87 This is why Zeno, in his work On Human Nature, said that the goal is to live in harmony with nature, which means to live according to virtue; for nature leads us to virtue. Likewise Cleanthes in his work On Pleasure and Posidonius and Hecaton in their works On Goals.
88 Again, to live according to virtue is equivalent to living according to the experience of natural events, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Goals. For our natures are parts of the nature of the universe. This is why the goal becomes to live according to nature, that is, according to our own nature and that of the universe, doing nothing that is customarily forbidden by the common law, which is the right reason that pervades all things, and is identical with Zeus, who governs all beings. And this very thing constitutes the virtue and smooth current of the happy life, when everything is done in light of the harmonious accord of each man’s guardian spirit with the will of him who governs the universe. Thus Diogenes explicitly states that the goal is to act rationally in the selection of that which accords with nature, while Archedemus says that the goal is to live in the performance of all one’s duties.
89 The nature according to which one should live Chrysippus takes to be both universal nature and, in particular, human nature. Cleanthes, however, holds that it is only the universal nature that should be followed, and not that of the particular.
Virtue, according to them, is a harmonious disposition, and should be chosen for its own sake, not out of fear or hope or with reference to anything external; and happiness lies in virtue, since virtue is the state of mind that makes the whole of life harmonious. But the rational being is distorted in some instances by the persuasiveness of external realities, in others by communication with his companions; for nature’s starting points are never distorted.
90,91 Virtue in a general sense is, for every object, a certain perfection, for example, that of a statue. A virtue may be nonintellectual (for example, health) or intellectual (for example, prudence). Hecaton, in the first book of his work On Virtues, says that some virtues are scientific and intellectual, namely those that have a structure of theoretical principles, for example, prudence and justice; nonintellectual are those that are conceived by extension from the former, for example, health and strength. For health accompanies and is coextensive with the intellectual virtue of temperance, just as strength results from the building of an arch. They are called nonintellectual because they do not entail the mind’s assent, but supervene on it and occur even in base men (for example, health or courage).
Perseverance, by Francesco Clemente, 1981.
A proof that virtue exists, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise On Ethics, is the fact that Socrates and Diogenes and Antisthenes made moral progress. And the existence of vice is proved by the fact that it is the opposite of virtue.
That it can be taught (virtue, I mean) is stated by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the Goal and by Cleanthes and by Posidonius in his Exhortations and by Hecaton. That it can be taught is clear from the fact that base men become good.
92 Panaetius divides virtue into two kinds, theoretical and practical. Others distinguish three kinds: logical, physical, and ethical. Posidonius posits four divisions, and Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater even more. Apollophanes,96 on the other hand, posits only one, namely wisdom.
93 Some virtues are primary, others subordinate to these. The following are primary: wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance. Species of these are magnanimity, self-control, endurance, quick-wittedness, and good counsel. They define wisdom as knowledge of things good and bad and of things neither good nor bad, and
Likewise with vices, some are primary, others subordinate to these. Thus folly, cowardice, injustice, and intemperance are primary, while lack of self-control, slow-wittedness, and ill-advisedness are subordinate to these. They hold that vices are ignorance of the things of which the virtues constitute knowledge.
94,95 Good in general is that from which something beneficial comes, and specifically, something that is either identical with or not different from benefit. Hence virtue itself and that which participates in it are said to be good in three senses; as being (1) the source of the benefit; or (2) the manner of the benefit, that is, the virtuous action; or (3) the agent of the benefit, that is, the good man who participates in virtue. A different specific definition of the good is “the natural perfection of a rational being as such.” That is what virtue is like, as are also the participants in virtue, namely virtuous actions and virtuous persons. Its by-products include joy, cheerfulness, and the like. In the same way, vices comprise either folly, cowardice, injustice, and the like; or the participants in vice, comprising vicious actions and inferior persons. Their by-products include despondency, anxiety, and the like.
96 Furthermore, some goods are goods of the soul, others are external, and still others are neither of the soul nor external. Goods of the soul include virtues and virtuous actions; external goods include having a good country and a good friend and their prosperity. The goods that are neither of the soul nor external include being good and happy in oneself. Among vices, likewise, some are of the soul, namely vices and vicious actions; others are external, namely having a foolish country and a foolish friend and their unhappiness; and still others are neither of the mind nor external, such as to be base and unhappy in oneself.
Marble torso of a female figure in motion, 100–50 BC.
97 Furthermore, some goods are final, others instrumental, and still others both final and instrumental. Thus a friend and the benefits derived from him are instrumental goods, while confidence, high spirits, liberty, delight, cheerfulness, freedom from pain, and every virtuous action are final. The virtues are goods both instrumental and final. Insofar as they cause happiness they are instrumental goods; and insofar as they fulfill it, so that they are parts of it, they are final. Similarly, some bad things are final, others instrumental, and still others both final and instrumental.
One’s enemy and the harms one suffers from him are instrumental; but consternation, abasement, slavishness, lack of enjoyment, despondency, profound grief, and every vicious action are final. The vices are both instrumental and final, since insofar as they cause unhappiness they are instrumental, but insofar as they fulfill it, and thus are parts of it, they are final.
98 Of goods of the soul some are habits, others are dispositions, and still others are neither habits nor dispositions. The virtues are dispositions, while occupations are habits, and activities neither dispositions nor habits. And in general there are mixed goods, for example, having good children and a good old age, whereas knowledge is a simple good. And some goods are permanent like the virtues, while others, like joy and the exercise of walking, are not.
99 Every good is expedient, binding, profitable, useful, serviceable, beautiful, beneficial, desirable, and just. Beneficial because it brings the sorts of things by which we are benefited when they occur; binding because it connects things together when this is needed; profitable because it repays what is spent on it, with the result that the yield from the transaction exceeds the amount expended; useful because it makes available the use of something beneficial; serviceable because it produces a praiseworthy utility; beautiful because it is proportionate to the use made of it; beneficial because by its very nature it confers a benefit; desirable because it is such that to choose it is reasonable; and just because it i
s in harmony with law and instrumental to social life.
100 They say that the perfect good is beautiful because it encompasses all the elements sought by nature, or is perfectly proportioned. There are four species of the beautiful, namely the just, the courageous, the orderly, and the knowledgeable; for it is under these forms that beautiful actions are achieved. Similarly, there are four species of the ugly, namely the unjust, the cowardly, the disorderly, and the foolish. By the beautiful is meant, in a unitary sense, that which renders its possessors praiseworthy; in another sense it implies a natural aptitude for one’s proper function; and in yet another sense the beautiful is that which adorns anything, as when we say that only the wise man is good and beautiful.
101 They say that only the beautiful is good, as Hecaton says in the third book of his work On Goods and Chrysippus in his work On the Beautiful; and that the beautiful consists of virtue and that which participates in virtue. This is equivalent to saying that every good is beautiful, and that the good is the equivalent of the beautiful, which comes to the same thing. For it is beautiful because it is good; and it is beautiful; therefore it is good.98 They think that all goods are equal and that every good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of neither slackening nor intensification.
102,103,104 They say that some existing things are goods, others bads, and still others neither of these. The virtues, namely wisdom, justice, courage, temperance, and the like, are goods, whereas their opposites, namely folly, injustice, and the like, are bads. Neither good nor bad are all things that neither benefit nor harm, such as life, health, pleasure, physical attractiveness, strength, wealth, good reputation, and good birth; their opposites include death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like, as Hecaton says in the seventh book of his work On the Goal, as do Apollodorus in his Ethics and Chrysippus. For they maintain that these former things are not goods, but are indifferents in the category of preferred things. For just as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so benefiting, not harming, is the property of good; but wealth and health do no more harm than good, and thus neither wealth nor health is a good. Furthermore, they say that is not good which can be put to both good use and bad; but wealth and health can be put to both good use and bad; therefore wealth and health are not goods. Posidonius, however, says that these things are also included among goods. But Hecaton in the ninth book of his work On Goods and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure deny that pleasure is a good. For there are also shameful pleasures; and nothing shameful is good. To benefit is to set in motion or to maintain in accordance with virtue, whereas to harm is to set in motion or maintain in accordance with vice.
105 “Indifferent” has two meanings. In one sense it signifies the things that contribute neither to happiness nor unhappiness, like wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy even without these things, though depending on how they are used they contribute to happiness or unhappiness. But in another sense “indifferent” signifies things that excite neither impulse nor aversion, as is the case with having an odd or even number of hairs on one’s head, or with extending or bending one’s finger. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above are called indifferent, since they are able to excite impulse and aversion. This is why some of the indifferent things are selected and others rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense provides no grounds for choosing or avoiding.
Of indifferent things they say that some are preferred, others rejected. The preferred have value, whereas the rejected lack value. Value they define in the first place as anything that contributes to the harmonious life—a property that characterizes every good; but secondly as some intermediate faculty or usefulness that contributes to life according to nature, which is the same as saying “the value brought by wealth or health to the life in accordance with nature”; a third sense of value is the appraiser’s value, which is determined by someone conversant with the facts, as when it is said that wheat is exchanged for barley at the rate of three measures for two.
106 Thus the preferred things are those that have value, for example, among mental qualities, natural ability, skill, moral progress, and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health, strength, good condition, soundness, physical attractiveness, and the like; among external things, wealth, fame, noble birth, and the like. Rejected things include, among mental qualities, lack of ability, lack of skill, and the like; among bodily qualities, death, disease, weakness, poor condition, maiming, ugliness, and the like; among external things, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. Those things that belong to neither class are neither preferred nor rejected.
107 Of the preferred things some are preferred for their own sake, others for the sake of something else, and still others both for their own sake and the sake of something else. Things preferred for their own sake include natural ability, moral progress, and the like. Things preferred for the sake of something else include wealth, noble birth, and the like. Things preferred both for their own sake and for the sake of something else include strength, quick sensibility, and soundness. Things are preferred for their own sake because they accord with nature; things are preferred for the sake of something else because they secure considerable utility. Likewise, conversely, with things that are rejected.
They apply the term “duty” to an action that, when done, can be defended on reasonable grounds, such as its consistency with life; and this extends to plants and animals as well. For “duties” can also be discerned with respect to plants and animals.
108 The term “duty” (kathēkon) was used first by Zeno and is derived from kata tina hēkein, that is, “incumbent on So-and-so.” It is an activity inherently appropriate to natural arrangements. For of actions prompted by impulse some are appropriate, others the reverse, and still others neither the one nor the other.
109 Actions belonging to duty are those that reason prescribes our doing, as is the case with honoring one’s parents, brothers, country, and spending time with one’s friends. Actions contrary to duty are those that reason forbids, for example, neglecting one’s parents, ignoring one’s brothers, being out of sympathy with one’s friends, disregarding one’s country, and the like. Actions neither belonging to duty, nor contrary to it, are those that reason neither prescribes our doing nor forbids, such as picking up a twig, holding a stylus or a scraper, and the like.
110 Some actions belong to duty regardless of circumstances, while others are conditioned by circumstances. Actions belonging to duty regardless of circumstances include taking care of one’s health and sense organs, and the like. Actions conditioned by circumstances include maiming oneself and sacrificing one’s property. The same distinctions apply for actions contrary to duty. Some actions always belong to duty and some not always. It always belongs to duty
The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, by Robinet Testard, c. 1510.
They say that the soul has eight parts: the five senses; the vocal part; the thinking part, which is the mind itself; and the generative part. And distortion, which arises from falsehoods, afflicts the mind. From this distortion arise many passions, which are causes of instability. Passion, according to Zeno, is the irrational and unnatural motion of the soul, or an excessive impulse.
111 The most dominant passions, as Hecaton says in the second book of his work On Passions and Zeno in his work of the same name, consist of four classes: pain, fear, desire, and pleasure. They think that the passions are judgments, as Chrysippus says in his work On Passions; for greed is a presumption that money is something beautiful, and the case is similar for drunkenness, licentiousness, and the others.
112 They say that pain is an
irrational contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heavyheartedness, annoyance, chagrin, anguish, and confusion. Pity is a pain felt for someone whose suffering is undeserved, envy a pain felt when others have good things, jealousy a pain felt when others have things one wants oneself, rivalry a pain felt when others have things one has oneself, heavyheartedness a pain that weighs us down, annoyance a pain that cramps and confines us, chagrin a lingering and intensifying pain occasioned by brooding, anguish a pain that saps our energy, and confusion an irrational, gnawing pain that prevents us from comprehending the present situation.
113 Fear is the expectation of something bad. The forms of fear include terror, shrinking, shame, shock, panic, and dread. Terror is a fear that produces fright; shame is fear of a bad reputation; shrinking is a fear of future action; shock is a fear caused by the appearance of something unusual; panic is a fear accompanied by a sudden sound; and dread is a fear of the unknown.
114 Desire is an irrational yearning; under this heading are included craving, hatred, contentiousness, anger, erotic passion, wrath, and temper. Craving is a desire that is frustrated and, as it were, separated from its object yet vainly attracted to and straining for it; hatred is a growing and persistent desire that things go badly for someone; contentiousness is a desire to get the better of someone; anger is the desire to take revenge on one who is thought to have inflicted an undeserved injury; erotic passion is a desire that does not arise in virtuous men, for it is an impulse to form a relationship on account of physical attractiveness. Wrath is a long-simmering and vengeful anger that is awaiting its opportunity, as is illustrated in these lines:99
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers Page 42