China Border Defense Army, in case Chinese troops were needed for the
war. In August, Mao de cided that if he sent troops into Korea he would
. 305 .
china and japan
send them as “volunteers,” rather than as Chinese troops, to reduce the risk
that the United States would declare war on China. China expected that
the war would quickly come to an end.
By September 15, UN forces began arriving in Inchon, and two weeks
later they recaptured Seoul. On October 3 Zhou Enlai asked the Indian
ambassador to China, K. M. Panikkar, to announce to the world that if UN
forces moved north across the 38th parallel, China would enter the war.
George Kennan and other officials advised against allowing the UN troops
to cross the 38th parallel because the risk of China’s or the Soviets’ entry
into the war was too great. General Douglas MacArthur and other Amer-
ican leaders, overly confident, believed that Zhou was bluffing, and UN
troops immediately proceeded to cross the 38th parallel. Beginning on Oc-
tober 19, some 200,000 Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River into North
Korea. Within months, the UN troops were pushed back below the
38th parallel and Seoul fell to North Korean and Chinese troops. The UN
troops advanced again, and a stalemate was reached. Each side still hoped
to push the enemy out of the Korean Peninsula. It was more than two years
later, on July 27, 1953, when the two sides signed an armistice agreement and
officially ended the fighting. It is estimated that 900,000 Chinese, 520,000
North Korean, and 400,000 UN soldiers, mostly South Koreans, died or
were wounded in the war.8
Before the United States de cided to seek UN support to fight in Korea,
China had been preparing to invade Taiwan, but after the Korean War broke
out and the United States dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the coast of
Taiwan, it became impossible for the Chinese Communists to take Taiwan.
Thus, as a result of the Korean War, Taiwan was able to remain separate
from China.
Although Japa nese soldiers did not take part in the war, as China had
feared, Japan’s ports served as a staging area for the UN troops. The revival
of the Japa nese economy was greatly strengthened by the UN’s procure-
ment of Japa nese products for use by its troops in Korea, the military equip-
ment repairs carried out in Japan, and the “relief and rehabilitation” of UN
soldiers granted time off in Japan. Even more impor tant, the Korean War
strengthened the willingness of the United States to support the Japa nese
economy. Japa nese businesspeople were welcomed in the United States to
study U.S. technology and management skills. In contrast, the Korean War
. 306 .
The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972
was a severe drain on China’s resources. It also led the U.S. government to
ban trade with China, freeze Chinese assets in the United States, and block
other countries from helping Chinese industry.
Taiwan’s Transformation from Colony to Business
Partner, 1947–1972
Once the Japa nese refugees had returned from China, pragmatic Japa nese
leaders tried to keep trade relations open with the mainland, but U.S. of-
ficials, firmly opposed to the Communist bloc, placed stringent limits on
Japa nese trade with Communist China. Japa nese continued their close re-
lationship with Taiwan, however, especially with the local people with whom
they had had contacts since Taiwan’s colonization in 1895. Japa nese leaders
also established relations with the “mainlanders” ( waishengren)— those born
outside Taiwan—as members of the Nationalist Army, the Nationalist gov-
ernment, and their allies began arriving in Taiwan in large numbers in
1947, when they were retreating from Communist advances.
After 1949, the mainlanders who had accompanied Chiang Kai- shek to
Taiwan made up less than one- third of the island’s population. The “locals”
( benshengren)— those born in Taiwan— were mostly descended from im-
migrants from Fujian, some of whom had been Ming loyalists, who had ar-
rived during the Qing dynasty. Taiwan’s population also included aborig-
ines descended from those who had lived in Taiwan before the arrival of
Koxinga; they constituted about 2 percent of the population. The average
standard of living and educational standards in Taiwan during the Japa nese
occupation had risen far above those on the mainland.
Once the mainlanders arrived in Taiwan, they controlled not only the
military but also the government. Tensions between the mainlanders and
the locals rose quickly. Riots broke out, first in Taipei and then in other
cities. On February 28, 1947, after more troops arrived from the mainland
to support the Nationalist military already stationed in Taiwan, the
Japanese- speaking Nationalist general Chen Yi, who had been sent by
Chiang Kai- shek to bring order to Taiwan, imposed a firm crackdown. Ac-
cording to a report by the Executive Yuan in 1992, it is estimated that main-
land Nationalist troops killed between 18,000 and 28,000 locals, including
most of the individuals capable of providing leadership to resist the new
. 307 .
china and japan
arrivals from the mainland. For de cades, the date of the crackdown, “Feb-
ruary 28” (Ererba), was a power ful symbol of the locals’ hatred of the main-
landers. Even when the Nationalists later executed General Chen Yi, on
charges of cooperating with the Communists, it did little to end the deep
resentment.
Though some Taiwanese had complained about the Japa nese when they
occupied Taiwan, after the February 28 Incident, the local population pre-
ferred their former Japa nese rulers to the recently arrived mainlanders.
Showing an appreciation for Japa nese culture became a way of indirectly
protesting against mainland rule.
Even after the mainlanders arrived in Taiwan, it remained easy for Japa-
nese businesses that had been established in Taiwan before World War II
to work with Taiwan’s companies. As wages for industrial workers in Japan
rose in the 1960s, Japan passed on some of its textile and footwear manu-
facturing to Taiwan, where wages were lower. Thus Taiwan’s industrializa-
tion followed soon after the postwar revival of Japa nese industry. Some of
the Japa nese who had lived in Taiwan before the end of World War II re-
mained there and took part in the continuing Taiwan- Japan business
network.
The key positions in the Republic of China government on Taiwan and
in the military were held by mainlanders. Most mainlanders, both soldiers
and officials, looked down on what they saw as “lowly” business careers.
Therefore the businesses in Taiwan in the 1950s were virtually all small- scale
companies dominated by locals. During the first several years after 1949 and
the end of the Chinese Civil War, the standard of living for local business-
people was generally lower than that of the mainlanders, but as the economy
grew, many locals began to succeed in business and to enjoy a standard of
li
ving that was higher than that of the mainlanders who were living on of-
ficials’ salaries.
Japa nese businesspeople enjoyed good relations with the Taiwanese in
business, and some Japa nese po liti cal leaders who had worked on the main-
land before 1945 were able to establish good contacts with mainlander of-
ficials, some of whom they had known on the mainland. Even though their
countries had been at war, the Japa nese and Chinese who had gone to
Taiwan were not necessarily personal enemies. Some Japa nese individuals
who had served in China shared an appreciation of the same regional main-
. 308 .
The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972
land cuisine and culture (Zhejiang, Shanghai, or Beijing) as their Taiwan
counter parts. The Japa nese prime ministers Kishi Nobusuke and Sato
Eisaku were among those who had worked on the mainland before 1945
and who maintained relations with po liti cal leaders on Taiwan.
Mainland Chinese officials in the 1950s and 1960s were furious with
Japan for maintaining close relations with their enemies in Taiwan. Until
1971 the People’s Republic of China could not take part in the United Na-
tions because the Republic of China (on Taiwan) held the China seat.
Because Japan did not support replacing Taiwan with the mainland for the
UN China seat, in the view of mainland officials Japan was helping their
enemy, the Nationalists.
Mainland leaders who remembered Japan’s industrial strength and am-
bition before 1945 feared that, if given the opportunity, Japa nese business-
people would again dominate economic life on the mainland. Some in China
expressed the fear that Japan was trying to reestablish the Greater East Asia
Co- Prosperity Sphere, in which China, Japan, and the Southeast Asian na-
tions would enjoy shared trade and prosperity under Japan’s leadership.
Therefore the Chinese were cautious about giving Japa nese businessmen op-
portunities on the Chinese mainland.
Taiwan did not allow Japa nese companies that were engaged in busi-
ness in Taiwan to conduct business on the mainland. If they did, they were
warned that they would be expelled from Taiwan. Similarly, the mainland
did not allow Japa nese firms doing business on the mainland to conduct
business with Taiwan. Until the mid-1960s many Japa nese businesspeople
felt that, despite its small size, Taiwan offered greater business opportuni-
ties than the mainland. Despite the small population of Taiwan compared
with that of the mainland (in 1970 mainland China had 825 million
people, whereas Taiwan had only 15 million), until 1964 Japan sold more
products in Taiwan than on the mainland.
Just as Japa nese businesses hoped to operate both on Taiwan and on the
mainland, so they hoped to have government relations with both Taiwan
and the mainland. Even after Henry Kissinger visited China in the summer
of 1971 and signaled a new relationship between the United States and Com-
munist China, Japa nese officials, hoping to retain official relations with the
Republic of China on Taiwan, advocated a two- China policy. Once mainland
China entered the United Nations in 1971 and President Nixon visited
. 309 .
china and japan
China in February 1972, China was in a strong position to require Japan to
cut off diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan if it
wanted to normalize relations with the mainland. Having no choice when
he normalized relations with China in 1972, Tanaka Kakuei (see Biogra-
phies of Key Figures) cut formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of
China on Taiwan, but Japan still maintained strong unofficial connections
with the Taiwanese government.
Sino- Japanese Channels without Diplomatic Relations, 1949–1972
From 1949 to 1972, as during most of the period from 868 to 1873, China
and Japan had no formal government- to- government relations, but trade
between them continued. China was allied with the Communist bloc, had
a planned economy, and stressed class strug gle. In contrast, Japan was al-
lied with the Western countries, had a market economy, and stressed co-
operation among diff er ent social layers.
During the Song dynasty, in the absence of formal relations, monks had
provided trustworthy connections that enabled trade to continue between
Japan and China. During the period from 1949 to 1972, Japa nese officials
who were “friends of China” and Chinese officials who were “friends of Japan”
served as go- betweens for conservative Japa nese leaders and Chinese Com-
munist Party leaders, thus enabling a modest amount of trade to take place
between their two countries.
On the Chinese side, Liao Chengzhi (see Biographies of Key Figures)
and Guo Moruo, a famous writer who had lived in Japan for twenty years
and had spent many years in a Japanese- style home with a Japa nese wife,
were available to meet with Japa nese visitors. On the Japa nese side, Utsu-
nomiya Tokuma (1906–2000) was a friend of China and an advocate of
better relations with China. Utsunomiya had been a brilliant elite student
of economics at Kyoto Imperial University, and he was elected to the lower
house of the National Diet for ten terms, beginning in 1952. His father,
Utsunomiya Taro (1861–1922), had been a Japa nese Army intelligence officer
and had served for five years in London as well as in China, where he
enjoyed good relations with Chinese reformers, including Sun Yat- sen.
Utsunomiya Taro was known as an advocate of pan- Asian cooperation. When
his son Tokuma was studying at Kyoto Imperial University, the university
. 310 .
The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972
had many leftist economics professors and Utsunomiya became a disciple
of the great leftist faculty member Kawakami Hajime, who introduced
Marxism to Japan. While still a student, Tokuma was arrested in the
roundup of Communists on April 16, 1929. In the 1930s, after his release,
Tokuma became president of a phar ma ceu ti cal com pany. Following World
War II Tokuma joined the Liberal Party, which in 1955 was incorporated
into the Liberal Demo cratic Party. Even though he was an avowed leftist,
he was reelected so many times not only because he was respected but also
because he looked after his local constituency. He remained an impor tant
channel for contacts with China.
Among other members of the Liberal Demo cratic Party considered
friendly to China were Matsumura Kenzo, Oyama Ikuo, Kono Ichiro
( father of Kono Yohei, who was later also considered friendly to China and
was the grand father of Foreign Minister Kono Taro, also friendly to China),
and Takasaki Tatsunosuke (see Biographies of Key Figures). Takasaki was
also a channel to Japa nese “friendly firms” that did not trade with Taiwan.
When China’s relations with Japan improved, these individuals provided
links to the mainstream Liberal Demo cratic Party. But before normaliza-
tion of Sino- Japanese relations in 1972, China’s Communist Party, which
retained contacts with Japan’s Socialist and Co
mmunist Parties, could use
those parties as outlets for voicing complaints about Japa nese policies and
trying to win support for China within the International Communist
Movement.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party,
Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen, who was then mayor of Beijing, frequently
met with Japa nese Communists and Socialists, and also with local Japa nese
officials from vari ous other parties. Among China’s leaders, these po liti cal
channels before 1960 were key because politics was then considered more
impor tant than economics. After China split with the Soviets in 1960, Chi-
nese Communist Party officials tried to convince the Japa nese Communist
Party to criticize the Soviet Communists, but the Japa nese refused and in
1965 the Chinese Communist Party broke off relations with the Japa nese
Communists. Thereafter, the Chinese worked through the Japan Socialist
Party and the Komeito Party. Just as Buddhist monks had played an impor-
tant role in Sino- Japanese relations in earlier centuries, so Komeito, the
po liti cal party in Japan affiliated with a Buddhist sect, Soka Gakkai, played
. 311 .
china and japan
a key go- between role. In 1968 the head of Soka Gakkai, Ikeda Daisaku,
spoke out in favor of normalizing relations with China even before China
began opening to the West in 1969. These Japa nese po liti cal groups also pro-
vided channels through which the Chinese could gather information about
their common enemy, the Liberal Demo cratic Party. Some of the criticisms
China made of Japan’s mainstream politics were essentially derived from
criticisms by Japan’s leftist parties.
Between 1953, when the armistice in Korea was signed, and 1972 there
were many ups and downs in relations between the two countries. Between
1953 and 1957, Zhou Enlai and Japa nese leaders Yoshida Shigeru (see Bio-
graphies of Key Figures) and Hatoyama Ichiro tried to improve relations.
Between 1957 and 1961 relations worsened as China turned to the left and
Japan turned to the right. But between 1961 and 1966, during China’s re-
trenchment from the Great Leap Forward and Prime Minister Ikeda’s ef-
forts to avoid provocations, relations improved somewhat, allowing for the
establishment of Liao- Takasaki trade. During the early years of the Cul-
China and Japan Page 48