List of Illustrations page vii
List of Tables ix
List of Maps X1
Preface xiii
Chapter 1. Prelude to MacArthur's Attack to End the War 3
2. Uncertainty on the Eve of the UN Advance 23
3. UN and CCF Positions and Orders of Battle 34
4. The First Day of Eighth Army's Attack 49
5. The Second Day of Eighth Army's Attack 60
6. The CCF 2nd Phase Offensive 74
7. The CCF Armies' Rout of the ROK II Corps 77
8. Defeat of the US 25th Infantry Division 102
9. Withdrawal of Eighth Army Left Flank to the Chongchon River 143
10. The CCF 40th Army Attack on the US 2nd Infantry Division 154
11. The US 2nd Infantry Division Retreats to Kunu-ri 193
12. MacArthur Calls a Commanders' Conference 212
13. Withdrawal of Eighth Army South of the Chongchon River 220
14. Withdrawal of the 2nd Infantry Division from Kunu-ri 227
15. Back to Pyongyang 294
16. Evacuation of Pyongyang 313
17. The Waist of Korea 341
18. Big Bugout or Skillful Retreat? 354
19. The Death of General Walker 390
Notes 398
Bibliographical Note 438
Index 441
Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Lt. Gen. Walton Walker
Bridges over the Yalu River
Maj Gen. John Coulter serving Thanksgiving dinner
Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Maj. Gen. John Coulter
Maj. Gen. William Kean and Lt. Gen. Walton Walker
Maj. Gen. John Church
Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser
2nd Infantry Division squad advancing down a hill
Carrying supplies on a packboard to 9th Infantry
The 8076th MASH at Kunu-ri
11th Engineer Battalion constructing floating bridge
Eighth Army troops withdrawing past refugees
8th Kings Royal Irish Hussars covering withdrawal from Pyongyang
North Koreans fleeing across Taedong River v v
ROK 2nd Division withdrawing ten miles south of Pyongyang
1. Eighth Army strength, 24 November 1950
2. Chinese XIII Army Group order of battle, 24 November 1950
3. Alignment of Eighth Army and CCF forces, 25 November 1950
4. Casualties for US 2nd Division as of 30 November 1950
5. Strength of US 2nd Division units, 30 November 1950
6. US 2nd Division artillery losses at Kunu-ri
7. ROK II Corps strength, 3 December 1950
1. Eighth Army area of combat, 25 November-2 December 1950
2. Eighth Army attack plan, 24 November 1950
3. CCF XIII Army Group deployment, 24 November 1950
4. CCF 38th and 42nd armies' attacks on ROK II Corps, 25-30 November 1950
5. US 25th Division attack and CCF counterattack, 24-29 November 1950
6. Task Force Dolvin, 25-27 November 1950
7. CCF attack on 9th Infantry, 2nd Division, 25 November 1950
8. CCF 40th Army attack on 9th and 23rd infantries and crossing of Chongchon River, 25-26 November 1950
9. 2nd Division front line, 2 A.M., 28 November 1950
10. Withdrawal of I Corps, 25-29 November 1950
11. 2nd Division positions in Kunu-ri and vicinity, 29-30 November 1950
12. 2nd Division at Kunu-ri, 30 November 1950
13. Eighth Army withdrawal positions, 30 November12 December 1950
14. The waist of Korea
15. Plan for withdrawal defense lines given in Operational Plan 12, 11 December 1950
16. Eighth Army front line, 31 December 1950
Flushed with the victory of Inchon and Seoul in the late summer of 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur ignored many warnings and forged ahead in the autumn, determined to complete the victory for all of Korea. To this end, he ordered what he thought would be the last campaign: his Eighth Army would advance to the north and his X Corps to the northeast. From the Korean side of the Yalu River border they would be able to see China's desolate Manchuria province and the Soviet Union's Siberian wasteland. Korea would be unified once again, the Korean War won.
This volume tells the story of Eighth Army's misfortunes in the west in that campaign, so optimistically launched in late November 1950. The results dimmed forever MacArthur's aura of military might and led directly to his eclipse and downfall in the early spring of 1951.
It is a story of a sophisticated modern army being overwhelmed by a Chinese army group of light infantry that carried small arms and grenades and that emerged from its mountain hideouts to strike at night with stunning speed against a surprised American and United Nations army. The ancient Chinese weapons of noise and strange calls at night (bugle, shepherd's horn, and an assortment of whistles) together with colored flares worked effectively for them as a communications system in attack and at the same time frayed the nerves of their adversaries, often to the point of paralysis.
The Chinese onslaught in late November and early December in the hills south of the Yalu was not that of an ignorant command system; it was well planned and showed the influence of deep study of Antoine Henri Jomini's theory of warfare. It was characterized by surprise and frontal attack to hold an enemy while other formations attacked one or both flanks and still other parts executed forced marches to reach the rear of the enemy and cut off his retreat. These tactics created great confusion in the separated UN ranks and frequently led to panic and unit disintegration. From the Chinese point of view the campaign against Eighth Army in the west was also a classic example of using night fighting to demoralize an adversary not accustomed to such action.
The campaign was fought with the UN forces, including the Americans, believing that the legendary Chinese soldier Gen. Lin Piao, famous in the Long March and afterward in the Communists' ranks, commanded his veterans of the Fourth Field Army in the battles against Eighth Army. Such was not the case. Lin Piao was not in Korea during the fighting, nor did he command the troops of the Chinese XIII Army Group of his Fourth Field Army. Even now, one comes upon statements in writings on the Korean War that Lin Piao was the adversary commander.
Another myth widely circulated at the time (and still repeated), apparently believed by commanders in Korea and Western military analysts, is that the Chinese exploited the physical gap between Eighth Army and the X Corps-that they attacked through it and around the right flank of Eighth Army to destroy the ROK II Corps on the army's flank, gain the exposed rear of Eighth Army, and then roll up the army line westward, thus causing the quick defeat of the UN forces and threatening their destruction. Nothing could be more misleading. The Chinese never operated in a military way in the gap, any more than the UN did. It simply was not feasible to do so. Neither side made use of the gap in the high Northern Taebaek Mountains. The fact is that the Chinese attacked the ROK II Corps frontally and broke through its center. The deep penetration through the center of its front and the exploitation of that breakthrough to pour waiting columns of troops through it to the rear of the ROK corps on the army right flank is what caused the rapid disintegration of Eighth Army's right flank and the enemy's subsequent enveloping movement behind the army's center.
It has seemed that no one then or later who has written on the subject has done any independent study of the military positions and movements of both sides in this action or plotted their locations on a tactical map. If this had been done, the readily accepted explanation that the Chinese gained a great victory by exploiting a gap between the Eighth Army and the X Corps could not have survived. It simply did not happen that way. I believe that this book will lay that myth to rest.
I began studies and interviews as early as 1951, when I was in Korea attached to Eighth Army and wanted to learn what had happened the preceding winter. At that time I centered my studies on Kunu-ri, which seemed to have been the critical event. Over the years I continued interviews and carried on correspondence with individuals who survived the fighting in November and December 1950. In 1961 the Department of the Army published my South to the Nakwng, North to the Talu as its official combat history of the Korean War from its beginning on 25 June 1950 to 24 November 1950. The latter date marks the beginning of General MacArthur's campaign to drive to the border and to end the war. It is also the date at which this volume picks up the combat story in the west. My East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 tells the story of Army troops east of Chosin Reservoir in MacArthur's resumption of his efforts to end the war.
The writing of this volume was long delayed because not until after I retired could I find the time necessary to study properly the existing archival records. All the unit reports of the Eighth Army engaged in ground combat in Korea are preserved in the National Archives, Federal Records Center, Record Group 407, in Federal Building 1, Suitland, Maryland. I spent two years there, going through the official records of Eighth Army units and the intelligence reports of prisoner interrogations and translated enemy documents. I also spent nearly two months at the Army History Research Center, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, studying the Matthew B. Ridgway Papers.
This book is based on my study of the actual records of the units involved, supplemented by interviews and correspondence with participants, as the notes and documentation will disclose, together with in-depth map study of the terrain involved. My purpose was to present as precisely as possible just what did happen on the ground at the combat level.
Perhaps the most difficult part of the work was to understand what happened at Kunu-ri on 29-30 November and 1 December 1950 that resulted in the virtual destruction of the US 2nd Infantry Division as a combat-effective force. The records are wholly inadequate to describe the events. Most of them were lost in the action. It was only by interviews, and principally through correspondence, with survivors over a period of nearly thirty years that I was eventually able to synthesize at least an approximation of what happened.
A few comments about military terminology may be helpful. The United States Army uses arabic numerals to signify squads, platoons, battalions, regiments, and divisions. It uses capital letters to signify companies. Roman numerals are used to designate corps, and spelled-out numbers to designate armies. Thus, "IX Corps" and "Eighth Army."
Throughout, I use several abbreviations common in discussions of the Korean War and in US military parlance generally, the most common of which are the following:
For those who are not well acquainted with military usage, it will be helpful to clarify what may seem the bewildering nomenclature of companies within battalions of an infantry regiment. There are three infantry battalions in a regiment-the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. Each battalion has four companies-three rifle companies and one weapons company. A regiment thus comprises twelve companies. Each company has a capital letter as its name, and the lettering progresses through the battalions from A Company through M Company. (J is not used, because of possible ambiguity in telephone or radio communication.) One familiar with the company nomenclature would know at a glance that D, H, and M are the weapons companies of the three battalions in a regiment and that the others are the rifle companies.
The period of time covered in this volume is from 24 November to 26 December 1950. In that short time the CCF had not only defeated but routed the UN forces under General Walker in the west of North Korea to such an extent that the evacuation of Pyongyang and the frantic retreat south toward the Han River and Seoul, below the 38th Parallel, often seemed a "bugout." This volume recounts one of the worst defeats an American Army has ever suffered. It also reveals astonishing military-command failures that are possibly unique in our history.
General Walker was killed in a jeep accident on 23 December 1950. His replacement in command was Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who arrived in Korea directly from Washington to assume command of Eighth Army and the UN forces on 26 December. By that time the Chinese had moved south from the Pyongyang area and had established contact with the new Eighth Army defense line just north of Seoul and the Han River. Reorganized North Korean divisions had also moved south from the border to form an assault line east of the North Koreans who had remained in the mountains of central Korea. Together they were ready to launch a major attack across the breadth of Korea when General Ridgway assumed command. This volume's narrative ends at that point.
The Chinese and North Korean attack, beginning on New Year's Eve 1950, marks the beginning of a new phase of the war. That story, with the UN forces under General Ridgway's command, will he told in another volume.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of Don Bufkin, who prepared the maps based on sketches I provided, and of M. L. Creamer, who prepared the index.
The half year that had passed since the North Korean army swept across the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950, and in a matter of days nearly destroyed the American-trained South Korean army, had seen many unexpected and untoward changes in the uncertain fortunes of war. The American and UN entry into the conflict had changed the course of events only gradually. The victory that had seemed so certain in the first week for the Soviet-supported North Korean attack faded, and their attack stalled three months later along the Naktong River and the Pusan perimeter in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.
At that critical moment, Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur launched his seaborne invasion behind the enemy lines at Inchon, captured Seoul, and cut off the North Koreans to the south from their base of supply and lines of communication. Quickly, the US Eighth Army and ROK soldiers drove north against a disintegrating and demoralized enemy force and joined the American seaborne troops that had landed at Inchon. The fortunes of war had reversed suddenly in the brilliant maneuver of Inchon. By the end of September 1950 the invaders had been driven out of South Korea. Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army and Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond's X Corps again controlled all of Korea south of the 38th Parallel.
In October 1950 the decision was made to drive on north across the parallel and to reunify Korea by completing the destruction of the fleeing North Koreans. This objective seemed within grasp. But in late October, Chinese Communist forces suddenly appeared in North Korea in the area south of the Yalu River. They entered the battle only a day's march or two from the Manchurian border. Their surprise onslaught all but destroyed two South Korean divisions and cut to pieces a regiment of the American 1st Cavalry Division. All the UN forces on the west side of the peninsula beat a retreat to a line generally south of the Chongchon River, about fifty miles south of the Manchurian border. On 6 November, as silently and as quickly as they had appeared in attack, the Chinese forces broke contact and withdrew into the cold, northern hills. Just where they were or what their intention for the future was, no one knew.
With this disappearance of the Chinese troops, confidence quickly returned to the American and UN forces, and General MacArthur ordered an advance to the northern boundary of Korea. The Eighth Army advance in the west began on 24 November. It was to be joined three days later by the X Corps attack on the cast side of Korea. But then disaster struck. Chinese troops in massive formations sprang up out of the snow-covered mountains and in the west sent the US Eighth Army and the ROK Army reeling southward.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur (left) and Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, commanding general of Eighth Army (sight), after the conference at Kimpo Airfield, Seoul, 11 December 1950. US Army photograph SC 354108
The sudden blow stunned Eighth Army, as if a phantom force had unnerved it. Its only desire, seemingly, was to flee the ghastly, dreaded scene. In the days that followed, Eighth Army never got hold of itself. It did not try to face about and never really fought the Chinese forces in the west
in a unified, holding, defensive battle. For the next month it was simply a case of breaking contact with the enemy and of outrunning them southward.
In the east, the X Corps never was able to launch the attack that was planned for 27 November. The X Corps, centering on the 1st Marine Division, was itself attacked just as it assembled for its planned attack north and northwest to help Eighth Army. The tide never turned, and there was no sign that it would turn, until Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of Eighth Army and the UN command in Korea at Christmastime, 1950. His presence in Korea was a direct result of General Walker's death in a jeep accident on 23 December.
The Korean War was thus six months old when General Ridgway came to the Korean peninsula to take command of the US Eighth Army and the United Nations forces. The Chinese Communist troops were jubilant because of their great victory over the American and UN troops-a victory of such proportions that it must have surprised them exceedingly. After all, they were a peasant lightinfantry force, poorly and unevenly armed, short of hand and shoulder arms, without artillery, armor, or air power, and possessed of only a primitive supply system. Electronic communication equipment was all but nonexistent among them. A year after they had seized control of China from Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist leaders in Peking had committed their army in 1950 to a war south of the Yalu River against the strongest military power in the world. It was against a field force equipped with sophisticated weapons and having uncontested control of the skies and an unchecked naval power in the seas around the peninsula. It must have seemed a rash act indeed, a gamble, but one that the Soviet leaders had urged the Chinese to take.
In the period from 24 November to 25 December 1950-one month-a series of disasters unequaled in our country's history overwhelmed American arms. The events seemed to spell utter and total defeat. When Chinese troops entered the Korean War and confronted Americans, it marked the first time the United States found itself in military conflict with a Communist force. From 25 October 1950, which the Chinese themselves give as the beginning of their military action in Korea, until the end of May 1951, the fighting was essentially a war of movement, with both sides maneuvering and avoiding static lines and both sides alternately hoping for victory. Only in midyear, 1951, after the largescale Chinese attack in the middle of the peninsula collapsed and the American pursuit slowed in the rugged mountains of north-central Korea, did truce talks start and the war gradually become one of position, of heavily fortified main lines of resistance on both sides.
Disaster in Korea Page 1