The Great Illyrian Revolt

by Jason R Abdale

  Never Surrender: The Story of the Pannonian Partisans

  The news of the Pannonians’ surrender to Tiberius in early August must have come as a severe shock to Bato the Daesidiate. Half of the entire rebel force had laid down their arms and pledged to submit themselves to Rome, including the Pannonian commander General Pinnes, a man in whom Bato had confidence to carry out the war for as long as possible. Bato and his Dalmatians must have been in a state of panic. It must have also been a severe blow to their morale. How could they possibly win in their war against the Romans now that the Pannonians had surrendered?

  However, Cassius Dio notes that not all of the Pannonians were willing to give up as easily as General Pinnes and his men had done. Small bands of Pannonian warriors were determined to continue the war against the Romans until death, regardless of the official surrender. They carried out their own private war against the Romans for a long time afterwards.32 This sort of fighting is known as partisan or guerrilla warfare. No concrete information is given about these underground resistance groups as to their location, numbers or activities. I assume that they continued to harass the Romans for the duration of the war, which would last for two more years. Their continued involvement would explain why it would take the Roman troops two more years to push into Dalmatia. By carrying on the war, it not only served to keep the Roman legions engaged and slow down their advance into southern Illyria, but it also helped to maintain Illyrian pride. General Pinnes’ surrender earlier that year had been a devastating blow to the rebels’ morale, but these little bands fighting on doggedly against the Roman invaders helped to preserve their country’s honour.

  In order to see what sort of tactics these guerrilla bands would have used, we need to take a look at similar circumstances that have occurred at other places and times in Roman history. Notable examples include the Spartacus Revolt as well as the Roman invasions of Spain, Gaul and Germany. Sextus Frontinus claimed that the Germans excelled in ambush tactics: ‘The Germans, in accordance with their usual custom, kept emerging from woodland-pastures and unsuspected hiding-places to attack our men, and then finding a safe refuge in the depths of the forest.’33

  The preceding quote definitely describes partisan or guerrilla operations: emerging from some secret hideout to attack or harass the enemy and then quickly retreating to some place where they could conceal themselves. The Pannonian partisans, too, would have engaged in a strategy of stealth and surprise, attacking quickly and then vanishing. Using such techniques, they would whittle down the Roman presence in Illyria one by one and cut crucial supply and communication lines. Roman units would be regularly and continuously harassed by small armed bands roving through the countryside and then disappearing. Guerrilla operations thrive in wars that involve over-extended enemy forces, formidable terrain and a supportive local population, and all three of these factors were definitely in play in the rugged mountainous land of Illyria during the first years of the first century AD.34

  All guerrilla-based wars have certain similarities. First, guerrilla forces cannot sustain themselves without local help, so the local people have to support the rebel side. To do this, the guerrillas work hard to build up the loyalty of the population. Second, a small core of specifically-selected targets is attacked that are designed to both weaken the enemy as well as demonstrate to the people that the enemy forces are not as strong as they appear. These carefully-chosen targets include destroying key military installations as well as the methodical assassination of military personnel and government officials. Third and finally, the guerrillas cease their clandestine operations and engage in open field warfare against the enemy force.35

  In order to carry on their operations, guerrilla forces need to relocate away from urbanized areas and establish secret camps far removed from the prying eyes of military or government forces. Here they can find refuge, build up their strength or recuperate from losses.

  Guerrilla operations also exact a psychological toll in addition to a militaristic one. Modern militaries that have had to fight against guerrilla forces, such as the British redcoats in the Thirteen Colonies, Napoleon’s Grande Armée in Spain, the Nazis in Yugoslavia, the Americans in Vietnam and the Russians in Afghanistan, all relate that a distinct atmosphere of fear and uncertainty pervades any operations conducted in those theatres. You never know when you will be stabbed in the back, step on a land mine or have your head taken off by a sniper’s bullet.

  Would the Roman military have launched counter-insurgency operations? I doubt it. Their strategy for dealing with guerrilla fighters was simply to destroy every living thing that they saw and burn down every settlement that they came across. There was no ancient Roman version of the US Army Special Forces or the British SAS. Many times, the opposing military force will turn their aggression upon the ordinary people to dissuade them from providing any assistance to the guerrilla forces as well as provoking the rebels into abandoning their places of concealment and coming out into the open where they can be easily destroyed by the military’s superior force.

  Guerrilla forces seemed to be predisposed to suffering unusually high casualty rates. Their limited numbers, their limited strength and logistical capabilities, as well as the enemy’s drive to thoroughly destroy them usually mean that partisans suffer heavy losses, but the enemy finds it difficult or even impossible to completely destroy them. Such may have been the same for the Pannonian partisans. This would also explain why the Romans had to deploy so many troops to this region. In order to deny the partisans any territory for recruitment or refuge, every single piece of ground would have to be held. In order to do that, thousands of troops would have to be brought in to provide a sizeable amount of security. Small detachments would be easy pickings for partisan forces, as the Romans would find out in Germany.

  Aside from these small bands of fanatics, Pannonia was out of the war. All that was left was the subjugation of Dalmatia. Tiberius named one of his subordinates, General Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, as the commanding general of all Roman forces operating within Illyria, at least until the start of the next year’s campaigning season. Tiberius also designated his aide-de-camp Magius Celer Velleianus, Paterculus’ brother, as his second-in-command (Tiberius would actually have Velleianus decorated due to his conduct in the war). In autumn, the army marched proudly back to their winter quarters and awaited the coming offensive against the Dalmatians.36

  Chapter Five

  A Long Hard Slog

  The Rebels are on the Defensive in Dalmatia

  It was now the year 8 AD. Marcus Furius Camillus and Sextus Nonius Quinctilianus were made the new consuls for the Senate. Caesar Augustus stayed in the Adriatic city of Ariminum (modern-day Rimini, Italy), so that he could receive news of the revolt faster than if he stayed in Rome.1

  The campaign of 8 AD got off to a late start. Usually, the campaigning season began right after the spring thaw, but in this circumstance Rome’s forces didn’t start moving until the beginning of summer.2 One wonders why. No explanation is given within the ancient accounts as to why the Romans launched their operations so late in the year, but considering what had happened towards the end of the previous year’s campaign season, we can make some guesses.

  First, the Romans had made some substantial advances into rebel territory. They likely needed time to consolidate their positions even further before pressing onwards. Second, although the Pannonians had officially surrendered, small groups continued to wage an underground resistance campaign against the Roman occupation forces. These guerrilla bands were likely harassing Rome’s supply and communication lines in the area, as well as attacking targets of opportunity. These partisans would have hampered Rome’s war effort. Third, in order to destroy or just neutralize the guerrilla threat, Rome had to bring in large numbers of troops to act as security forces, manning every individual station so that the rebels could not locate and exploit any easy targets. It would take a staggering amount of manpower in order to make sure that every inch of the reclaim
ed zone was sufficiently defended, and it would take a lot of time to get such numbers of troops into position. This would also validate claims given in the ancient sources as to the large numbers of troops that Rome employed to suppress this rebellion.

  This delay in operations gave Bato the Daesidiate and his Illyrian rebels a few months’ head start to make all necessary preparations to resist the Roman advance. Following General Pinnes’ surrender the previous August and with the subjugation of most of the Pannonians, Bato had decided that it was no longer feasible to defend all of Illyria, especially the northern region of Pannonia where the rebel presence was too low and the Roman presence was too high. Yes, there were small guerrilla operations going on there, but he correctly deduced that it would not take the Romans long to isolate and destroy each of these rebel bands one by one. So he withdrew all surviving rebel forces under his command southwards to defend his home region of Dalmatia. Pannonia’s landscape was mostly flat, and it was easy for the Roman army to advance across it with relative ease. By contrast, Dalmatia’s terrain was much more rugged and treacherous, and much better suited to the defensive campaign that Bato was now trying to wage against the ever-advancing legions. Trudging up and down mountains and steep forest-covered river valleys was sure to wear the legions down. Every rock and every tree stump would be defended, and he would make the Romans pay dearly for every inch of ground that they took. Bato would turn Dalmatia into his own version of the Gothic Line, and would make each battle fought here like an ancient Roman version of Monte Cassino.

  A Delayed Start

  Once summer had begun, General Marcus Lepidus and his troops marched from their winter camp to aid Tiberius in the war to the south. Paterculus states that Lepidus and his army had to struggle not only with the difficult rugged terrain, but also with the constant attacks by the ferocious natives. The legions ventured into the territories of various tribes that had not yet been attacked by the Romans during the revolt. These tribes had not suffered defeats and their morale was still high, and as such they were in high spirits when it came to killing the legionnaires.3

  Regrettably, our information for the whole campaign season of 8 AD is aggravatingly slim. Only two authors, Gaius Paterculus and Cassius Dio, provide any information about the fighting during this year, and both of them relay only generalized facts about General Lepidus’ campaign against the Dalmatians. So we are forced to fill in a lot of the details ourselves.

  Before we go into the particulars of this offensive (or more accurately, the hypothetical particulars since there is hardly any information for the campaign season of 8 AD), it’s important to establish a little biographical information concerning our man of the hour so that we can get a better idea of why the campaign progressed in the way that it did. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus came from one of the oldest patrician families in Rome. He was a prominent senator, a gifted lawyer and had imperial connections: he was the brother of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the husband of Julia the Younger, Caesar Augustus’ granddaughter. In the year 6 AD, he served as a Senatorial consul.4 Therefore it was during his administration that the conflagration in the province of Illyricum erupted.

  If there ever was a paragon of the Roman ideals of virtus (manliness), dignitas (dignity) and severitas (sticking to one’s principles no matter what the consequences may be), then Marcus Aemilius Lepidus must have been regarded as such a person during his time. Paterculus described Lepidus as ‘a man who in name and in fortune approaches the Caesars, whom one admires and loves the more in proportion to his opportunities to know and understand him, and whom one regards as an ornament to the great names from whom he springs.’5 Tacitus was more simplistic in his praise, calling him noble and wise.6 Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was therefore a prime example of exempla: a role model of proper behaviour that is supposed to be copied by others.

  In keeping with this conservative principled image, General Lepidus’ conduct in this stage of the war was stereotypically Roman. He not only inflicted heavy losses on the tribes that attacked him, but also burned their houses and farms and slaughtered many of the people who lived in that region as a punishment for siding with the rebels.7

  However, impressive as these records are, there are many aspects about this campaign that the historical documents do not mention. For example, it was earlier stated that at the end of the campaign season of 7 AD, Tiberius designated Marcus Lepidus as the commanding general of all Roman forces engaged in the Illyrian uprising and named his aide Magius Celer Velleianus as his second-in-command, which I find to be a rather odd choice. This leads me to ask the following question: where was Tiberius? If he named another man as the supreme commander of all Roman forces within Illyria, that naturally implies that Tiberius himself was not in Illyria during the winter ‘recess’. My guess (and it is only a guess) is that he went south to Ariminum to keep Caesar Augustus apprised of the situation and to get a little rest and recuperation in Italy before heading back east again to beat up the rebels. For the commanding general, going back to Rome during the winter lull was a common occurrence. Indeed, Cassius Dio states that in early spring of 9 AD, Tiberius returned to Rome.8 So when the winter season of 7 AD began to set in, he was presumably on his way south to Italy and he put Lepidus in charge of things while he was gone.

  With Marcus Lepidus now in command of all Roman troops in Illyria, where would he himself have been stationed during the winter? Any number of places within north-western Illyria could be a probable answer. The sources say that when he got his men moving, Lepidus joined up with Tiberius’ forces. So if we know where Tiberius and his men were stationed, then we might be able to make a guess as to where Lepidus and his men were stationed.

  Since Lepidus was put in charge of Roman troops within the region, and since Tiberius was presumably nowhere to be found, and since there was still a resistance movement going on in Pannonia, I would say that it’s fairly reasonable that Marcus Lepidus was headquartered somewhere within Pannonia so that he could maintain command and control over all of the Roman troops operating within that region, who I imagine were busily engaged that winter in patrols hunting for the Pannonian guerrilla fighters. Because Tiberius was away, the city of Segestica seems to be the most likely place where Marcus Lepidus would establish his headquarters. It lay on the border between the regions of Pannonia and Dalmatia. From here, Lepidus could keep apprised of the efforts of the Roman occupation forces to the north, while at the same time remain close enough to the rebel forces in the south to keep an eye on them.

  Moreover, there does not seem to be an adequate number of Roman bases located within Pannonia itself to provide any workable option. Archaeology and historical records show that many of the Roman sites within northern Illyria were constructed after the Great Illyrian Revolt took place. Only a few Roman settlements were located within the region, none of which appear to have been sizeable enough to support a large military presence. There were only a small number of forts, most of them being forts for Roman auxiliaries, and nearly all of them are constructed along the Danube River frontier. This may have been just fine for guarding against attacks by the Germans and Dacians who were located on the opposite bank, but it was inadequate for guarding against any Illyrian rebels that were already in the area. The largest military base within northern Illyria, the fort at Vindebona, was almost at the furthest northern edge of Illyria, and would have been of absolutely no use whatsoever in acting as a headquarters for military operations because the action was too far to the south by this time. So, since Segestica seems to be the only reasonable option, it is likely that Marcus Lepidus was stationed there.9

  Since it says in the records that Lepidus and his troops linked up with Tiberius and his troops during the campaign, it is obvious that these groups of soldiers were separated from each other when the campaign season of 8 AD began. There were, therefore, two Roman armies marching into south-central Illyria at the same time. Since Lepidus was likely headquartered in Segestica during the winter, and since the majority o
f the troops under his command were there and to the north in Pannonia, and since Tiberius was away (presumably in Italy) during the winter lull, and since more troops were needed to be brought in for security and to provide ever-greater manpower when it came to carrying out the war, then it is therefore possible that Tiberius had been busy recruiting men in Italy and then led them into the war zone, possibly by marching along the coast. So we would have Tiberius driving in from the east, and we also have Lepidus and his men driving down from the north-east.

  This would also explain why the campaign of 8 AD got off to a late start. If Tiberius’ intention was to have a two-pronged assault into central Illyria, he needed a sufficient number of men to do it. Aulus Caecina Severus couldn’t be called in once again because his troops had already fought hard and had suffered much. Besides, he needed to defend his own province. As for the large number of Roman troops that were already within northern and western Illyria, the vast majority of those were tied down trying to keep the Pannonians in line and hunting for the partisan groups. So Tiberius would have to raise more men from somewhere, and that would take time. The pincer assault could not begin until both armies were in position. Since it would take time for Tiberius to raise a sufficient number of new troops, the offensive would have to be delayed until he had the number of men that he needed. While the Romans waited, Bato the Daesidiate used the time to further strengthen his positions.

  Marcus Lepidus Ravages the Balkans

  In the summer of 8 AD, after delaying military operations for months, Marcus Lepidus and his troops finally got under way. What exact route would Lepidus and his men have taken? It would seem natural for us to suppose that Lepidus’ march lay along the route of the famed Roman roads. Many people have acclaimed these roads as engineering marvels, but contrary to what is often said or alluded to, these were not ancient versions of highways. Roman roads were not that wide. A typical Roman via or ‘way’ was only eight to ten feet wide, sufficiently wide for two waggons to travel in opposite directions without either one of them having to pull over so that the other could pass by.10 Very few paved Roman roads were in Illyria during this early stage. There appears to have been one situated along Illyria’s Adriatic coast called the Via Gemina, which connected the Italian city of Aquileia with the city of Salona. Another road, the Via Flavia, went down the Istrian peninsula to the city of Pula, which is located on the peninsula’s tip.11 One of the few Roman roads that lay in the interior of the region, the Via Pannonia, was constructed sometime within the first century BC and connected Aquileia to Sirmium.12