Bato the Daesidiate was still lying in bed, still recovering from the injury he had received during the failed attack on the city of Salona.
Then he was informed that a large Roman army was approaching from the north-west. Tiberius was coming. Although he was not yet fully recovered from his wound, Bato resolved to rise from his bed and face the Romans in battle.72
There are two records of the fight that occurred soon afterwards. Paterculus states that both sides fought in one single large battle and that the Romans emerged victorious. Cassius Dio, writing nearly two centuries later, states that Bato and his Dalmatian warriors fought against Messallinus in two engagements: in the first fight the rebels defeated the Romans, but later the Romans ambushed the Dalmatians, and Bato and his warriors were forced to retreat.73
Paterculus provides some details about the ensuing battle. According to his version of the events, Messallinus led his small force of 2,500 men forward and was sucked into a trap. He was immediately surrounded by a much larger rebel army. Cut off from any help, he ordered his troops to take the offensive. Despite being massively outnumbered by about eight to one, Messallinus won a great victory, forcing 20,000 rebels to flee for their lives. For this impressive victory, he was awarded with the ornaments of a triumph in lieu of an actual triumphal parade.74
The fact that the Romans were surrounded probably contributed to their ferocity. Armies that are completely cut off will fight ferociously to escape or even just to survive. A good general knows that enemy armies will fight all the harder if they are surrounded. Knowing that they will either be massacred or taken prisoner, the enemy forces will fight with great tenacity to survive. Therefore a good general will always leave a pathway of escape, no matter how small, for the enemy force. Knowing that they have an opportunity to get out, the smaller enemy force will usually abandon its position and flee rather than fight to the last man. Once the enemy side panics and routs, then the general can send out his cavalry in pursuit and hack them down while they run. It seems that Bato did not do this, and we will never know his reasons. Perhaps Bato intended to overwhelm the Romans through sheer brute force. If that was his plan, he failed.
Scoring a great victory despite being immensely outnumbered by enemy forces is nothing new in Roman history. As an example, Gaius Julius Caesar, commanding an army numbering 40,000 men, defeated a massive Gallic horde numbering 250,000 at Alesia. Still, it must be said that Caesar’s men were fighting in a well-prepared defensive position, and that his men were professional heavily-armed and heavily-armoured legionnaires fighting against a massive horde of local tribesmen, many of whom did not have body armour and were not drilled in military tactics. Marcus Messallinus did not have such tactical advantages. The rebels that his small force fought against were just as well-armed, well-armoured, well-equipped and well-trained as his own men. By the book, Bato’s rebels should have scored an easy victory but they didn’t; in fact, they were forced to retreat. How could Messallinus have possibly beaten off such odds? In my opinion, the Romans just ‘wanted it’ more. I admit that it isn’t much of an explanation, but you’d be surprised at what people are capable of when they are motivated hard enough, and there is no greater motivation than facing the prospect of death.
The Rebel Alliance
Although all of Illyricum was in uprising, the revolt was not a united one. There were in fact two simultaneous uprisings within the same region, one led by the Pannonians and one led by the Dalmatians. In order for the revolt to be a success, the two separate rebel forces would have to unite. After his embarrassing defeat by Governor Messallinus, Bato the Daesidiate decided that he should meet with Bato the Breucian and discuss the possibility of combining their forces to achieve a common goal. Although no record is given as to the location or details of this meeting, the desired objective was attained: the two uprisings were now a single united revolt aimed at destroying the Roman presence in Illyricum forever.75
This new alliance would soon be put to the test, because the Romans were assembling a massive force to crush the revolt. Tiberius had already sent Governor Marcus Messallinus forward with a small vanguard of soldiers to clear the path; Messallinus and his undersized 20th Legion had accomplished that goal. Tiberius himself was soon to follow with an absolutely massive army, but it would still take some time for his men to reach the border.76
Rome’s allies were also lending contingents of native warriors to aid the Roman forces. One of them was King Rhoemetalces of Thrace, one of Rome’s vassals. Earlier, the Thracian king had been contacted with regard to sending aid. Rhoemetalces accepted (as Rome’s vassal, he really didn’t have any choice in the matter), and marched off to battle with a large number of cavalry. The Thracians had a reputation for fine horsemanship, and their cavalry would certainly be put to good use.77
In addition to Tiberius’ army approaching from the north near the German border, a second large Roman force was about to invade Illyricum, this time by sea, although it isn’t stated from where these soldiers were coming. This force was led by the two Senatorial consuls: Aulus Severus (the governor of Moesia) and Marcus Plautius Silvanus. The army consisted of five legions (a maximum of 24,000 men on paper, although probably much less than that) and an unknown number of auxiliary cohorts.78 One of the units that was brought in from elsewhere was the 7th Legion Claudia, which had previously been posted in Galatia ever since Augustus had come to power. Now it was being sent westwards to fight in the Balkans.79
It is clear that the Roman strategy was a pincer movement. Tiberius would invade Illyricum by land, attacking from the north. The second Roman army, commanded by Severus and Silvanus, would launch an amphibious operation, presumably attacking from the south and landing their troops on the rebel coast. According to this plan, the rebels would be trapped in the middle, smashed by two large Roman armies advancing upon them from the front and the rear simultaneously. It seemed like a good plan.
However, as any veteran or student of military studies knows, something always goes wrong. The timing of the operation was more than a little off; the two Roman attacks were not synchronized to attack on the same day. The amphibious army of Severus and Silvanus landed much sooner than expected, and Tiberius’ forces did not get under way until well after the seaborne troops had already landed on the beach. However, I should state that having coordinated attacks, especially ones occurring hundreds of miles apart, was almost impossible until radios were used on the battlefield.
When word arrived that Roman troops had landed on the coast and were advancing inland, the Illyrians appear to have been caught off guard. They had been preparing to repel Tiberius’ attack from the north and they were confident that no new Roman troops would advance upon them from the west, but they were not expecting an attack across the Adriatic Sea. A group of rebels hurriedly took a stand at the nearest location that they thought would be defendable and would give them slightly better odds against the oncoming troops: a hill called Mount Alma.80
The Battle of Mount Alma
Aulus Severus and his seaborne army had already landed on Illyricum’s shores and were advancing into the interior. He sent King Rhoemetalces and his Thracian cavalry ahead of the Roman force as a vanguard, presumably to scout the area. Eventually, the Thracians made contact with the Illyrian rebels stationed atop Mount Alma and prepared for battle.
Unfortunately, you won’t find Mount Alma listed on any modern map. The name means ‘fertile/fruitful mountain’. Some historians and archaeologists say that the Mount Alma of ancient times is called Fruška Gora today, 81 and with good reason. Despite its name, Mount Alma was not a mountain, but was instead a low grassy hill without any of the fortifications common to Illyrian hilltop forts.
Considering that no ancient author or geographer describes this location in detail, how can we possibly know what Mount Alma looked like? My first reason for making my claims comes from the historic records, or rather the lack of them. Cassius Dio is our only source for this battle and he never mentio
ns Mount Alma as having any defensive fortifications whatsoever, unlike other mountains in Illyria. Many times, Greek and Roman writers explicitly testify when the Roman army was forced to lay siege to or assault an Illyrian fortified settlement, and they often describe the fortifications in detail. The lack of any description of walls, towers, stockades, trenches or indeed any defensive fortification of any sort leads me to think that Mount Alma was unfortified.
My second reason for surmising what Mount Alma looked like comes from those who were involved in the upcoming battle itself. According to Cassius Dio, the force that attacked the Illyrians atop Mount Alma was made up entirely of cavalry. You cannot use cavalry to storm a fortified defensive position. True, the horsemen could have dismounted and fought on foot, but King Rhoemetalces and his Thracians were light cavalry, who were either lightly armoured or completely unarmoured, and armed primarily with javelins. Such troops rely on mobility and quick manoeuvres, showering their enemies with missiles from a distance and using the speed of their horses to escape when the enemy attacks. If you were to take such troops off their mounts and have them fight on foot, they would, quite frankly, be sitting ducks, especially if they have to fight uphill.
In addition to being unfortified, Mount Alma wasn’t steep or rocky either. It is specifically stated that cavalry were the only attacking forces involved in this battle – no infantry at all – and they were almost certainly javelin cavalry. Cavalry cannot advance up steep rocky terrain. If the land was rocky and steep, the Thracians would have dismounted, but if they did that they would have been slaughtered. Mount Alma, therefore, could not have been one of those impressive rocky crags that Roman writers talk about with a castle perched atop its pinnacle. It was just a big grassy hill, similar to the one located on the golf course a few miles away from my house.
The site that is regarded by many as the same as Mount Alma, Fruška Gora, has many of the qualities that we are looking for. Although large parts of it are now overgrown with small trees and shrubs, these are ‘secondary growth’ plants, and I dare say that the hill would have been much more open and grassy. It isn’t unusual to see flocks of sheep along its slopes. The Latin name, ‘fruitful or fertile mountain’, hints that the hill may have been used as a sheep pasture or possibly for the production of wine in ancient times.
Mount Alma may not have been fortified, steep or rocky (which certainly would have been advantageous), but perhaps the Illyrians making their stand atop it were comforted to a slight degree by the knowledge that their enemies would have to advance uphill. When fighting in elevated terrain, like on a hill or mountain, the army stationed on the top will almost always be at an advantage, especially in pre-gunpowder warfare when fighting is mostly conducted hand-to-hand. The defending force stationed atop the hill has the ability to dig in, if it chooses. They do not need to wear themselves out by marching and as such can be well-rested, a crucial advantage in an age when fighting relied primarily upon one’s physical strength. If the defending force has archers, the increase in elevation will enable the archers to shoot at their intended targets from longer distances. By contrast, the attacking force is at a distinct disadvantage. They will be forced to advance uphill, which will make the troops tired even before they make contact with the enemy soldiers.
A parallel to the Battle of Mount Alma could be the Battle of Hastings in 1066. Here, in the opening stages of the battle, Norman cavalry needed to launch an uphill assault to attack a defensive infantry position. The hill in question was not particularly steep and it was grassy, not rocky. Yes, advancing up it would have been slightly more difficult for horses, but not that much more.
The Thracians had arrived on the scene. One would think that they would send word back to Severus to quickly bring up the rest of his army so that they could overwhelm the position through force of numbers. However, King Rhoemetalces didn’t do this. Instead, he did something that many military commanders today would find foolish and reckless: he ordered his light cavalry to sweep up the hill and attack the Illyrians alone without waiting for the rest of the army to arrive.82
What chance did this unit of Thracian cavalry have against the Illyrian defenders? What kind of soldiers were they? The Thracians were regarded by the Greeks and Romans as being thoroughly barbaric. Tacitus states that the Thracians were savage people living like wild animals up in the mountains and were completely undisciplined, and then states that they only obeyed their chiefs when they chose to do so. This shows that the Thracians practised what is known to anthropologists as ‘bottom-up’ leadership, in which the ordinary people dictated to the leader what had to be done and if the leader asked the people to do something that the people didn’t want to do, then the people would simply not follow that chief any more. They chose their war-leaders, and would flatly refuse to fight under the command of anyone of whom they personally did not approve.
Strabo and Polyaenus write of how the Thracians would break truces:
Ephorus says that the Thracians, after making a treaty with the Boeotians, attacked them by night when they, thinking that peace had been made, were encamping rather carelessly; and when the Boeotians frustrated the Thracians, at the same time making the charge that they were breaking the treaty, the Thracians asserted that they had not broken it, for the treaty said ‘by day,’ whereas they had made the attack by night; whence arose the proverb, ‘Thracian pretence’.83
The Thracians fought against the Boeotians by lake [sic] Copais, and were defeated; then they retreated to Helicon, and made a truce with the Boeotians for a certain number of days, to give time for agreeing the terms of peace. The Boeotians, who were confident because of their recent victory and the truce that followed it, celebrated a sacrifice in honour of Athene Itonia. But at night while they still were intent on the ceremony, and engaged in festivities, the Thracians armed, and attacked them; they cut many of them to pieces, and took a great number prisoners. When the Boeotians afterwards charged them with a breach of the truce, the Thracians replied that the terms of the truce expressed a certain number of days, but said nothing concerning the nights.84
The Greek military historian Polyaenus describes a battle between the Thracians and the Greeks led by Clearchus during the Persian Wars. After encamping in the mountains, the Greek leader expected that the Thracians would attack his position during the night, which shows that night attacks by the Thracians were fairly common; later on, Polyaenus writes that the Greek soldiers were always afraid of night attacks. Clearchus ordered his men not to take off their armour and posted watch sentries in shifts throughout the night. During the night, while most of the soldiers were asleep, in order to test his own men’s readiness for battle, he secretly selected a few of his men, took up position beyond the encampment and then began banging their weapons together. Polyaenus says that the Thracians used to do this in order to intimidate their enemies. Believing that these men were actually Thracians, the Greek soldiers immediately drew themselves up in battle formation. However, Clearchus did not have time to congratulate his men on how well prepared they were, because at that moment the Thracians really did attack! They had been stealthily creeping towards the Greeks’ camp, and had expected to take the Greeks completely by surprise when they were startled by the sudden noise. The Thracians were slaughtered.85
The Thracians, especially the eastern tribes, had been heavily influenced by the steppe nomads of central Asia which had settled in the lands north of the Black Sea, including the Scythians and Sarmatians. The warriors of these tribes were primarily cavalrymen, mostly armed with bows and arrows. The poet Ovid states that the warriors of the Getae tribe who lived around the frontier town of Tomis would ride their horses through the streets. All of them carried a quiver full of arrows, all of which had their heads dipped in a poisonous concoction of snake venom, human blood and human excrement. The arrowheads had a ring of small thorns around their base to shred the flesh as they entered and which would also make the arrowhead difficult to extract (likely ripping the fles
h as it did so, making it almost impossible to cleanly sew up and as such would likely not heal) and possibly even break off inside the body, causing great bleeding and eventually death.86
Thracian warriors fought both on foot and from horseback, and were equally good at both. The most common weapon used by Thracian warriors, either infantry or cavalry, was the javelin. The ancient Greeks called Thracian infantry javelineers peltasts. The name comes from the type of shield that these men used: a crescent-shaped shield made of wicker and covered with leather called a pelte. The English verb ‘to pelt’ means to hit someone or something by throwing something at him/her, which may be derived from the peltast javelin-throwers that the ancient Greeks fought against.87
The Thracians were famous for the high quality of their cavalry. Thracian horses were bred for speed. Thracians didn’t like wearing body armour, preferring to be light and mobile rather than be protected but encumbered under so much weight. The only heavy troops, those that actually wore armour, were the members of the king’s bodyguard.88Eastern Thracians, like the Getae tribe, preferred to fight as cavalry archers, much like their Scythian and Sarmatian neighbours. Ovid, residing in Tomis, had first-hand experience of dealing with these people: he saw them, he fought them and was even shot at by them, if we believe his verses.
The Great Illyrian Revolt Page 19