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china and japan
Facing History While Looking Forward
The current dialogue on history between China and Japan has focused on
the unfortunate side of the relationship. Less attention has been given to
the good relations between the two countries at times of great cultural bor-
rowing, especially in the periods from 600 to 838, when Japan borrowed so
heavi ly from China, and from 1905 to 1937 and 1978 through the 1990s, when
China borrowed so much from Japan. The two cultures have changed
throughout history, but there remains a broad base of commonality in the
written language, lit er a ture, Buddhism, Confucianism, art, architecture, and
music they share, some of which is even incorporated into popu lar culture,
and this could form the basis for continued cooperation in the future, if per-
mitted by national policies.
Each country has placed more emphasis on its own contributions to the
other and its own suffering at the hands of the other. These images have
been kept alive to strengthen loyalty to the nation and to the nation’s leaders.
The Chinese, especially through popu lar Sino- Japanese War movies,
have emphasized the negative side of Sino- Japanese relations throughout
history. Many Chinese people are convinced that the Japa nese are aggres-
sive by nature. In China’s patriotic narrative, the Sino Japa nese War of
1937–1945 is simply the latest chapter revealing the true Japa nese character.
In this view, the Japa nese are polite—on the surface. In the 1920s, for ex-
ample, the Japa nese talked about cooperation, but in the end they initiated
incidents and sneak attacks against both China and the United States.
The Chinese people have little awareness of the positive side of their re-
lationship with Japan, of how much they have benefited from the “learn
from Japan” programs after 1895 and the “development assistance” programs
after 1978. They are not fully aware of the generosity of Japa nese aid pro-
grams in the 1980s and 1990s. They are also not aware of the extent to
which Japan has apologized, or how thoroughly the Japa nese have renounced
militarism and pursued peace.
Throughout history the Japa nese have had a deep sense of the Chinese
as a proud and arrogant people who demand subordination by other people.
Thus, ever since 607 the Japa nese have maintained a reluctance to bow down
to the Chinese and a determination to be treated as po liti cal equals. For the
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Facing the New Era
Japa nese, requests by the Chinese that they grovel in apologies represent
the latest version of China’s attempts to assert its superiority. The Japa nese
are willing to apologize, but they are not prepared to bow down and apolo-
gize in the way that the Chinese demand.
The Japa nese are aware of Japan’s positive contributions to China in the
modernization of Manchuria and Taiwan and its contributions to China
after 1895 and 1978. However, their collective historical memory directs less
attention to the harm and suffering Japan caused to China, an issue that is
constantly stressed by the Chinese. The Japa nese government at times has
not allowed textbooks critical of Japan’s aggression in China to be used in
its schools, and many publications and public discussions in Japan gloss over
the atrocities that Japan committed in China.
What Japan and China Can Do to Face History
Both countries could avoid aggravating the prob lems that arise from his-
tory by providing their citizens with a fuller and more accurate account of
their history and a more balanced pre sen ta tion of their current relations.
They could help their citizens better understand their long- entangled his-
tory in a way that acknowledges how much they have learned from each
other and reflects their positive experiences from working together.
The Japa nese prime minister and other se nior officials could decide that
they will not visit the Yasukuni Shrine while they are in office. The Japa-
nese could also provide fuller accounts of the Sino- Japanese War in cur-
riculum guidelines for compulsory high school history courses, in par tic-
u lar by including the word “invasion” ( shinryaku) in their textbooks. Japan
could produce more tele vi sion programs that give a full accounting of the
suffering inflicted on the Chinese people by Japan’s invasions. The Japa nese
people, individually, could make greater efforts to understand the history
of Japa nese aggression in China, as well as to better understand Chinese
society and the attitudes of the Chinese people.
The Chinese could teach their students more about what China learned
from Japan between 1905 and 1937 as well as after 1978. They could give
the public a fuller account of the Japa nese turn to peace after 1945, Japa nese
contributions to China since 1978, and the apologies already offered by
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Japa nese officials. They could reduce the number of anti- Japanese movies
about World War II produced and shown in China and pre sent more
balanced descriptions of Japan in their museums, their classrooms, and the
media.
The Chinese could also study the example of Japan’s history in the first
half of the twentieth century as a warning of what can happen as a country
becomes richer and stronger, when support for military expansion becomes
so strong that its leaders are unable to restrain superpatriotic passions that
can ultimately lead to disaster.
A New Vision: Warm Politics, Hot Economics
It has been customary for the Chinese and Japa nese to describe their rela-
tionship as “cold politics, hot economics.” Despite poor po liti cal relations,
they have extensive business relations. The question now is whether the two
nations can build on their business relations and improve their po liti cal
relations.
Since 2010 the key leverage for improving relations has been in the hands
of the Chinese, because China has suffered more and because China now
has the larger economy and more global influence. Chinese leaders will of
course consider how much it is in their national interest to work with Japan
on regional and international issues. A fundamental question is to what ex-
tent Chinese leaders feel confident enough of the loyalty of their own
people that they do not need to use anti- Japanese programs to strengthen
nationalism among the populace. In the 1990s, war movies depicting Japa-
nese enemies were an effective tool for strengthening patriotism, but their
production and use could be reduced as Chinese leaders feel more confi-
dent of the patriotism of the public.
It is unrealistic, considering the depth of the historical passions involved,
that China and Japan will quickly develop feelings of trust and become close
friends. That may be a goal for several de cades in the future. A reasonable
goal for the next de cade would be to manage their relations in a straight-
forward, frank, and businesslike way so that the two countries can become
reliable partners. It is unrealistic to expect that China and Japan in the next
/> de cade will enjoy “hot politics.” But if they can continue to expand their co-
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Facing the New Era
operation in such enterprises as the Belt and Road Initiative, in developing
joint proj ects for solving environmental issues, and in multinational organ-
izations, it is not impossible that they could achieve “warm politics.”
A closer businesslike relationship between China and Japan should not
be a prob lem for the United States. Some individual Americans might re-
spond with alarm, but their alarm would be misplaced. A reduction of ten-
sions between China and Japan, increased stability in the Western Pacific,
and contributions from both countries toward maintaining world order are
all outcomes that accord with the interests of the United States as well as
those of other countries.
An Agenda for Sino- Japanese Cooperation
From 2006 to 2008, leaders and representatives of China and Japan held a
series of meetings to discuss how their nations could work together for
their mutual benefit and laid out an agenda to achieve that goal.
In April 2007 Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan and gave a key
speech—in Chinese, translated for a Japa nese audience, and relayed back
to China, where it was broadcast to the public in the original Chinese. He
publicly stated what Japa nese leaders had long hoped a Chinese leader
would say. He acknowledged that on many occasions Japan’s leaders had
expressed their deep remorse and apologies, and he expressed apprecia-
tion for Japan’s peaceful development. Premier Wen proposed four princi-
ples for bringing Sino- Japanese relations to a new stage: mutual trust, a
big- picture perspective, common development based on equality and mu-
tual benefit, and strengthening exchanges with an eye toward the future.
The agenda that Chinese and Japa nese officials then agreed to pursue
includes the following goals:
Expanded exchanges and dialogues among leaders, cabinet
ministers, and high- level officials.
Exchanges of young people.
Reciprocal visits by the People’s Liberation Navy and the Japan
Maritime Self- Defense Force.
Cooperation on issues involving North Korea.
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china and japan
Energy cooperation (including cooperation on energy conserva-
tion and environmental protection).
Establishment of a ministerial- level dialogue on energy.
Further cooperation in fields such as agriculture, intellectual
property rights, phar ma ceu ti cal products, small and medium- size
enterprises, information and communications technology, finance,
and criminal justice.
This agenda from 2007 has great promise as a starting point not only
for the benefit of China and Japan but fot the benefit of global peace and
order.
. 416 .
Biographies of Key Figures
Notes
Sources and Further Reading
Acknowl edgments
Index
Biographies of Key Figures
Chiang Kai- shek ( Jiang Jieshi), 1887–1975
In 1926 Chiang Kai- shek, until then a military officer of modest ability and
genuine patriotism, succeeded Sun Yat- sen and became “the Generalis-
simo” (the supreme commander), the top military and po liti cal leader of
the Nationalist Party, and from 1928 until his death he was president of
the Republic of China, first on the mainland and after 1949 on Taiwan.
However, he never acquired the po liti cal skills, charisma, or success of Mao
Zedong, his Communist rival for four de cades. He remained stoic during
his failures to unify China in the 1930s, to expel Japan from China
(1937–1945), and to win the Civil War (1946–1949). During war time he
was a micromanager, often personally giving directions to local officers. Yet
in Nanjing (1927–1937) and Taiwan (1949–1975) while ruling with an aloof
grandeur, he brought order and economic progress. He was accused of
being a right-wing authoritarian, but in Taiwan he carried out land reform
that his base of support did not allow him to implement on the mainland.
Chiang had a complicated history of relations with Japan. He attended
a military acad emy in Japan for three years and admired Japa nese soldiers
for their military spirit and the Japanese readiness to die for their country.
In the early 1920s, for his personal safety, he escaped to Japan for several
months. He endured the taunts of patriots for not fighting the Japa nese
when he realized that they had superior forces. In the Sino- Japanese War,
he fought huge battles against the Japa nese in Shanghai and Wuhan, and
at times he expressed a deep hatred of the Japa nese for their cruelties. But
after World War II, he did not require the Japa nese to pay reparations to
China. In Taiwan he welcomed Japa nese businesspeople who were a great
help to Taiwan’s economic growth.
Chiang Kai- shek came from a merchant family in Fenghua county, Zhe-
jiang province, near Ningbo, 150 miles south of Shanghai. The family had
enough funds to support his studies under Confucian tutors and his at-
tendance at Confucian schools in Ningbo from 1903 to 1906. Scarcely a
year after hearing that Japan had defeated Rus sia, as it had defeated China
in 1895, Chiang signaled his opposition to Manchu rule by cutting off his
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Biographies of Key Figures
queue and setting out for Japan to learn the secrets of its military success.
He planned to pursue a military career to help unify China and revive its
civilization. After several months in Japan studying language, he returned
home and passed an exam to enter the Chinese Central Army School in Ba-
oding, where he underwent his first year of military training. He then passed
an examination to enter Shimbu Gakko, a school in Japan where Chinese
students studied to prepare for entrance into Japa nese military schools. Not a
bril iant student, at Shimbu Gakko Chiang ranked fifty- fourth among the
sixty- two students in his class. He graduated from Shimbu Gakko in No-
vember 1909 and was then assigned to the Japa nese Nineteenth Field Army
Regiment for practical training. Though reserved, he acquired a reputation
for being serious, honest, loyal, and dedicated to his country.
In 1908, while in Japan, he joined Sun Yat- sen’s Chinese Revolutionary
Alliance, the Tongmenghui, at the age of twenty- one. When Chiang got
word that the 1911 Revolution had broken out in Wuhan, he joined 120 other
Chinese cadets in Japan to immediately return to China. They boarded a
Japa nese freighter in Nagasaki and landed at a wharf in the Japa nese area
of Shanghai. Having spent nearly three years in Japan, Chiang spoke and
read Japa nese fairly well, but he had no close Japa nese friends. Chiang re-
garded the dedication of Japanese soldiers as critical to Japan’s military vic-
tories in the Sino- Japanese and the Russo- Japanese wars. He was also im-
pressed with Japa nese efficiency and Japan’s success in building the modern
industrial base and transportation system that underpinned its modern
military capacity. Chia
ng hoped to build a similar industrial base and a
dedicated military force back in China.
In 1913 when Sun Yat- sen first met Chiang, who was then a midlevel
army official, Sun was impressed by his dedication. When Japan announced
its Twenty- One Demands in 1915, Sun, still hoping to win Japa nese sup-
port, wrote a letter in support of the Japa nese position. As a result, many
of Sun’s erstwhile followers abandoned him for being too soft on Japan, but
Chiang remained steadfastly loyal to Sun. In early 1916, Chiang, then back
in Shanghai, with financial help from Japan, attempted to build a military
base to overcome the northern warlords. He began writing letters to Sun
offering suggestions for military strategy. Chiang rose to a high position
not because of his outstanding military rec ord but because of his personal
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Biographies of Key Figures
relationship with Sun Yat- sen, who valued his loyalty, his dedication to the
nation, and his military knowledge.
In 1924 Sun Yat- sen founded a national military acad emy at Huangpu
(Whampoa), near Guangzhou, and appointed Chiang Kai- shek, then age
thirty- nine, to head it. Although funds for the military acad emy came from
the Soviet Union and the army was modeled after the Soviet military,
Chiang attempted to inculcate in the troops the bushido spirit— the code
of honor and self- sacrifice— that he had observed in Japan. Sun and Chiang
both hoped to train dedicated military officers who could work together
in a national army to unify the country. Although Chiang had doubts about
Sun’s policy of including Communists in a united front, he was successful
in training excellent officers who would later serve in his Northern Expe-
dition to unify the country.
After Sun died on March 12, 1925, there was a succession strug gle be-
tween Chiang and Wang Jing wei, whose connections with Japan were deeper
than Chiang’s. Although Wang initially had a po liti cal advantage, Chiang
had a military advantage, and one year later Chiang emerged as Sun’s suc-
cessor, while Wang Jing wei was elected head of Sun’s Po liti cal Council.
In 1922 Chiang Kai- shek proposed marriage to Song (Soong) Meiling,
daughter of the rich businessman T. V. Soong, but she refused him. In Oc-
tober 1927, Meiling, her sister Ailing, and their mother were in Japan. Chiang
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