graded their skills in making ceramics. Therefore, by this time Japa nese
leaders had reason to feel that Japan’s governmental structure, philosoph-
ical under pinnings, religion, and art were all comparable to China’s, and that
it was no longer necessary to accept a formal tribute relationship in which
they had to acknowledge that the Chinese leader was the “Son of Heaven,”
ranked far above the “King of Japan.”
Furthermore, the Chinese state was no longer such a compelling model.
After the An Lushan Rebellion of 755–763, the Tang dynasty had begun
to decline. By 838, China no longer had the appeal as a model that the great
Tang dynasty had earlier, at the peak of its dynamism. Many groups out-
side China’s bound aries had stopped sending tribute missions to China, and
in 838 Japan sent its last tribute mission. In the de cades just before and after
. 29 .
china and japan
the collapse of the Tang dynasty in 907, there were continuing strug gles for
power, and the succeeding dynasties had difficulty gaining the necessary
unity and leverage to control China’s trading partners.
Six centuries later, from 1403 to 1547, when the Ming dynasty (1368–
1644) was strong and the Japa nese shogunate was weak, Japan agreed to re-
turn to the ritual subordination to China by resuming a tribute relationship.
The founder of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang, confident that China had
all the trade it needed, demanded that Japan resume its tributary relationship
if it wanted to trade with China. The shogun at the time, Ashikaga Yoshim-
itsu, believed that trade would be beneficial to Japan and that China’s recog-
nition of the shogun as a partner would also strengthen the shogunate. The
tribute relationship in 1403 continued for more than a century, until Japa nese
leaders again felt they were in a strong enough position to abandon it.
During the millennium from 838 to 1862, the basic relationship between
China and Japan revolved around trade.1 As Chinese shipbuilding pro-
gressed during the Song and Yuan dynasties China began to produce ships
that were larger and stronger, and trade increased.2 But compared with the
scale of trade in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the amount of
trade between Japan and China at the time was still miniscule.
Chinese and Japa nese leaders generally sought to maintain peaceful
working relations with each other. The major exceptions were two wildly
ambitious leaders who wanted to conquer overseas territories. One was a
Mongol, Kublai Khan, who led Yuan dynasty troops to attack Japan in the
late thirteenth century, and the other was Japa nese, Toyotomi Hideyoshi,
who invaded Korea on the way to a planned conquest of China in the late
sixteenth century. However, both failed in their attempts to conquer the
other country. Thereafter, in both cases trade resumed and officials pro-
moted peaceful relations between the two countries.
The countries’ images of each other underwent changes over the years.
As Joshua Fogel observes, earlier Chinese images of the Japa nese had largely
been derived from Japan’s “sagacious monks,” who had studied in China
during the Sui and Tang periods. However, during the Ming period the
dominant Chinese image of the Japa nese was formed by the “bloodthirsty
pirates” who then ravaged the Chinese coast.
In Japan, images of China and its people were dominated by the re spect
that the Japa nese had for learned Chinese officials and monks. The Japa nese
. 30 .
Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
never lost sight of China’s huge size, its wealth of resources, and the extraor-
dinary objects its artisans produced, and Japa nese traders never lost sight
of China’s high level of commercial activity. However, victories by Toyotomi
Hideyoshi’s troops in some battles with Chinese troops in Korea reduced
Japan’s awe for China because its military was not so overwhelming.
Until 1895, the Japa nese took far more interest in Chinese matters than
the Chinese took interest in Japan. Japa nese scholars continued to read Chi-
nese works, but few in China were interested in Japa nese culture. In the
middle of the nineteenth century, as Japan began to look outward, the Japa-
nese, rather than Chinese, took the initiative to renew official contacts be-
tween the two countries.
In contrast to the transformation of Japa nese civilization brought about
by what Japan learned from China from 600 to 838, and the later transfor-
mation of China by what it would learn from Japan after 1895, during the
millennium from 838 to 1862 neither country was fundamentally trans-
formed by what it learned from the other. To trace the major changes in
Sino- Japanese relations during this long period, it is useful to divide the mil-
lennium into the period from 838 to 1403, when there were no tributary
relations; the period from 1403 to 1547, when China and Japan had a tribu-
tary relationship; and the period from 1547 to 1862, when there were no of-
ficial contacts.
Local Supervisors, Merchants, and Monks, 838–1403
By the time Japan stopped sending tribute missions, the major economic
center of China had shifted from China’s northwest in the Wei River valley
to the lower Yangtze River area along the Pacific coast. Advances in irriga-
tion and planting in the lower Yangtze region enabled the development and
expansion of rice paddy agriculture. The good harbors in the region made
pos si ble more rapid economic development, which led to an increase in the
region’s population.
Because the Japa nese central government no longer controlled trade,
Japa nese merchants were free to transport goods from Japan to the lower
Yangtze ports— Yangzhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo, and to Fujian and Guang-
zhou on the Pacific coast south of the Yangtze River— and to return with
Chinese exports. Similarly, Chinese merchant ships could carry goods to
. 31 .
china and japan
sell in Japan and return with goods for the Chinese market. At the time,
Japan’s most active international port was Hakata (present- day Fukuoka,
in Kyushu), where local officials appointed by the shogun were stationed
to supervise the comings and goings of ships for international travel.
During the Song dynasty (960–1279) the Chinese economy became
more commercialized, and copper coins were used as exchange. Song offi-
cials found it advantageous to carry on trade with Japan and to collect cus-
toms fees, so they did not insist on continuing the tribute relations. Sino-
Japanese trade grew, and exchanges were relatively smooth. Because Chinese
ships were generally sturdier than Japa nese ships, more Chinese ships than
Japa nese ships made the voyage between Hakata and China’s ports.
Before, when ships were smaller and less sturdy, traders from Japan gen-
erally took the northern route from Kyushu to Korea, and then along the
western coast of Korea through the Gulf of Bohai to North China. How-
ever, as Richard Von Glahn explains, with larger ships travel increased via
the more
direct but more dangerous southern route, across the rougher seas
between Hakata and Ningbo.
During much of its rule, the Song dynasty managed to coexist peace-
fully with the Liao dynasty (970–1125) to its north. Although most trade
from Japan was conducted with the Song dynasty in the lower Yangtze area,
Japan also carried on a small amount of trade with the Liao. Goods from
the Liao dynasty, whose territory covered much of present- day China’s
Northeast, were transported across the Korean Peninsula to Japan.
In 1127, Jurchen invaders from the north conquered Kaifeng, capital of
the Song dynasty. After the Song retreated southward and established a new
capital in Hangzhou, the dynasty was called the Southern Song and the
previous era when Kaifeng was the Song capital became known as the
Northern Song. With the capital in Hangzhou, located on the southern
bank of the Yangtze River where it could take advantage of the economic
growth in the lower Yangtze region, Southern Song trade flourished be-
tween the ports in the Yangtze delta and Hakata, up until Hangzhou was
overwhelmed by the Mongols in 1279.
Japa nese recognized that the Song dynasty, with its large continental
base and its massive public works proj ects, had a more advanced economy
and more specialized markets than Japan, and it had attractive products
. 32 .
Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
Japan could buy. As overseas trade grew, craftsmen along China’s coastal
areas expanded their businesses, making porcelain, ceramics, silk, and cotton
textiles to sell to Japa nese and other foreign buyers.
The Chinese had begun making copper coins (sometimes called bronze
coins) even before the Han dynasty was established in 206 bc, and by the
time of the Northern Song dynasty they were producing extensive quanti-
ties of such coins. Scholars have estimated that there may have been as many
as two billion copper coins in circulation during Song China.3 The coins
could be used not only as a mea sure for collecting taxes but also for long-
distance commercial exchanges. During the time of the Song dynasty, Japan
made efforts to produce copper coins on its own, but Japan’s coin- making
technology was inferior to China’s, and Japan soon abandoned its attempts
and began using Chinese copper coins. The Japa nese, eager for more coins,
were willing to export cloth, pottery, and other goods to China in exchange
for Chinese copper coins. At times, government supervisors in Chinese
port cities endeavored to limit the amount of copper coins going to Japan.
As an alternative, in the late ninth century the Japa nese monk Ennin and
others used gold dust to pay for Chinese goods, and there was a set conver-
sion rate between rice and gold dust. By the tenth century less gold dust
was available, and the Japa nese resorted to using rice again to pay for Chi-
nese goods. Papermaking skills in China had by then improved, and for a
time the Song dynasty used paper currency, but after some de cades it aban-
doned the use of paper currency and returned to using copper coins.
During the 838–1403 period, without tribute relations— and thus
without diplomatic relations— the central governments of China and Japan
did not play impor tant roles in organ izing trade. The key actors carry ing
out and regulating trade between China and Japan were government super-
visors at the trading ports, merchants, and monks.
Port Supervisors
Although the successive Chinese and Japa nese governments no longer or-
ga nized trade missions after the end of tribute relations, they still set rules
governing trade and established offices in port cities to supervise trade, ex-
amine the goods entering and leaving the ports, and collect customs fees.
. 33 .
china and japan
The local port supervisors sought to make certain that the government
got an appropriate share of the imports and that goods in short supply were
not exported. Because China had more ships and exchanged more goods
with more countries than Japan, it was easier for China’s port supervisors
to exercise some standardization and to exact set fees. In contrast, in Japan
there were so few ships that it was difficult to set standard fees, leaving more
leeway for local officials to set fees themselves. There were continuing ten-
sions with the merchants over the fees that port officials extracted. The port
supervisors also had the right to refuse to accept certain cargo. But demand
for many goods was high and the distance from Chinese ports to the Song
capital and from Japa nese ports to the court in Kyoto made it difficult for
both governments to maintain tight control over port supervisors. Local
port supervisors often found opportunities to pass on some of the goods
and some of the income from fees to family and friends. Corruption, by its
nature, is impossible for scholars to mea sure, but there are documents from
the time acknowledging that such prob lems existed and that violators were
punished.
In some years, to prevent the outflow of certain goods, local supervisors
in both China and Japan limited the frequency that ships could enter the
ports and the amount of those goods that could be exported. For example,
when Chinese officials grew concerned about the shortage of copper and
the great demand for coins, they required that supervisors restrict the
number of copper coins being exported to Japan.
The office supervising trade at the Hakata port was the Kyushu Head-
quarters in nearby Dazaifu. When the Kyushu Headquarters was first es-
tablished in the seventh century, the Kyoto court assigned some officials
from the nobility in Kyoto to serve there, to ensure central control over for-
eign trade, and to make sure the court in Kyoto had the first opportunity to
purchase select goods from China. Because of the difficulty of supervising
local port officials from a distance before modern communication and trans-
port facilities were available, the local port supervisors assumed consider-
able in de pen dence in managing trade.
Some goods that arrived from China cleared customs in Hakata and
could be transported by ship to other Japa nese ports that were not allowed
to engage in direct foreign trade. By 1469 the port of Sakai, located on the
. 34 .
Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
outskirts of Osaka, an in de pen dent city similar to the merchant cities of
medieval Eu rope and famous for metalworking and textiles, was opened.
Domestic ships traveling from Hakata up through the Inland Sea to Sakai
could pass on foreign goods that had come into Japan at Hakata. Sakai pro-
vided opportunities for wealthy families in the prosperous Kansai region,
including Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, and Nara, to acquire imported goods. Only
a very small number of localities could engage in direct foreign trade. One
such port was Bungo Funai (in present- day Oita City, Oita prefecture, in
northeastern Kyushu), and a regional trade headquarters was established
there with supervisors to oversee the import and export of goods.
Hakata is not as well known in the Western world as Nagasaki, but as
the only open port in Japan at the time, it followed many policies that were
later adopted in Nagasaki when it was the only open port during the
Tokugawa period (1603–1868). For example, local officials in Hakata were
expected to inform the court in Kyoto about the foreign ships that arrived
in Japan and about the goods that were imported and exported. In nearby
Dazaifu there was a guest house, the Korokan, that provided the hotel ser-
vices for foreign visitors, enabling local officials to have a mea sure of con-
trol over the activities of those foreigners who docked their ships nearby.
After the middle of the eleventh century, when the guest house was no
longer used, Chinese traders who stayed in Hakata were grouped together
in a “Chinatown” district, similar to that in Nagasaki during the Tokugawa
period. Some remains of the Korokan guest house were discovered in 1987,
and they have been studied by archaeologists seeking to gather information
about the types of goods exchanged.
In 971 the Chinese government established a Marine Trade Superin-
tendence Office (Shibosi) in Guangzhou (in Guangdong province) to
serve as the gatekeeper on the Chinese side. Later, as the lower Yangtze re-
gion began to prosper, government offices to supervise the trade were
established in Hangzhou (989) and Ningbo (992). Merchants were re-
quired to obtain licenses to engage in foreign trade. In 1080 Ningbo was
the only city allowed to issue licenses for Chinese ships to travel to Korea
and Japan. All arriving ships had to undergo inspections, and their goods
were taxed. Actual taxes varied greatly over time, ranging from as low as
5 percent at times to as high as 70 percent. When the taxes were very high,
. 35 .
china and japan
merchants had greater incentives to resort to smuggling. Because there
were far more foreign ships in Chinese ports than there were in Japa nese
ports, China developed facilities and more standardized methods for taxing
imported goods.
Prior to the Tang dynasty (618–907), Guangzhou was the key port in
China for foreign trade. Until the eleventh century, Dengzhou, in Shandong
province, a port for trade with Korea, was also used for trade with Japan.
Guangzhou remained a lively port for foreign trade until the thirteenth
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