Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  Burch, now back in the E Company position, called down fire from a 155-mm howitzer battery in front of the 3rd Squad outpost position. This fire and the determined defense by the outpost squad was so discouraging to the Chinese that they did not rush the position. When his squad ran out of ammunition, Sgt. Henry Pertree withdrew it about 2 A.m., 26 November, without losing a man. They rejoined E Company. There Captain Desiderio distributed the survivors from Burch's 3rd Platoon among the 2nd Platoon on Hill 207'

  Through the Valley of the Shadow of Death

  While the 2nd Platoon of E Company dug in on the crest of Hill 207 and the 3rd Platoon took squad outpost positions on three different knobs of ground in front of Hill 207, the 1st Platoon rested on the rear (south) slope of the hill, interspersed among the tanks of the Assault Gun Platoon, 89th Tank Battalion, that were attached to E Company. Quiet still reigned. Captain Desiderio decided that the situation would be improved if he sent the 1st Platoon over to the Ranger hill to tie in there with the Rangers, who had both flanks open, and then to extend westward to tic in with the 3rd Platoon's right-hand squad outpost. M. Sgt. William D. Cox received Desiderio's brief instruction and led the 1st Platoon off in the shadowy darkness.

  The Ranger hill, Hill 206, was about one mile almost due east of Hill 207 but northeast of its southern slope, the point from which Cox started with the 1st Platoon. A wide, open rice-paddy valley separated the two hills. At the southern end of this little valley, it was about half a mile across; farther north it narrowed to no more than a quarter of a mile. There is some indication that Desiderio did not give Cox full and explicit instructions about the distance to the Ranger hill and that the sergeant himself did not have the information. In any event, it seems that Sergeant Cox led his platoon up the rice-paddy valley west of Hill 205, instead of diagonally across it, passed on the west side of Hill 205, then crossed about half a mile of higher ground covered with scrub growth, and descended to another area of flat paddy ground, now a mile inside enemy temtory and north of the Ranger hill. He was lost. Cox had led his platoon unknowingly into the enemy's midst. All this happened about the time Chinese overran the right-hand outpost of the 3rd Platoon in front of Hill 207.

  The moon had been temporarily hidden by a cloud, but now as Cox led his platoon single file along a dike, its beams again illuminated the scene. The paddy system here was wider and more complex than it had been to the south. On the dike, Cox and his men heard firing in the distance, to his right rear (on the Ranger hill). Just in time, the leading scouts at the point detected a movement at the far end of the dike. They quickly dropped down along the shadow side of the high dike, and all others behind them slid down quickly. There now emerged from a darkened stretch of terrain two columns of Chinese soldiers, one on either side of the paddy ground. Thev were talking excitedly and dogtrotting south. The Ist Platoon literally held its breath. The Chinese hurrying south, not expecting any hostile troops in this area, passed the dike without noticing the American platoon hugging the darkened side of it.

  Cox knew he faced the imminent appearance of more Chinese and that he must get out of the open paddy land. The nearest high ground was to the northtoward the enemy assembly areas. But Sfc. Maynard K. Bryers thought they should head quickly for it and get to the shadow at its base. Cox agreed. They had barely reached the base of the hill when another Chinese column rounded the hill and humed southward.

  Cox decided he had to get in touch with Desiderio by radio if possible and get instructions from him. When his radio call was answered, Cox described the situation, the type of ground he had traveled, and the nature of the topography around him. On consulting his map, Desiderio correctly estimated where Cox was and told him that he should go straight south 2,000 yards and he would come to a big ridge-the Ranger hill-and that he should join the Rangers.

  Cox followed instructions but proceeded cautiously. He finally came to the end of the valley they had entered earlier and started uphill. This, they thought, must be the Ranger hill. They could hear sounds of gunfire and explosions toward the top. Then, several rounds of 155-mm artillery shells landed near them. No one was hurt, but they at once recognized this fire as coming from their own batteries near Ipsok and fired on the reverse slope of the hill to help the Ranger Company by interdicting enemy reinforcements. Cox and his men knew they could not take the risk of climbing the hill through this fire, and they decided to wait at the bottom until it stopped. They sat down and waited.

  Before the fire stopped, Lieutenant Puckett and three other Rangers with him came off the hill and by chance encountered the 1st Platoon where it waited. Puckett was bleeding from two wounds, one in the arm and the other in the chest. Puckett thought he and his three companions were the only survivors. But others escaped individually or in groups of twos and threes in the same manner he had and eventually gained Task Force Dolvin's lines during the morning. In all, out of the 83 who had entered the fight for the hill the previous afternoon, only 21 or 22 survivors, many of them wounded, arrived at Dolvin's positions.

  Now, with the situation changed and there no longer being a Ranger Company for him to join, Sergeant Cox once more got Captain Desiderio on the radio, explained the situation to him, and asked for instructions. Desiderio told Cox to rejoin F Company. This might be hard to do with CCF all around. In addition to capturing the Ranger hill, other CCF had overrun two of E Company's outposts and had the other one under attack. Cox realized the hazards facing him. He and Sergeant Bryers went from man to man, whispering instructions to each about what they were going to do and ordering each not to talk and not to fire a weapon under any circumstance unless ordered to do so. They would march single file, closed up, and holding hands in the line if necessary when they came to dark spots; they would try to avoid open and moonlit areas and would skulk from one bush to another. If they saw or encountered Chinese, they would freeze in their tracks and do nothing unless ordered. It was a throwback to early American frontier Indian warfare.

  They started. Discipline was so good that they passed Chinese parties but were not themselves discovered. Cox finally led his men into E Company lines at 4:30 A.M., 26 November. In their entire adventure not a man had been lost. That their leadership and their own understanding and discipline had been good has to he assumed. In the entire adventure, not a shot was fired at them, nor did they fire at an enemy.'

  There was no further action against E Company during the remainder of the night. Before dawn the Chinese soldiers withdrew from Hill 207 and from in front of E Company. Across the valley that separated them from the Chineseheld Ranger Hill 205, E Company could see artillery fire and white phosphorus shells bursting on Hill 205. While darkness lasted, the hill seemed to glow. Knowing that the Rangers no longer were on the hill, Lieutenant Colonel Doivin had ordered the artillery to saturate it with shellfire so that no Chinese could stay alive on it. After daylight, aircraft came over in several waves, dropping bombs and napalm canisters, firing rockets, and strafing the hill. The Chinese who survived this ordeal fled northward to the next ridgeline. Ranger Hill 205 was a shell-pocked no-man's-land.

  Elsewhere, B Company, 35th Infantry, reached Objective 7, Hill 234, on the east side of the road, a little more than a mile south of the Ranger Company. A platoon of tanks from B Company, 89th Tank Battalion, supported it. B Company continued on north and tried to take the next ridgeline, also numbered 234 on the map and almost directly opposite the Ranger hill. At 10:15 A.M., however, it reported to Lieutenant Colonel Dolvin that it was unable to take the position. He authorized it to withdraw to Objective 7. It established a defensive line there for the night.

  Everything was quiet at B Company's position on Hill 234 until a figure approached the forward platoon and asked in fluent English how many men occupied the position. The men in the outpost gave the number. The figure disappeared. The man was a Chinese soldier. Soon after this incident a Chinese assault force attacked and overran the platoon. The remnants of the platoon escaped to another position. The B C
ompany commander now committed his reserve platoon, which joined the others engaged with the enemy on the perimeter. The fight continued there until 3:30 A.M. on 26 November. Then the Chinese withdrew briefly. Twenty minutes later, whistles and calls in front of B Company preceded a renewal of the attack. Some Chinese got close enough to tanks with B Company to throw grenades at them. Toward dawn the Chinese withdrew.'

  It seemed that Chinese groups had infiltrated all the way to Ipsok in the rear of all infantry elements. The 77th Field Artillery Battalion, firing from its emplacements just north of Ipsok, came under attack. Chinese overran one battery of guns and captured one of them. Several times CCF assault teams charged down the road toward two tanks guarding the artillery, throwing gre nades at them, but the coaxial machine guns mounted on the tank decks cut them down. This CCF attack also ceased at dawn.

  That night is remembered by those who lived through it as being exceedingly cold. One officer in Task Force Dolvin said, "It hurt to breathe." Second Lt. Robert K. Sawyer, commander of the 3rd Platoon, 25th Reconnaissance Company, was covering a ford over the Kuryong River behind E Company and guarding a section of the MSR in that vicinity. He said years later:

  My outstanding memory of this night is of the intense cold and how it affected us, men and machines alike. We humans huddled in our overcoats and fur-lined caps, reluctant to do anything except try to keep warm. The frigid air burned as we drew it into our lungs. I recall vividly my indecision about getting into my sleeping bag. I was tired and cold, and wanted to sleep, but I also thought about stories I had heard of G. L's being bayoneted in their sleeping bags. Sleep finally won out, however, and I curled up at last alongside one of my tanks. As for the vehicles, the guards were instructed to turn them over periodically during the night, and did so; but we had a real job getting everything moving the next morning.'

  Lieutenant Colonel Murch Brings the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, to Ipsok

  After his visit to Task Force Dolvin on the afternoon of 25 November, Brig. Gen. George Barth reported to Major General Kean, commander of the 25th Division, that the two battalions of supporting artillery, emplaced just north of Ipsok, were without adequate protection and vulnerable to enemy attack. This information set in motion consideration of the need to reinforce the task force. When General Kean received reports of the hard fight the Ranger Company had in taking Hill 205 and afternoon aerial reports of large enemy troop movements north of the task force, he decided to send a battalion of infantry to the area without further delay.

  At 7 P.M., the 25th Division sent an alert to Lt. Col. Gordon E. Murch, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which already was it an assembly area, having prepared to move on order to join Task Force Dolvin. Two and a half hours later his battalion, minus E Company (already with the task force), loaded on trucks and was ready to move. Ipsok was 11 road miles north of his assembly area. Murch's orders were to move the 2nd Battalion to Ipsok by truck, detruck there, and move the battalion on foot north of Ipsok. The main mission of Murch's battalion was to protect the artillery, trains, and supply and ammunition dumps that had been established at Ipsok during the day and to be a combat reserve for Task Force Dolvin.

  Murch reached Ipsok without incident, detrucked his two rifle companies, F and G, and marched about two miles north along the MSR to an assembly area. The 2nd Battalion stopped there, more than a mile north of the 77th and 90th field artillery battalions and two miles north of the trains and ammunition supply near Ipsok, and about a mile south of Task Force Dolvin's CP. Murch was about four miles south of and behind the front-line positions of the Ranger Company and F Company, 27th Infantry.

  Murch's battalion closed into its assembly area an hour before midnight, 25 November. It spent several hours digging in on a perimeter covering both sides of the road, with the bulk of its strength west of it. Murch believed the main enemy threat might come from the northwest, from the Kuryong River valley, which constituted an open avenue of approach. He outposted the perimeter with troops from his headquarters. On Lieutenant Colonel Dolvin's request, he sent a platoon from F Company to tie in on the northwest with Dolvin's headquarters perimeter. A platoon of tanks from C Company, 89th Tank Battalion, joined Murch's battalion. Murch sent two tanks to both the western and eastern ends of his perimeter to strengthen them. The night passed peacefully. His men heard no sounds of the heavy battle to the north of them at the Ranger and E Company hills."

  The daylight hours of 26 November did not project the prospect of moonlight for that night on the Chongchon. One who was there wrote of that day, "Skies which had been brilliant with moon and stars by night and sun by day, became leaden gray above the everlasting dust. There was a great white halo enclosing the fiery orange ball of the sun, and the heavy sky grew steadily more sullen all the 26th."9

  As the skies darkened, so did the perception of Eighth Army as to just what was happening. The fog of war settled over the Chongchon River front on 26 November. There was much reason to wonder what was "on the other side of the hill." But Eighth Army still assessed the situation rather optimistically. Its appraisal was that, "except for vague situation on the east flank, the enemy reaction to EUSAK attack had been one of active defense with local counterattacks in strength. This last was believed the likely course of action."'°

  After daylight on 26 November, Lieutenant Colonel Dolvin learned that his task force was out ahead of adjacent friendly units-the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, on his right, and the 35th Infantry on his left across the Kuryong River. Where B Company of the 24th Infantry was supposed to be, Dolvin could see CCF troops occupying a hill to his right rear. What had happened to B Company, 24th Infantry, was a mystery to Dolvin and the 25th Division.

  Nevertheless, Dolvin sent a message to the 25th Division G-3 at 7:45 A.M. that he wanted air strikes on Hill 205, the hill formerly held by the Ranger Company, and that then he would counterattack it. Presumably he intended to use B Company, 35th Infantry, from Hill 234, for this purpose. The G-3 told him not to attack the Ranger hill until General Kean approved it. But massive air, artillery, and tank fire was placed on the hill. An artillery forward observer reported large numbers of enemy were killed on the hill's rear slope as they tried to withdraw northward. After this saturation of the Ranger hill with shellfire, rockets, and napalm, Lieutenant Dickson, a liaison pilot, at 9 A.M. reported an estimated enemy battalion was digging in on Task Force Dolvin's Objective 9. Objective 9 was a ridgelinc straddling the road a mile northeast of the Ranger hill. Artillery fire was now directed at it.

  At 9:45 A.m., General Kean attached the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, to Task Force Dolvin and directed Dolvin to move B Company, 24th Infantry, up on line between A and C companies of the battalion and to secure a line from the 25th Reconnaissance Company at the Kuryong River to A Company's position on the right. The trouble with executing this order was that Task Force Dolvin did not know where B Company, 24th Infantry, was. At the same time he gave this order, General Kean directed Lieutenant Colonel Dolvin not to resume an attack but to await further developments."

  In the meantime, the Ranger Company, all but destroyed, was withdrawn from attachment to Task Force Dolvin and at noon, 26 November, placed in 25th Division reserve. On the task force's extreme left, C Company, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, relieved the 1st Platoon, 25th Reconnaissance Company, and the 3rd Platoon of the Reconnaissance Company shifted its position slightly to occupy a valley just east of the Kurvong River and south of Hill 222. Just west of this position the MSR turned due east and then bent northeast. Task Force Dolvin's CP was in this valley south of Hill 222 and adjacent to the road where it bent sharply eastward.'2

  During the morning of 26 November Lieutenant Colonel Dolvin received a message from the 25th Division G-3 that Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, assistant division commander, was on his way to assume command of the task force. General Wilson arrived at task-force headquarters at noon and assumed command 20 minutes later, at 12:20 P.M. The task force now officially became
known as Task Force Wilson. General Wilson made Maj. Leon F. Morand, Jr., S-3 of the 89th Tank Battalion and of Task Force Dolvin, his own S-3, and Major Goolsby thereupon assumed the S-3 duties of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion." In effect, Lieutenant Colonel Dolvin's staff automatically became the staff for General Wilson.

  After his arrival and assumption of command, General Wilson ordered the task force to withdraw from Objectives 8 and 10 and to form a new defensive line based on Objectives 7 and 6, Hill 234 held by B Company, 35th Infantry, and an eastward knob of Hill 222. This knob was separated from Hill 222 proper by a shallow saddle. E Company, 27th Infantry, did not leave Hill 207 until just before dusk, and then it filtered back to position just behind Objective 6 and the task force CP. As it left Hill 207, it heard noises immediately in front of its old CCF moving or deploying to the north of it.

  Behind the task force CP, E Company was allowed to go into a rest bivouac for a good night's sleep, badly needed. It did not dig in there, as no one had any thought it would be engaged during the night. The men ate a hot meal, posted guards, and got into their bedrolls."

  At dark on 26 November, C Company of the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion was on the left of the task-force line at the Kuryong River, with the 3rd Platoon, 25th Reconnaissance Company, behind it. B Company, 35th Infantry, held the right end of the line on its Hill 234 east of the road. Murch's 2nd Battalion was behind this line, about half a mile from the task force CP and Captain Desiderio's E Company's bivouac. On General Wilson's order, Lieutenant Colonel Murch sent F Company, minus one platoon, to the left flank of the fine to strengthen the security of the task force CP from that direction. Murch completed this move just before dark.