by Amy Knight
The Canadians quite clearly did not want to stand alone before the public in the Gouzenko case, and suffer criticism for violating civil liberties, just because they had been the first to take action against the spy suspects. They wanted it known that the Russians were spying against Britain and the United States as well. This is why the report mentioned specifically that the Russians asked about the movement and placement of American troops and the “particulars as to the materials of which the atomic bomb is composed.” The report also said that Willsher “had access to practically all secret documents” in the British High Commissioner's office. The High Commission objected strongly, telegraphing London to say that the “[Royal] Commission's specific reference to Willsher is inaccurate to [the] extent she did not . . . have access to any documents in this office relating to atomic energy.”38
Mackenzie King anticipated a huge reaction to the Royal Commission's first (interim) report, noting in his diary on March 4, “I imagine telegraph wires all over the world will be alive with the information it contains as they have not been in days since the beginning of the last war.” And indeed, the press in North America and Britain gave the report wide play. (This was the first time that the Canadians had openly named the Soviet Union as the country in question.) The commission's report, together with the news of the arrest on March 5 of Dr. Nunn May, whose link with the Canadian story was taken as evident, made banner headlines on the front pages of all the major newspapers. Most press reports sounded a note of extreme alarm about the leakage of secrets to the Russians and sensationalized the story by claiming that the Russians were planning a third world war. But the more cautious New York Times – bearing out Lester Pearson's misgivings – ventured the observation that “much of the information asked for . . . could have been obtained by any military attaché by request” and that “there is no indication in the report that any of this secret information was obtained or communicated.” A writer for The Spectator in London noted, “The righteous horror which was expressed appears to me somewhat exaggerated. It is the duty of service attachés to obtain all the information they can.”39
Contrary to what King had hoped, the hastily put-together report and the issuance of formal charges against four of the thirteen spy suspects did not stem the tide of domestic criticism against the government for its iron-fisted justice. According to a message to MI6, “In spite of Commission's first interim report, press on question of rights of detainees and civil liberties has not materially decreased, largely as result of agitation of wives and lawyers who have been retained but who are not allowed to see clients who have not been charged.”40
A Globe and Mail editorial on March 6 called the commission's justice “a totalitarian procedure” and expressed the view that “All the rules of freedom, the basic liberties of the individual, must, we all know, be subordinate on occasion to the safety of the state. But there is nothing in the acceptance of this which licenses the Government to suspend all the judicial safeguards in order to facilitate police work or make easier the conduct of an official inquiry.”41 Two days later, M.J. Coldwell, leader of the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, protested the illegal detentions of the spy suspects: “The war was fought to destroy states which made such police activities a general practice. To say that it is necessary to resort to totalitarian methods in order to secure evidence is no valid excuse for abrogating the elementary principles of Canadian justice.”42
With nine suspects still in RCMP custody, the issue of civil liberties continued to plague King. The Royal Commission was proceeding too slowly for the political agenda of the King government. He wrote in his diary on March 12, “St. Laurent and I feel very indignant at the length of time the commissioners are taking in detaining men: also we were both astonished that Kellock [one of the two commissioners] was going to adjourn sittings for some days to keep some engagement with a YMCA meeting.” Parliament was due to reconvene on March 14, and King knew he would face some hard questioning by the opposition for allowing the spy suspects to be held for such a long time without charge. King apparently relayed his views to the Royal Commission, and the postponement was canceled.
On March 15, the commission released its second interim report, giving evidence against four more spy suspects: Raymond Boyer, Harold Gerson, Matt Nightingale, and David Shugar. Professor Boyer was not only one of Canada's leading scientists – as president of the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers, he was also a political activist. Because CASCW advocated unions for technicians, the RCMP had already labeled it a subversive group, and none other than Inspector Harvison had been secretly investigating its activities for the RCMP's Intelligence Branch. The charges against some of CASCW's leading members for giving information to the Soviets was hugely significant to the RCMP. It confirmed the RCMP's idea that CASCW was an arm of the Soviet Communist Party.43
Boyer, who made no secret of his communist leanings (he had contributed substantial sums to the Labour Progressive Party), took the strategy of openly acknowledging to the commissioners that he wanted to help the Russians, apparently assuming that, since his intentions were pure, he would get off easily. He told the commission that he had given Fred Rose the new formula that he had devised (and received acclaim for) for the chemical explosive rdx. Rose then passed the information to the GRU. Boyer went on to say that “Mr. Howe [the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply] was willing to give it to the Russians and was not allowed to do so by the Americans. I felt throughout the work that it was unfortunate that . . . there was not closer scientific liaison in connection with such information between the Russian war effort and ours . . . I felt it was of great importance that the scientific war effort on the two fronts should be coordinated.”44
Like most of the other defendants, Boyer never accepted payment from the Russians. (Gouzenko added a negative twist to this in his testimony: “The professor was very rich and did not need money.”) There could be no doubt his motives were sincere. According to a message to MI6, “His interrogator Inspector Harvison, who would not be deceived and who has dealt so brilliantly with Lunan and Mazerall, is satisfied that Boyer was motivated by what appeared to him at [the] time to be sincere reasons.” And a later message noted, “Boyer is a highly intelligent man, makes no effort whatever to cover his own [garbled] nor communist activities of his friends. We are inclined to believe he is telling the whole truth.”45 Whatever his motivation, Boyer had signed a secrecy oath, which he had knowingly violated. He was later sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
Harold Gerson, a geological engineer and the brother-in-law of another suspect, Scott Benning, also knowingly acted as an agent for the GRU. The RCMP had a document from Gouzenko showing that the GRU had proposed to Moscow that they subsidize a geological engineering consulting office in Ottawa for Gerson, apparently to use as a cover for his acting as an agent for the Russians. According to a report to MI6 on February 27, “Gerson has been re-interrogated by [the] RCMP. This time he was shown photostats of his own handwriting from Corby documents and was severely shaken.” And on the next day, “RCMP interrogator states Gerson has been enquiring how many years imprisonment he would be liable to receive. This indicates further that he is likely to talk soon.”46 Of those arrested, Gerson and Gordon Lunan received the harshest sentences – five years.
Matt Nightingale and David Shugar, by contrast, were, from a legal standpoint, highly questionable cases. Nightingale, an engineer for the Bell Telephone Company, was accused of spying for the GRU while he was in the Royal Canadian Air Force during the war, working on the installation of landline communications. Asked about the case by the Toronto Daily Star, a former fellow officer in the rcaf gave his views of Nightingale: “An extremely fine chap and a gentleman. . . . The idea of a fellow like Matt thinking it out quietly and deciding to make some money out of cutting the throats of his friends and selling his country down the river is simply inconceivable.”47 In fact, Nightingale had been attending communist study groups in Montre
al for several years. But according to the lawyer he subsequently retained, Nightingale “was just a big farm boy from a Quebec farm. He was married to a girl with great ambitions to become a socialite and because of her took part in meetings with friends of Russia. He was at those meetings all right, but he didn't tell anyone anything.”48 The RCMP had picked up Nightingale because his name was found in some notes Gouzenko had stolen allegedly written by GRU colonel Rogov. The notes referred to meetings Rogov had had with Nightingale, but the RCMP had no evidence that any documents or information had been passed to the GRU.
Like the others, Nightingale was frightened and intimidated. On February 18, three days after his arrest, a report to MI6 noted, “Nightingale is likely to sing shortly as he came through his interview badly and asked for writing materials later.” Nightingale admitted to having met with Rogov, but to nothing more. The view of his interrogators was that “for reasons of their own Russians did not make any serious use of him.” Nonetheless, Nightingale was brought before the Royal Commission. “Commission have been hearing Nightingale for the last day and a half and will have to continue tomorrow,” read another message to London. “He appears an accomplished liar . . . Commission will make final attempt to extract truth.” In the end the commission could only conclude weakly in its second interim report that if Nightingale “did not in fact give to the U.S.S.R. secret and confidential information, he may very well have conspired to furnish such information.” Nightingale was nonetheless committed for trial by the magistrate. He was acquitted the following November.49
Dr. David Shugar's case was even more of a problem for the commission, not just because of lack of evidence. His wife had launched a press campaign on his behalf and was embarrassing the RCMP and the commission. Shugar, a young and very talented biochemist and an active union organizer with a reputation for political radicalism, was acquainted with Communist Party official and GRU recruiter Sam Carr. He acknowledged to the RCMP that he had had conversations with Carr about military matters when he was in the navy, but he insisted that the talks were very general and that he never came close to discussing secret information.
Gouzenko had produced nothing to suggest that Shugar had ever been an agent for the GRU. Instead, the RCMP and the Royal Commission presented what was essentially a GRU wish list of what might be ascertained from Shugar should he be recruited, and offered the list as proof that he had actually delivered information to Zabotin and his crew. As late as August 1945, despite various assignments proposed for Shugar by Zabotin and Rogov, his assigned handler, Sam Carr, had not even given the GRU Shugar's full name, address, or telephone number – although the GRU had assigned Shugar, like many other prospective agents, a code name, “Prometheus.” On August 14, the GRU director wrote to Zabotin, “I have advised that until the receipt from Prometheus of information and the establishment of his possibilities in the Navy Department, the contact with him should be maintained by Frank [Carr]. Should it prove that Prometheus is a truly valuable man to us, direct contact may then be established with him.”50
Compared with the other detainees at the RCMP barracks, Shugar had been bold and defiant. He declared that the entire proceedings were ridiculous and demanded to see both a lawyer and his wife, to no avail. Eleven days later he went on a hunger strike in protest and abstained from food and water for almost four days. He also wrote a series of appeals to the minister of justice and other officials. Meanwhile his wife had been giving the press details from Shugar's letters to her about his treatment in RCMP custody. Correspondence between Shugar and his wife was cut off, and it was decided to send Shugar before the Royal Commission earlier than planned.51
On March 9, the following report, probably from Dwyer, was sent to MI6: “shugar was taken [to the Royal Commission] next, largely because activities of his wife and his own hunger strike are sources of embarrassment. . . . [He] refused to reply to question concerning members of Communist study group to which he belonged while at McGill. He persisted when warned that such refusal must be taken as contempt by Commissioners.” The report went on to observe, however, that Shugar would most likely not be committed for contempt, “since this would eliminate any possibility of extracting even partial admission from him which would seem essential to substantiate Corby documents which do not in themselves constitute legal case.” [italics added]52
Shugar confessed to nothing. According to a report from Ottawa on March 11, “He is still sullen and answers have to be dragged out of him. . . .” As a result, the bizarre conclusion of the second interim report was as follows: “Shugar denies having given, or having agreed to give, any secret information, but has no explanation for the existence, in the documents above referred to, of the references to himself. We were not impressed by the demeanour of Shugar, or by his denials, which we do not accept. In our view we think he knows more than he is prepared to disclose. Therefore, there would seem to be no answer on the evidence before us, to a charge of conspiring to communicate secret information to an agent of the U.S.S.R.”53
Shugar later wrote a letter to a member of the Canadian Parliament about the commission's practice of making decisions based on the demeanors of witnesses: “These men have made, in my opinion, a mockery of our courts of law and have placed in danger all those democratic institutions of ours for the preservation of which this past war has been fought.”54
At Shugar's preliminary hearing before the court, his lawyer got Gouzenko to admit, under cross-examination, that the GRU never received any information from Shugar and knew nothing about him except that he worked in the navy. The magistrate dropped all charges, but this was not the end of Shugar's nightmarish experience at the hands of the Canadian justice system. Canadian authorities revived the charges on the basis of subsequent testimony from one of Shugar's former bosses that was cited in the Royal Commission's final report. Shugar was charged with conspiracy to violate the Official Secrets Act, tried in December 1946, and acquitted. But he had lost his job with the Canadian government, and when he applied to be reinstated he was refused. Faced with “a solid wall of rejection,” he eventually moved back to his native Poland.55
Shugar, who would become a professor at the University of Warsaw, gained a reputation as one of Europe's leading biophysicists. He received numerous citations and awards for his publications and contributions to his field, and at age ninety, in 2005, was still actively engaged in his profession. The experience he endured at the hands of the RCMP and Royal Commission, which he compares to the Star Chamber of Charles i, remains vivid in his memory. Nonetheless, after almost sixty years, it is a topic he is still reluctant to discuss.56
The commission excused its civil rights violations by claiming that the spies were so dangerous and their crimes so serious that extreme measures were called for. Yet, the most serious offender in terms of possible damage to national security, Alan Nunn May, was not arrested for two and a half weeks after the Canadian group was taken in. After his arrest the Royal commissioners asked the British if May could come over and testify; they wanted to include his statements in their final report and thereby buttress their case. Hollis responded, “Your anxiety to have either Primrose or his statement available to the Commission for the purposes of their final report and the consequent desirability of concluding trial of Primrose as soon as possible is appreciated. Director of P.P. [public prosecutions] advises that there may be serious legal and practical difficulties in securing the attendance of Primrose in Canada but is consulting the Home Office on this matter.”57
Toward the end of March the British director of public prosecutions flew to Ottawa to discuss how to coordinate the May case with the report. He agreed to allow the commissioners to publish May's statement as long as they waited until his trial was over.58
May's trial was a relatively quiet affair, with minimal publicity in the British press. He pled guilty to the charge of violating the British Official Secrets Act but refused to mention any names of those to whom he passed on information. His defens
e counsel emphasized before the judge that May had passed on information to the Russians at a time when they were allies and that he had acted out of his conviction that the information should be shared with the Russians rather than out of any desire for personal gain. May, in his February 1946 statement to the police, had said that he had given information to the Russians “about a year ago,” which would mean February 1945. His counsel made the point that attitudes toward the Russians were different then: “February 1945 was a time at which the then Prime Minister had not made the statements which he is since reported to have made [a reference to Churchill's “Iron Curtain” speech]. At that time the British Army were mostly in Holland, certainly not across the Rhine, and the Russians were in the course of their drive to Berlin. It was customary to refer to them as Allies who were doing at least their fair share in the war.”59
In fact, May passed the uranium samples and report on atomic research to the GRU not in February, but in August 1945, after the Americans had used the atomic bomb against Japan. Apparently the prosecutor had not seen the Gouzenko documents or read any of his statements, which MI5 and MI6 had in their possession. Otherwise, he surely would have pointed this out. Another discrepancy arose when the prosecutor mentioned the discovery of May's crime: “No suspicion whatever had arisen that he had been betraying the trust which he had voluntarily undertaken, but toward the end of 1945 or at the beginning of this year after he had been back in this country for some little time information came into the hands of the Military Intelligence authorities of this country which led them to make certain enquiries of him.”60 Either the prosecutor did not know or was covering up the fact that British intelligence authorities had been aware of May's involvement with the Russians since the beginning of September 1945.