The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)

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The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) Page 28

by James Falkner


  The most fatal blow, which profoundly injured our industry and population, came from the impact of the War of the Spanish Succession. It is impossible to describe the degree of misery caused by the hostilities and by the licence of the troops, and by the demands made on the country by the commissaries and contractors supplying food to the army.5

  However, there was no significant de-population over the decade of the war – both sides as a matter of pragmatic policy tried to avoid civilian casualties and those losses sustained in battle were, more often than not, non-Spaniards. The passage of campaigning armies, whether they be Spanish, French, Dutch, Portuguese, British or Austrian, had in fact, relatively little impact upon the ordinary people, apart from the usual trials and inconveniences of having hungry, ragged and sometimes ill-disciplined or mutinous soldiers roaming the neighbourhood. Any army in the early eighteenth century depended upon being able to support itself on the produce of the region through which it moved. Much of Spain was so agriculturally unproductive that armies simply could not fully operate there, both Berwick and Das Minas finding this out to their cost, and the freedom of action of such army commanders as a result was constrained to a fair degree. Poor harvests over the period of the war were a greater burden to the people than the vagaries of having campaigning armies operating in the locality, and between 1708 and 1711 the crops failed repeatedly, with much taxation being of necessity remitted by Philip V to alleviate the resulting distress of the people. That tax revenue would have been used to pay the troops and further the course of the war, but instead the king’s grandfather in Versailles made up the loss. Even so, late in October 1710, Philip V had to agree that Spanish ports should be opened to all shipping bringing in grain, even though those vessels might be Dutch or British. Bad harvests, not war, brought most distress to Spain over these years. The lingering fear, at least partly manufactured to encourage a cautious and sceptical parliament in London on the march to war, that there might be a union of the crowns of Spain and France, proved in the end to be nonsense.

  The France of Louis XIV, arguably the main player in the whole drama of the disputed succession, was left exhausted financially and militarily by the enormous efforts expended to secure the throne for d’Anjou. ‘I have loved war too much,’ the old king murmured on his deathbed in 1715, and this was evident from the state of affairs of the country that he bequeathed to his great grandson, the infant Louis XV. Periods of regency, such as that which ensued in France after the king’s death, are often not stable, and before long national bankruptcy came with harebrained notions on national finances and the abolition of money running amuck through the economy under the malevolent influence of a Scottish banker, Samuel Barnard. France and the French were robust enough, of course, to recover, but this inevitably took time, and when combined with the cost of the war, both in terms of treasure and lost prestige, the ability of the French to influence and dominate their neighbours in western Europe was diminished for many years as a result.

  The eighteenth century would certainly see many years of renewed war, but the formidable power and influence of the France of Louis XIV had been wasted away by the gruelling years of conflict. That no-one could be said to have either won the war on the one hand, or lost the war on the other, was beside the point. It had been found in 1702 that the question of who should succeed Carlos II could only be settled by force of arms – a conflict that no-one wanted was still a war that no-one was able to avoid. The reduction in French power, influence and prestige was a notable and in a broad sense beneficial turning point in European history, establishing once more a kind of balance of power that had been lost with the breaking up of the empire of Charles V many years before. No one state predominated, and was able to over-awe and over-power its neighbours, at least until the arrival of revolution in Paris and the rise of Emperor Napoleon I and his brilliant and baleful military capabilities. To that end, then, the treaties to end the war for Spain, arranged between 1713 and 1715, at Utrecht, Baden, Rastadt and Madrid, may be viewed, dispassionately and in their entirety, to have been a good thing.

  Appendix 1

  The Main Terms of the 1702 Treaty of Grand Alliance

  That the Allies [England, Holland and Austria, although Portugal and Savoy would join in time] would seek to obtain, by negotiation or war, that:

  1. Binding guaranties be given that the thrones of France and Spain would remain separate. [Note: Not that the Duc d’Anjou would necessarily have to vacate the throne in Madrid.]

  2. Austria should receive the Milanese, Naples, Sicily, the Balearic Islands, the Spanish [southern] Netherlands and Luxembourg.

  3. Holland would regain her Barrier Fortresses, recently seized by the French.

  4. The Elector of Brandenburg to be recognised as King in Prussia [not of Prussia] in return for his active support for the Grand Alliance.

  5. Financial subsidies to be paid to German princes in return for their military support for the Alliance.

  6. England and Holland to be free to conduct trade in the West Indies.

  Clauses(2) and (3) were partly contradictory over the issue of who had sovereignty over the southern Netherlands, but the treaty was drafted in sufficiently general terms that it was acceptable to all parties. The region was intended to ‘serve as a dyke, rampart and barrier to separate and keep off France from the United Provinces’: see Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 146. Clause (6) was of particular interest to England, where there were strong ambitions to expand overseas trade, including that of slaves, in the Indies. A later clause was added in April 1702 that the allies would jointly insists on a peaceful Protestant succession for the Crowns of England and Scotland – a direct result of Louis XIV’s injudicious acknowledgment of the Jacobite Pretender as King James III.

  Appendix 2

  The Main Terms of the Treaties of Utrecht, Baden and Rastadt, and Madrid (1713–1715)

  (a)

  King Philip V to be recognised as King of Spain and the Indies. The crowns of France and Spain to always remain separate.*

  (b)

  Naples, the Milanese region, Sardinia and the southern Netherlands to be under Austrian rule. The Dutch Barrier in the southern Netherlands, in revised form, to be re-established.

  (c)

  France to surrender the fortresses of Kehl, Freiburg and Breisach on the right bank of the river Rhine, but to retain Strasburg and Alsace. The fortifications and harbour mole at the port of Dunkirk to be demolished.

  (d)

  The Elector of Bavaria, and the Elector-Bishops of Liège and Cologne to be restored to their domains and properties.**

  (e)

  The Protestant succession to the throne in London, on the death of Queen Anne, to be assured. James Stuart, the Pretender James III, to be expelled from France.

  (f)

  Great Britain to retain Minorca, Gibraltar, Newfoundland, Hudson’s Bay, Arcadia (Nova Scotia) and St Kitts.

  (g)

  Holland and Great Britain to receive exclusive access to trade with certain Spanish ports and territories, to the exclusion of the French.

  (h)

  The Kingdom of Prussia (previously Brandenburg) to be recognised, and to receive Upper Guelderland. The Duke of Savoy to be recognised as King of Sicily and to receive a portion of the Milanese.

  Notes

  * How such a renunciation of rights to the throne of France could be assured and if necessary enforced is hard to see. There was no legal mechanism for a French Prince of the Blood, whatever other office he may hold, to renounce his claim even if he wished to do so. The Grand Alliance was, in effect, trusting that Louis XIV, Philip V and any heirs to either throne to keep to the bargain they had struck. Events were to prove that they would do so, as Louis XV, when he matured, did not lack heirs of his own.

  ** In restoring the Elector of Bavaria, the Duke of Marlborough lost the possession of the Principality of Mindleheim that had been given to him after the victory at Blenheim by Emperor Leopold I. Marlborough retained the title
of Prince of Mindleheim, however.

  The Range of Treaties in Total

  The whole series of treaties which brought to an end the War for Spain, generally but over-simply known as ‘the Treaty of Utrecht,’ comprised:

  Utrecht

  11 April 1713

  Treaty between France, Great Britain, Holland, Prussia, Portugal and Savoy.

  13 July 1713

  Treaty between Spain and Great Britain.

  13 August 1713

  Treaty between Spain and Savoy.

  26 June 1714

  Treaty between Spain and Holland.

  Rastadt and Baden

  6 March/7 September

  1714

  Treaty between France and Austria.

  Madrid

  6 February 1715

  Treaty between Spain and Portugal.

  15 November 1715

  Barrier Treaty between Holland, France and Austria.

  (N.B. Spain and Austria finally concluded a treaty at The Hague in February 1720).

  Appendix 3

  Key Military Figures in the War of Spanish Succession

  James FitzJames, Duke of Berwick (1670–1734) and Marshal of France was born on 21 August 1670, the natural son of James, Duke of York (James II of England) and his mistress, Arabella Churchill, the elder sister of John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough. In 1686 FitzJames was sent to take part in the campaign against the Ottoman Turks, serving with the imperial army at the capture of Budapest, which had been in Ottoman hands for 145 years, and the expulsion of the Turkish forces from much of Hungary. The young FitzJames was noted for behaving ‘with remarkable gallantry’ in the action. See Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, pp. 27–8 for more details on this campaign in Hungary. In March 1687 FitzJames was created Duke of Berwick, Earl of Tynemouth and Baron Bosworth by his father, now on the throne, rather precariously as it turned out, in London. Campaigning once more in Hungary, Berwick made the acquaintance of Claude-Louis-Hector de Villars, who would become a Marshal of France of equal renown in the arduous campaigns against Marlborough and Eugene. Made a major-general in the imperial army, although he never actively exercised that role, Berwick on his return to England was appointed to be governor of Portsmouth and Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards. On his father going into exile in France, Berwick campaigned in Ireland in the futile cause of a Jacobite restoration, landing in Kinsale on 27 March 1689, and going on to enter Dublin a week later. He served at the unsuccessful siege of Londonderry, and was present at the defeat suffered by his father at the Boyne in July 1690. After successfully defending the line of the Shannon for some months, Berwick returned to France in the spring of 1691. Serving with the French army in the Low Countries, the duke fought at the cavalry battle at Leuze in September of the same year, and would have had command a fresh expeditionary force to attempt a restoration of James II had the French ships involved not been destroyed at Barfleur and La Hogue in 1692. Having fought at the battle of Steinkirk, Berwick was taken prisoner during the bitter fighting at Landen in July 1693, having been recognised in the melee by Charles Churchill, Marlborough’s younger brother, and was introduced to William III. ‘The prince,’ he recalled (not caring to recognise William as a king), ‘made me a very polite compliment, to which I only replied with a low bow.’ Concerns that he would be regarded as a rebel and traitor were soon set to one side as ‘We were in the country of the King of Spain, and I had the honour to serve as Lieutenant-General in the army of the Most Christian King [Louis XIV]’: see Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, pp. 100–1. Soon set at liberty, Berwick married Honora de Burgh, the widow of Patrick Sarsfield, Earl of Lucan, in 1695, and crossed to England clandestinely the next year to sound out what support for the Jacobite cause might exist. His wife having died, Berwick married again in 1700, to Anne Bulkely, a fruitful union that produced thirteen children, not all surviving infancy. Serving actively through the war for the throne of Spain, and receiving his marshal’s baton as reward for many successes, the duke was engaged in campaigning in Spain once again in 1719 as Philip V’s forces tried to overturn the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht. He was made military governor of Guyenne, and took part of moves to reform the structure and training of the French army. Having lived in semi-retirement for some time, Berwick was recalled to service by King Louis XV to campaign in the War of the Polish Succession. At the siege of Phillipsburg, on 12 June 1734, he was decapitated by a roundshot thought to have been fired in error by his own gunners.

  Nicolas de Catinat, Marshal of France (1637–1712), born in Paris, and studied as a lawyer, but he entered military service and distinguished himself at the capture of Lille in 1667. Serving under the Prince of Condé, he fought at Seneffe in 1674, and subsequently against the Duke of Savoy and his Austrian allies in northern Italy. Catinat commanded at the victories of Staffardo and Marsaglia in 1693 and was made a Marshal of France, having the charge of the the successful siege of Ath in 1697, with Vauban’s assistance. At the outbreak of the war for Spain Catinat, ‘a careful general’, held the appointment of commander of the French forces in northern Italy, where he was outmatched by Prince Eugene’s daring strokes such as at Carpi, although contradictory instructions from Versailles and a lack of supplies hampered his efforts. After being replaced in command by Marshal Villeroi, he continued to serve loyally for a time with the army before being recalled to Versailles by Louis XIV. It is only fair to say that Villeroi had no more success fighting against Eugene than Catinat had enjoyed, and his replacement was something of an error. He held no further appointments, and in retirement was an ardent gardener.

  Prince (François) Eugene de Savoy-Carignan (1663–1736) was born in Paris the son of Eugene-Maurice, Comte de Soissons, and Olympia Mancini, the niece of Louis XIV’s close adviser in his early years, the Italian-born Cardinal Mazarin. Eugene was refused a commission in the French army by the king, who felt that he would make a better priest instead. Having no taste for a career in the church, Eugene took off for the Spanish Netherlands at the age of twenty-one, and went on to Vienna where he entered the service of Emperor Leopold I. He was engaged in the campaigns against the Ottoman Turks, and fought at the relief of the siege of Vienna, in Hungary where he was the imperial commander for a time, and at the battle of Zenta in September 1697, where the main Ottoman army was defeated. Appointed to the Imperial War Council in 1703, Eugene’s close collaboration with Marlborough in the 1704 campaign on the Danube was a key factor in the triumphant victory at Blenheim on 4 August that year. The skilful victory at the siege of Turin in 1706 later re-stated Eugene’s reputation as a great commander, and although unsuccessful at the abortive siege of Toulon in 1707, he fought in the victories at Oudenarde in 1708 and Malplaquet in 1709. Commanding the allied army in Flanders in 1712, his troops were out-manoeuvred and soundly defeated at Denain by Marshal Villars. After the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession, Eugene was appointed in 1714 to be the governor of the Austrian (previously Spanish) Netherlands, but campaigning against the Ottomans once more he was present at the victory at Peterwardin in 1716 and the capture of Belgrade the following year. Although he retired from active service, the prince became the principal adviser to Emperor Charles VI, and despite his age and increasing ill-health was appointed to be the imperial commander in the War of the Polish Succession in 1734–5. Although fond of female company, Eugene remained a lifelong bachelor and became a noted patron of the arts, and he died at his home in Vienna at the age of seventy-three.

  Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt (1662–1705), was the second son of Landgrave Ludwig I and his wife Elizabeth. He fought in the imperial service against the Ottomans in Hungary in 1687, and took part in the battle of Mohacs. After serving with the Venetians in the abortive fighting against the Ottomans in the Aegean, Prince George fought at the siege of Mainz, and was wounded in an attack on the French-held citadel in Bonn. He entered the service of William III of England in 1690 and was present at the Boyne and Aughrim, being wounded on b
oth occasions. The prince became a Roman Catholic and served against the Ottomans again before being appointed Emperor Leopold’s commander in Catalonia, where he was made Captain of Horse by King Carlos II. A highly competent commander, Prince George became well acquainted with Spain and the Catalonian people, which proved of great value in the opening years of the war of succession. His early death at the siege of Barcelona in 1705 was a distinct blow to the allied cause in the peninsula.

  Admiral Sir John Leake (1656–1720), the son of Captain Richard Leake, Master-Gunner of England, born in London and a highly accomplished seaman, described as ‘his countenance open, his eye sharp and piercing, and his address both graceful and manly, denoting both a military man and a gentleman’.1 He served at the battle of the Texel in 1673, during the Third Anglo-Dutch war, and was master-gunner of HMS Neptune (90 guns). He commanded the bomb-vessel HMS Firedrake, designed by his father, at the battle of Bantry Bay in 1689, where the French warship La Diamante was set on fire. Leake was present at the relief of the siege of Londonderry and three years later served at the destruction of the French fleet at the battles of Barfleur and La Hogue. As a vice-admiral he conducted highly damaging operations against French shipping and outposts in the early years of the war for Spain. His operations during the capture and subsequent siege of Gibraltar were very well handled, but his conduct of the sea-battle with the French main fleet off Málaga was criticised. He successfully relieved besieged Barcelona in 1706 having command of a fleet of ninety warships and transports, relieved Cartagena and Alicante, and participated in the occupation of Majorca and Ibiza. After the capture of Sardinia, Leake took part of his fleet out of the Mediterranean for the winter, and so did not join in the capture of Minorca. Promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1710, and a Lord of the Admiralty, he was also a Member of Parliament, but was pensioned off by King George I when he came to the throne in London in 1714, after which he lived quietly in retirement.

 

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