bility for the defeat, committed suicide. The Japa nese, who knew of the ad-
miral’s reputation, admired him for taking responsibility in the manner of
a proper defeated samurai. The Japa nese allowed his body to be carried away
on a Chinese ship, and as the ship passed, the Japa nese lowered their flags
in an expression of re spect.
Sarah Paine, in her study of the Sino- Japanese War, concludes that
Japan’s remarkable military successes, winning every impor tant battle without
losing a single ship, did not result from the superiority of its ships or its
weapons. The Chinese had purchased a number of excellent warships and
had a large supply of rifles. One major factor in Japan’s victory was that
China was not sufficiently unified to bring all its forces to bear in the key
battles. China’s southern fleet did not even take part in the fighting. Also,
regional dialects and loyalties rendered coordination among China’s vari ous
units difficult. Japan, with its standardized weaponry, could manage weapon
replacements better than China and could ensure the availability of appro-
priate ammunition. Japan’s superior information about the enemy also gave
it an advantage as it devised strategies for attack. And Japa nese troops were
better trained, more disciplined, and better or ga nized. New rural recruits to
the military during the Meiji period might not have understood the routines
for hygiene, punctuality, and orderliness required by the military, but such
military discipline was instilled in them through basic training. Some of
China’s leading military officers had been chosen because of their skills in
the traditional essay examinations for selecting government officials, not for
their military skills. And although some Chinese troops fought valiantly,
others, less imbued with patriotism, quickly abandoned their posts when
they were attacked. Thus, the forces of the smaller nation surprised, out-
maneuvered, and decisively defeated the forces of the larger nation.
In 1894, on the eve of the war, Japan had signed a commercial treaty with
Great Britain that ended the unequal treaties. For years Japan had been
building up its court system, enacting laws, and training lawyers to meet
international standards. Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu and Prime
Minister Ito Hirobumi, widely respected by foreign diplomats, had been
actively involved in the negotiations with Great Britain. According to the
new treaty, which was to go into effect five years later, Japan would have the
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right to try foreigners in Japa nese courts. In contrast, while the Chinese had
also long complained about the unequal treaties, the foreign powers, not
yet confident of the professionalism of Chinese courts, would not abandon
them until 1946. Among the unequal treaties that were fi nally ended in 1946
was the one unequal treaty that had been forced on China by a non- Western
country, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which Japan had imposed on China at
the end of the Sino- Japanese War.
The Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895
By January 1895, the devastating Chinese defeat and the continued presence
of Japa nese troops in China where they could easily attack Beijing gave the
Japa nese victors the power to impose a treaty that brought great pain to
China. Within China, a small number of officials realized how little bar-
gaining power they had, but some Chinese officials and citizens harbored
illusions of Chinese leverage that was out of keeping with what the Japa-
nese, confident of their position on the battlefield, would accept. Within
Japan, there was a triumphant mood, a sense that Japan had arrived as a
world power, that the Japa nese could humiliate the Chinese, who had acted
so arrogantly in the previous centuries, and that they could impose a victor’s
justice. They took as a model the conditions that Prus sia had imposed on
France in the Treaty of Frankfurt following its victory in the 1871 Franco-
Prussian War, a treaty that included large grants of territory and imposed
heavy costs on France.
While the fighting continued during the Sino- Japanese War, the
Chinese had sought on several occasions to negotiate a peace treaty. On
November 26, 1894, just after the Japa nese took Port Arthur, Li Hongzhang
gave a letter to Gustav Detring, commissioner of customs in Tianjin, to pass
on to Prime Minister Ito. Japa nese officials, aware that China was not yet
prepared to make what they considered an acceptable agreement, replied
that Detring was not properly accredited. On January 10, 1895, as Japa nese
troops in Manchuria marched toward Dalian, the Chinese government re-
quested a ceasefire, but the Japa nese did not grant it. On February 1, two
Chinese officials arrived in Hiroshima for discussions with Prime Minister
Ito. One of the men had recently served in Taiwan, where he had offered
bounties to those who delivered the heads of slain Japa nese citizens. The
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two, as midlevel officials, were not empowered to make decisions, and yet
shortly after their arrival they asked when they would meet the emperor.
In Japa nese eyes, this showed that the Chinese were still not treating Japan
with the proper re spect and were still unprepared to make concessions.
Prime Minister Ito reminded the two officials that in the past, Chinese rep-
resentatives had made agreements and then later refused to affix their
seals. He explained that Emperor Meiji was prepared to carry on negotia-
tions only with Chinese negotiators who had the power to conclude agree-
ments and affix their seals. The two Chinese representatives were sent back
to China empty- handed.
Six weeks later, after the Japa nese had destroyed China’s fleet at Wei-
haiwei and were poised to attack Beijing, the Chinese, in some haste, of-
fered to send an envoy who had the power to affix seals to an agreement.
The Japa nese responded that they would accept as negotiators only Prince
Gong or Li Hongzhang, both of whom could affix a seal. The top officials
in Beijing, all Manchus, worried that if a Manchu, such as Prince Gong, were
to sign a treaty that was certain to require unpop u lar concessions, it would
strengthen the already widespread anti- Manchu sentiment in China. Better
to have a Han Chinese representative, Li Hongzhang, make the unpleasant
concessions and then be blamed for the difficulties.
The concessions Japan demanded were indeed onerous. The Imperial
Japa nese Army, concerned about the growing Rus sian presence in north-
east Asia from the newly built Trans- Siberian Railway, demanded that it
be given control over the Liaodong Peninsula, including Port Arthur and
Dalian, which would deny the Rus sians a warm- water port in northeast
Asia. Japan’s Imperial Navy wanted control over Taiwan to strengthen its
position in the western Pacific. And Japan’s financial leaders sought a large
indemnity to finance the costs of heavy industrialization. The Japa nese were
confident that they could impose all of these demands, even though they<
br />
knew that the Western powers would not accept Japan’s control over large
amounts of territory on the Chinese mainland.
On March 19, Li Hongzhang and 100 other officials arrived in Shimono-
seki, a port at the southwest corner of Honshu, Japan’s main island. Shi-
monoseki was in Yamaguchi prefecture, which had formerly belonged to the
Choshu domain where Ito Hirobumi had grown up. Prime Minister Ito,
who spoke quite good En glish, spoke with Li Hongzhang in En glish. Al-
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Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
though Li Hongzhang was able to speak some En glish, he spoke in Chi-
nese and negotiated through a Chinese- English interpreter. At the time of
the meeting, Japa nese forces were within marching distance of Beijing. Ito
started with a proposal that China would certainly refuse. He proposed
Japa nese occupation of Tianjin, Dagu (the military base guarding Beijing),
and Shanhaiguan, the pass separating Manchuria from the rest of China;
Japa nese control over China’s major railway; and Chinese funds to support
the Japa nese occupation. As expected, Li said he could not accept those con-
ditions, so the negotiations continued. Li Hongzhang had negotiated with
Ito before, and the two understood that their prob lems were not personal,
that they were representing their countries. Li made a personal appeal, how-
ever, describing— very accurately, it turned out— how he would be seen
within China for accepting such conditions.
On March 24, when Li Hongzhang was on his way back to his lodging
from the building where the negotiations were being conducted, a young
Japa nese firebrand attempted to assassinate him. Before the police could ap-
prehend him, the youth fired one shot that lodged in Li Hongzhang’s
cheek, just below his eye. Though it was painful, Li chose not to have the
bullet removed.
Japa nese officials and the Japa nese press, thoroughly embarrassed and
aware how this would damage Japan’s international reputation, were full of
apologies both at home and abroad. Japa nese public spokesmen were very
solicitous of Li Hongzhang’s welfare, and the Japa nese government sought
to atone for what was considered a hideous act. Emperor Meiji issued an
apology to the Chinese nation and offered to have his own physician treat
Li. Li received a large number of letters of apology from the Japa nese public,
and the emperor offered China a three- week armistice.
Meanwhile, Li Hongzhang’s blood nephew whom he had adopted as his
son, Lord Li Jingfang, continued the negotiations with Prime Minister Ito.
Following the shooting, the Japa nese slightly lessened their demands, but
their conditions remained harsh. Six days after the assassination attempt,
an armistice agreement was signed. The treaty handed over Taiwan and the
Pescadores Islands to Japan; a large indemnity, equivalent to three- fourths
of China’s annual bud get, was to be paid to Japan over four and a half years;
and Chinese suzerainty over Korea and China’s tributary relationship with
Korea were to be terminated. Korea was to be completely in de pen dent; a
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large portion of mainland territory that included the Liaodong Peninsula
was to be handed over to Japan; Japan was to enjoy the same commercial
privileges in China that the Eu ro pean powers enjoyed; Japa nese traders
would no longer pay the lijin (transit tax) on goods passing through toll
gates as they were transported within China; Chinese offensive military op-
erations were to end; seven key Chinese cities were to be opened to Japa-
nese residents and businesses; and more inland markets were to be opened.
As expected, once the terms of the treaty were made known in China,
the Chinese people were furious. Li Hongzhang was denounced for ac-
cepting the imposition of such conditions. Thousands of Chinese officials
wrote memorials to their emperor denouncing the treaty. But the Chinese
emperor knew that if China did not sign the treaty, Beijing and Shenyang
would soon be devastated and the Ming tombs might be destroyed. On
May 8, in Yantai (Chefu), Shandong, near where Confucius was born on
the Bohai coast, the treaty was signed in the presence of warships from
Rus sia, the United States, England, France, Germany, and Italy.
Having no choice but to sign the treaty, the Manchu court did what it
could to pass down blame for accepting the harsh conditions. Empress Cixi
passed responsibility on to the Guangxu emperor. By selecting Li Hong-
zhang to carry out the negotiations, the Manchu rulers could blame a Han
Chinese for agreeing to the terms. In fact, although Li Hongzhang had been
trying to strengthen China for several de cades, his efforts had not been fully
supported by conservative officials. As he told Ito Hirobumi when the treaty
negotiations began, he had been attempting to do in China what Ito had
accomplished in Japan. The assassination attempt slightly softened the Chi-
nese reaction to Li Hongzhang, as it had slightly softened the Japa nese
demands, but on his return Li was stripped of all his titles except that of
grand secretary. For generations, among Chinese patriots Li Hongzhang
would be the scapegoat for agreeing to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed
following China’s defeat because of weaknesses he had dedicated his life to
overcoming.
In earlier times the Japa nese had felt humiliated by the way the Chi-
nese had treated them, as if they were supplicants facing their superiors.
Elaborate protocols, or “rites,” for meetings had made clear their status. The
Chinese were at the top and the Japa nese were subordinate. Even in 1895
when Japan had won on the battlefield, the Chinese initially treated the
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Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
Japa nese as inferiors, and only when their capital was in grave danger did
they yield. Now the Japa nese had an opportunity to return the humiliation.
One territory that Japan had demanded was the area around Shenyang,
which had no great strategic significance, but it was the location of the orig-
inal Manchu capital and of the imperial tombs. Thus the Manchu, rulers
of China for three centuries, were thoroughly humiliated. Anti- Manchu
sentiment became widespread, and sixteen years later the dynasty was
overthrown.
In their meetings, Ito Hirobumi had reminded Li Hongzhang that when
they had met in 1886, Li had threatened Ito that if he did not agree to Chi-
na’s proposal to quiet things down in Korea, China might be forced to
fight Japan. At the time, Li could not have imagined that one day Japan
would be the victor. In 1886 Ito had said that China should do more to mod-
ernize. Li admitted that this assessment by Ito had been correct and that
he had personally tried to pursue modernization, but those who believed
in modernization could not overcome the re sis tance against it. Li asked Ito
what he would have done differently if he were in Li’s place. Ito admitted
that he could not have done as well as Li. Although Li Hongzhang was im-
&n
bsp; pressed with Japa nese achievements, it was reported that Li was so upset
by the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that he vowed never
again to set foot on Japa nese soil. The next year a ship on which he was trav-
eling docked at Yokohama, but he refused to go ashore.
The Triple Intervention
Throughout the war the Japa nese had made great efforts to reduce the
chance that the Western nations might assist the Chinese in their war
against Japan. Japan refrained from attacking Chinese ships in the Shanghai
area to avoid disturbing the foreign settlements and took pains to assure
the Western countries that it would not invade their settlements. Japan told
Japa nese residents in the United States to avoid displays of patriotism that
could upset the Americans, who might then urge their government to act
against Japan.
Before the war, key Western leaders had developed positive feelings
toward Japan. They saw Japan as a modern country and found China to be
a country that was not only poor, dirty, and chaotic, but also one that did
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less to abide by the legal practices of “civilized countries.” But as the Japa-
nese victories overwhelmed China, other countries, especially Rus sia,
began to show concern about Japan’s future territorial ambitions.
Six days after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the ministers
of Rus sia, Germany, and France who were stationed in Japan called on the
Japa nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to offer “friendly advice.” They told the
Japa nese that the Liaodong Peninsula (where Port Arthur and Dalian were
located), which, according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, was to be handed
over to Japan, should remain in Chinese hands. They pointed out that if
Japan were to occupy the Liaodong Peninsula, not far from Beijing, it would
cause the Chinese undo worry, it would be considered a threat by Korea,
and it would be an obstacle to peace in East Asia. It was clear to the Japa-
nese that if they did not follow this friendly advice, the foreign powers were
prepared to use force to intervene, and they knew that the Japa nese mili-
tary was no match for the combined Western forces. On November 7, 1895,
six months after ratification of the treaty that gave Liaodong to Japan, a new
treaty was signed that returned Liaodong to China.
China and Japan Page 20