bookstores and to Kyoto.
In his diary Zhou commented on how well or ga nized and disciplined
the Japa nese were. He lamented that the Chinese were so poorly or ga nized
and were not making rapid pro gress toward modernization. He read news-
papers about the Rus sian Revolution and books in Japa nese about
Marxism. The Japa nese author he found most in ter est ing was Kawakami
Hajime, whose book The Tale of Poverty analyzes the causes and distribu-
tion of poverty and what nations might do to deal with it. Even rich na-
tions had poor people, Zhou learned. Zhou, like Kawakami, had come
from a comfortable family and was becoming concerned about moral issues,
including the need to help the poor. Zhou made an effort to enter Kyoto
University to study under Kawakami, but it did not work out. Like
Kawakami, Zhou was not yet a Marxist, but also like Kawakami, such con-
cerns paved the way for his later commitment to Marxism.
In the summer of 1918 Zhou was troubled by Japan’s rice riots. A group
of farm house wives had blocked people from taking rice from the villa gers
to sell in urban markets. Inflation was high and rice merchants were making
a great deal of money, but the rice farmers were receiving a very low price
for their crop. An estimated 700,000 people, including some urban resi-
dents upset by the spiraling costs owing to inflation, joined in the riots. For
Zhou, the riots raised questions about justice for the poor farmers, who
were being squeezed out by a cap i tal ist system that brought profits only to
the merchants. While a student at Nankai, Zhou had written essays praising
Japan’s economic pro gress, but the rice riots raised questions about whether
China should be copying the Japa nese economic system, and if so, how its
policies should be modified. In December 1918 Zhou also observed the dem-
onstrations of Korean students at the Korean YMCA in Kanda as the
Korean In de pen dence Movement was growing. In 1921 Zhou joined the
Chinese Communist Party.
In March 1919, after he failed the examinations for a second time, Zhou,
who had relied on friends for funding, de cided it would be better to return
home than to continue burdening his Chinese friends. But before he re-
. 467 .
Biographies of Key Figures
turned to China, he stayed with a Nankai friend for a month in Kyoto,
where he took some last looks at the gardens and wrote poems about their
beauty. “Cherry blossoms, delicately pink, tenderly sweet,” he wrote. “All
soul- enchanting. Beauty of nature, untouched by artfulness.”
In late April Zhou boarded a ship in Kobe for Pusan, and from there
he went on to Beijing. Fortuitously, Zhou arrived home just before May 4,
and he immediately threw himself into the demonstrations for a national
awakening. Zhou formed the Awakening Society, a secret organ ization to
help raise national awareness. The society included some who had been his
friends in Japan and several who later became Communists. His two years
in Japan, when he was wrestling with the issues of poverty, capitalism, and
imperialism, had helped prepare him for his role as an intellectual leader in
the aftermath of May 4, 1919.
In January 1920 Zhou and some other members of his Awakening So-
ciety were arrested in Tianjin for participating in demonstrations. After his
release some six months later, Zhou and others set sail for France for fur-
ther study, where they would gain a greater understanding of Eu ro pean so-
cial conditions and a clearer picture of what needed to be done in China.
Unlike most young Chinese students then in France who were on work-
study programs, Zhou had received funding to write for a Tianjin news-
paper and he could devote himself full- time to writing and organ izing. Chi-
nese youths who were selected to go to France on the work- study programs
were among the most able elite students, but the depression in France at
the time made it impossible for them to earn enough money working, mostly
in factories, to pay for their tuition. Therefore they studied not in the class-
rooms but outside them, through observation and reading, and sifting
through new ideas in their discussion groups. Zhou remained in touch with
friends in China, and in 1921, just months after the Chinese Communist
Party was formed, Zhou and others or ga nized a Chinese Communist Party
cell in France. Zhou became a full- time party or ga nizer, traveling to England,
Belgium, and Germany to help expand the Chinese Communist Party
among Chinese students in Eu rope. In 1923, he also joined the Nationalist
Party. By this time, having already been imprisoned and with many friends
living under fear of arrest, Zhou had been hardened.
In the fall of 1924 Zhou returned to China and was assigned by the party
to serve as po liti cal commissar at the Huangpu Military Acad emy, working
. 468 .
Biographies of Key Figures
under Chiang Kai- shek as part of the United Front. In the next year he mar-
ried Deng Yingchao, who had been a member of his Awakening Society in
Tianjin. Throughout his life, she remained his partner in marriage and in
the Communist cause.
In 1926 Zhou left the Huangpu Military Acad emy to engage in organ-
izing work in Shanghai. Following the split between the Communists and
Nationalists in April 1927, Zhou and the other Communists became en-
gaged in life- and- death battles with the Nationalists. It was Zhou’s respon-
sibility to obtain intelligence from the Nationalists. In 1934 he received
secret intelligence that helped the Communists break through the Nation-
alist encirclement and start on the Long March. Even after the two sides
restored the United Front in December 1936, each remained suspicious of
the other side and what it would do after the Anti- Japanese War ended.
Zhou Enlai carried on negotiations with the Nationalists while also looking
for in for mants who would reveal to him the Nationalists’ secrets. During
the Anti- Japanese War Zhou spent some time in Chongqing, the Nation-
alist headquarters, where he negotiated with the Nationalists and met with
Westerners, and he also spent some time in Yan’an with Mao and other
Communist leaders. When the Marshall Mission, led by U.S. Army gen-
eral George Marshall, was dispatched to Chongqing in 1946–1947 to try to
avert a civil war, Zhou joined with Mao in the negotiations.
From the time the Communists took power in 1949 until his death in
1976, Zhou was a central pillar in all Chinese policies, domestic and for-
eign, and all major negotiations, owing to his broad strategic perspective,
extraordinary command of detail, capacity for incredibly long hours of work,
and good relations with the major Communist leaders. Mao had the power
to make all impor tant decisions, such as entering the Korean War, allying
with the Soviet Union, later breaking with the Soviets, and opening to the
West. But Zhou carried out the detailed negotiations. He negotiated the
Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1950, and he managed the
negotiations surrounding the Korean War. In 1955
, when permitted by Mao,
Zhou attended the Geneva Conference to expand China’s diplomatic arena
and improve relations with Japan and the Western countries. His negotia-
tions with Henry Kissinger over resuming diplomatic relations between
China and the United States, beginning in 1971 when they represented their
respective countries, have become legendary.
. 469 .
Biographies of Key Figures
Mao purged many leading party officials, especially in 1942–1943, 1957–
1959, and 1966–1967. He often disparaged Zhou Enlai and expressed great
dis plea sure that many officials seemed at times to re spect Zhou more than
they respected Mao himself. Zhou was always self- effacing, however, he al-
ways deferred to Mao, and he wisely anticipated Mao’s moods. Mao also
realized that no one could compare with Zhou in his knowledge of foreign
affairs and the re spect he enjoyed among foreign leaders.
As Japan began its programs for economic growth in the 1950s, Zhou
was deeply worried about the danger that Japan would use its newfound
economic strength to return to militarism. Yet after 1949 Zhou welcomed
Japa nese “friends of China” to Beijing, and after 1972 he welcomed main-
stream Japa nese visitors from across the po liti cal spectrum, all of whom
regarded Zhou as an icon.
During the weeks when Zhou Enlai was on his hospital deathbed in
late 1975, Mao never visited him. After Zhou died on January 8, 1976, Mao
chose not to attend his funeral, and he forbade foreign countries from
sending del e ga tions to pay their re spects. On April 3, two days before the
annual grave- sweeping festival, Beijing officials, knowing that many people
were unhappy that Zhou had not been given appropriate funeral ser vices
and anticipating that large crowds might use the occasion to remember
Zhou, issued an order from Mao: Do not go to Tian anmen Square to lay
wreaths. Nevertheless, on April 5, 1976, an estimated two million people,
touched by Zhou’s contributions to China for more than five de cades, espe-
cially his tireless efforts to curb the excesses of the Great Leap Forward
and the Cultural Revolution, went to the square to honor Zhou. Mao, ailing
himself, but well enough to understand that Zhou’s popularity exceeded
his own, died five months later.
For further reading, see Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Rev-
olutionary: A Biography (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Miyumi Itoh,
The Origins of Con temporary Sino- Japanese Relations: Zhou Enlai and Japan
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Henry Kissinger, White House Years
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
. 470 .
Notes
chapter 1. chinese contributions to
japa nese civilization, 600–838
I profited from the guidance of Yukio Lippit and Robert Borgen for scholarship on
this period, especially concerning architecture. For the overall history of the period,
I drew especially on the first two volumes of The Cambridge History of Japan and
East Asia: Tradition and Transformation by Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig. For the
account of the clans and use of the kabane system, I relied on research by Richard
Miller. I am indebted to Mark Byington for helping me understand the Korean in-
fluence. For information about the development of the Japa nese language, I relied
on work by David Lurie. For the Japa nese military, I relied especially on work by
William Wayne Farris. I also benefited from the advice of Richard Dyck, Andrew
Gordon, Li Tingjiang, Benjamin Ng, and Wang Yong.
1. For con ve nience, I use the names “China,” “Japan,” and “ Korea” to describe the
po liti cal units of the time, even though they did not then have the well- developed
po liti cal structure of a modern nation- state and did not cover as broad a geo-
graph i cal area as they do today.
2. I use “clan” for the Japa nese word uji. The uji was basically a patrilineal descent group, but it could also include those who married in or others who were added
in. There is insufficient recorded information to be precise about who was added
to the basic descent groups.
3. There is disagreement among specialists about the historical authenticity of
Prince Shotoku. He was not called Prince Shotoku until after his death. Some
Buddhists believed he was the reincarnation of a Chinese monk. The legend of
Shotoku that developed after his death is traced in Michael I. Como, Shotoku:
Ethnicity, Ritual, and Vio lence in the Japa nese Buddhist Tradition (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2008). For my account of Shotoku, I have relied on the
view of most historians.
4. Gina L. Barnes, Archaeology of East Asia: The Rise of Civilization in China, Korea
and Japan (Philadelphia: Oxbow Books, 2015), 270–271.
5. Some scholars have assumed that the term wo in woren implied that the Japa-
nese were dwarfs, but more recent scholarship casts doubts on this conjecture.
6. Inoue Mitsusada, with Delmer M. Brown, “The Century of Reform,” in The
Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 1, Ancient Japan, ed. Delmer Brown (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 182.
. 471 .
notes to pages 12–30
7. William Wayne Farris, Heavenly Warriors: Evolution of Japan’s Military, 500–
1300 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University
Press, 1992), 38–39.
chapter 2. trade without transformative
learning, 838–1862
I have benefited from detailed advice from Paula Harrell and Robert Innes on all
parts of this chapter. I have also benefited from the advice of Robert Borgen,
Richard Von Glahn, and Peter Bol on the Song period, Michael Szonyi on the
Ming period, and Ronald Toby on trade between China and Japan. On the role of
the monks, I have profited especially from the thesis by Li Yiwen, in which Li traces
the role of monks during the six centuries when there were no tribute missions. For
an account of the views of Xu Guangqi, I have drawn on Timothy Brook, in Fogel,
ed., Sagacious Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors. For the lasting image of Japa nese
pirates, I have drawn on the article by Wang Yong in the same volume. I am in-
debted to Wang Yong for his help on the earlier centuries.
1. The discovery in the 1970s of two Chinese shipwrecks still filled with Chinese
goods added to our knowledge about trade between China and Japan. In 1976 a
sunken ship, now called the Sinan, which had been headed from Ningbo to
Hakata, was discovered off the coast of South Korea. It was built and owned
by Chinese merchants. Many rec ords were found on the ship. When the Sinan
sank on its 1323 voyage from China to Japan, its cargo included some 28,000
tons of copper coins and 20,000 pieces of Chinese ceramics. More than 350
wooden slips were attached to the goods, indicating to whom they belonged.
Apparently most of the people on board the Sinan were Japa nese, and the
goods were all connected to the Jotenji Monastery in Hakata. Another sunken
ship was discovered in 1974 in the bay off Quanzhou (in Fujian province).
Many of the goods on that ship were owned by the Japa nese Tokufuji Monas-
tery,
but some were owned by merchants. In another find in the 1970s, when a
subway was being built in Hakata thousands of Chinese coins and fragments
of ceramics were discovered.
For some de cades, Japa nese Buddhists believed that to prevent the deterio-
ration of the world until the arrival of the next Buddha, it was necessary to
bury sutras in mounds whenever someone died. Thousands of such mounds
were built in Japan between the eleventh and nineteenth centuries, and they
were discovered throughout Japan in the twentieth century. Most were found
in Kyushu and in the area around Kyoto, but many were also found on the
island of Shikoku, on the Inland Sea route for Chinese goods traveling from
Kyushu to the area near Kyoto. Thousands of Chinese goods, especially Chinese
. 472 .
notes to pages 30–68
sutra containers, were found in the sutra mounds in Japan, but no such sutra
mounds have been found in China. Coins, knives, and images of Buddha were
also found with the sutras in mounds dating from the eleventh to the thirteenth
century. The presence of so many goods from China in these sutra mounds
reflects the high prestige of Chinese goods in Japan during that time.
2. It has been estimated that some 50 Chinese ships visited Japan in the ninth
century, approximately 100 ships in the tenth century, 100 ships in the eleventh
century, 120 ships in the twelfth century, approximately 50 in the thirteenth
century, very few in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and nearly 100 in the
sixteenth century. Few Japa nese ships ventured abroad in the tenth to the twelfth
centuries, but an estimated 200 Japa nese ships sailed to China in the thirteenth
century. Fewer ships went abroad in the fourteenth century, but after learning
about Ming shipbuilding advances, the Japa nese built better ships and sent more
than 1,000 to China every year during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Richard Von Glahn, “The Ningbo- Hakata Merchant Network and the Re-
orientation of East Asian Maritime Trade, 1150–1350,” Harvard Journal of Asi-
atic Studies 74, no. 2 (2014): 249–279.
3. Reported by Von Glahn, in “The Ningbo- Hakata Merchant Network.”
4. Jurgis Elisonas [George Elison], “The Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with
China and Korea,” in The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 4, Early Modern
China and Japan Page 72