Over the coming weeks, Trump became distracted by other matters and ended up sticking with his nominee. On April 7, 2017, the Senate would confirm Gorsuch as the 113th justice of the Supreme Court, installing a 5–4 conservative majority after fifteen months of an evenly split court. When McGahn had written his memo months earlier, he had predicted that Gorsuch would be confirmed between April 3 and April 7. Soon after, McGahn gifted the new justice a memento: the resignation letter he had drafted when Gorsuch’s nomination seemed in doubt.
★ ★ ★
FEBRUARY 10, 2017
NINETY-SIX DAYS UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III
THE SITUATION ROOM—In the two weeks that had passed since the Justice Department warned the White House about Flynn, the national security adviser—potentially compromised by the foreign adversary that had just meddled in the election—had been allowed to remain in his post, because the White House mishandled the matter in nearly every way possible. There was apparent inertia and distraction: The White House counsel’s office, which had initially been skeptical of how the Justice Department described Flynn’s calls and was apparently busy dealing with the fallout of the travel ban and the Gorsuch nomination, took days to read the transcripts of the calls between Flynn and the Russian ambassador.
There was bad timing: On January 30, Trump had fired Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, the main point of contact on the Flynn matter, for her refusal to defend Trump’s travel ban on constitutional grounds.
There was deceit: Even though McGahn, Trump, Priebus, and Bannon knew that Flynn had almost certainly lied to Vice President Pence, they held back from telling Pence anything about what they had learned. And Flynn had lied to fellow White House officials, saying that the FBI had told him during his interview that the investigation into him had been closed.
There were things that were inexplicable. Given everything he already knew about Flynn’s conduct, on Saturday Trump had allowed Flynn to sit in on an Oval Office call that he took with Putin. This not only invited more questions about the true nature of Trump’s relationship with Russia; it also raised the question: Was Trump disturbed about the Flynn affair because his national security adviser now posed a threat to American national security, or was he disturbed by the Flynn affair because it posed a public relations problem?
Even though Trump’s reality television persona fired people with bravado, not only did Trump the president not enjoy the prospect of firing people, but he would come to rely on others to do it for him—a pattern that would become more tumultuous in the coming months. And in the case of Flynn, an inertia had set in at the White House. It would take an external factor to force Trump to actually do something about his troublesome national security adviser.
The delay in doing something about Flynn only agitated the departed members of the Obama administration and those in the know about the calls at the Justice Department, FBI, and intelligence community. Two weeks after Yates’s warning, The Washington Post, citing “current and former U.S. officials,” reported that Flynn had in fact spoken about sanctions with the Russian ambassador on December 29, the day they had been imposed. In the article, the spokesman for the National Security Council contradicted Flynn’s previous denials, saying that “while [Flynn] had no recollection of discussing sanctions, he couldn’t be certain that the topic never came up.”
That disclosure finally forced McGahn and Priebus to act and particularly aggravated Pence, who was left looking as if he were either part of some sort of conspiracy or hopelessly out of the loop. That Friday, February 10, they all gathered in the Situation Room to read the call transcript for themselves, after which McGahn and Priebus determined that Flynn had to be fired and told Trump. But Trump, who was preparing for a weekend meeting with the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, at Mar-a-Lago, said that it could wait until after he returned.
So, Flynn, known to the vice president, the chief of staff, the White House counsel, and the rest of the country to be a liar and potentially compromised, continued that weekend as national security adviser, heavily involved in the country’s most sensitive matters. On Saturday night in Florida, Trump was having dinner at Mar-a-Lago with Abe and aides—including Flynn—when word reached them that North Korea had launched a ballistic missile off its eastern coast and into the ocean. Rather than head to a secure area to deal with a response, Trump—with Flynn alongside him—insisted he could handle the matter right from his dinner table while fielding ad hoc advice from his foreign counterpart. Guests dining at neighboring tables easily listened in on the conversation and debate.
Meanwhile, Trump continued to lie about Flynn. On Air Force One, he popped his head into the press cabin. Reporters asked him about the Post story on Flynn. Trump claimed not to know anything about the reports.
“I don’t know about that, I haven’t seen it,” Trump said. “What report is that? I haven’t seen that. I’ll look into that.”
★ ★ ★
FEBRUARY 13, 2017
NINETY-THREE DAYS UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III
OVAL OFFICE—With Trump and his top aides back in Washington after the weekend at Mar-a-Lago, Flynn continued to be involved in foreign policy matters. He attended a working lunch held with the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau. And the White House continued to put out misleading information on Flynn’s situation.
On MSNBC, Kellyanne Conway, a top aide to the president and his former campaign manager, was asked whether Flynn might be leaving the White House in the wake of the Washington Post story. Conway insisted that “General Flynn does enjoy the full confidence of the president.”
But even as Conway made those statements, Trump and his aides debated what to do about Flynn. The consensus, again, was that he had to go. It’s unclear what happened next or whether that message was relayed to Flynn. What is known is that a little after 10:00 p.m., Flynn arrived at the Oval Office with Trump, Pence, and Priebus there waiting for him, each knowing that it would be his final moment as national security adviser. Flynn had a signed copy of his resignation in hand. Trump shook Flynn’s hand, gave him a hug, and told him, “We’ll give you a good recommendation. You’re a good guy. We’ll take care of you.”
★ ★ ★
FEBRUARY 14, 2017
NINETY-TWO DAYS UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III
JAMES S. BRADY PRESS BRIEFING ROOM, WEST WING—Flynn was gone, but the White House still had to explain what had happened—a task McGahn knew would be a difficult one for an administration that had no discernible communications strategy in place and had already so publicly struggled with the truth.
With headlines of the departure dominating the news the next day, all of Trump’s aides knew the daily press briefing would be a bombardment of questions about Flynn. To prepare Spicer for the 1:15 p.m. briefing, McGahn decided he had to intervene, to help ensure the press secretary avoided misleading the public. McGahn spent the morning in Spicer’s office, walking him through the background of the White House’s work—or lack thereof—on the Flynn investigation.
Then, in the Oval Office, the pair had a larger meeting with Trump, Priebus, Bannon, Hope Hicks, and Conway to talk more generally about what should be said. Trump didn’t sit back as messaging was discussed. In going over the coverage, Priebus informed the president that House Speaker Paul Ryan had praised the president for being the person to request that Flynn resign.
“That sounds better,” Trump said. “Say that.”
Spicer, searching for the truth, asked the president if that was accurate.
“Say that I asked for his resignation,” Trump replied.
It was unclear to those in the room what the truth was.
Spicer entered the briefing with a joke, attempting to liven up the mood.
“Good afternoon. Happy Valentine’s Da
y,” he said. “I can sense the love in the room.”
Once Spicer began answering questions about Flynn, lawyers from McGahn’s office closely listened in, wanting to hear Spicer stick to the facts, just as McGahn had briefed him.
But under pressure, Spicer came apart. In the course of the forty-five-minute briefing, the press secretary essentially discarded the notes that McGahn offered him, instead delivering a multitude of false statements to the press. McGahn and his office counted fourteen lies or mischaracterizations in Spicer’s remarks about how the White House handled the Flynn matter, spinning a narrative that made the administration appear far more on top of the situation than it had been.
What the hell? McGahn thought. Had Trump gotten to Spicer after their meeting to direct him off the talking points he had approved?
McGahn confronted Spicer in front of several other White House officials after the briefing to lay out the misstatements.
Despite the upbraiding, Spicer would do nothing to correct the record.
McGahn and the lawyers in the counsel’s office were frustrated by Spicer’s performance and alarmed at what such a performance augured for the White House’s ability to communicate accurate information to the world. The national security adviser had been fired for his contacts with the Russians. It was not entirely clear what Trump knew about these contacts, the vice president had been kept in the dark about the entire matter, and the administration had lied along the way. Then after Flynn’s dismissal, it gave an inaccurate on-the-record briefing to reporters from the White House lectern. Someday, someone might have to explain all this. So McGahn and the lawyers took the ultimate move to protect themselves. They compiled an eight-page memo marked “Confidential” and “Attorney Work Client Product.” It was addressed to “FILE,” and it outlined and recounted the timeline of the Flynn affair and how the counsel’s office had handled it and included a two-page appendix that listed all of Spicer’s misstatements in the press conference.
The press had already determined Spicer was a liar. Now that same conclusion would be memorialized in a secret White House document, which ended with a stark pronouncement about how McGahn and his team viewed the entire episode.
“The White House Counsel’s office remains concerned that Spicer’s inaccurate briefing remains the definitive public account by the White House of the events surrounding Flynn’s resignation. As noted above, and in Appendix A, Spicer’s remarks misstate the record and mischaracterize the legal process and legal conclusions of the White House counsel’s office in important respects.”
Don McGahn had been Trump’s White House counsel for twenty-six days. From a completely different vantage point from the FBI director, he could see how Trump and the administration had been staggered and undisciplined from the outset. Much more than Trump, McGahn was a committed conservative who relished the policy goals that the administration might be able to achieve. But he also had an obligation to the law and the Constitution. The Constitution required constancy, not chaos. McGahn had already written one resignation letter and at least one memo to the file to protect himself. He was alert to trouble, and his wariness at the outset of the administration was similar to Comey’s. But for McGahn, the warnings hit even closer to home. Not a month in yet, and he was already creating a record with the Flynn memo, the same kind of thing his uncle Paddy had done in Atlantic City decades earlier to protect himself from Donald Trump.
* * *
—
At 4:15 p.m., as the lawyers in McGahn’s office began putting the memo together in the wake of Spicer’s briefing, Comey and other top intelligence officials walked into the Oval Office to give Trump his first briefing on terrorist threats to the country.
Sitting in one of six chairs in front of the Resolute desk, Comey laid out some fairly dire ways terrorists wanted to kill Americans.
Trump said little and seemed uninterested. After the briefing, Trump asked everyone, except for Comey, to clear the room.
Kushner lingered, apparently realizing that Comey being alone with Trump could be problematic.
But Trump insisted everyone leave.
“I knew whatever we were going to talk about was going to be really important,” Comey would say later. “I was so focused on trying to remember every word because I knew whatever we were going to talk about was something I would need to remember. So I was looking at his mouth, literally trying to remember every word.”
Trump started by saying he wanted to talk about Mike Flynn, who Trump said “hadn’t done anything wrong” on his calls with the Russian ambassador. Trump said he was a good guy but had to be let go because he lied to the vice president. The president’s comment about Pence was particularly amusing because Trump, Priebus, McGahn, and Bannon had kept it from Pence for two weeks that Flynn had lied to him.
The president then brought up that afternoon’s briefing by Spicer—the same briefing the counsel’s office was now dissecting because it was riddled with inaccuracies. Trump praised Spicer for how he had handled it, saying the White House spokesman had done a great job explaining the Flynn matter. Trump’s train of thought then hopped over to leaks, and he complained about recent ones that disclosed his calls with foreign leaders. He lightly touched the classified phone on his desk, saying he had made the calls on “this beautiful phone.” He then brought it back to Flynn, saying that he had done nothing wrong on his calls but that leaks about the contacts were terrible.
Comey tried to jump into the conversation to say that indeed the leaks were awful.
Priebus then opened the door to try to end the meeting. But Trump said he needed more time with Comey. Priebus closed the door, and Trump began talking again about Flynn. Trump said he was a good guy who had been through a lot. He said Flynn had been wrong to mislead the vice president but did nothing wrong on the call.
“I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go,” Trump said. “He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go.”
Oh fuck, Comey thought to himself. Trump’s overtures in the early days of the administration about loyalty and his job had been inappropriate. But now Trump was walking up to—and maybe over—the line of obstructing justice. Had the president of the United States just broken the law in front of his FBI director?
In response to Trump, Comey said only, “I agree he is a good guy.”
Trump brought up leakers again and then ended the conversation.
It was Valentine’s Day. Comey and Patrice ordered takeout and ate at home. He wouldn’t share much of what had happened that day, though. He saved that for the memo he wrote later that evening to document the meeting. On the twenty-sixth day of the administration, just as McGahn had felt compelled to do, Comey sat at his desk and wrote the story of an astonishing event in a presidency not yet a month old. He had evidence that, at the least, strongly raised the question of whether the president of the United States had broken the law. If that was ever disclosed, it would have a devastating if not catastrophic impact on Trump. Now Comey had to figure out what to do with it and ensure that the president’s wishes about Flynn were ignored. The Flynn investigation would continue.
★ ★ ★
MARCH 2, 2017
SEVENTY-SIX DAYS UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III
MCGAHN’S OFFICE ON THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE WEST WING—In Oval Office meetings with aides in his first month and a half as president, it was plain to McGahn that Trump was ignorant of the government’s most basic functions.
Trump believed that the president could do whatever the president wanted, and he had no grasp of the concept that the founders had set up the government for the three branches to share power. While there were certain executive actions Trump could take unilaterally, he often needed to work with Congress, and the courts had the power to curtail executive actions they saw as illegal.
McGahn and other aides woul
d explain this to the president, who often grew irritated and angry when told the bounds of his powers.
“Let’s just do it and if someone wants to sue us, they can,” Trump would say when told he could not do something on his own.
Not surprisingly, Trump struggled with the next level of understanding how Washington worked. He had no grasp for how senators could block legislation through the filibuster and that the filibuster could be ended through a cloture vote. He said he did not understand how he could appoint certain officials to cabinet posts during a Senate recess—a move that allowed the appointees to serve in that position but for a fixed amount of time.
He didn’t know that the Justice Department was meant to be independent of politics and political considerations. He didn’t know that presidents didn’t get to decide who and what gets investigated. And he failed to grasp what the FBI was investigating, what it meant to his administration and campaign, and that no matter how much he wanted it to, the investigation would likely not go away. In a sign of Trump’s ignorance, in the aftermath of the Flynn firing, Trump and Kushner told confidants they believed that with Flynn gone, they had put the entire Russia question behind them. McGahn, meanwhile, remained skeptical of what the FBI was truly up to but hoped that whatever it was, it would not interfere with the Gorsuch nomination.
Two weeks after the Flynn firing, with the Gorsuch nomination appearing on track, Russia reared its head again for the Trump administration when The Washington Post reported that the intelligence community had evidence that the attorney general, Jeff Sessions, had had at least two meetings during the campaign with the Russian ambassador—the same guy Mike Flynn had spoken to about Obama’s sanctions. On the heels of the Flynn dismissal, the Russia story suddenly had new legs.
Donald Trump V. the United States : Inside the Struggle to Stop a President (9781984854674) Page 18