them, and many were allowed to return to Japan.
. 292 .
The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972
Most of the Japa nese who returned from China after 1949 had learned
the Chinese language and had found some way to earn a living in China.
By the time they returned to Japan, there were better economic opportuni-
ties in their home country than there had been in 1945 and 1946, when Japa-
nese returnees first began to arrive back home. However, culturally they
were more Chinese than Japa nese, and they often had even more difficult
adjustment prob lems than those who had returned right after the war. Some
found work in Japa nese companies that wanted to carry on trade with China,
where they could make use of their language skills, their knowledge of Chi-
nese business practices, and their personal contacts in China.
Clusters of administrators from Mantetsu settled in Kyushu where
they worked in regional planning. Scholars from Toa Dobun Shoin in
Shanghai built up Chinese studies programs at Aichi University. Many
who had been administrators became the backbone of Sino-Japanese
friendship associations.
After Japan’s surrender, the Chinese who, in the late 1930s, had escaped
from the advancing Japa nese troops and sought refuge in the countryside
and in the Southwest, beyond the reach of the Japa nese imperialists, began
to move back to their original home regions. Most had become refugees
during the first years of the war, but others had fled later, when the Japa-
nese began bombing Shanghai and Chongqing and during the 1944 Ichigo
Campaign, when Japa nese troops marched into Henan, Hunan, and
Guangxi. Most of the refugees were desperately poor, and many died of star-
vation. Many of the refugees had lived in areas with very diff er ent cultures
in which they never felt at home.
There are no reliable figures on how many Chinese relocated after the
end of the war, but the number was in the tens of millions. Some have es-
timated that it was as high as 100 million. Because few could make use of
the trains, and highways were not yet built, most refugees walked, either
carry ing their few belongings by hand or pulling them on small carts.
The Race to Take Over Japa nese Facilities in Manchuria
In the weeks after Japan’s formal surrender on September 3, 1945, Japa nese
commanders throughout China surrendered to nearby Chinese officials and
turned over Japa nese facilities to the Chinese. In a few cases, high- level
. 293 .
china and japan
Japa nese commanders had known their Chinese counter parts when they
were fellow students at military academies in Japan, and such former school-
mates found it easy to work with one another. In general, Japa nese sol-
diers remained disciplined after their surrender. In some communities,
because there were no Chinese troops in the area, they were asked to stay
on for some weeks, or even some months, to maintain order. In Shanxi,
former warlord Yan Xishan hired more than a thousand Japa nese troops
to serve on his staff, in the hope that the Japa nese could help him resist the
growing power of the Chinese Communist forces.
After the end of World War II, the Nationalists and Communists were
unable to maintain the United Front they had formed against their common
enemy during the war. Both sides began maneuvering to take over Japa nese
facilities and to position themselves for a pos si ble civil war, which others
still hoped could be avoided. In December 1945 the United States sent Gen-
eral George Marshall to Chongqing, where he hosted negotiations be-
tween Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai- shek in an effort to facilitate the for-
mation of a co ali tion government and avoid a civil war. It quickly became clear
that the two sides could not work together.
Within weeks after the end of the war, the victorious troops—
Communist, Nationalist, and Russian— raced into Manchuria, where
they vied to gain control of the facilities that the Japa nese had built in the
four de cades since 1905. Manchuria was China’s largest industrial base and
the location with the largest assemblage of modern military weapons any-
where in China. As soon as World War II ended, Mao Zedong, acutely
aware of his army’s shortage of modern military equipment, directed
Communist troops in northern and northwestern China to march at top
speed to the Northeast, to take control of stockpiles of Japa nese weapons
and industrial equipment that they could use if war were to break out
with the Nationalists. In addition to larger machinery, it has been esti-
mated that the Nationalists acquired between 350,000 and 750,000 rifles
in Manchuria.4
Although the Nationalist troops, centered in southwestern China, were
far from the Northeast, the United States helped transport them to the
Northeast and to China’s east coast by air, by ship, and by rail. Officials in
Washington specifically directed that U.S. forces were not to take part in
military clashes or to provide military assistance to either side. However,
. 294 .
The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972
Chiang Kai- shek was the official ruler of China, and some American leaders,
worried about the threat of communism, found ways to assist him.
Both Chinese Communists and Nationalists accused Rus sian troops of
stripping Japa nese factories to take industrial equipment across the border
into Rus sia. The Rus sian troops recognized the Nationalists as the official
government of China and allowed them to occupy key locations and to ac-
quire some Japa nese equipment. The Chinese Communists hoped that
Soviet troops, as fellow Communists, would side with them. Some Soviet
troops did provide assistance to the Chinese Communist troops that were
establishing their bases in the rural areas. But the Rus sians had worked with
the Nationalists since the early 1920s, beginning with Sun Yat- sen, and
Stalin still thought the Nationalists might win the war in China, so he con-
tinued to work with the Nationalists until the Rus sian troops withdrew
from the Northeast in the spring of 1946.
Although Japa nese military equipment was taken by the vari ous
armies, enough of the former Japa nese industrial base and infrastructure
remained that for many years after 1949 the Northeast was the industrial
base for the Chinese Communists. After 1949 the factories were operated
by Chinese workers who had learned their skills under Japa nese leader-
ship as well as by some Japa nese technicians and man ag ers who stayed on
in China until Chinese replacements could be trained. Even Mao Zedong
expressed admiration for the Japa nese state owner ship of and planning
for the industrial development of Manchuria. In 1949 Liao Chengzhi
asked Takasaki Tatsunosuke (see Biographies of Key Figures), former
chairman of the Manchurian Industrial Development Com pany, for a list
of Japa nese firms that could supply materials that could be used in the
former Japa nese factories in Manchuria, along with a price list for such
materials. In 1952 China’s Northeast accounted for about half of China’s
total industrial production. During the First Five- year Plan, 1953–1957, a
high proportion of China’s key industrial proj ects, including those that
received Soviet help, were in China’s Northeast, building on the original
Japa nese industrial base. The area remained China’s main heavy industrial
center until some years after reform and opening began in 1978, when in-
dustry in the Shanghai and Guangdong areas began to grow rapidly, soon
achieving a much larger production scale than that of the factories in the
Northeast.
. 295 .
china and japan
The Chinese Civil War and Reunification, 1945–1949
Had it not been for the Japa nese invasion, the Nationalists might have de-
feated the Communists in the mid-1930s. After Chiang Kai- shek was
forced to form the United Front with the Communists to resist Japan in
December 1936, the Nationalists could no longer attack the Communists.
Once the Nationalists retreated to the Southwest, it was difficult for them
to sustain national support, as they could do nothing to protect people in
other parts of China. The Communists, based in China’s northwest, used
this opportunity when they were not under attack by the Nationalists, to
build a tight organ ization, gain experience in carry ing out land reform, hone
a clear message to win public support, train an army that would be prepared
to fight the Nationalists, and forge a general agreement among their fol-
lowers about what policies should be pursued after their conquest of all of
China.
During some of the early battles of the Chinese Civil War in North-
east China, the Nationalists fought well. They began with more weapons
and had some well- trained troops. Gradually, however, the Communists
gained in strength as their troops won key battles in the Northeast and took
over Japa nese weapons, supplies, and their industrial base. Chiang chose to
fight rather than to concentrate on bringing the economy under control. But
the resultant wild inflation, shortage of goods, and corruption among the
Nationalist troops trying to provide for themselves and their families in this
chaotic period alienated the general public. Because they promised land re-
form, the Communists had greater appeal to peasants, who hoped their
families might acquire land if the Communists won the Civil War. By re-
cruiting youths who were alienated by the corruption of the Nationalists
and hopeful of gaining land, the Communists gained many soldiers who
were more dedicated to the fight than the Nationalist soldiers, some of
whom had been recruited by force.
After capturing the bases in the Northeast, Communist forces captured
Beiping and then moved southward toward the Yangtze. By the time they
crossed the Yangtze, they had gained sufficient strength that the Nation-
alist forces could no longer stop their advance. On October 1, 1949, even
before their troops reached the Southwest, the Communists declared the
founding of the People’s Republic. Thereafter, they consolidated their power,
. 296 .
The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972
and through campaigns to wipe out counterrevolutionaries, they eliminated
the landlord class and distributed land to poor peasants. By building up
party and youth- league organ izations of loyal followers, they were able to
unify the country for the first time since the collapse of the imperial order
in 1911.
Japan’s Re orientation from Al ied Occupation, 1945–1952
American leaders, who dominated the Allied Occupation of Japan, believed
that to prevent another world war, they had to help other countries make
deep changes to remove the causes of war and create a basis for pursuing
peace. From September 1945, when General Douglas MacArthur arrived
to lead the Occupation, until April 1952, the Allied Occupation forces in-
troduced changes in Japan’s po liti cal, economic, and education systems and
controlled Japan’s foreign policy.
At the end of World War II, leaders in the United States, by far the
strongest nation in the world at the time, believed that a prosperous country
would not need to attack other countries. In 1945 many Americans wanted
to punish Japan for its sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, for its cruelty to Amer-
ican soldiers during the Bataan Death March in the Philippines, and for
its aggressive be hav ior in Asia and the western Pacific. But unlike the Chi-
nese, who had suffered during eight years of Japa nese occupation, Ameri-
cans had not directly experienced Japa nese occupation and the U.S. civilian
population had had few personal contacts with Japa nese soldiers. Amer i-
ca’s hatred of the Japa nese enemy was not as deep, long lasting, or personal
as China’s.
After considering the issue, Occupation officials concluded that for the
Japa nese public to accept the decision to surrender and follow the Allied
forces’ guidelines, they needed the support of the emperor. Therefore, Oc-
cupation officials did not dwell on the question of the emperor’s responsi-
bility for the war. The emperor renounced his divinity, announced the sur-
render, and publicly appeared with General MacArthur, showing the
Japa nese public that he supported the Occupation.
American leaders had concluded that Germany had been punished too
severely for war- making after World War I, resulting in a power ful German
drive for revenge that resulted in its initiation of World War II. Hence, after
. 297 .
china and japan
World War II they felt that they should be less vengeful in their occupa-
tion of Germany and Japan. In Japan, the Allied powers gave directions, but
the government was administered by the Japa nese. This required close col-
laboration. As a whole, the Japa nese were orderly, accepted the directives
of the Allied Occupation, and worked to carry them out. When U.S. sol-
diers began arriving in Japan, the Japa nese found that they were a surpris-
ingly friendly group that gave out candy and chewing gum to children.
Allied Occupation leaders believed that to prevent Japan from ever again
pursuing militarism, a thorough attack on the root causes of war was nec-
essary. They believed that democracies did not make war, so Japan was
“forced to be free” to develop demo cratic institutions, including a demo-
cratically elected Diet, a free press, enterprises free of government control,
and labor unions, as well as parent- teacher associations and textbooks that
promoted democracy. To reduce the power of landlords and build up a rural
base for democracy, the Occupation carried out land reform, dividing up
the land formerly owned by large landlords. To strengthen democracy, the
Occupation worked with Japa nese leftists, labor unions, and liberal aca-
demics who supported the goals of the Occupation forces. The small
number of Communists in Japan had been some of the boldest opponents
of Japa nese militarism in the 1930s, and they were welcomed as a legal party.
The Allied Occupation was suc
cessful in its attack on militarism not
only because the Japa nese knew it was necessary in order to bring an end
to the Occupation but also because Japa nese officials and the majority of
the Japa nese public firmly believed that militarism had brought disaster to
Japan, to other countries, and to Japan’s relations with other countries. The
Occupation thus abolished Japan’s military forces, making them illegal. It
destroyed factories and closed large companies that produced military
equipment. Some Japa nese historians joined in criticizing the high concen-
tration of power during the Meiji period, calling it “Meiji absolutism”
because it had paved the way for the growth of the militarism that had re-
sulted in suffering for all Asians and had alienated other Asians from Japan.
During the first two years of the Occupation, tens of thousands of Japa-
nese died from starvation. Having lost the colonies that supplied food for
Japan, Japa nese leaders realized they had to increase exports to earn money
to buy food from abroad. To a large extent, the United States replaced Man-
churia as the main source of raw materials and soybeans for Japan. In 1951,
. 298 .
The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972
for example, the United States supplied 34 percent of Japan’s iron ore,
71 percent of its coal, and 97 percent of its soybean imports.5
The Japa nese drew on their war time experience in guiding the economy,
but they chose to introduce indicative planning— setting targets but al-
lowing companies the freedom to decide how to reach their targets—
rather than imposing socialist- style government- administered planning.
Japa nese leaders realized that Japan’s reputation for producing low- quality
goods would negatively affect their exports, so they paid great attention to
what was needed to improve quality, bringing in U.S. specialists and dedi-
cating themselves to experimenting with new techniques. Within several
years, Japan had gained a reputation for producing high- quality goods.
In the early years after 1945, Japa nese scholars specializing in the study
of China criticized some of Japan’s leading prewar China specialists, in-
cluding Naito Konan, who died in 1934, for not having done enough to
oppose Japa nese aggression in China. After the Occupation ended with a
China and Japan Page 46