Generalized Exchange
Lévi-Strauss calls the second form of the exchange of women “generalized.” Here the equivalence between the gift given and the gift returned is reached not directly, but in a roundabout manner. If, in the first model, there can only be an even number of exogamous phratries, exchanging women strictly “one to one,” then in generalized systems, theoretically any number of phratries, unlimited, can participate. Here the exchange is executed in accordance with the following figure:
A → B
C
A → B
↑ ↓
C ← D
Figure 9. Type of generalized exchange of women among lineages.
In this model, women from the exogenous Phratry A are given to Phratry B, from Phratry B to Phratry C, and from Phratry C to Phratry A. The number of elements can theoretically be increased, but has, in practice, an upper limit. In this situation, the spectrum of the relations of affinity, which doubles, is substantially broadened. Now the members of two phratries at once become one’s own (“one’s others”): the one, to which the women are given, and the one from which they are taken.
The general balance remains the same; the circulation of women aims at full equilibrium: a lineage gives away as many women as it receives. But this time, it does not receive them immediately from the place to which it gave its own away, but through an intermediary. In the case of the number of dimensions exceeding three phratries, groups arise, which, while participating in the exchange, no longer enter into the system of direct affinity. They are “others,” but no longer “one’s others.”
At the same time, generalized systems do not differ principally from direct systems, since a strict ordering of women — “nao” and basic social taboos are preserved.
The Atomic Structure of Gender Relations and their Scale
Lévi-Strauss singles out the minimal structure that is constantly preserved in all social models of gender exchange.270 He describes it through a group of four members: husband (father) — wife (mother) — son — brother of the wife (uncle). Six axes of relation are theoretically possible between them:
— husband — wife
— mother — son
— father — son
— sister — brother
— uncle — cousin
— husband — brother-in-law
Figure 10. “Atomic structure” of kinship according to Lévi-Strauss.
Relations along the a axis are based on distance in every society (difference of phratries, “others,” affinity in its pure form); relations along the e axis are based on intimacy in every society (kinship in its pure form); relations along the b, c, d, and, f axes vary depending on the specific arrangement of each concrete society.
For the study and systematization of these connections, Lévi-Strauss proposes to separate them into two categories: intimacy/distance. Intimacy includes tenderness, spontaneity, and nearness. Distance, authority, respect, restraint, circumspection, and sometimes hostility. There are no societies in which only one type dominates. If everything were based on distance, it would not possible to continue to a lineage and to start a family; if on intimacy, there would be no order, hierarchy, or observance of taboos (in particular, those concerning incest). Hence, each relation in the atomic structure can be different in different societies; i.e., either intimacy or distance can prevail.
Lévi-Strauss singles out two constants, the relations of mother and son, which are always intimate, and the relations of husband and brother-in-law, which are always based on distance. Thus, only four axes of relation are strictly variable. This variability depends not on how relations in the family take shape, but on the type of society in which the given family finds itself. The structure of ties between husband and wife, father and son, sister and brother, and uncle and cousin are strictly socially predetermined, and this predetermination serves as the concrete dialect that a given society speaks. This is reflected on a different level in myths, social institutions, cultural and stylistic constructs, etc.
Lévi-Strauss isolated a mathematical regularity in the character of these relations, in the form of reverse similarity:
uncle—nephew
∙
father—son
brother—sister
∙
husband—wife
Figure 11. Formula of exchange-axes of kinship.
If we know, for example, that among the Circassians, relations between father and son, and husband and wife, are notable for a certain distance, then from this it is easy to conclude that the relations between uncle and cousin, and brother and sister, will be near and intimate. This provides evidence of a shift of attention to those close by flesh (kin) in the matrilineal kin-group (hence the relations with the uncle), to the detriment of the erotic impulse, directed outside the lineage.
Another example, from the tribes of the Polynesian Tonga. Ethnologists relate that in this tribe relations along the lines of father-son and brother-sister are strictly regulated and made taboo (up to the point that the father and son cannot stay overnight together in one and the same quarters or cabin). In this case, the relations between husband and wife and uncle and cousin will be, on the contrary, much more intimate, since the accent falls on the socialization of the maternal uncle (not the paternal, since, again, it is a matrilineal society) and the structure of the marital union along the line of the spouse (the external impulse in relation to the lineage) is positively evaluated.
The Maternal and the Paternal in the Socium
Before Lévi-Strauss, the evolutionary perspective on the phases of the sexual development of society were predominant (Morgan, Tylor, Bachofen). It went as follows: the earliest horde dwelt in a condition of sexual promiscuity, in which there were no regulations on sexual behavior: all members of the horde engaged in sexual relations with each other in a disorderly and chaotic manner. In the next stage, the belongingness of babies to the mother was raised to the status of a social law, since it is obvious that the begotten belongs to the begetter. The existence of matriarchy was assumed on this basis. And, finally, in the last stage the more “attentive” savages learned to trace the fact of paternity, which led to patriarchy.
In the 20th century anthropologists and ethnologists, following Lévi-Strauss, refuted this idea, showing convincingly that a society based on promiscuity never existed, notwithstanding certain special and always strictly ritualized orgiastic rituals, which are met with not only in primitive tribes, but also in highly developed cultures. Moreover, even some species of animals do not have the practice of promiscuity: storks, wolves, ravens, etc.271 What is taken for matriarchy could well be a form parallel to patriarchy, since in some societies feminoid elements predominate even now and do not give the slightest hint of the evolution of these societies in the direction of classic patriarchy.
Instead of reductionist evolutionary schemes, refuted by ethnosociological and sociological data, Lévi-Strauss proposed the structural classification of kindred ties, based on a fundamental principle: the determination of the belonging of a child to one or another lineage and the location of the child in the space of one of the two phratries.
Lévi-Strauss divided all variations of determination of kinship into four groups: matrilineal, patrilineal, matrilocal, and patrilocal. The first two types relate to the determination of the belonging of the child to the lineage of the mother or father; the second two, to the location of the child on the territory of the lineage of the mother or father.
Four variants thus emerge:
1. Matrilineal kinship + matrilocal location
2. Matrilineal kinship + patrilocal location
3. Patrilineal kinship + matrilocal location
4. Patrilineal kinship + patrilocal location
Lévi-Strauss called variants 1 and 4 harmonious, and 2 and 3 disharmonious. In cases 1 and 4, the child is located in the lineage to which he belongs and he is raised in i
t as a “kindred,” i.e., as part of that kin group from the moment of his appearance in the world right to maturity and the marital period. In cases 2 and 3, on the other hand, the child, after being born, is located in that phatry which is exogenous for him, which puts him the position of a certain alienation from his surroundings, with the exception of the mother (in all cases). None of these versions gives rise either to “matriarchy” or “patriarchy,” since they serve to regulate the general balance of the exchange of women on the basis of equilibrium. Theoretically, Lévi-Strauss stipulated, the same process could be described as an “exchange of men,” but such an attitude is not recorded in any known societies, since even in sociums with elements formally resembling “matriarchy,” the man is not considered a commodity, subject to exchange in the general social system. Neither matrilineality nor matrilocality nor any combination of the two are signs of matriarchy. In the social structure, the mother acts as the carrier of the main factor: belongingness to a lineage, which in itself does not have a gender sign, but merely helps to classify the members of the lineage: that which belongs to A concerns A; that which belongs to B concerns B. The principle of patriarchy and matriarchy plays the same role, but on a different level, on the level of the spatial location of the family or progeny.
In this situation, exchange and equilibrium become the main laws of gender strategies in society.272
Cross-Cousin and Parallel-Cousin Systems
Relations with first-cousins have a tremendous significance in the system of kinship. Their example shows that the prohibition on incest does not have a physiological or hygienic, but a social character. This is expressed in the division of cousins into cross and parallel. Parallel cousins are the children of the father’s brothers or mother’s sisters. Cross cousins are the children of the father’s sisters or mother’s brothers. In all forms of determination of belongingness to a lineage, both patrilineal and matrilineal, cross cousins turn out to be members of the opposite lineage in relation to the son or daughter of the given parents.
The majority of archaic societies allow cross-cousin marriages precisely on the basis of social exogeneity, despite the fact that from a physiological point of view cross cousins do not differ from parallel cousins. This refutes the hypothesis of the making taboo of incest due to the observation of the degeneracy of the progeny of incestuous unions.
We stopped to consider Lévi-Strauss’ ideas in so much detail precisely because they form the methodological basis of Ethnosociology and comprise its fundamental theoretical base (alongside the theories of Thurnwald, Mauss, the school of Boas, and the Social Anthropology of English Functionalism).
Louis Dumont: Hierarchical Man and Holism
The eminent French sociologist and anthropologist Louis Dumont (1911–1998) made an enormous contribution to Ethnosociology since he applied the sociological method to the study of Indian society and built on this basis profound theoretical models, which enriched Ethnosociology.
Dumont was disciple of Marcel Mauss and continued the main line of French Sociology, which considers society as a “total phenomenon.” Evans-Pritchard exerted a significant influence on his enthusiasm for Ethnology.
Dumont’s studies of Indian society with increased attention to those categories in which Indians themselves think and act led him to a number of fundamental conclusions. Thus, he described the caste system as a model of the introduction of “transcendence” into the social system, i.e., the assimilation by society of the concept of the “other.” In this way, social hierarchy reflects the philosophical dimension of that which lies on the other side and the inclusion of that point which is “beyond the limit” not only in religious and philosophical systems, but in the structure of society as such. Dumont emphasized that social stratification in its extreme form of caste expression (as in Indian society) embodies in itself a certain binary opposition.273 In particular, such forms as right/left, Adam/Eve, Father/King are built according to a model in which one of the terms of each pair is not simply part of the whole but the whole itself, while the other is only a part or derivative of the whole. In other words, these binary pairs can be drawn up in a general form: whole/part. In India, this is expressed by the fact that the caste system proposes that the fullness of society exists in the Brāhmaṇas, who occupy themselves with rites and religious ceremonies, as well as religious philosophy. While being only part of the caste system, they are thought of as its essence and purpose, i.e. as the whole . Dumont calls this “Holism.” Moreover, Dumont understands hierarchy in a broad (or sociological) sense separately from the problem of power and submission. Thus, in India the highest caste are the Brāhmaṇas, whose status is higher than that of warriors and kings (Kṣatriyas). At the same time, Brāhmaṇas do not possess political and economic power, and in this sense, they depend on Kṣatriyas. Hierarchy is higher and deeper than the structure of power relations. It is connected with the concept, very important for traditional society, of the “whole.”
Holism expresses the principle of the superiority of the whole to the partial, the individual. Holistic society acts on the premise that society itself as a whole (as the totality, not only of all presenting living persons, but also their ancestors and progeny, as well as their social relations, cults, traditions, rites, symbols, beliefs, etc.) is endowed with the greatest reality. Separate individuals, on the other hand, are real through communion with this whole: their being is dual; on one hand, as a part of the whole they participate in the higher being of the whole; on the other hand, they also have their own being, of a lesser and secondary quality, often identified with the unclean, inauthentic, or illusory (the Indian māyā).
The holistic attitude towards society is characteristic for traditional societies, in which caste structures predominate. Indian society is a model of such societies and can be taken as a paradigm.
According to Dumont, modern Western European society, which is built on a different understanding of the fundamental sociological moments, is on the directly opposite paradigm. All binary oppositions — sex, class, etc. — are thought of as complex agglomerations, as a summation of parts. Standard binarity is expressed by the general formula: one part/another part. Instead of an integrating holism we have individualism, in which each part is thought of as an independent authority. Masses are not removed in the elite, women in men, etc. Dumont calls this paradigm “individualism” and considers it the general model of Western and modern society. Dumont comes to this conclusion through the juxtaposition of India’s hierarchized caste society and democratic, secular, and individualistic European society. His work Essays on Individualism, considered a classic of Sociology and Anthropology, is devoted to this issue.274
Dumont paid special attention to Economic Anthropology, started by Mauss, and subjected to profound sociological analysis the processes and institutions of “economic society” and the basic concept of “economic equality,” actual equality in sociological theories and the equality of possibilities in liberalism. In his book Homo Equalis, which is a symmetrical supplement to the book Homo Hierarchicus, Dumont shows that modern Europe, beginning from the Middle Ages, entered into a transition phase from holism to individualism, i.e., from one type of society to another.275 , 276 The order and caste structure of holistic society creates barriers to the growth of material prosperity of the masses. But the quest by the masses for the unencumbered satisfaction of their interests leads to anarchy and social materialism. That is why bourgeois revolutions and reforms consist in the transition from politics and religion, which justify stratification and hierarchy, to economics and especially the (materialistic) morals founded on this economics.
Dumont thoroughly investigates the genesis of individualism — as an ideology, methodology, and philosophy. Some traditional societies (for instance, the Indian, early Christian, and part of the European Middle Ages) know the concept of the “individual outside the world.” This is the ideal of the hermit, the yogi, the monk. Such an individual abandons society (n
ormatively holistic) and the world together with it, asserting individualism through his withdrawal. But even those societies that know such a figure and raise him high as an ideal do not reject in all other cases holism and the laws of integrity in all things that concern the remaining sides of life, which the exception of the bracketed sphere of the ascetic. Between the “individual outside the world” and the holism of the rest of society, relations are hierarchical: they do not lie on one place (either-or). Being higher and recognized as such, the ascetic or hermit does not try to change society itself and does not interfere in its affairs.
But at a certain moment, a transition occurs from the “individual outside the world” to the “individual within the world.” This process began to manifest itself in Western Europe together with nominalism, and later with the Reformation (Calvinism) and the metaphysics of Modernity. The individual is acknowledged to be the fundamental reality, and the philosophy and ideology based on individualism begin to enter into direct opposition to traditional society, rooted in holism. Dumont meticulously traces individualism as the basis of modern society in the most diverse manifestations: from Ockham’s argument about universals to the pioneers of the economic and political thought of Modernity (Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, etc.) and right up to modern neoliberalism (Hayek, Popper, etc.).
According to Dumont, Holism is inseparably connected with hierarchy and traditional society. Individualism is logically associated with equality and modern society.
Dumont considered another important characteristic of the dichotomy between holism and individualism: the distinction between relations between persons (holism) / relations between the individual and nature (individualism). The transfer of attention from social relations to the relations of the individual with the external world laid the foundation of economics as an autonomous discipline, which primarily studies the relations of man and private property (i.e., privatized by the individual and hence an individualized fragment of the external world).
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