Across the ROK division boundary to the cast, the ROK 8th Division had its 10th Regiment bordering the ROK 7th Division. The ROK 8th Division's 21st Regiment was on line at the right flank near Yongwon. The third regiment, the 16th, was south of and behind the 21st Regiment, in the vicinity of Maengsan. The ROK II Corps's third division, the 6th, was in rear areas reorganizing after its near destruction three week9 earlier northwest of Huichon by Chinese forces in the 1st Phase Offensive. Only its 2nd Regiment, at Tokchon, was considered combat effective.
The CCF 38th Army, with its 112th, 113th, and 114th divisions, stood in front of the ROK II Corps, ready to launch its devastating attacks. As early as 21 November two CCF soldiers from the 112th Division were captured near Yongwon on the right flank. They confirmed that the 38th Army had shifted cast from the Kujang-dong area along the Chongchon and that its 112th Division would confront the ROK II Corps in a frontal holding action until the 2nd Phase Offensive began. Then the other divisions of the 38th Army would make an enveloping movement after the army achieved a penetration of the ROK line. Their immediate objective was the capture ofTokchon. The Chinese plan then called for the recently arrived CCF 42nd Army to assume the right flank position and make an enveloping move south and southwest toward Sunchon, while the 38th Army drove west from Tokchon. Prisoners taken later during the actions at Yongwon, Maengsan, and Tokchon confirmed that this is precisely what happened.'
A Chinese soldier from the 374th Regiment, 125th Division, 42nd Army, captured in the fighting on the ROK right flank at this time, criticized the ROKs they had faced. He said the ROKs were guilty of many weaknesses in combating the Chinese-he said they fired rifles and machine guns at random at night and built fires to keep warm, both actions revealing their positions. He advised the UN to enforce blackout and noise discipline at night and to use grenades in night fighting. He commented that machine-gun fire was ineffective at night.'
The Chinese 112th Division Splits the ROKs
It is a maxim in military theory that the best place to mass for an offensive strike is where enemy units have boundaries. It is here that weakness usually is found. The larger the unit boundary, the greater the weakness is apt to be, and the greater the chance for exploitation of a success. The Chinese throughout the Korean War demonstrated their ability by thorough night reconnaissance and patrolling to find unit boundaries, whether platoon, company, battalion, regiment, division, or corps. In this case, in planning their first major strike against the ROK II Corps, they chose to hit the center of the corps and to split it down the middle at the boundary of its two divisions. In so doing, they would also strike indirectly at the boundary of the ROK II Corps with Eighth Army to the west. If successful, their tactic would destroy the army's right-flank protection and set in motion a massive westward turning maneuver that might put them behind Eighth Army.
As daylight faded into near darkness, about 5 P.m. on 25 November, a Chinese assault force struck with precision and great energy on a narrow front at the boundary between the ROK 7th and 8th divisions in the center of the ROK II Corps line. The attack straddled the boundary between the two divisions. It overran the ROK infantry companies on either side of the boundary. Almost at once the Chinese had made a hole in the ROK line more than half a mile wide. Hundreds-possibly thousands-of Chinese, massed in echelon behind the assault force, at once poured through the gap and moved fast into the ROK rear areas. This penetration was about ten air miles northeast of Tokchon. After penetrating the ROK positions, the Chinese paid no further attention to the ROK front in that vicinity, and a perplexing quiet settled over the scene. But when the two ROK battalion commanders on either side of the division boundary tried to restore the line there by counterattacks, they found Chinese forces firmly established on both shoulders of the penetration and determined to hold open the gap through which the CCF 38th Army was sending large formations of its troops in the early hours of darkness on 25 November. All ROK counterattacks failed to close the gap.
The 8th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division and the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division were not willing to bring their reserve battalions up by a threemile approach march during the night through the jumbled terrain, with large but unknown numbers of Chinese soldiers now moving into their rear areas. Both ROK regimental commanders put their reserve battalions into defensive positions guarding the now exposed flanks south of the enemy penetration. The Chinese made no further effort during the night against the ROK 7th and 8th divisions. A patrol from the ROK 10th Regiment learned from a civilian that he had been forced to guide a Chinese force of at least 500 men to a mountain village three miles south of the battle line.
General Hue, the ROK II Corps commander at Pukchang-ni, 15 miles south of Tokchon, did not learn of the Chinese penetration of his lines until about midnight, four to five hours after it occurred. This delay was due in some degree to poor communications and partly to the fact that subordinate ROK officers were reluctant to report unfavorable developments to their superiors. Thus, 25 November ended ominously for the ROK II Corps.3
At daylight on 26 November, the 2nd Infantry Division, on the west or left flank of the ROK II Corps, did not know the full scope of developments in the ROK area on its right flank, nor did the rest of Eighth Army. But enough was known to give a picture that caused concern. The Eighth Army G-3 section report for 26 November said of the ROK II Corps front, "Practically nothing was known with respect to location of ROK units," except that elements of the ROK 3rd Regiment were in and behind the positions of the 38th Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, that the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division was east of Tokchon, and that Tokchon itself was in enemy possession.`
The IX Corps estimated that two enemy regiments had penetrated the right flank of the ROK 7th Division, and it was known that Chinese had established roadblocks in that division's rear along the MSR. A KMAG report to IX Corps at 9 P.m. stated that other ROK troops had reoccupied Tokchon and opened the MSR. This development, if true momentarily, did not last.
There were flumes of reports during 26 November from aerial observers over the Tokchon area (for that matter, over all the ROK II Corps zone of operations), trying to learn what had happened, and there were radio reports from various KMAG advisors with the ROK units giving bits of information known to them. These reports indicated a rapidly changing situation everywhere in the ROK corps area and real confusion as to the overall situation. A Mosquito plane over Tokchon reported at that many refugees were moving south and southwest toward the town and that air strikes were taking place in the area. It requested that an escape route to the west and northwest from Tokchon he reconnoitered. It reported an enemy roadblock west of Tokchon. A patrol left Tokchon to disperse this roadblock, but about 500 enemy troops stopped the patrol and then moved on toward the southwest. Later in the afternoon a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) asked for a helicopter to evacuate United States Army personnel from Tokchon. At 2 P.m., three L-5 planes landed at Tokchon and took off, carrying two enlisted men from the 38th Field Artillery Battalion and Major Keller, KMAG advisor to the ROK 3rd Regiment, 7th Division. When he landed at the Kunu-ri airstrip Major Keller said there were two enemy regiments in Tokchon. He had no information on the situation east of the ROK 8th Regiment.
Major Keller said that, after daylight that morning, a convoy from the 38th Regiment, comprising one ambulance with six wounded, a truck with 15 wounded, and three jeeps each with two or three wounded, had arrived at Tokchon. They reported they had run through an ambush behind the 3rd Battalion, 38th Regiment, on their way to Tokchon. This convoy ran into another enemy roadblock south of Tokchon, but some got back to Tokchon to report it. The 2nd Battalion, ROK 2nd Regiment, arrived at Tokchon at 10 A.M. from the east and was sent south to destroy this roadblock, but Keller had no information on what happened to it. An observation pilot reported during the day that Yongwon, at the northeastern corner of the ROK II Corps front, appeared deserted.
Another aerial report at stated that Tokchon was und
er enemy mortar fire and that 15 to 20 ROK or American vehicles were burning there. This report said that between 600 and 700 ROK troops were retreating west from the town with 200 to 300 civilians mixed in with them.
Still another Mosquito pilot reported he took off from the Tokchon airstrip at 4:50 p.m. under fire from 20 to 30 enemy soldiers wearing white uniforms and armed with new equipment. He estimated 2,000 enemy were then in Tokchon and that 2,000 more, tactically deployed, were moving toward the town from the northeast and southeast.'
At 3:15 P.M., Eighth Army received a report that a control party of American advisors and ROKs were cut off northeast of Tokchon, and that 15 American personnel needed air evacuation from a small strip a mile east of Tokchon. This same report said air strikes were in progress against a CCF roadblock five miles south ofTokchon. About an hour and a half later, Colonel Bums informed Eighth Army that a Corporal MacMillan had been evacuated from the Tokchon airstrip at 3 P.M. Bums's call at 4:55 P.M. said none of the 15 KMAG advisor personnel waiting at the airstrip for air evacuation were wounded.
Brig. Gen. Francis W. Farrell, Eighth Army chief of KMAG, at this point ordered that no KMAG advisors attached to ROK ground forces be evacuated. He wanted to stay with the ROK troops to help keep them from disintegrating as combat units. Maj. Gen. Levan Allen, Eighth Army chief of staff, concurred in this order. At that time a regiment of the ROK 7th Division, it was thought, protected the airstrip.
In a matter of minutes, however, another report to Eighth Army said Chinese held the airstrip and Tokchon and that the ROK regiment had disappeared. Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, KMAG advisor to the ROK 6th Division, later said all the KMAG advisors attached to the ROK 7th Division were lost at Tokchon. At apparently unaware of General Farrell's order that no American advisors to ROK ground troops be evacuated, a Lieutenant Richardson, a 25th Infantry Division liaison officer, flew to Tokchon to evacuate KMAG personnel. He reported that he was fired on when he tried to land, that seven to ten jeeps were burning on the airstrip, 15 vehicles north of Tokchon were being shelled and were burning, and that 200 enemy in blue uniforms were entering Tokchon. A column of vehicles reported earlier south of Tokchon had moved farther south. Lt. Col. Willard Pearson reported to IX Corps early in the afternoon that Korean civilians had reported large numbers of enemy moving around the flank of Yongwon and estimated that as many as two Chinese divisions were in the Songchon area. Aerial reports at the same time reported an enemy roadblock and ambush west of Tokchon on the road to Kunu-n*."
When the ROK II Corps commander, General Hue, learned about midnight, 25 November, of the Chinese penetration northeast of Tokchon and the spreading chaos in his zone, he took immediate steps to counter the potential disaster. His only reserve close to the action was the ROK 2nd Regiment at Tokchon. He released it at once to the commander of the ROK 7th Division and ordered that it attack into and seal off the gap between the 7th and 8th divi sions. He ordered the ROK division commander in the east to use part of his reserve regiment, the 16th, to patrol the area south of the Chinese penetration and to find and destroy any North Korean and Chinese soldiers found there. This was a desirable goal in theory but utterly impossible to execute in practice; the area was vast, and if the plan was feasible at all, its execution would take days and possibly weeks. None of his orders could be carried out as planned.
Three miles short of the Chinese penetration point, a strong enemy force met and blocked the ROK 2nd Regiment on the Tokchon-Yongwon road. And even before the ROK 16th Regiment was able to begin scouring the mountains back of the penetration, that order was superseded. When daylight came on 26 November, aerial observation, patrolling, and Korean civilian reports showed that strong Chinese forces of a regiment or more were enveloping the ROK 21st Regiment and Eighth Army's eastern flank along the Sangdong-Aechang road. This force included horse cavalry and undoubtedly were elements of the CCF 42nd Army. The ROK 16th Regiment now, instead of searching for enemy south of the penetration of the night before, was ordered to advance to meet this new force already south of and behind all front-line positions. The 16th Regiment made initial contact five miles north of the village of Toron. It was unable to stop or turn back the Chinese column. Instead it had to assume the defensive and try to delay the enemy advance, which, if continued, would reach the main roadnet behind the ROK positions. All day this fight continued, but the ROKs there were slowly forced back.7
After daylight of 26 November the ROK II Corps headquarters started moving south from Pukchang-ni. It encountered no enemy during its withdrawal. Colonel Gillette was the American KMAG advisor with the ROK II Corps, and he recounted what information the corps had at the end of the day. He reported at 9:45 P.m. that the enemy roadblock between Tokchon and Pukchangni had been eliminated, that four friendly battalions were in Tokchon-two from the ROK 2nd Regiment, one from the ROK 5th Regiment, and one from the ROK 8th Regiment. He reported four other ROK battalions were in covering positions north and east of Pukchang-ni but that three other ROK battalions were in a heavy fight in the vicinity of Maengsan.
But in view of other information that had been streaming into IX Corps and Eighth Army headquarters during the day by radio and aerial reports, this favorable summary of the situation at the end of daylight on 26 November seemed dubious at best. Instead of four friendly battalions holding Tokchon after dark that evening, the more reliable report was that 4,000 Chinese soldiers occupied the town. And there was a report that Lt. Col. Clark Campbell, senior KMAG advisor at Tokchon, had told all the KMAG officers and enlisted men gathered there earlier in the day that they were on their own, as all avenues of escape had been cut off. A Mosquito pilot reported just before dark that he saw six to eight American vehicles east of Tokchon, 100 abandoned vehicles on the road west of Tokchon, 100 more American vehicles abandoned in the vicinity of Yongwon. He said that enemy occupied the hills around Tokchon.'
The night of 26 November was cold and clear in the ROK II Corps zone, with a nearly full, brilliant moon spreading a silvery light over the landscape-a Chinese moon, in the parlance of Eighth Army. It provided optimum conditions for the Chinese to exploit their success thus far against the army right flank. While the Eighth Army did not fully understand the situation on its right flank at the end of daylight on 26 November, it realized it was ripe for enemy exploitation. To protect itself, Eighth Army ordered the 1st Cavalry Division from army reserve to take positions in the area ofSunchon, Sinchang-ni, and Kachongni, behind the ROK II Corps area, and to be ready to stop an enemy turning movement against the Eighth Army from the east (right) flank. The IX Corps also ordered the Turkish Brigade during the day to move out east from Kunu-ri on the road to Tokchon to meet any Chinese threat from that direction. Eighth Army also changed the IX Corps boundary on 26 November, assigning the former ROK II Corps area west as far as Kujang-ni to it. Late in the afternoon of 26 November, groups of the ROK 3rd Regiment began appearing in the 38th Infantry sector. Colonel Peploe informed General Keiser, 2nd Division commander, who directed him to collect the ROKs coming into his zone."
When the ROK 2nd Regiment failed to open the Tokchon-Yongwon road eastward to the area of the original Chinese penetration, it became vital to keep open the Yongwon-Maengsan road farther east. It was the only remaining supply and communications road that entered the ROK II Corps eastern positions. To accomplish this objective, the ROK 8th Division commander refused his right flank, turning his troops at right angle to face east instead of north. To make this front stronger, he had the 10th and 21st regiments send their reserve battalions to hills just west of the Yongwon-Maengsan road.
It seems incredible in this hour of crumbling defeat all across the ROK II Corps front that these units, upon arriving at their assigned defensive positions, seemed to be concerned only with their immediate physical comfort. The night was bitterly cold. The ROK battalions started fires on their hilltops to keep warm. These bonfires, twinkling over the mountain landscape, clearly marked for the Chinese the ROK positions. What happe
ned that night can best be stated by an American officer, advisor to the ROK 10th Regiment of the 8th Division and present in the area. He wrote:
The early part of the evening was quiet and peaceful.... At 2100 hours [9 P.m.], the entire corps front, covering a distance of 100 miles erupted with a violence that had not been witnessed previously in the Korean conflict. The Chinese launched simultaneous attacks in overwhelming numbers against the front, flank, and rear of the 8th, 10th, 21st, 16th, and 2nd Regiments. An effort was likewise made to eliminate the 3rd and 5th Regiments by multiple penetrations and pincers. The Maengsan-Yongsan road was cut at the important junction near the town of Songpyong. Other Chinese Communist Forces elements blocked the Maengsan-Tokchon road at Hyo-ri. The Chinese established defensive positions throughout the area, oriented to the north, along stream beds and ridge lines so as to complete the destruction of the ROK units after they had been split into small groups by the fury of the initial attack.'°
The ROKs could not cope with this attack. After the first assault, they split into small groups, unit integrity was lost, and soon there was no communication with each other or higher headquarters. Each group under its own leader tried to fight its way to the rear, or it surrendered. By the morning of 27 November virtually all the ROK forces on the forward combat positions had been destroyed, except for the ROK 3rd Regiment on the left (west) flank adjacent to the US 2nd Division. This regiment drifted westward into the lines of the 38th Regiment of the 2nd Division, where Colonel Peploe, on 2nd Division order, tried to collect and reorganize them. The ROK 3rd Regiment was attached to the 2nd Division (it fought with the 38th Regiment) and was an effective combat unit in the following days, as the 2nd Division was forced to withdraw to Kunu-ri.
Disaster in Korea Page 12