stitutionalized charisma of the emperor provided legitimacy for the genro.
The system depended on the team of talented individuals serving at a spe-
cific time in Japan’s institutional development, and after those team mem-
bers left the scene, Japan strug gled with central authority.
The center of Japan’s po liti cal system faltered at a time of impor tant his-
torical transitions in other countries. The fall of the Qing dynasty was at
the top of the list. Japan had impor tant interests in China that had been
negotiated with the Qing, particularly in the Northeast. The Western im-
perialist powers stood ready to take advantage of the collapse of the Qing,
and although the Anglo- Japanese Treaty provided the framework for coop-
eration between Japan and Britain, Rus sia, Germany, France, and, poten-
tially, the United States, could also try to expand their respective interests,
to the detriment of Japan. The po liti cal structure in the Pacific was also be-
ginning to change. The United States had become a Pacific power with its
colonization of the Philippines, its annexation of Hawaii and Guam, and
the scheduled completion of the Panama Canal in 1916. The state govern-
ments on the West Coast, most prominently in California, passed racially
tainted laws limiting Japa nese and Chinese immigration and land owner-
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Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
ship. For the Japa nese, the United States was increasingly taking on the ap-
pearance of an adversary. Then, in 1914, the catastrophic war broke out in
Eu rope, followed by the Bolshevik Revolution in Japan’s other neighbor,
Rus sia. Most of Japan’s leaders— the remaining genro and their successors—
were realists, meaning they understood the limitations of Japan’s resources
and military power in relation to those of the Western powers, and there-
fore they preferred to maintain a low posture while securing Japan’s posi-
tion in northeast Asia. But Japan also had its share of aggressive ultrana-
tionalists who believed in Japan’s exceptionalism and its superiority over its
Asian neighbors and the West.
The myth and sanctity of Emperor Meiji was further enhanced by the
ritual suicide of General Nogi, the Japa nese hero of the Russo- Japanese War,
and his wife, in the sacred Japa nese tradition of junshi (i.e., following their
leader in death). The entire country mobilized to build the Meiji Shrine, a
huge Shinto shrine in the middle of Tokyo. Ishibashi Tanzan, the liberal
journalist and a great admirer of Meiji, objected to the shrine, not only
because of the expense but also because he felt that it conveyed the wrong
image of the emperor who had led the modernization of Japan. Ishibashi
thought Meiji’s legacy would be better served by building universities and
research centers. For the next several de cades, Ishibashi frequently wrote of
the dangers of the cultish reverence with which many Japa nese, particu-
larly extreme nationalists, viewed the monarchy. Many of the assassina-
tions, coups, and terrorist acts of the 1920s and 1930s were carried out for
the cause of “restoring the absolute authority” of the emperor. The terrorists
believed the myth and misunderstood the imperial system.
Meiji’s son, Yoshihito, the Taisho emperor, suffered from a neurological
disorder and could not perform his duties at the same level his father had.
This had been recognized long before Meiji’s death, and the efforts by the
palace had been focused on grooming the grand son, Hirohito, the Showa
emperor, who was only eleven years old at the time of Meiji’s death.
From Disorder to Military Dominance, 1911–1937
In both China and Japan, the history from 1911 to the outbreak of war in
1937 is the story of po liti cal leaders struggling to maintain domestic order
and good relations with other countries but losing out to their militaries. By
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china and japan
the end of the period, amid the domestic disorder in Japan and China the
militaries had gained control, and public opinion in both countries in-
creasingly supported stronger assertions of patriotism against the other.
But the Chinese military was not unified in a single national force, and the
Japa nese Army and Japa nese Navy were not united in a single command
structure and they were quite competitive with each other.
After 1911, amid China’s disintegration into regions, any attempt to gain
po liti cal control inevitably required military force. In the strug gle between
Sun Yat- sen and Yuan Shikai, power ended in the hands of the soldier, Yuan
Shikai. Similarly in the regions, po liti cal power accrued to those with mili-
tary power, the warlords. In the strug gle within the Guomin dang after Sun’s
death, power went not to Wang Jing wei, Sun’s po liti cal deputy, but to the
commandant of the military acad emy, Chiang Kai- shek. The militarists, not
the politicians, became the arbiters of Chinese policy.
In Japan, too, power gravitated to the hands of the military at a time
when China itself and Japa nese policies toward China were both in dis-
array. Skilled po liti cal leaders, such as Hara Takashi, and seasoned diplo-
mats, such as Shidehara Kijuro, voiced policies that, in the spirit of the
Washington framework, were intended to re spect Chinese sovereignty and
allow China the opportunity to develop a stable government. But Hara was
assassinated, Shidehara was replaced, and in Tokyo the power of the mili-
tary grew stronger. In contrast to China, within Japan the army and the navy
were both centrally or ga nized national military ser vices, and they gradu-
ally gained power, but it was unclear who was in charge at the top as the
generals and admirals strug gled with one another the control and direc-
tion of their China policy. In Manchuria, as in Tokyo, Japa nese civilian of-
ficials at Mantetsu and in Changchun attempted to maintain control, but
amid tensions with the Chinese and local Manchurian warlords, power
accrued to the military, the Kwantung Army.
In the late 1920s, as the Guomin dang became more or ga nized and Chi-
nese nationalism grew stronger, insubordination by Japa nese military units
in Manchuria became more of a prob lem. This started a tragic cycle. Mili-
tary command in Tokyo too often turned a blind eye to the insubordina-
tion that destroyed discipline. The Chinese public became increasingly
anti- Japanese, particularly when Chinese blood was shed. And the growing
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population of Japa nese citizens living in China began to fear for their safety,
causing an anti- Chinese backlash in Japan.
The anti- China fervor in Japan was so strong by late 1931 that the Japa-
nese public welcomed the takeover of Manchuria, even though it was an
obvious act of military insubordination. Insubordination continued after
the Manchurian Incident, and the public continued to show support. Not
only had the po liti cal parties and civil authorities lost control of the mili-
tary, but the higher military command in Tokyo had also lost cont
rol. It was
not until the failed uprising of February 26, 1936, that the central military
fi nally took the required steps to regain control and purge the ultranation-
alists from the military. The assassinations, attempted coups, and acts of
obvious insubordination ended after February 1936 under tighter military
control. Japa nese military leaders who gained control of the government
completely underestimated the resolve of the Chinese. Because most of
their military encounters with the Chinese up through 1936 had been short,
the Japa nese did not have a plan for a larger invasion of China, nor did any
of Japan’s leaders expect a long war.
China’s Weak Government and Strong Voices, 1915–1937
After 1911, the weaknesses of the Chinese government strengthened the
voices in Japan calling for their country to take advantage of its greater
power, and strengthened the voices of Chinese youth demanding that their
government take stronger action against Japan.
Once Yuan Shikai prevailed in the power strug gle in China, the most
impor tant priority for Japa nese leaders was to secure the rights that they
believed they had won in the Russo- Japanese War, namely the leasehold
rights in the Liaodong Peninsula, including the lease on the land along the
Mantetsu rail line. Some of these leases were due to expire in 1923. The
British had been prescient and strong enough to obtain a ninety- nine- year
lease on the New Territories near Hong Kong before the collapse of the
Qing. The Japa nese were intent on getting a similar lease for Liaodong. The
Japa nese had a strong belief, not shared by other countries, that their rights
in Manchuria were vital to Japan’s well- being. This mindset had solidified
by 1895, when the Eu ro pean powers prevented Japan from taking over the
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china and japan
Liaodong Peninsula, Dalian, and Port Arthur after the Sino- Japanese War.
In the minds of the Japa nese, the blood of 100,000 Japa nese soldiers had
been shed in battles with the Rus sians that had “won” Manchuria for Japan.
The Japa nese also believed that their population was too large for the home
islands, and they needed the sparsely populated expanse of Manchuria for
their excess population, as a place to relocate and prosper. During the forty-
four years of Meiji rule, the population of Japan grew from thirty- five
million to fifty million, and with improvements in public health and hy-
giene it was adding half a million people to the population every year.
Emigration to the United States was becoming more difficult because of
anti- Japanese U.S. immigration policies, including the Gentlemen’s Agree-
ment that limited emigration during the administration of Theodore Roo-
se velt. The wide- open spaces of Manchuria, more than two times the size of
Japan, seemed to offer unlimited possibilities.
The most articulate and prominent critic of the dominant mindset about
Manchuria was Ishibashi Tanzan (see Biographies of Key Figures). A col-
umnist, and later the publisher of Toyo keizai, an influential business mag-
azine, Ishibashi argued against the Manchuria dream on practical grounds.
Manchuria shared a border of thousands of kilo meters with Japan’s main
adversary, Rus sia, so defending the border and pacifying the wide expanse
of Manchuria would require enormous military expenditures. It would be
cheaper to buy the agricultural products, as well as the coal and iron ore
from Manchuria’s mines, on the open market at standard world prices. Ishi-
bashi also argued that Japan should think of its educated population as an
asset, not a liability. To deal with the prob lem of excess population Ishibashi
advocated birth control. He began promoting the articles of Margaret
Sanger, the American birth- control activist, as early as 1915. Along with the
small minority of anti- imperialists in Japan, Ishibashi felt that Japan’s colo-
nial policy in China and Korea was creating populations that for genera-
tions would be “anti- Japanese, despise the Japa nese, and hold an eternal
resentment against Japan.”
The cabinet that was to take on the negotiations to gain control over
the Liaodong Peninsula was that of Okuma Shigenobu, who took office in
early 1914. Okuma, a prominent po liti cal leader who had not been a genro
insider and who had long advocated British- style cabinets, became prime
minister, for the second time, at the advanced age of seventy- six. He was
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Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
enormously popu lar and well known for founding Waseda University, a pri-
vate institution that produced journalists and members of the po liti cal
parties. As foreign minister he appointed Kato Takaaki, a seasoned but ar-
rogant diplomat, devoted Anglophile, and former executive of Mitsubishi,
who would later become prime minister. Okuma was known as a friend of
China, but like other Japa nese who were supportive of China, he viewed
Manchuria as a separate issue and, with the chaotic changes after 1911, was
determined to secure Japan’s “rights.”
Then, just as Foreign Minister Kato was preparing for negotiations,
World War I broke out in Eu rope. Japan had an official alliance with Britain,
and Kato had served as ambassador in Britain. He sided with the British
against the Germans in attacking Germany’s holdings on the Shandong
Peninsula, including the fortified port at Qingdao in Jiaozhou Bay, a stra-
tegic naval station. In August 1914 a force of 23,000 Japa nese soldiers, com-
bined with the token support of 1,500 British troops, attacked 5,000
German soldiers at Qingdao in what was expected to be a quick battle. The
Japa nese prevailed, but the battle turned out to be more difficult than ex-
pected, with more casualties and deaths. Much to the shock of the army’s
leaders, Japan’s military technology had fallen behind. They were expecting
a traditional battle of infantry soldiers with rifles and bayonets, similar to
battles during the Russo- Japanese War, but they were confronted with
modern artillery and, for the first time, air power. Articles in the Japa nese
press glossed over the difficulties and celebrated Japan’s glorious victory, its
first since 1905. However, the battle set off a debate about the need to reas-
sess Japan’s military policy. The debate began quietly, but it continued for
de cades because Japan had no central authority that could resolve the
issue.
Twenty- One Demands, Versail es, and the Burst
of Chinese Nationalism
After the “victory” at Qingdao, Japa nese leaders had the po liti cal momentum
and confidence not only to negotiate with the Yuan Shikai regime to secure
Japan’s rights in China’s Northeast but also to demand rights to the newly
won German territory in Shandong. The document the Japa nese govern-
ment produced was known as the “Twenty- One Demands,” which soon
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china and japan
became notorious as an aggressive, ham- fisted diplomatic blunder that
further aroused Chinese hostility to Japan. The demands were patterned
after the six demands the Rus sians had delivered to the Qing twenty years
earlier, but the Japa nese government carried them much further with de-
mands for territory, exclusive rights to ports, and the placement of advisers
in the Yuan government.
The Twenty- One Demands, 1915
The Twenty- One Demands, presented by the Japa nese government led by
Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu, represented the first test of a post- Meiji
cabinet’s ability to deal with a totally new regime in China. Whereas the
Meiji approach would have been for the palace and the genro to set the
strategy and then delegate implementation of the negotiations to the cab-
inet and the bureaucrats, Prime Minister Okuma and Foreign Minister
Kato Takaaki intentionally did not consult with the genro. Also, there is no
rec ord that they consulted with the emperor, even though the Taisho em-
peror, according to the Constitution, had sole authority to make treaties.
Okuma waited until the close of the Diet session in December so his pro-
posed draft of the demands was not subject to a chaotic debate in the Diet.
The majority party in the Diet at the time was led by Okuma’s po liti cal ad-
versary Hara Takashi (prime minister from 1918 to 1921).
In January 1915 Kato directed Japan’s top diplomat in Beijing, Minister
to China Eki Hioki, to pre sent the Twenty- One Demands to Yuan Shikai,
with instructions to tell Yuan to keep the negotiations confidential. Kato
wanted them secret not only from foreign powers but also from other power
centers in Japan.
Yuan was in a weak position, but he was clever and he knew how to get
the most out of a weak hand. He put together a skilled negotiating team.
For the negotiations with the Japa nese minister, he brought in Cao Rulin,
a gradu ate of Waseda University who was fluent in Japa nese, and he also
made good use of the Japa nese academic Ariga Nagao (see Chapter 5). To
buy time, Cao set up the negotiations so that he and Minister Hioki held
their sessions once a week, on Saturdays, and took on one demand at a time.
Having begun in January, the sessions were still ongoing in May, when fi-
nally Yuan could no longer resist and yielded to all but the fifth set of de-
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