The flow of messages and changed orders to the Turks on the road to Tokchon on 27 November reflects the uncertainty and lack of precise information at IX Corps and Eighth Army of what was happening. It is certain, however, that during the day, and probably during the morning, Chinese ambushed the leading battalion of the Turks three to four miles east of Wawon and inflicted on it a decisive defeat. It appears that one battalion of the Turks lost most if not all of its vehicles in this fight, that their personnel losses were heavy, and that survivors took to the hills if they could not retreat back west on the road they were following. The records show only that the next morning, 28 November, many Turkish stragglers appeared in the zone of the 38th Infantry, north and northwest of the Wawon road, and that 2nd Division observers saw part of the Turkish command retreating west toward Kunu-ri."
Information that filtered into IX Corps and Eighth Army headquarters a day or two later seems to indicate that the leading parry of Turks from their 1st Battalion was ambushed in the pass a few miles cast of Wawon. One message stated there were 100 men and six to eight vehicles in this parry. After daylight the Turkish battalion commander sent a company forward, but it made no headway, and the entire battalion was then committed. The CCF probably could bring up a greater force than the Turks could muster, although there is no reliable information as to their strength. In any event, the Turkish battalion was surrounded, and there was close knife and bayonet fighting. One comment later was that about half the Turk battalion broke through the CCF force and withdrew west, reaching Tacchon, a large village about seven miles southeast of Kunu-ri, where General Yazici had established his brigade headquarters CP. Two companies of Turks at that time were allegedly still fighting east of Wawon with about 400 wounded in their midst. It appears that these Turks held out at Wawon into the afternoon, and then those able to do so withdrew to another position two miles southwest of Wawon. Here they were soon outflanked by pursuing CCF and forced to withdraw farther on the road toward Kunu-ri. The CCF followed them closely.
In the meantime, General Yazici established a defense position half a mile east of Kaechon, where he attempted to reorganize his soldiers who escaped from the vicinity of Wawon. Some of the Turks fought delaying actions all the way from Wawon and slowed the CCF advance on Kunu-ri from Tokchon." At 11 A.M. on 28 November, IX Corps attached the Turkish Brigade to the 2nd Infantry Division for operational control.
With information about the condition of the Turks so uncertain, General Keiser, 2nd Division commander, sent Col. John C. Coughlin, then attached to the 38th Regiment as an assistant to Colonel Peploe, to the Turkish Brigade CP at Kacchon to learn what he could of its condition. He found the Turks at the CP very excited. One battalion had been cut off at Wawon and vicinity, and they had no situation map posted and no communications with their forward units. He tried to get the Turks to send tanks up the road to the combat point, but the tanks kept coming hack. He urged the Turkish command to stay where it was. The Turks there, however, seemed to expect the CCF to appear at any moment. That danger was certainly still many hours away.
Colonel Coughlin reported to Brig. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, assistant 2nd Division commander, that he could not get the Turks on the line desired but that it would be farther to the rear, southeast of Kaechon and Kunu-ri. He also reported that he had found the Turkish command very indecisive. They would order the artillery forward and then order it hack. In the meantime, the 38th Infantry Regiment, and indeed all of the 2nd Division, on the left of the Turks was withdrawing and trying to coordinate the Turkish moves on their right with their own.
Shortly after midnight, early in the morning of 28 November, the 2nd Division sent a message to General Yazici, through the American advisor attached to the Turkish Brigade, to move his troops on the right flank of the 38th Regiment, south of the Kaechon River and south of the town of Kaechon below Kunu-n*. The commanding officer refused to do so. Many American officers in touch with the situation felt that the Turkish command was weak but that the individual Turk was a good soldier and fighter. From this time on, the Turkish Brigade became fragmented. About 250 of them showed up at Anju in trucks, miles away from the front. Many others appeared at Sunchon far south of the battle front, and some even got as far away as Pyongyang. At 3:10 P.M. on 29 November, the G-3, IX Corps, received a message from Pyongyang stating that 125 to 150 Turks in about ten or more trucks, with an American KMAG advisor, had arrived there and asked, "What shall I do with them?"
The final collapse of the Turks in the battles of the Chongchon came about 4 P.M. on November 28 near Kaechon, when the 38th Infantry found they were withdrawing from their positions. Efforts to stop them and turn them around were unavailing. The CCF simply walked through them-those it found still in front of them. The CCF then got behind two battalions of the 38th Infantry because of the complete collapse of the Turks and attacked them from front and rear.2°
The Eighth Army G-3 Operations journal for 29 November reveals that the army command had little precise information on the situation surrounding the Turkish Brigade and was much concerned about it and that Gen. Laurence Keiser, commander of the 2nd Division, was on his way to the IX Corps CP to give as full a report as possible on the subject. Reports reaching Eighth Army at this time estimated about half the Turkish Brigade remained and that it was trying to hold just east of Kaechon but was short of ammunition, artillery, and tank support. Obviously, this report was incorrect, since the CCF broke through or walked past the Turks at Kaechon and vicinity and attacked the 38th Infantry from the rear. Another report stated that two companies of Turkish infantry had arrived at Sunchon bringing along about 400 casualties and that some other Turks were driving trucks and ambulances to Pyongyang."
Until the late afternoon of 29 November, the Turks, in the face of crippling losses, had indeed held and delayed perhaps the major part of a CCF division that was advancing on Kunu-ri by road from Tokchon. But in the late afternoon of 29 November their opposition seems to have crumbled at last. At 4:40 P.M. that afternoon, Colonel Peploe reported to the 2nd Division that the Turks were not on position to his right and were unwilling to take a defensive position. Peploe urgently requested that everything be done to get them back in the defense line. Col. Gerald Epley, the 2nd Division chief of staff, telephoned Colonel Grunby, the principal American advisor with the Turks, asking him to get the Turks out of the village of Kaechon and into a defensive position. Grunby promised to try but said he did not think he would succeed. A few hours later the situation had deteriorated further. At 6:30 P.M., the division headquarters received a report that the Turks were milling around and appeared to be in such a chaotic and uncontrolled condition that they could not be used. At this very moment the CCF were pressing hard all around on the approaches to Kunu-ri. They especially threatened the survival of the US 2nd Infantry Division.28
Two weeks later, when all stragglers had been accounted for and the Turkish Brigade had assembled in a rear area for reorganization, it was found that, in their battles with the Chinese on the road from Tokchon to Kunu-ri and around Kaechon and Kunu-ri, the Turks had lost about 20 percent (roughly 1,000 men) in killed, wounded, and missing in action. They had lost approximately 90 percent of their communication equipment and vehicles. Only six artillery pieces remained to them.29 Thus, in its destruction of the ROK II Corps, the CCF, it must be stated, also rendered combat ineffective the Turkish command of about 5,000 men.
On 13 December, General Walker presented Brig. Gen. Tahzin Yazici and 15 of his officers and men of his command with 15 Silver Star and Bronze Star medals for gallantry in action against the Chinese in late November. The Turkish Army gave no medals, so this presentation was an occasion the Turks remembered.'°
The 1st Cavalry Division Checks Chinese Envelopment
The military situation had deteriorated on the army right flank in the ROK II Corps area so far by the evening of 27 November that the 1st Cavalry Division, in Eighth Army reserve, received a flash warning at 5:45 P.m., informing
it that the division would be ordered to move to Pukchang-ni and to secure the town, protect the army right flank, and cover the ROK II Corps in its further withdrawals and reorganization. It was informed at the same time that about four battalions of mixed units were in the ROK 11th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division with some artillery and that about 500 more ROK soldiers from the ROK 8th Division with a few pieces of artillery had assembled about one mile south of Pukchang-ni. Also, the message said the road from Sunchon to Pukchang-ni was under fire at some points. Two hours later Eighth Army sent the Ist Cavalry Division orders to advance on Pukchang-ni as early as practicable the next morning, 28 November." IX Corps assumed operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division at 1:40 A.M., 28 November.
Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay's 1st Cavalry Division headquarters on 27 November was near Pyongmyong-ni, about six miles southeast of Kunu-ri. The 5th Cavalry Regiment sent its Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon from there at 8:40 A.M., 28 November, to make a reconnaissance of the road south to Sunchon. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, left the Pvongmyong-ni area about an hour later, en route to Sunchon, following the I&R Platoon. The 2nd Battalion reported at 10:30 A.M. that a platoon sergeant and two enlisted men of the I&R Platoon had escaped back to it, reporting that Chinese had ambushed the I&R Platoon and taken all but themselves prisoners. They reported that the enemy were carrying small arms and automatic weapons.
The ambush site was about one and a half miles south of Chusong-dong and two and a half miles north of Samso-ri, where there was a ferry crossing of the Taedong River. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, reached the ambush site just before noon. The troops dismounted from their vehicles and deployed for an attack, while their vehicles turned around to take a route farther west to Sunchon. F and G companies attacked the enemy positions and had hard going from the outset. By 4:30 in the afternoon the battalion had suffered 70 casualties. It requested a resupply of ammunition and evacuation facilities. The divi sion immediately complied with both requests. The 2nd Battalion then renewed the fight.
The 2nd Battalion drove the Chinese south, and soon the fight centered on Hill 82, half a mile north of the river and east of Samso-ri and the road. Higher ground, Hill 167, west of the road and Samso-ri, gave dug-in enemy there a very strong position. The battle lasted until dark, with the 2nd Battalion unable to dislodge the Chinese. Later information indicated that the Chinese held these high ground positions in regimental strength. They apparently had the mission of preventing a UN crossing of the Taedong River at the Samso-ri ferry site. It became apparent that the enemy could not be dislodged without artillery support.
The 3rd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, already at Sunchon, sent K Company up to help the 2nd Battalion, but this reinforcement failed to alter the situation. K Company withdrew back to Sunchon, and the 2nd Battalion then quit the battle, reformed on the road north of the river, retraced its way to a bypass route it took around the Chinese roadblock, and went on to Sunchon. This action, in effect, left the Chinese in control of the main road south from Kunu-ri to Sunchon. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, suffered heavily in this action, losing approximately 15 officers and 200 enlisted men killed, wounded, or missing. Because of this heavy loss, the 5th Cavalry assigned all its 105 replacements just received to the 2nd Battalion."
Meanwhile, the 5th Cavalry Regimental headquarters and the 1st Battalion, aware of the strong enemy roadblock at Samso-ri, moved to Sunchon by an alternate road to the west. The Chinese force at Samso-ri may have continued on west and established the initial roadblock on the western alternate road to Sunchon from Kunu-ri that developed the next day and confronted the 2nd Infantry Division when it started to move south from Kunu-ri to Sunchon.
While these events were happening to the 5th Cavalry, the 7th Cavalry Regiment spent the day moving through Sunchon and on east and north toward Pukchang-ni. As a consequence of this maneuver, the IX Corps at 11 A.M. attached the ROK 6th Division to the 1st Cavalry Division for operational control."
The enemy force that had seized control of Samso-ri and its ferry at a big bend of the Taedong River and turned back the 5th Cavalry from that road had a direct connection with the force the 7th Cavalry was advancing eastward to meet. The Chinese troops that had seized Samso-ri were in the vanguard of the Chinese 38th Army, which was moving westward after its capture of Tokchon. They had hurried south from Tokchon to Pukchang-ni and, after the capture of that place, had there turned due west, leaving the 42nd Army to continue on south and southwest from Pukchang-ni toward Sunchon. It was these troops from the Chinese 42nd Army that the 7th Cavalry would meet."
When the vanguard of the 38th Army turned west from Pukchang-ni to get in the rear of the US 2nd Infantry Division, the leading elements of the 42nd Army had arrived there from Maengsan. The 125th Division led this army's enveloping movement. It left Pukchang-ni on the main road that ran southwest in a big loop through Wolpo-ri, Kujang-ni, and Sinchang-ni to Chasan, the last being six miles south of Sunchon. The 38th Army's mission was to cut off Eighth Army elements north of the Taedong River, while that of the 42nd Army was to engage in its broad, sweeping envelopment behind the whole of Eighth Army."
The 7th Cavalry Regiment, now on a collision course with the advance elements of the CCF 125th Division, passed through Sinchang-ni and reached Kujang-ni, about 25 road miles northeast of Sunchon. It continued on a short distance and found the ROK 6th Division, with the ROK 7th Regiment in a defensive position astride the road just north of Wolpo-n. A strong Chinese force was known to be not far north of this ROK position. Darkness soon settied over the scene on the evening of 28 November.36
The Kujang-ni Incident, 29 November At about 6:30 the next morning, 29 November, the 7th Cavalry Regiment perimeter came under Chinese attack, and the regiment that Lt. Col. George H. Custer commanded in the 1870s thus had its first battle contact with Chinese in the Korean War. The 1st and 2nd battalions of the regiment were on either side of the road, with the 3rd Battalion behind them, when the action began. The 2nd Battalion had a strong roadblock at Kujang-ni, facing north toward Wolpo-ri. Ahead of them at Wolpori, they knew, was a ROK 6th Division mixed force, principally elements of the ROK 7th Regiment. Its strength on 29 November was given as about 1,200 men. No word had come back to the 7th Cavalry perimeter during the night of any enemy attack or activity at Wolpo-ri.
But suddenly before dawn, perimeter and roadblock guards heard the sound of fining to the north, and soon thereafter a long column of retreating ROK troops and equipment piled up at the 2nd Battalion roadblock, demanding to be let through. Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, had given Col. William A. Harris, commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, oral orders that he should not permit a retreating ROK unit, specifically the ROK 6th Division elements to the north of him, to retreat through his positions, in case of an enemy attack on the ROKs. There was always the danger that enemy dressed as civilians would infiltrate the retreating ROKs as refugees and either act as spies or suddenly open fire with concealed weapons and grenades to create confusion. General Gay had experienced several such incidents during the battles of the Pusan perimeter earlier in the year with the North Koreans. It was a well-known North Korean, and possibly Chinese, practice. It was also imperative to stop ROK withdrawals in the ROK II Corps area, to assemble and reorganize them, and to try to get them back in the fight.
When the retreating ROK column, with what appeared to be some civilian refugees mixed with them, came up to the 2nd Battalion roadblock near Kujangni, 1st Lt. John E. Sheehan, commanding officer of E Company, 2nd Battalion, went out into the road and began questioning some refugees in the halted column. During this discussion, a group of about ten enemy soldiers, posing as civilian refugees, suddenly opened fire with hidden small arms, killing Lieutenant Sheehan and another American soldier and wounding five others." This incident caused further confusion, and no more refugees in the ROK columns were permitted entrance into the 7th Cavalry perimeter.
The Chinese attack on the ROK 6
th Division elements at Wolpo-ri before dawn on 29 November caused a subsequent bitter dispute between KMAG officers with the ROK 7th Regiment and General Chang, commanding general of the ROK 6th Division, on one side, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Cavalry Division, on the other. Following the roadblock incident, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was immediately engaged with Chinese forces driving south from Wolpo-ri, an action that continued during the rest of the day and that night. The events at Wolpo-ri had some lasting repercussions and illustrated the nature of much of the fighting and military situation in Eighth Army at the time.
Maj. Thomas E. Bennett, the senior KMAG advisor to the ROK 7th Regiment, in a memorandum to General Gay a month and a half later, gives his version of the Chinese attack just north of Wolpo-ri and subsequent events. He was the closest responsible American officer to the scene. He wrote:
At 0602 hours 29 November 1950, I was awakened by a burst of machine gun fire from the high ground at the north side of Walpori. I sent my interpreter to the 7th Regimental CP to find out the situation; meanwhile I assembled my KMAG group.
At 0605 hours, our interpreters rushed into our billet calling, "Komunkwan! Danger! Go quickly!" Machine gun firing and small arms firing could be heard in the north side of Walpori.
At 0610 hours I put my KMAG Group on the road at the tail end of a long convoy of vehicles (exact numbers could not be determined because of darkness). Artillery howitzers and prime movers of the 27th Korean Field Artillery Battalion were in the column.
The vehicle column with my group just in front of the tail of the column began to move forward.
The column halted just after our three KMAG jeeps crossed a railroad south of Walpori. I sent my interpreter forward to find out what was delaying the column.
Machine gun firing and small arms firing at the tail of the column became more pronounced, still the vehicles were not moving.
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