In the afternoon of 25 November, Colonel Fisher from the eastern ridgclinc of Hill 324, south of Unsan, could see into the town. He saw no sign of enemy activity. His advance troops were now a mile farther north than Task Force Dolvin that evening, which was eastward across the Kuryong River. The next morning, Fisher planned to send one battalion around Unsan to Hill 191, northwest of the town, and occupy it. Then he intended to advance into the town from the south along the road. By 10 A.M., his advance platoon that morning reached a bridge on a tributary of the Kuryong River, just south of Unsan. From there its members could look into the Unsan schoolyard, where they could see 10 to 12 vehicles of the 8th Cavalry Regiment still standing where they had been abandoned or destroyed nearly a month earlier. Neither this platoon nor any other part of the 35th Infantry advanced any farther, and no member of the regiment ever entered Unsan, now so plainly in view.
Before he left Yongbyon that morning, 26 November, to assume command of Task Force Dolvin, Assistant Division Commander Brigadier General Wilson had sent a radio message at 10 A.M. to Colonel Fisher not to advance farther but to hold in place and to be on guard for enemy action from his left flank. Enemy had hit the ROK 1st Division there hard during the night. This message did not mention the enemy's equally strong attack against Task Force Dolvin on his right flank. Thus far, the 35th Regiment had remained untouched between two seething cauldrons of battle. It bothered Fisher that he did not have contact with the ROK 1st Division on his left flank. He sent a patrol to Hill 598, a massive height southwest of Unsan, in an effort to reestablish contact. His patrol failed to find any ROK troops.
The first Chinese action against the 35th Infantry occurred at 3:45 A.M. on 26 November when a Chinese patrol of about 15 soldiers crept up on a mortar outpost of L Company, surprised it, and took five prisoners. They also killed one American and wounded two others in the course of his incident. Apparently this patrol had the specific mission of capturing prisoners for intelligence purposes. There was no enemy attack, however, immediately following this enemy patrol action.
Upon receiving General Wilson's order not to advance farther, Fisher ordered his 2nd Battalion, which had already started to move toward Hill 191, to turn around and dig in at its position of the night before. A platoon of A Company tanks, 89th Medium Tank Battalion, returned with the infantry. A platoon of F Company remained at a roadblock it had established about five miles south of Unsan. From this vicinity, A Company tank fire killed some enemy seen trying to cross the Kuryong River, east to west, during the day. Chinese overran the F Company roadblock just after dark at 6:15 P.M., 26 November. Many of this Chinese force subsequently were killed.3°
The immunity of the 35th Infantry on the night of 25-26 November and during the day of 26 November from Chinese attack, when it was general elsewhere across the Eighth Army front, seems to have been intentional. Later intelligence disclosed that the 39th and 40th CCF armies were massed in assembly areas near Unsan and that the 35th Infantry was advancing straight toward them. The CCF 66th Army was concentrated just a few miles farther west. The Chinese hit the ROK 1st Division, just to the left of the 35th Infantry, and Task Force Dolvin, just to the right of it, in strength on the first night of their 2nd Phase Offensive, 25-26 November. They could have done the same against the 35th Infantry, had they wanted. But with their attack forces advancing south of the 35th Infantry on both its left and right flanks and with the 35th Infantry having no physical contact with friendly forces on either flank, the enemy envisioned a perfect trap for the unit as it advanced into the heart of their assembly areas. The regiment then could have been cut off in the heart of enemy-held country and surrounded. Fortunately, the 25th Division CP realized the danger facing the regiment and stopped it on the morning of 26 November.
In its position on the night of 26 November south of Unsan, which was essentially the same as on the night of 25 November, 16 men from the F Company Platoon, which had been overrun at its roadblock, returned to the 2nd Battalion perimeter about an hour after midnight, and two hours later 13 more men made their way into its lines. Later, about 4 A.M., about 60 Chinese attacked F Company, but they were held off with artillery and mortar fire. Already the enemy had launched a very heavy attack against the 3rd Battalion.
Beginning about 3 P.M. on 27 November, Chinese assault groups drove in K and L Company outposts. The combat quickly became hand-to-hand in places, especially in K Company. Lieutenant Hinewood, a forward observer with K Company for the mortar company, had a fistfight with a Chinese soldier. Captain Hughes, K Company commander, stayed with his men two hours after being wounded. K Company held its lines against repeated enemy attacks and quickly scaled off one enemy penetration and subsequently restored its own position. An estimated two Chinese regiments assaulted the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 35th Infantry during the night, withdrawing from the battle only with the coming of dawn. After daylight, a great many Chinese dead could be seen in front of the company perimeters. The dead were especially numerous in front of K Company. There were 374 counted enemy dead and an estimated 600 Chinese soldiers killed from the defensive fires and fighting of the 35th Infantry during the night. Six Chinese prisoners were captured, all from the 117th Division, 39th Army.
Brig. Gen. George B. Barth later stated that the stand of K Company in hurling back repeated Chinese attacks probably averted a major disaster. The Chinese attacks against it were particularly persistent because that is where the Chinese command intended to open a penetration. More than a division of enemy troops, about 10,000, according to prisoner information, stood ready behind the assault teams to pour through the penetration into the rear of the 35th Infantry lines if K Company had broken. This large enemy force subsequently shifted westward and exploited a penetration of the ROK 1st Division lines during the day. Despite the heavy fighting during the night, the casualties of L and K companies were not heavy-a tribute to good leadership, discipline, and professional use of weapons."
On the morning of 27 November, the 25th Division headquarters informed Fisher that, during the night, the CCF had broken through the ROK 1st Division lines on his left and that he should withdraw. Fisher at 9 A.M. ordered his 2nd Battalion to prepare to screen the withdrawal of the regiment. By 10:30 A.M., the 1st Battalion had established a roadblock to cover the rest of the regiment. But enemy attacks against the 2nd and 3rd battalions developed. These had to be repulsed before any withdrawal could begin.
Enemy mortar and machine-gun fire still hit around the 2nd Battalion CP when the 2nd Battalion withdrawal started. At the same time, enemy forces struck at E and G companies. The tail end of the 2nd Battalion did not get away until midafternoon, and then it had to leave behind sleeping baggy, six trucks, and five jeeps. The 3rd Battalion followed the 2nd Battalion, starting its movement about 3 P.M.
The regiment withdrew to the positions it had held north of Yongsan-dong when it began its advance northward on 24 November. During the withdrawal, Fisher had to turn rear units around to face enemy attacks on his rear. The 64th Field Artillery Battalion, as it too withdrew, continued to fire close support for the infantry when enemy forces threatened to close in. Fisher ordered that any vehicles at the tail of the column would he abandoned at once if they were trapped. Some were abandoned. But in this way he saved lives of men who might have tried to save the vehicles, and he also kept his column closed up and moving. That night, 27 November, Fisher established his CP at Yongsan-dong. His regiment went into position on the long cast-west ridge of Hill 387, three miles north of the town.32
On the evening of 27 November, before dark, two groups of about 100 men each, dressed as Korean farmers, were seen assembling just north of Yongsandong behind the 35th Infantry lines. They were in fact CCF soldiers. In the hours of darkness they established a roadblock that cut the withdrawal road of the 35th Infantry, which passed through the crossroads town of Yongsan-dong. In the town, the 35th Infantry would have to take the road running due cast to the bridge across the Kuryong River and, once acro
ss the river, continue on east to Yongbyon.
The road at the infantry defensive position three miles north of Yongsandong crossed a low saddle in the Hill 387 ridgeline and then ran south to Yongsandong. Control of this saddle was vital during the withdrawal, and the congested crossroads area in Yongsan-dong constituted a potential trap.
The Chinese began their attack on the 35th Regiment half an hour before midnight. It quickly spread across the regimental front. At the same time, unknown to the men on the forward line, a Chinese force had captured and occupied Yongsan-dong, three miles behind them. The 35th Infantry commandpost personnel in Yongsan-dong barely escaped eastward.
The ROK 15th Regimental CP, ROK 1st Division, was also in Yongsan-dong that night. In fact, the division boundary between the 25th Infantry Division and the ROK 1st Division converged to pass through Yongsan-dong, a key crossroads point for both divisions. When the Chinese entered Yongsan-dong, they contrived to surround the ROK 15th Regimental CP, but the regimental commander and most of his staff escaped. The Chinese were now set to destroy the 35th Regiment, and they might have, had it been less disciplined and less ably led. The Chinese that night again had driven back the ROK 1st Division, which extended the army line westward from the 35th Infantry. Part of the enemy force cut the Yongsan-dong-Pakchon road south of Yongsan-dong and thus trapped large parts of the ROK 1st Division north of it. Both the 35th Infantry of the US 25th Division and the ROK 1st Division were now threatened with destruction.
The CCF coordinated attack had started first against the 2nd Battalion between 11 P.M. and midnight, striking all three infantry companies-E, F, and G. The fight lasted all night there, with hundreds of CCF killed. Colonel Fisher ordered a withdrawal, but it could not be undertaken at once. The battalion was not able to start its withdrawal until 6:15 A.M. on 28 November, shortly before daylight. The battalion lost many vehicles, but the main body of troops broke through the town of Yongsan-dong and headed east for the river.
Earlier, when the enemy roadblock north of Yongsan-dong became known, A Company, 89th Tank Battalion, with a company of infantry, went south from the defensive line to clear it. The CCF tried desperately to hold the block, and the fighting there went on for several hours. Eventually, the tank and infantry force partially cleared the block, losing two tanks in the effort.
In the general CCF attack that night, A Company, 1st Battalion, came under attack at 1 A.M. on the morning of 28 November. It held until after 4 A.M. It then began to withdraw but ran into the enemy roadblock north of Yongsandong. A and C companies found a little cut-off trail north of the town and turned east on it. The 1st Battalion was thus able to bypass the roadblock and the town. It continued on to high ground overlooking the Kuryong River. There it took up a defensive position to protect the Kuryong River bridge and to cover the withdrawal across it of the 2nd and 3rd battalions.
The 3rd Battalion S-3 Operations Journal gives a succinct summary of what happened to that battalion. At 1 A.M., 28 November, it was alerted for withdrawal when it received word that ROK forces on its left (west) had given way. Twenty minutes later CCF attacked L Company from all sides. An hour later all battalion vehicles were sent to the rear. Ten to 15 minutes later, artillery fire ceased because the 64th Artillery Battalion firing for it was under enemy attack. At 3 A.M., the plan for the withdrawal of the 2nd and 3rd battalions was put into effect. G Company of the 2nd Battalion and I Company of the 3rd Battalion would cover the withdrawal. I Company engaged enemy on the high ground west of the saddle at Hill 387. L Company joined it in the fight there and held the road open while the rest of the 3rd Battalion moved south and was then followed by the 2nd Battalion. A tank platoon of A Company, 89th Tank Battalion, covered the withdrawal of L and I companies when they started off the hill. In their withdrawal all had to fight their way through Yongsan-dong."
Although it is apparent that the 35th Regiment had to fight its way south and through Yongsan-dong to the bridge crossing of the Kuryong River and just barely made it, a word must be added here about the part the ROK 1st Division played in making possible the withdrawal of the regiment. The ROK 1st Division, under Gen. Palk Sun Yup, had almost the entire CCF 66th Army to hold off in the battles around and south of Taechon from 25 November on. Shortly after midnight of 27 November, the Chinese broke through the ROK 12th Regiment, and at about the same time a massive enemy attack at close quarters broke the 15th Regiment's line two miles north of Yongsan-dong, adjacent to its boundary with the 35th Infantry. The Chinese then surrounded Yongsan-dong and quickly captured it. The ROK 15th Regimental headquarters there barely escaped. The Chinese in Yongsan-dongoverran both the ROK 11th and 15th Regimental headquarters that night and both regimental commanders were killed or missing.
After daylight on 28 November General Paik left his headquarters near the Chongchon River and went north to the fragmented 11th and 15th regiments, gathered their scattered units, reorganized them, led them to positions where they again had the Chinese to their fronts, and ordered them to counterattack the Chinese. In this counterattack General Paik recaptured Yongsan-dong. Had it not been for his stalwart leadership and the response he was able to get from his troops, the safety of the 35th Infantry might have been in doubt during the morning of 28 November.
When his CP had been forced to flee from Yongsan-dong during the night of 27-28 November, Colonel Fisher crossed the Kuryong River to its east side. He then turned north to find Brigadier General Wilson and Colonel Dolvin with Murch's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, at Yongpo-dong. He conferred there with General Wilson about the situation of the 35th Infantry. Apparently Colonel Fisher had ordered the withdrawal of the 35th Infantry on his own authority, but he knew that the regiment had to cross the Kuryong as soon as possible if it were to escape, because if the Chinese on the east side of the river broke through the ever-thinning blocking force of Murch's 2nd Battalion, his chance of getting the bulk of the 35th Infantry out of the closing jaws of the Chinese trap would be greatly diminished. Two batteries of the 64th Artillery Battalion and most of the tanks had crossed the river by dawn.
The 1st Battalion held its defensive positions on the west bank of the river, guarding the bridge and the Kuryong River crossing until 4:45 P.M., 28 November. At that time all other elements of the 35th Regiment had crossed the river. The 1st Battalion then left its covering positions and crossed the bridge. The 35th Regiment assembled at Yongbyon and saw the old walled city for the last time. The 2nd Battalion closed there at 2:45 P.M., and the 3rd Battalion at 5 P.M. After dark, at 6:30 P.M., the regiment started on south toward the Chongchon River, a march of ten miles.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Murch's 2nd Battalion continued to hold its blocking position north of Yongpo-dong on the east side of the Kuryong River until all of the 35th Infantry had crossed the river and were on their way to Yongbyon. Then, at 5 P.M., 28 November, it followed the 35th Infantry. The service trains of the 25th Division departed Yongbyon on 28 November on short notice, headed for Kunu-ri, 22 miles away on the south bank of the Chongchon."
It would appear that the CCF 117th Division of the 39th Army and elements of the CCF 66th Army, the latter in front of the ROK 1st Division west of the 35th infantry, carried the fight against Fisher's 35th Infantry."
All things considered, Task Force Dolvin-Wilson, the 35th Infantry, and Murch's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, came off better against the surprise and massive Chinese attacks than might have been expected, and the Chinese must have been surprised at their escape. The Chinese attackers, using their well-tested tactics of frontal attack and double envelopment, failed to panic and destroy the two UN attack columns, even though they succeeded in surrounding both of them and in cutting off their withdrawal routes. Both forces fought their way through the Chinese behind them while holding against their continuing frontal pressure. It was a professional display of courage and soldierly competence by officers and enlisted men alike.
The "Deuce-Four" Regiment Loses Its Way in the Hills
; It remains to follow the misfortunes of the 24th Infantry Regiment in its efforts as part of the US 25th Infantry Division's "attack to the border." The 24th Infantry was on the right (east) flank of the 25th Division, or east of Task Force Dolvin, which was the division center attack column. On the right flank of the 24th Infantry and the division was the 9th Infantry, the left flank of the US 2nd Infantry Division. There was no north-south road in the 24th Infantry's sector. The only decent road in its zone of operations was a southwest-northeast road that ran from Yongbyon, 25th Division headquarters site, northeast across the hills to strike the Chongchon River opposite Kujang-dong, a road distance of more than 15 miles. Most of the way, this road was from four to six air miles north of the river. The village of Unhung, or Muksi-dong on some maps, about ten road miles northeast of Yongbyon, was the only settlement larger than tiny villages on the road.
The valley of the Wichon River ascended eastward from Ipsok for a distance of eight miles to a point approximately two air miles north of Unhung, where its headwaters were trickles in the hills, topped by massive Hill 528. North of the Wichon valley there was a jumble of unbroken hills for many miles. Into this rough terrain, traversed only by poor trails, the 24th Infantry moved from the vicinity of Yongbyon on 24 November with its 1st Battalion on the left, the 3rd Battalion in the middle astride the Unhung road, and the 2nd Battalion on the right. The two flank battalions, the 1st and the 2nd, soon became lost.
Disaster in Korea Page 21