The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)

by James Falkner

  Philip V had been recognised as King of Spain by the Elector of Bavaria before he even set off from Versailles, and Savoy, Poland, Brunswick, Malta, Danzig and Hesse-Darmstadt hurried to do the same; the Maritime Powers accepted things as a fait accompli. Richly dressed in the Spanish style and sporting the starched godilla neck-cloth worn at the court, with the fair hair of his grandmother, and appearing to be calm and reflective yet eager to please and be pleased, Philip arrived at the Buen-Retiro palace just outside Madrid on 18 February 1701, where he was received with a tumultuous and joyous welcome from the assembled people. The Duc de St Simon recalled that:

  The King of Spain arrived in Madrid on the 18th February. From his first entrance into the country he had everywhere been most warmly welcomed. Acclamations were uttered when he appeared; fêtes and bull-fights were given in his honour; the nobles and ladies pressed around him. He had been proclaimed in Madrid some time before, in the midst of demonstrations of joy. Now that he had arrived amongst his subjects there, that joy burst out anew … It was impossible to conceive a greater or more general demonstration of joy. The Buen-Retiro, where the new King took up his quarters, was filled by the Court and the nobility. The Junto and a number of great men, received him at the door and the Cardinal Portocarrero, who was there, threw himself on his knees, and wished to kiss the King’s hand, but the King would not permit this; raised the Cardinal, embraced him, and treated him as his father.17

  The late Carlos II’s German-born widow, Mariana von Neuburg, was packed off into obscure and not very comfortable retirement, where she would be unable to make mischief. ‘The Queen of Spain was sent away from Madrid, and banished to Toledo, where she remained with but a small suite and still less consideration.’18 The very capable pro-Austrian viceroy to Catalonia, George, Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, was replaced by a nephew of Cardinal Portocarrero. French influence was strengthened by having the Duc d’Harcourt, Louis XIV’s ambassador to Madrid, appointed to be a member of the king’s council, while the national finances, such as they were, were put in the hands of French advisers. On 14 April Philip V made his formal state entry into Madrid; the pouring rain did nothing to dampen the enthusiasm of the welcoming crowds as the royal procession made its way from the Prado to the Puerta del Sol and onwards to the Alcázar. All things told, the new king was thought to have made a very good start to his reign, and encouraging news was received shortly afterwards that William III of England, bowing to parliamentary pressure to avoid renewed war, had on behalf of England and Holland sent his congratulation to the young Frenchman on his accession to the throne.

  A king had, of course, to have a wife and it was not to be expected that he would make his own choice, certainly not in a matter of such state importance and at the tender age of hardly eighteen years. In this affair Louis XIV was active on his grandson’s behalf, and chose as a suitable spouse Marie-Louise, the thirteen-year-old younger daughter of Duke Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy. The duke’s older daughter was already married to the Duc de Bourgogne, the Dauphin’s eldest son and eventually heir to the French throne, so this new alliance would keep things nicely in the family and, it was confidently hoped, bind Savoy more closely to France. This proved to be a false hope, however, and Victor-Amadeus, having his own dynastic ambitions, would in time join the military effort against France and the French contender for the Spanish throne. This could not be foreseen or imagined, and the marriage was duly celebrated, by proxy, in Madrid and Turin on 11 September 1701, and the bride set out for Nice two days later. where Spanish galleys waited to take her to her new home and husband. Philip V, just having learned of the joyful celebrations in the overseas empire at his accession to the throne, began a journey through Aragon and Catalonia to greet his wife. He travelled first to Saragossa, where he confirmed the fueros, their traditional rights and liberties, and then on to Barcelona, where the Catalan Cortez met the king in formal session, and their fueros were also confirmed.

  The marriage ceremony between the young royal couple was completed at Figueras; Marie-Louise had been accompanied by Anne-Marie de la Trémoille, the widowed Princesse des Ursins as her camarera mayor (head of household), chaperone and companion, and she would prove to be the éminence gris behind the throne, and misjudging her own role and position, in some respects make herself a thorough nuisance.19 The marriage got off to an inauspicious start, as the young bride was strong-willed and on learning that her Savoyard attendants were not to accompany her to Madrid, refused to enter her husband’s bed for several nights. On hearing of this difficulty, Louis XIV felt it appropriate to offer a few helpful words to his grandson concerning what made for a happy marriage:

  She has intelligence, and she will see that she ought to care uniquely to please you. I am sure that she will apply herself to this as soon as she controls her own behaviour, but it is necessary for your happiness, and for hers, that she disabuse herself of the ideas that someone has given her of governing you … Kings, exposed to public view, are even more scorned when they allow their wives to dominate them. You have before your eyes the example of your predecessor. The Queen is your first subject. In this role and in that of your wife, she ought to obey you. You ought to love her. You will not love her if tears have enough power over you to make you agree things contrary to your duty. Be firm from the beginning. I know that the first refusals will cause pain; that they are contrary to the sweetness of your nature, but do not fear to cause the Queen these slight chagrins for they will save her the real ones in the course of her life … Keep the Queen happy in spite of herself.20

  What attention the young king paid to this well-meant advice is not too clear, but the couple quickly became affectionate and close, as far as court etiquette would permit, even though Marie-Louise had all her father’s stubbornness of character. She remained a force to be reckoned with both at court and in her own household, and at times, particularly those of crisis in the coming war, she would prove her value as consort for Philip V.

  At his grandfather’s urging, in September 1701 Philip set out to travel to Naples to greet his Italian subjects. but the reception he received was not particularly warm and it was reported that ‘they seemed indifferent to whether a Bourbon or Habsburg prince should rule them. The Emperor has a considerable party there and the desire to have a king of their own is always apparent in their minds.’21 Cardinal Portocarrero had been appointed to be governor of Spain in his absence, and the queen remained behind, but the grandees in Madrid were not amused that their new king should prefer to spend time in Italy when affairs demanded his attention in Spain. The young man was understandably also homesick for the company of his new wife, and soon returned.

  All the same, despite such relatively minor difficulties, it seemed outwardly that the question of the succession to the throne was settled; there was no realistic possibility of a union of the crowns of France and Spain taking place, although French influence had obviously been extended, and so long as Louis XIV behaved judiciously in his dealings with his neighbours. The Maritime Powers, England and Holland, would certainly not go to war for the sake of an Austrian archduke, particularly if their trading interests in the Spanish Empire could be assured and even enhanced, while the actual ability of France to overawe and influence Spain in the long term appeared to be limited. Certainly no-one really wanted the expense and aggravation of a renewal of outright war over the issue – all might yet be well, even though the English and Dutch hopes of improved trading rights were dashed when the Spanish signed over the contract for the slave trade – the Asiento, previously held by the Portuguese – to a French company.22 Parliament in London had no taste for the cost and risks of renewed war – if only some ground could be gained over trade with the Spanish Empire perhaps the brewing storm would pass by.

  Attempts to reach an amicable and lasting agreement to settle the problem proved elusive, and Louis XIV would miscalculate the implacable opposition which he faced. However, for the moment Philip V was widely recognised as the legitimate
King of Spain, only in Vienna was this denied. Louis XIV was strategically in a strong position, being able to count as potential allies in the event of trouble, declared or intending to do so before long, Spain, Portugal, Savoy, Bavaria and the Elector-Bishops of Cologne and Liège. This being so, it was difficult to see how France itself could be attacked other than at enormous and laborious effort, while the Iberian peninsula was in the same way difficult for any force hostile to the new king to approach. Conversely, two of the main parties which might range themselves against France, Holland and Austria, were exposed to potential attack, and this perceived vulnerability would dominate the councils of the allies, and fix their strategy, for several long years.

  In the meantime, active hostilities had begun in earnest in northern Italy where the emperor had gathered an army and manned the passes through the southern Tyrol to counter the movement of large numbers of French troops into the plain of Lombardy.

  After some time the war, waited for and expected by all Europe at last broke out, by some Imperialist troops firing upon a handful of men near Albaredo. One Spaniard was killed, and all the rest of the party taken prisoner. The Imperialists would not give them up until a cartel was arranged. The King, upon hearing this, at once despatched the general officers to Italy. Our troops were to be commanded by Catinat, under M. De Savoie [Victor-Amadeus II]; and the Spanish troops by [the Prince of] Vaudemont, who was Governor-General of the Milanese.23

  The Milanese was one key part of French strategy, for to hold this region would effectively keep Habsburg Austria well away from Spain and much of the rest of Italy. At Louis XIV’s instructions, Marshal Nicolas de Catinat secured Mantua and the valley of the river Po, taking up a good defensive posture with his left flank secured on Lake Garda; Catinat and Vaudemont were, however, not on good terms and this hampered their operations. The imperial forces, commanded since May 1701 by the redoubtable Prince Eugene of Savoy, were concentrated at Roverodo to the north of Rivoli. After seeming to threaten an advance on Milan, and drawing French attention in that direction, Eugene then moved over steep mountain passes to Vicenza, blithely ignoring Venetian neutrality, and then pressed on across the rivers Adige and the Po to Carpi on 9 July 1701, completely turning the right flank of the French position. This was a significant accomplishment, passing large numbers of troops and materiel over poor roads and harsh terrain. ‘Retreat became necessary, but it was accomplished in excellent order and without disturbance from the enemy.’24 Catinat hastily withdrew to hold the line of the river Mincio, but Eugene adroitly switched his line of approach and turned the left of the new French position at Peschiera close to Lake Garda. ‘I trust,’ Louis XIV wrote peevishly on receiving the news of the reverse suffered by Catinat, ‘that my soldiers did their duty.’25

  The French lines of communication to Milan were now threatened, and Catinat fell back again, but having lost the confidence of the king, he was replaced on 23 August 1701 by François de Neufville, Duc de Villeroi. ‘The surprise of everybody at this was very great,’ St Simon recalled, ‘for no one expected that the Marechal de Villeroi would repair the fault of Catinat.’26 Louis XIV was, however, confident of new successes and wrote to Villeroi: ‘I cannot tell you how pleased I am to have you in command. I have reason to believe that you will finish the campaign gloriously, but take care of yourself, you know how necessary you are to me.’27 By then the imperial army had reached Chiari, and Eugene went into an entrenched camp in front of the French positions on the river Oglio. There, on 1 September the Franco-Spanish and Savoyard troops attacked Eugene in position, not understanding the strength of his defences, and in fierce fighting they were repulsed with severe losses. ‘My post at Chiari,’ the Prince wrote,

  notwithstanding its excellence, was nearly forced by the unparalleled impetuosity of the French; the houses, mills and all were already carried. Never did I witness such valour. Daun drove them back. My right, concealed on the ground behind an entrenchment, suddenly started up and fired when the enemy had advanced quite close. Villeroi ordered an attempt to be made with the centre; but this scarcely ever succeeds when the wings are beaten. The worthy, the admirable, Catinat rallied the troops, led them back to the attack, and received severe contusion on the breast, and a shot in the hand.28

  Villeroi had been accompanied by Duke Victor-Amadeus, as well as Catinat and Vaudemont, which cannot have simplified the chain of command on the day. ‘M. De Savoie,’ St Simon wrote, ‘led the attack; but was so firmly met by Prince Eugene, who was in an excellent position for defence, that he could do nothing and in the end was compelled to retire.’29 The news of this costly defeat stunned Louis XIV, but his reproof for his army commander was measured ‘I ordered you to seek out the enemy, to keep as near to them as possible, but that ought to have been carried out with prudence.’ The king and Villeroi were old friends, and the note then softened in tone, alluding to the clearly demonstrated skill of his opponents. ‘I have great confidence in you … Be cautious and risk nothing with people who know how to profit by everything, and who entrench themselves before you.’30

  There was not much more to be done than to prepare to go into winter quarters, and Villeroi settled his army into camp at Cremona. ‘The campaign passed away, our troops always retreating, the Imperialists always gaining ground, they continually increasing in numbers; we diminishing little by little every day.’31 With this skilful campaign, and Mantua firmly in imperial hands, Prince Eugene had thrown back the French occupation of much of the north of Italy, savaged Villeroi’s army in the process, and encouraged the Italian states either to support the alliance being formed against Louis XIV, or at least to cling to neutrality and not get too closely involved. In this preliminary phase, before the outbreak of the war proper, a significant advantage had thus been gained in the struggle for the throne of Spain. If imperial troops could seize and hold enough Spanish territory in northern Italy, then the division of the empire could be said to be actively underway. This was widely recognised, and would help to persuade the Elector of Brandenburg of the wisdom of allying himself to the effort against France. More might still be obtained and the Earl of Marlborough, soon sent to command the Anglo-Dutch army in the north, had a careful eye on events in Italy, and the strategic importance of what was achieved there, writing that ‘the King [William III] is greatly perturbed as to the possibility of a French attack on Holland [but] the strengthening of Prince Eugene must not be neglected.’32

  Map 2: The Netherlands in the late seventeenth century, before Louis XIV’s campaign of expansion.

  Chapter 2

  The Grand Alliance

  ‘No great war was ever entered upon with so much reluctance.’1

  Early in February 1701, in a dramatic and highly inflammatory move, French troops had been sent to occupy the principal towns in the Spanish Netherlands. This could only have been done with the connivance of the governor-general of the region, Maximilien-Emmanuel Wittelsbach, the Elector of Bavaria. Ostensibly owing allegiance to the emperor in Vienna, the elector was, however, in league with Louis XIV, having arranged a secret treaty with the king, the key clause being that ‘He shall permit the troops of France upon a certain day to enter into all the strong places of the Low Countries.’2 Furthermore, if conflict with Austria or the Maritime Powers ensued, the elector was to quit the Spanish Netherlands, handing the governance over to the Marquis de Bedmar, and go to Bavaria where ‘he would receive into his dominions a body of French troops with such a general as the Most Christian King shall think fit to command them’. The motives of the elector and the inducements offered him were clear and on a vast and dazzling scale, for a further clause in the agreement had it that ‘if it should please God to bless his Electoral Highness’s arms so far as to dethrone the Emperor, the two Kings [Louis XIV and Philip V] will employ all their power to place his Electoral Highness upon the Imperial throne’. Wittelsbach was a gifted soldier with a fine reputation in the field, but his ambitions got the better of him and he would prove to be
a poor statesman.

  The ostensible reason for this French campaign of seizure was to afford some protection for the possessions of His Most Catholic Majesty, King Philip V (until recently the Duc d’Anjou), but the practical result was to give enormous offence to the Dutch. Towns which provided the States-General with their Barrier, a safeguard against future French aggression, and guaranteed to them under solemn treaty terms, now passed into the hands of Louis XIVs soldiers withoutt a shot being fired. There was almost no resistance; the local Spanish officials welcomed the arrival of the French troops, and the Dutch garrisons in Luxembourg, Namur, Mons, Charleroi, Oudenarde, Ath and Nieupoort, 15,000 strong, were rounded up and interned. At the same time, the towns of Liège, Huy and Ruremonde came under French influence when the Prince-Bishop of Liège allied himself to France. Only at Maastricht, packed with huge stocks of warlike materiel, did the Dutch governor, Johan Wigand van Goor, robustly refuse the French summons, but at a stroke, the southern border of Holland had, it seemed, been laid open to whatever malevolent intentions Louis XIV might have for the future. The French king had gained important and strong positions for use in any future military campaign, and certainly had no intention of quickly handing them over to the care of Spanish garrisons: ‘They never had any apprehensions of the Dutch remaining in their towns in Flanders and it is not they but France who has driven them out and will never give the fortresses back to Spain.’3 Louis XIV had gained much but was to pay more for this unwise course of action, and the price demanded would be disproportionately high.