If Paterculus’ laudatory record of Tiberius’ actions comes across as sounding rather thick, you’re not wrong. After all, Gaius Paterculus wrote his Roman History during the reign of Emperor Tiberius. Of course he’s going to make the general-turned-Caesar look as glorious as he possibly could. Even so, we can detect a few hints of the true conduct of Tiberius during this campaign by examining Paterculus’ panegyric praise.
Paterculus specifically states that Tiberius tried to avoid a direct head-to-head clash against the full might of the rebels. Remember that the Illyrian rebel forces significantly outnumbered the Romans, and they had already proven to be more than capable of giving even large Roman armies a severe thrashing. If we take Paterculus’ account as possessing a certain degree of truth, then it’s understandable that Tiberius would be wary of becoming engaged in a single massive all-or-nothing fight against the Illyrians, lest he and all of his men should be pinned down and thoroughly massacred. Roman history already had its fair share of embarrassing defeats at the hands of so-called ‘barbarians’, and he likely didn’t want his own name to be added to the list of the empire’s hall of shame. So instead, Tiberius carefully avoided the massive bulk of the Illyrian rebel force and instead focused his attention on small enemy units, pounding each of them one by one. Thereby Tiberius and his legions managed to whittle down the Illyrian rebel force one tiny piece at a time.
However, the historian Cassius Dio, writing 200 years after Paterculus, tells the complete opposite version of the story. According to his account of these events, Tiberius actually wanted to attack the rebel army and destroy the whole lot of them in a single massive battle. Cassius Dio says that Tiberius took his large army on the offensive, but very little was actually done because the rebels always managed to somehow stay one step ahead of Tiberius. Bato the Daesidiate and his Dalmatian warriors continuously evaded the Roman advance, refusing to engage in a pitched battle, and instead engaged in a scorched-earth policy to cause as much devastation as they could and to deny the Romans supplies and food. Cassius Dio elaborates that due to the Illyrians’ knowledge of the terrain and the lightness of their equipment, they could quickly travel from place to place and as a result Tiberius was never able to catch up with them.105
So which story is the right one? I’m more inclined to believe Cassius Dio’s account for three reasons. First, Paterculus was writing his history during the time of Emperor Tiberius’ reign, which was also the time of the reign of terror conducted by Tiberius’ head of the Praetorian Guard, Lucius Aelius Sejanus. To him, criticism was the same as treason, and so it’s safe to say that Paterculus’ account of Tiberius’ actions during the war is certainly biased in an effort to prolong his own life span as much as he could by showering Tiberius with flattery. Because Cassius Dio was far removed from the politics of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, he was able to write about things that happened two centuries earlier with little fear of retaliation. Second, Cassius Dio’s account is significantly longer and more detailed than Paterculus’ account, which is very odd because as a direct participant in the war, you’d naturally think that Paterculus would write a very long rendering of the saga of the Great Illyrian Revolt. Yet this doesn’t happen: Paterculus whizzes through the bloody chaos in the western Balkans in eight chapters, which, in Roman literary works, are actually more like eight very lengthy paragraphs. By contrast, Cassius Dio devotes fourteen chapters to the war. Third, if the war was going so swimmingly for the Roman side, then why did Caesar Augustus send in Germanicus to help the war effort along? Both Paterculus and Cassius Dio say that Germanicus was called in to help fight the rebels. The only reason that I can think of for Augustus to do this is if he felt that the war’s progress was not going to his liking, and this probably means that Tiberius was not making much headway against the Illyrians, so Germanicus was sent in to speed things along. Therefore I believe that Cassius Dio’s account is the more reliable and trustworthy of the two major accounts of this war.
As suspect as Paterculus’ record of Tiberius’ actions in the war may be, I’d like to examine one of the things he says because it could have two meanings. Paterculus’ comment that Tiberius conducted his campaigns with ‘moderation and kindness’ might be a reference to Tiberius’ personability among his soldiers. According to Paterculus, Tiberius’ soldiers loved him. A notable example is when Tiberius was sent into Germania to take charge of subduing a rebellion among the tribes in the years 1-4 AD. Paterculus beams:
Words cannot express the feelings of the soldiers at their meeting, and perhaps my account will scarcely be believed – the tears which sprang to their eyes in their joy at the sight of him, their eagerness, their strange transports in saluting him, their longing to touch his hand, and their inability to restrain such cries as ‘Is it really you that we see, commander?’ ‘Have we received you safely back among us?’ ‘I served with you, general, in Armenia!’ ‘And I in Raetia!’ ‘I received my decoration from you in Vindelicia!’ ‘And I mine in Pannonia!’ ‘And I in Germany!’106
Suetonius’ account of Tiberius’ conduct in the opening stages of Rome’s revenge campaign against Arminius and the Germans following the disaster at the Battle of Teutoburg in 9 AD states very clearly that Tiberius always took care to listen to the advice and counsel of his subordinate commanders, he issued all orders in writing so that his men could easily understand them, and if anyone was uncertain about what his orders were, he gave them the freedom to come to him anytime, day or night, even waking him up from his sleep, in order to get clarification.107
Then again, ‘moderation and kindness’, especially the ‘moderation’ part, might also be a stealthily-concealed jab at Tiberius for not being aggressive enough, which is the very same thing that Cassius Dio stated in his own record of the war two centuries later. The historical record shows that as Tiberius grew older, he became more and more cautious in his military ventures. Even Caesar Augustus would grumble about the slow progress that Tiberius was making against the Illyrian rebels and felt compelled to call in Tiberius’ nephew Germanicus, the darling of the imperial family, to add a bit more oomph to the war effort.
Meanwhile, Back in Rome…
When Caesar Augustus read the reports of Tiberius’ lack of progress, he began having suspicions about his commander. The emperor believed that Tiberius should have easily overpowered the Dalmatians but had moved slowly rather than speedily, and became concerned that Tiberius wanted to retain control of the army longer than anticipated; the emperor was highly conscious of threats to his power. He therefore ordered that Tiberius’ nephew Germanicus should go to Illyricum.108
Drusus Claudius Nero Germanicus was born on 24 May 16 BC. The young boy did not know his father all that well since Drusus the Elder was almost constantly on campaign during the boy’s early childhood, but the boy was a beloved member of the imperial household and Augustus and other members of the family took every effort to make sure that the young Germanicus had a proper Roman upbringing. As he matured, he turned into a fine young man. In the year 5 AD, Germanicus married his cousin Vipsania Agrippina, the daughter of Marcus Agrippa and Augustus’ daughter Julia. Germanicus had never commanded troops in battle before, and he had never held any major political offices. As charming as Germanicus was, sending such an inexperienced youth into a war zone like that seems odd to say the least.109
Cassius Dio states that Caesar Augustus’ choice of commanders was limited at this stage. In fact, he only had two to choose from: Germanicus and his younger brother Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa Postumus, so-named because he was born after his father had died. Agrippa Postumus’ conduct left something to be desired. Cassius Dio says that he was prone to vice, he had a hot temper and often didn’t know when it was best to keep his mouth shut. Augustus had, for a time, considered him as a successor, but his poor character made Augustus change his mind. In the autumn of 6 AD, he was banished to the tiny island of Planasia, located not too far from the larger island of Elba.110 This left Germanicus as the only o
ption on the table.
Augustus recognized that even more soldiers were needed to combat the Illyrian rebels, and so he gave Germanicus his own army composed of citizens, freed-men and recently-freed slaves that had been taken from their masters specifically for the purpose of fighting in the war against the Illyrians; the masters were given a monetary compensation of the slave’s value plus the cost of their upkeep for a period of six months. This shows that Augustus didn’t expect the war to last any longer than that. He would be in for a dismaying shock. Germanicus would spend much of the remainder of 6 AD and the early part of 7 AD getting his army in shape.111
Augustus was having problems at home, too. The population of the city was full of anxiety due to the war and also due to a famine that had set in, and so Augustus tried to devise any methods he could to keep the population calm. Moreover, fighting the rebellion in the Balkans was severely depleting the empire’s treasury, and so Augustus introduced a 2 per cent sales tax on slaves in order to replenish the imperial coffers. Moreover, he decreed that no money should be spent on gladiatorial games. The Romans, for the time being, would have to give up their blood entertainment for the sake of necessity.112
The War in Winter
Tiberius returned to Segestica just as winter set in, and he ordered his subordinate commanders (Paterculus states that he himself was designated to be one of Tiberius’ subordinates, which was a very high honour) to take charge of the various Roman military camps in the country. Paterculus states that the winter of 6-7 AD was very harsh; whether this statement applies to Illyricum specifically or to Europe in general isn’t clear.113 Winter in the western Balkans is dreadfully harsh, and back in ancient times it was just as bad.
Governor Aulus Caecina Severus of Moesia had been one of the first to respond to the revolt and had quickly sent in soldiers to help suppress it. He had fought two large battles against the rebels and on both occasions was very nearly defeated. He and his men were battered and weary. Now he was compelled to return to his province of Moesia. The Dacians and Sarmatians, two large and powerful barbarian ethnic groups that dwelt in the north in what is now Romania and Ukraine, had taken advantage of the absence of Roman troops in Moesia, crossed the Danube River and were now utterly ravaging that province.114
We can get an idea of the threats posed by these two barbarian groups by looking at the writings of the poet Ovid. In the year 8 AD, he was exiled by Caesar Augustus as a punishment for an unknown offence. He was sent to the furthest fringe of Rome’s holdings in Europe, to the frontier town of Tomis (modern-day Constanţa, Romania), located on the shore of the Black Sea in eastern Moesia. Tomis was a Greek colony founded sometime in the 600s BC, and the Romans had made it their own. He would remain in Tomis for the rest of his life, but he only had nine more years to live.115
Tomis was located right on the border of barbarian territory. It was an important centre for trade, with the barbarians bringing slaves, furs and other goods in exchange for the aspects of ‘civilized’ society such as wine, olive oil and fine clothing. However, the nearest Roman military force was miles away, and the townsfolk were expected to defend their settlement themselves. Most of the population was Greek and Getae (a Thracian tribe) but mostly the latter. Ovid describes them as boldly walking in the streets carrying their weapons, including knives, bows and poisoned arrows. Many of these tribes did not farm but were pastoralists, migrating with their flocks in search of greener grass. A few authors comment that in the wintertime the Danube River freezes and that large numbers of men, horses and waggons could cross over it as if it were solid ground.116
In circumstances like this, raiding parties become a very serious threat when winter comes. Warriors who are desperate to prove their martial prowess, who are covetous of the prestigious goods that the Greeks and Romans bring and who are becoming increasingly anxious due to the shortage of food, will begin their raids and descend upon the frontier settlements like Tomis. Many tribes made their livelihood by raiding their neighbours. During the 300s AD, a Greek clergyman named Grigoris (‘Gregory’ in English) was preaching to the Sarmatians. He told them that they had to give up their lives of brigandage and plundering, but the Sarmatians were greatly disturbed by this. At length, their leader asked the Greek missionary how they could survive if they gave up robbing and plundering their neighbours.117
Ovid states that while the weather was warm, the Danube protected the people of the town because the barbarians could not cross it, but when winter came and the river began to freeze, the barbarians then descended upon them in hordes. Ovid gives chilling accounts as to how these nomadic horse warriors were perceived, how they conducted their battles and how the people of Tomis were forced to fight against them to save their lives. Even Ovid himself had to man the defences against attack.118
Usually when winter sets in the fighting stops, with both sides hunkering down in the camps and readying themselves for the next spring’s campaigning season, but the Dalmatian rebels decided to use the winter to their advantage. Assuming that the Romans would be within their winter quarters, which they were, the rebels launched a fresh offensive and invaded the province of Macedonia for a second time. Winter offensives were extremely rare in pre-modern warfare, and this one almost certainly took everyone by surprise. There was very little that the Romans could do to stop this. Aulus Severus, who could have easily marched his men south, was preoccupied fighting the Dacians and Sarmatians who were in the process of ravaging his province. Tiberius and his forces were encamped in far-off Segestica, and by the time he mustered his men and marched the many miles through the freezing cold to help the people of that province, and with his supply and communication lines always in danger of being cut, it might have already been too late to help. Rome’s Thracian allies were the only ones who were available to come to Macedonia’s aid and to meet the Dalmatians in battle. King Rhoemetalces and his brother Prince Rhascyporis commanded the army that stood against the rebels. No details are given with regard to the battle’s location or time, nor is there any information on the numbers of men that fought. All that we know is that the Thracians were victorious and the Dalmatian advance was stopped:
Later, when…Tiberius and Messallinus were tarrying in Siscia [Segestica], the Dalmatians overran the territory of their [Rome’s] allies… As for these forces, now, Rhoemetalces and his brother Rhascyporis checked them by a battle; and as for the others, they did not come to the defence of their country when it was later ravaged (in the consulship of Caecilius Metellus and Licinius Silvanus), but took refuge in the mountain fortresses, from which they made raiding expeditions whenever the chance offered.119
Paterculus wraps up his commentary of the first year of the rebellion by taking note of the practices of the Roman army’s medical corps and of Tiberius’ character. Tiberius, he says, cared deeply for the soldiers that he led, and there was not one single person among the Roman force that fell ill without having Tiberius attending to that person’s health as fervently as any other martial duty of his. Although his mind was preoccupied with many heavy responsibilities, he devoted himself entirely to the care of those who needed care, as though this was his primary duty. The Romans employed ambulances – horse-drawn waggons – to carry away the sick. He donated his personal litter to help carry away the sick, although Paterculus states that Tiberius very rarely used it since he preferred to ride his horse rather than be carried on a litter by servants. Also, his personal physicians, his personal cooking staff and even his bathing equipment were all given up to serve the greater comfort of the sick soldiers.120
By now, the Romans’ repeated assaults upon the rebels had inflicted many casualties. Moreover, the rebels’ morale was crumbling. Paterculus gloriously states that the rebels were no longer satisfied with their numbers and had little confidence in their abilities to inflict a serious blow upon the Romans, and they had no faith in themselves whatsoever if they were certain to face Tiberius! Indeed, the portion of the rebel force that had been fighting against
Tiberius since the revolt began had been so worn down by constant attacks and constant defeats that it was on the verge of collapse. The rebels in that area knew that Tiberius would attack again. Not willing to make another stand against the legions on open ground, for they were certain that they were all going to be slaughtered if they remained where they were, they retreated to Mount Claudius (now named Moslavača Gora, located near Warasdin, or Varaždin, on the Drava River121) and set up a defensive position behind fortifications.122 Cassius Dio states that from this position and other mountain strongholds like it, the rebels would launch raiding expeditions.123 To add to their misery, a famine was now under way in Illyricum. The rebel forces now faced destruction not by the hand of the legions, which could be either merciless or merciful depending on their whims, but by the constant merciless hammer of starvation.124
As the winter of 6 AD changed to the winter of 7 AD, the Illyrians were no longer boastful and defiant. Their early victories had been soured and tempered by several crushing defeats at the hands of Rome and its Thracian allies. Things were not looking good and some of them began to contemplate putting an end to the fighting now, while they might still have a chance to live.
Chapter Four
The Great Illyrian Revolt Page 21