, Lysimachus said, “Tell me, aren’t you the Theodorus who was banished from Athens?” Theodorus replied, “You have been well informed; for when Athens could not bear me, she expelled me, just as Semele expelled Dionysus.”207 When Lysimachus replied, “Take care not to come here again,” Theodorus said, “I won’t, unless Ptolemy sends me.” When Mithras, Lysimachus’ minister, who was standing nearby, said, “It seems that you ignore not only gods, but kings as well,” Theodorus replied, “How can I ignore the gods, when I consider you their enemy?” They say that one day in Corinth, when Theodorus was walking by with a number of students, Metrocles the Cynic,208 who was washing wild chervil, said, “Hey there, sophist! You would not have needed so many students had you washed lettuces.” To which Theodorus replied, “And had you learned to associate with men, you would not have needed to occupy yourself with those lettuces.” The same remark has been attributed, as was mentioned earlier, to both Diogenes and Aristippus.209
Such was Theodorus’ character and his discourse. Finally he returned to Cyrene, lived with Magas,210 and continued to be accorded every honor. The first time he was expelled from Cyrene he is said to have made a charming remark; for he said, “You do well, men of Cyrene, to banish me from Libya to Greece.”
104 There have been twenty men named Theodorus. The first was a Samian, the son of Rhoecus. It was he who advised laying charcoal under the foundation of the temple in Ephesus; for the site was very damp, and he said th
at once the charcoal had lost its woody part, the solid part would be impermeable to moisture. The second Theodorus was a Cyrenaean geometer whose lectures Plato attended; the third our present subject; the fourth the writer of an excellent book on exercising the voice; the fifth an authority on composers of music, beginning with Terpander;211 the sixth a Stoic; the seventh a writer on the Romans; the eighth a Syracusan author on tactics; the ninth a man from Byzantium known for his political speeches, as was the tenth, whom Aristotle mentions in his epitome of orators; the eleventh was a Theban sculptor; the twelfth a painter mentioned by Polemon; the thirteenth an Athenian painter of whom Menodotus writes; the fourteenth an Ephesian painter mentioned by Theophanes in his work On Painting; the fifteenth a poet who wrote epigrams; the sixteenth a writer on poets; the seventeenth a doctor, a student of Athenaeus; the eighteenth a Stoic philosopher from Chios; the nineteenth a Milesian, also a Stoic philosopher; and the twentieth an author of tragedies.
Pedagogue and boy, third to second century BC, Greek.
Phaedo
105 Phaedo of Elis, of the Eupatridae,212 was taken prisoner when his native land was conquered, and was forced to stay in a brothel. But he would close its door and take part in conversations with Socrates, until the latter induced Alcibiades or Crito to buy his freedom. From then on he studied philosophy as a free man. Hieronymus, in his work On Suspension of Judgment, attacks Phaedo and calls him a slave. Of the dialogues attributed to him the Zopyrus and Simon are genuine; the Nicias is doubtful; the Medius is attributed by some to Aeschines, by others to Polyaenus; Antimachus, or The Elder, is also doubtful; and the cobbler’s dialogues213 are attributed by some to Aeschines.
He was succeeded by Plistanus of Elis, and in the third generation by Menedemus of Eretria and Asclepiades of Phlius, both of whom had left the school of Stilpo. Until then, it was known as the Elian school, but after Menedemus it was called the Eretrian school. We will speak later214 of Menedemus, because he too founded a school.
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers Page 13