to fight the Japa nese. By the time the fleet reached Indonesia, Japa nese ships
were observing its movements very carefully. After the Japa nese discovered
that the Rus sians would pass through the narrow strait near Tsushima,
Japa nese ships were deployed to lie in wait. When the Rus sians, who had
not taken great care in following Japa nese troop movements, passed through
the Tsushima Strait, the Japa nese caught them in another surprise attack.
After a two- day battle, the Japa nese had destroyed two- thirds of the Rus-
sian fleet and incurred very few losses themselves. By the end of the battle,
Rus sia, preoccupied by the 1905 revolution at home, had lost the will to con-
tinue the war. In fact the Japa nese were also exhausted by the end of the
Russo- Japanese War, and had Rus sia continued the fight, it is doubtful Japan
would have won. Once Rus sia sought an end to the war, Minister of For-
. 186 .
The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
eign Affairs Komura Jutaro went to his classmate from Harvard Law School,
Theodore Roo se velt, to seek his cooperation in concluding a peace treaty.
Peace discussions, mediated by President Theodore Roo se velt, who was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role, were held in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, in August 1905 and an agreement was signed on September 5.
In the treaty, the Rus sians acknowledged that Japan had paramount interests
in Korea and agreed that they would not interfere with Japan’s activities
there. Japan gained full sovereignty over the southern half of the island of
Sakhalin. Rus sia also transferred its Port Arthur lease and nearby territorial
waters to Japan. Rus sia did retain control of the railway from Harbin to
Changchun and thus could continue to dominate northern Manchuria, but
it transferred to Japan the lease, then good for twenty- five more years, to a
420- mile portion of the southern spur of the China Eastern Railway, from
Changchun to Dalian, and other branches of the southern spur, such as the
link from the city of Jilin to Changchun, a total of approximately 700 miles
of railway. The Japa nese renamed the railways that they received the South
Manchurian Railway Com pany. Japan was also given rights to the land adja-
cent to the railway, extending out for ten kilo meters on each side, and rights
to the coal mines that supported the railway. In 1915, impressed by the ninety-
nine- year lease Great Britain had received for Hong Kong in 1898, Japan
pressured China to grant it an additional ninety- nine- year lease.
Rule by the South Manchurian Railway and the Kwantung
Army, 1905–1931
After the Russo- Japanese War, Japa nese po liti cal leaders remained anxious
that Rus sia might launch a war of revenge. They were frightened by the
growing number of Rus sian settlers in Siberia and by Rus sia’s increasing
ability to send troops and goods from Moscow to Vladivostok as a result
of its double- tracking of the Trans- Siberian Railway and its completion of
a new railway around Lake Baikal in 1905 that enabled the Rus sians to go
by rail directly to East Asia without stopping to transfer goods to and from
a boat to cross the lake. Japa nese po liti cal leaders began planning for how
to respond to Rus sian attacks if Rus sia were to launch such a war of re-
venge. But Rus sia was facing domestic turmoil, especially after the Rus sian
Revolution of 1917, and though relations between Japan and Rus sia remained
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china and japan
tense and Rus sians dominated the area north of Changchun where the
railway remained in their hands, in the end Rus sia did not interfere with
Japa nese interests south of Changchun.
At the time, Japa nese leaders realized that the United States and the Eu-
ro pean powers would not tolerate Japan’s turning Manchuria into a Japa-
nese colony, and after the Russo- Japanese War, China retained po liti cal sov-
ereignty over Manchuria. But Japa nese organ ization along the railway was
far better than the regional organ ization of Manchurian warlord Zhang
Zuolin, and Japan began to extend its influence beyond the leased territory.
Although not part of Japan’s formal empire, Manchuria in effect became part
of its informal empire. Western businesses kept operating in Manchuria,
but after 1905 Japa nese businesses began to dominate the economy.
Japa nese interests in other parts of China, especially in Shanghai and
Fujian, continued to grow, but after 1905 its investments centered around
the South Manchurian Railway Com pany (Minami Manshu Tetsudo
Kabushiki Gaisha; abbreviated as Mantetsu in Japa nese, Mantie in Chinese),
and Japanese- owned companies in Manchuria grew faster than Japa nese
companies elsewhere in China. By 1914 an estimated 69 percent of Japa-
nese direct investments in China were in Manchuria, and most Japa nese
activity in China remained in Manchuria until the Second Sino- Japanese
War broke out in 1937. Manchuria remained an agricultural area, where soy-
beans and soybean products (including soy sauce and soybean pulp for
fertilizer) were the major export items (to Japan, Eu rope, and to China
proper, south of Manchuria). Since land in Manchuria was basically dry,
little rice could be produced there, and sorghum ( gaoliang) was the main
grain. New Japa nese investments were mainly focused on the railway and
the construction proj ects near the rail lines.
The Japa nese assassinated Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin in 1928
(see Chapter 7) and tightened Japan’s control in Manchuria, and in 1931
Japan turned Manchuria into a Japanese- controlled puppet state. Army
strategist Ishiwara Kanji began considering how to expand the industrial
base in Manchuria so as to equip a modern army. In the mid-1930s his ef-
forts were unsuccessful because he refused to make investments in Man-
churia attractive to private companies. He wanted such investments to be
controlled by the state, not by private cap i tal ists. In 1935, a bright young bu-
reaucrat from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Kishi Nobusuke,
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The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
who believed in Soviet- style economic planning, was appointed deputy min-
ister of Manchurian industrial development. Kishi made enough conces-
sions to attract Nissan ( Japan Industries), after World War II a car com-
pany, led by Ayukawa Yoshisuke, who was willing to cooperate with the
government to develop heavy industry so as to strengthen the military-
industrial base. Though Manchuria later suffered from U.S. attacks on its
shipping fleet that made it difficult to transport the necessary machine tools
from Japan and impossible to achieve its ambitious targets, Manchuria de-
veloped coal, iron, and copper mines. By 1942, it was producing more than
three million tons of iron and steel per year.
Given the shortage of laborers in Manchuria, some of the physical labor
during Japa nese colonization— clearing the fields and growing the soybeans,
working in the mines and on construction proj ects— was supplied by mi-
grants from other Chinese provinces, particularl
y Shandong and Hebei.
Once the Manchu rulers, concerned about Japa nese and Rus sian pressures,
had begun allowing non- Manchus to migrate to Manchuria in the late nine-
teenth century, Chinese mi grants began to move into sparsely populated
Manchuria from nearby Shandong and Hebei, which were heavi ly popu-
lated. From the 1890s until the beginning of World War II, approximately
twenty- five million people migrated to Manchuria from Shandong and
Hebei, and of them, approximately eight million remained there.1 After 1942
the number of Chinese mi grants declined as the economy slowed down in
the chaos of the war.
About two- thirds of the Chinese mi grants to Manchuria from 1905 to
1942 were seasonal workers, mostly young men who performed physical
labor. In the early years, they worked in agriculture and construction, but
later, as industry developed, they worked in factories and mines. The sea-
sonal workers came from spring through fall and then they returned to their
homes during the winter months when much of Manchuria was very cold.
During the period Manchuria was under Japa nese control, on average more
than 500,000 mi grants arrived in Manchuria each year. Most of them went
to Manchuria only once and then returned home with earnings for their
families. The mi grant workers, unlike the young intellectuals, generally did
not take part in po liti cal activities.
From 1905 until 1931 when the Japa nese made Manchuria a puppet state,
the two major centers of Japa nese authority in Manchuria were the South
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china and japan
Manchurian Railway Com pany (Mantetsu) and the Kwantung Army of the
Imperial Japa nese Army. After 1931, although the highest Japa nese official
in Manchuria was the governor- general, in fact Mantetsu and its manage-
ment retained considerable in de pen dence and had a far larger staff than the
governor- general had.
Mantetsu (The South Manchurian Railway)
Beginning in 1905, the South Manchurian Railway Com pany became the
administrative headquarters for the Japa nese in Manchuria. As a model for
how to manage Japan’s role in Manchuria, some Japa nese researchers were
assigned to study how the Dutch East India Com pany conducted its busi-
ness while representing Dutch broad national interests. As Mantetsu be-
came a quasi- government institution, Japa nese industrial, financial, and
agricultural ministries assigned officials to serve under Mantetsu’s leader-
ship in Manchuria. Within Japan, Manchurian development was consid-
ered of sufficient importance that not only the ministries but the very
highest levels of the po liti cal leadership were involved in development plan-
ning that went far beyond the operation of the railway.
The importance of Mantetsu’s broader mission was reflected in the
November 1906 transfer of Goto Shimpei from Taiwan to become the head
of Mantetsu. Although officially Goto was only administering the railway
and the land along the railway, in fact he had a mandate to strengthen
Japan’s overall interests in Manchuria. For this task, he drew on his broad
experience as head of all civilian work in Taiwan.
Despite his wide- ranging mandate, Goto realized that Mantetsu was at
its core a business, responsible for running a railway efficiently and profit-
ably. Railways were then at the cutting edge of modern infrastructure around
the world. Mantetsu purchased the world’s best railway cars from the United
States and quickly developed a reputation for providing high- class ser vice
for passengers, on- time arrivals, and reliable transport for freight traffic. The
Japa nese also quickly began double- tracking railways that originally had
been single track and building wider- gauge tracks. The telephone and tele-
graph, which the Japa nese were already using during the Russo- Japanese
War, were linked with the transportation and communications advances
built up around the railway.
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The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
After the damage from the Russo- Japanese War, considerable funds
were required for reconstruction in Manchuria, but the Japa nese govern-
ment had exhausted its financial reserves during the war. To supplement
the funding from the Japa nese government, Mantetsu raised money from
the financial community in London. As a business operation, the railway
quickly became financially in de pen dent, and within years it was bringing
in a large profit. During its early years, its major source of income was the
transport of soybeans and soybean products that were being exported from
the ports on the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan and Eu rope. In transporting
soybeans, Mantetsu was competing with Chinese companies that used
trucks and horse- drawn carts that could transport soybeans at a lower cost
than Mantetsu.
Goto Shimpei was well known for his commitment to science and for
the research he had or ga nized in Taiwan to study local social customs. By
April 1907, shortly after his arrival, he established Mantetsu’s Research De-
partment (Chosabu). The Research Department provided information
and analy sis to guide the operation of the railway and overall Japa nese poli-
cies for the po liti cal, economic, and social development of Manchuria. It
also became the center for Japa nese government research on the economy,
politics, and society of North China. Even the Kwantung Army drew on
research conducted by Mantetsu’s Research Department, which grew to be
one of the largest research centers anywhere in the world. At its height in
the early 1940s, the Research Department had more than 2,300 researchers.
Its scale and scope reflected the Japa nese belief in the importance of knowl-
edge and in the role of enlightenment in guiding national policy. At the
time, no research institution anywhere in China conducted work of such
breadth and depth. As a result, the Mantetsu Research Department had a
far deeper knowledge of Manchuria than the Chinese government did.
Goto was willing to work with the Kwantung Army, but he considered
establishing rules and laws to be central to the development of an adminis-
trative infrastructure in China. He selected Okamatsu Santaro, a professor
of Chinese law at Kyoto Imperial University, as the first head of the Re-
search Department. Although Goto sent Okamatsu to Eu rope to study the
role of the Western powers’ colonial research centers, he hoped to surpass
what those research centers were doing with re spect to their colonies.
Okamatsu and his staff believed that rules for Manchuria should grow out of
. 191 .
china and japan
existing law. While Americans guiding the development of local laws might
have used American laws as a framework for teaching local people around
the world, the Japa nese realized that in some cases Western laws did not fit
Asian traditions, and therefore they were more willing to create laws that
accorded with local customs. A central task for Okamatsu after arriving in
Manchuria was to or ga nize research on Manchurian law and then to adopt
appropriate policies that would prove effective.
Goto recruited young gradu ates from Japan’s best universities to join the
staff of the Mantetsu Research Department. Since they had been trained
in Japan in an intellectual atmosphere that focused on how to promote de-
velopment and modernization, they knew how to conduct research that
would help the administrators in Manchuria build a modern economy, so-
ciety, and governance structure. Like the faculty under whom they had
studied in Japan, many came from modest social backgrounds, had risen
because of their academic rec ords, and held liberal or even leftist views.
Just as he had in Taiwan, Goto Shimpei attached a high priority to ed-
ucation in Manchuria. Teacher-training programs were established, and
the number of elementary schools rapidly increased. In addition to Japa nese
language, the subjects taught included basic mathe matics and science. In
the better schools in towns and cities, where some Chinese students were
admitted along with the more privileged Japa nese students, the schools had
some teachers from Japan and some Chinese teachers who had studied in
Japan. Most of the educated Chinese in Manchuria who were of school age
between 1931 and 1945 learned Japa nese language.
In the 1930s nearly three- fourths of the employees of Mantetsu were
Chinese. Although many did not hold positions as high as those of Japa-
nese employees of comparable ability and length of ser vice, they did have
better working conditions and received more stable salaries than most
people in Manchuria. Other Chinese workers in Manchuria served as
house hold servants for Japa nese families or operated small retail establish-
ments that catered to Japa nese customers. Some were upset that they were
treated poorly by the Japa nese for whom they worked, but others appreci-
ated the higher wages they received from Japa nese employers. For higher
positions in Mantetsu and for teachers, the Japa nese drew from the small
group of Chinese who had studied in Japan and then had returned to Man-
churia. In addition to working for the South Manchurian Railway and for
. 192 .
The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
the government, those educated in Japan could also teach Japa nese lan-
guage in schools.
Goto left Manchuria in 1908 to become minister of communications and
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