Wargames

by Martin van Creveld

  Two-sided maneuvers continued to be held by many armies (and navies, and air forces, these being subjects that cannot be explored here) after World War II. Throughout the Cold War, the technology at the disposal of both sides and their allies kept improving as new weapon systems were introduced. However, except for the fact that some US troops (certainly) and Soviet ones (possibly) were made to drive over terrain made radioactive by the explosion of an atomic bomb, they did not break much new ground.36 For decades on end, Western commanders looked at the German campaigns of 1940–1 as the acme of the military art, studied them, and, since there were no plans for attacking the Soviet Union, looked for methods to stop them. Red Army commanders for their part tried to find ways to repeat, and improve upon, their own great armored offensives of 1942–5. Meanwhile, the scale on which the maneuvers designed to test the ideas, the methods, and the weapons were conducted declined. For example, the 1964 Exercise Desert Strike held in the deserts of California and Nevada involved 90,000 troops. The 1981 Exercise Certain Encounter involved 70,000 West German, British, and American troops, 17,000 of the latter having to be flown from the US to Europe. There they picked up their pre-deposited equipment and drove to the “battlefield,” a hilly region north of Frankfurt, and joined in the fray.37

  Contributing to the decline was the constant, though highly uneven, process whereby most armed forces around the world, and those of “developed” countries most of all, tended to become smaller and smaller, as well as the enormous and rapidly growing cost of post-1945 weapons and weapons systems. The latter simply could not be mass-produced the way their predecessors were. For example, when the Canadian armed forces held maneuvers, said to be the largest in several decades, in Alberta in May and June 1985, they fielded exactly eighteen tanks – all those they had in the country.38 In Europe − the “central theater” as NATO planners fondly called it − another factor was the spread of urbanization, sub-urbanization, and conurbation (the process whereby cities spread, grow together, and ultimately merge into one another). In a continent that had long been crowded, finding open spaces sufficiently large for the forces to train in became almost impossible: the more so because the forces themselves tended to operate in an ever more dispersed manner so as to avoid the immense firepower, possibly including nuclear warheads, they expected to be directed at them.39

  The more time passed, the clearer it became that much fighting would take place not en rase campagne but in built-up areas; however, the need to maintain daily life meant that training forces of any size in urban warfare was all but impossible. Finally the decades from about 1970 on saw the rise of those who believed that protecting the environment should have priority over war preparation. All this, plus the typical peacetime aversion to incurring casualties of any kind, caused NATO exercises, especially the larger ones, to display a disturbing tendency to degenerate into somewhat childish games. Far from trying to simulate the brutality of war, which is perhaps the latter’s most outstanding quality, units and troops had to gingerly make their way among people and their property so as to avoid injury or damage.

  Thus World War II seems a good point to stop the discussion and take stock of the kind of wargames in question. Characterized by the fact that bodies of real troops, rather than headquarters or counters, or blips, are made to “fight” each other, such games may go back all the way to ancient Rome, though the record is too spotty to allow clear conclusions about this to be drawn. Eighteenth-century armies may have held them, but again it is impossible to be sure. Really large-scale maneuvers as we know them today first became possible during the second half of the nineteenth century as a direct result of the rise of the railways. These made it possible to concentrate huge masses of troops within a reasonable time and, what was equally important, disperse them once the exercise was over. Soon all armies were holding them, with the German ones generally acting as the model for the rest from about 1870 on. The objective, certainly in theory and often in practice as well, was to exercise and test commanders, troops, equipment, doctrines, and methods under the most realistic conditions that money – maneuvers were enormously expensive – space, and ingenuity could provide. Scenarios considered relevant to future war could also be rehearsed.

  As those who direct theatrical performances and movies know only too well, simulating “reality” is always a very difficult task, all the more so when the location is not a stage or a movie set but a huge piece of country dotted with topographical obstacles of every kind and quite often with humans and their habitations as well; and all the more so when the exercise is two-sided and involves strategy. Again as in a theater or movie, to this is added a certain artificial character that is built into the very nature of the exercise – one scheduled in advance and planned to unfold at such and such a place with such and such forces over so and so many days and weeks – and that is almost impossible to get rid of. For these and many other reasons, historically there has hardly been an exercise that did not attract its share of criticism.40 Particularly memorable was the claim of Basil Liddell Hart, the British military pundit, that the 1927 maneuvers, the same ones that Popular Mechanics had praised so enthusiastically, were “like an attempt to drill a mechanical menagerie into a Noah’s Ark procession, and more fitted to fulfill a sergeant-major’s dream than a vision of mobile warfare.”41 Now the maneuvers were said to look to the past instead of to the future; now commanders acted in too schematic a manner. Now those in charge had failed to prepare properly, turning the whole thing into a mess with units going off in all directions or simply doing nothing. Now the demands made on the troops were too great, now – perhaps more often – too small. As in many other kinds of wargames, often more intelligence was available to commanders on both sides than there would be in reality.

  Whereas warfare is in some ways the least constrained of all human activities, two-sided maneuvers always involve some kind of overall control. The rules of engagement that Control lays down will go a long way to dictate what will happen even before the first move is made. Worse, even: in war, as a free creative activity, scoring a great success often results precisely from a commander violating whatever rules exist; in exercises, to the contrary, he risks being disciplined for doing so. A classic example of this truth was provided by the Israeli maneuvers of 1951. The goal was to simulate an Egyptian invasion – one such had, in fact, taken place just three years earlier – and the response of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to it. In charge of the “Egyptian” force was the Commander, Southern Front, General Moshe Dayan. Instead of sticking to the roads (and the rules), he had his troops advance cross-country, by-passing the crossroads complete with the umpires stationed at them. Had the chief of staff not cancelled the exercise, he would have captured Tel Aviv. Called to explain himself, Dayan was told that taking the other side by surprise in such a way was “no great feat” (kuntz, in the bastardized German that was part of Hebrew slang at the time). “To the contrary,” he is said to have retorted, “that is just the greatest kuntz of all.”42

  Unless excellent care is taken, in other words, maneuvers by their very nature may well stifle the boldest and most original spirits. The outcome is a “flattened” image of reality that may prove fatal when the real thing comes about. Another element that maneuvers cannot simulate is the one that forms the very essence of war, i.e. fighting. To be sure, modern technology makes it easy to imitate and broadcast the “strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield” (compliments to General Douglas McArthur).43 Smoke rising from burning vehicles or else forming part of screens can be generated, and so on. Troops can be and often have been issued with blank ammunition, firing away as if their lives depended on it and enjoying every moment doing so. As ballistic weapons are being increasingly replaced by guided ones, though, the astronomic cost of the missiles in question had rendered doing so extremely problematic. Consequently there is always a tendency to cut corners and use simulators instead. These and other measures only go a fairly short way towards recreating the te
rror of war amidst which commanders and troops have to perform and which forms the background against which, in reality, their performance will have to be evaluated.

  Finally, two-sided though they were and are, maneuvers violate Jesus’ saying that “by their fruit shall thou recognize them.” In the end umpires, however excellent the manuals on which they rely and however godlike their own training, knowledge and objectivity, are no substitute for bullets in deciding what the outcome of combat would be. Conversely, supposing sufficient umpires of a sufficient quality were available (and supposing they would all agree with one another), one would hardly need maneuvers to simulate the future and plan for it. Ever since tournaments had lost their realism at some time after 1300, and certainly since the spread of firearms had made it impossible for units to realistically train against each other, commanders had been looking for something better. In the late 1970s, something better finally made its appearance.

  The road to Fort Atari

  In sharp contrast to many kinds of previous wargames from antiquity on, after about 1500 the realistic use of weapons and two-sided exercises went their separate ways. Exercises, or call them games, which demanded that players aim and fire their weapons at their “enemies” could not be two-sided: individuals and groups engaged on two-sided maneuvers could not make realistic use of their weapons. Often, indeed, they were reduced to doing no more than lugging them around putting them into position, loading them, and aiming them, only to go through the same routine again as the situation developed and the signal to “move” was given. With the important and very interesting exception of the duel, only children were able to “fight” mock battles. Either they employed slings or else the kind of wooden, cork-firing, pump-action gun Christopher Robin used to bring down the balloon that carried Winnie-the-Pooh aloft. Toy weapons, though, did not have the range for anything like a realistic simulation of real-life combat. From air guns up, weapons that did have the necessary range were too dangerous to use. As time passed and technological progress continued, giving birth to a steady stream of more and more powerful weapons, the problem only became worse.

  Attempts to create “firearms” that would be both sufficiently powerful to provide some kind of realistic simulation of fighting and sufficiently harmless not to endanger participants in the game have a long history. Apparently the first successful ones were made in the late 1970s when three Americans, Hayes Noel, Bob Gurnsey, and Charles Gaines, came up with the idea of employing pistols similar to the ones farmers and ranchers use to fire balls full of paint at trees and livestock.44 The fragile balls burst on impact, thus marking their targets. Apparently the public had been waiting for something of the kind: so successful was the idea that National Game Survival, the first company founded to manufacture and distribute paintball guns, balls, goggles, webbing, vests, and the like, began to turn a profit within a mere six months.45

  As other firms entered the field various technical improvements, including compressed air or gas bottles to increase range and magazines or hoppers that allowed a single gun to fire multiple rounds without having to reload, were introduced. Some are capable of firing balls at 200 miles an hour: that is about 50 percent faster than the strongest tennis player can serve. Some come equipped with a “special operations silencer” which, although it does not actually quiet the shots, will endow a gun with “an awesome tactical look.” For those prepared to spend anything between $250 and $1,174 on the hobby, one firm alone sells a variety of guns with such interesting names as GoG G-1 Tactical Paintball Gun, Proto-Reflex Rail Paintball Gun, and Bob Long Victory Intimidator Paintball Gun. A favorite term this particular firm likes to apply to all sorts of gear is “eclipse”: whether that fact hints at some underlying sadistic tendencies I leave it for psychologists to decide.46 Other companies have their own descriptions.

  Airsoft guns differ from paintball ones in that they look exactly like “real” weapons. Though the two types work on somewhat different principles and fire somewhat different kinds of ammunition, their use in wargames is sufficiently similar for the two to be treated together. In 1982 the first dedicated paintball field was opened in Rochester, New York. From the US the idea spread to other countries including Canada, Britain, Australia, Germany, and Israel. The world’s largest indoor paintball court – covering 28,000 square feet – is said to be located, of all places, in Tehran.47 For serious players, leagues have been established. By 1987 the game had become sufficiently popular for the first magazine dedicated especially to paintball to hit the newsstands. A monthly called Action Pursuit Games, it still exists.48 As in the case of other niche publications, though, much of the activity has been moved to the Internet. There are even teams of professionals who, somewhat like Roman gladiators and medieval knights-errant, will “fight” demonstration games against each other or else take on whoever is prepared to pay for their services. Over two hundred teams participated in the 2006 World Cup tournament alone, and the total number of US players is said to be in excess of ten million.49 As if to confirm its popularity, a Google.com search conducted in early 2011 resulted in no fewer than 161,000,000 hits.

  Paintball/airsoft games are played in one of two kinds of environments: the entirely artificial ones built and maintained by commercial firms who rent them out to interested parties or in the open. The former tend to be relatively small. Many take advantage of parking lots that would otherwise be empty during the weekend. Such courts are usually studded with inflatable, movable obstacles of various sizes and shapes that players can use to take shelter and maneuver about. Natural terrain has the advantage that it is often much larger, allowing more interesting scenarios and tactics to be introduced. Bunkers, streams, and other topographical features can be added or selected at will. Different kinds of terrain may well force players to completely rethink their tactics, a fact that some of them consider one of the great attractions of the game. Provided the area is sufficiently large, thousands of players may become involved in a single game. Even vehicles up to and including armored cars may be accommodated.

  The technical limitations of the equipment apart, what most distinguishes the game from real-life warfare are the rules. The most important rules are those that lay down the meaning of victory. Normally it is gained either by deciding in advance how long the game will last and ending it by counting the number of “survivors” on each side or by capturing the opponent’s flag. Some large games may have more than one flag with a points system governing the value of each, whereas in others it is a question of finding treasure or shooting the “enemy” general. Other rules may define such things as the minimum distance at which a player may use his weapon on an opponent – being shot at close range may be quite painful – or else the kind of “injury” that will cause participants to leave the game. Some games employ umpires to enforce the rules, particularly those designed to prevent players from wiping off the paint they have received and returning to the game, others do not. Some have detailed scenarios similar to those the military use on maneuver, others do not. New variations keep emerging as players seek to avoid boredom and those who manufacture the equipment and provide the facilities seek to avoid a loss of customers.

  The games are played not just by individuals and groups on their own initiative but by all kinds of firms, corporations, government organizations, and even universities. The objective appears to be to improve cohesion among employees or simply give them a day of recreation, if hardly rest. To some, the idea of, say, having a stag party or celebrating a birthday in this way may appear childish. Others, though, consider it “an intensified version of what people do everyday. With varying degrees of success, we’re all avoiding and confronting obstacles on our way to reaching goals.” “Being great at paintball,” we are told, “requires you to learn how to take great risks and succeed.”50 As if to prove the point, the military have also latched onto the game. For the first time in centuries, it has enabled them to shoot at each other in a way that, though not quite similar to real-life c
ombat, at any rate is much more realistic than firing blanks or simply yelling “bang-bang.” In some cases, the distinction between paintball and the kind of non-lethal weapons police forces sometimes use is being obliterated. So closely related are the tactics of paintball and those used by light infantry in particular that they have started borrowing them from one another.

  The title of one booklet, a Handbook of Infantry Tactics for Paintball, speaks for itself.51 The author, one D. Wagner, says he acquired his hands-on experience during the eleven years he spent as an enlisted man in various US Army infantry units. His work, explicitly aimed at enthusiasts, has chapters on basic marksmanship, individual firing positions, close assault, reconnaissance/stealth, moving through the indoor playing field, contact, ambush, fighting/defensive positions, and infantry hand and arm signals. Individual sections deal with such problems as crossing danger areas, firing around an obstacle, defending a room/bunker, and so on. The book concludes with a list of military unit map symbols. As the author notes, the ones his readers are likely to find most useful are those indicating smaller infantry units, scouts, and the like. But for those who happen to have “a tank in [their] yard,” armor symbols are also included.

  Another author, Christopher E. Larsen, “has spent more than twenty years working with warriors from around the world.” At the time he published his work, he was “military-analyst-instructional systems designer for the US Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.”52 Helping drive the rapprochement between paintball/airsoft and real-life warfare is the fact that over the last few decades human settlement patterns have been changing. Over much of the developing world, which is where almost all armed conflicts take place, there has been a massive shift towards urbanization.53 As America’s war in Iraq has demonstrated only too well, and as the civil one in Syria was demonstrating through much of 2011 and 2012, most modern combat no longer takes place in the open as it used to do. Its setting is towns and cities with their closely packed, extremely heterogeneous, and often very complex, structures of every kind. In many places around the world the field no longer exists. This is expected to become even more the case in the future.54