The Eighth Army situation maps for 25 and 26 November show that the ROK Ilth Regiment's most advanced units were attacking the high ground of Mulsil-san and Hyangjok-san (2,000-2,500 feet in elevation) when the CCF struck them. The ROKs did not capture any of this high ground and were pushed back from the outset of the Chinese attack. During 25 November, the ROKs held their positions after the attack of the night before but made virtually no gain.
The CCF attack against the 11th Regiment of the ROK 1st Division northeast of Taechon during the early hours of 25 November was the earliest frontal attack against the Eighth Army in the CCF 2nd Phase Offensive. The ROK 1st Division had reached CCF assembly areas, and the CCF could not allow it to proceed farther.
CCF forces kept the 11th Regiment under attack from midnight on through 26 November, from the west, north, and northeast. The 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment came under a series of attacks, beginning at midnight. One enemy battalion hit the ROK 2nd Battalion by moving along a network of mountain trails, and another enemy battalion struck it from a more easterly direction, both from Hills 782 and 750 in the Hyangjok-san mountain mass, five to six miles northeast ofTaechon. The ROK 11th Regiment, now quite disorganized, withdrew. It became necessary for General Paik to commit his reserve, the ROK 15th Regiment. It moved up on the right (east) of the 11th Regiment. Its 3rd Battalion took a position about seven miles east of Taechon between Sonhwa-dong and Tonggol, on the lower hills of the Hyangjok-san mountain. The 2nd Battalion was behind it and a little nearer to Taechon, but southeast of the town.
Another enemy force on the night of 25-26 November crossed the Chonbang River two miles south of Tacchon and struck the ROK 12th Regiment. The Chinese achieved a penetration there, but the 12th Regiment quickly counterattacked and regained its position.
It seems likely that elements of both the 196th and 197th divisions of the CCF 66th Army were trying to overrun the ROK 11th Regiment. Their attack did not stop with the coming of daylight. Air strikes hit the northern slope of Hill 659, where enemy horses and soldiers were good targets. With the help of artillery fire and many air strikes, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Regiment, beat off the attacks from the northwest by noon. The Chinese attacking from the north and northeast changed tactics at this time to move around the east flank along the ROK division boundary with the 25th Division. This move was halted by 1:35 P.M. But an hour and a half later, two enemy companies penetrated the ROK line to Hill 358. A ROK counterattack forced the Chinese to withdraw from there."
In the fighting on this day, 26 November, near Taechon, ROK troops captured a copy of a pamphlet in Chinese, entitled "Primary Conclusions of Battle Experience at UNSAN," printed from handwritten notes by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army Headquarters, 66th Army, on 20 November 1950. This pamphlet analyzed the fighting weaknesses, as the Chinese saw them, of the American troops in the battles near Unsan in the 1st Phase Chinese Offensive at the end of October, nearly a month earlier. As previously mentioned, this pamphlet, or extracts from it, was translated into English and widely distributed among UN forces in Korea.
During the night of 26-27 November the CCF continued their assaults on the ROK 1st Division. A Chinese attack struck the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 11th Regiment, after midnight. By 4 A.M., the regiment was badly disorganized, and it withdrew through the ROK 15th Regiment. The CCF gained about six miles in this attack on the right of the ROK 1st Division. The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the ROK 15th Regiment at 5 A.M. now had the task of holding the Chinese assaults on the division right.
At the same time, other Chinese formations attacked the left side of the ROK 1st Division south of Taechon. There, enemy attacked the 2nd Battalion, 12th Regiment, at 2:30 A.M. on 27 November, forcing it to withdraw. The battalion reorganized and after daylight counterattacked just after noon and regained its earlier position.
During the night of 26-27 November the combat was intense all along the ROK 1st Division line. The Chinese now held Taechon and the high ground above the town and from these places mounted attack after attack. In an unusual effort, the 78th AAA Gun Battalion during the night conducted seven different missions of marking enemy targets with white phosphorus for the Air Force. Night-flying planes then bombed and strafed those enemy targets. According to ROK patrols that went into some of these target areas the next day, the 78th AAA Gun Battalion fire and the resulting aerial bombing during the night resulted in hundreds of enemy dead."
At 11:15 A.M., an estimated regiment of Chinese infantry and a squadron of horse cavalry hit the right flank of the ROK 1st Division, mainly the ROK 15th Regiment. These daylight attacks on 27 November were as unrelenting as the Chinese night attacks usually were. Now there was no respite when daylight came, even with air strikes helping to stem the enemy advances.
The ROK 15th Regiment had to withdraw farther south from its defensive positions around Kandong, six miles southeast ofTaechon on the road to Yongsandong. The ROK 11th Regiment was now in the vicinity of Yongsan-dong, another six miles southeast of Kandong. At Yongsan-dong the road forked into two main escape routes for wheeled and tracked vehicles. The road to the east crossed the Kuryong River and went on to Yongbyon in the 25th Infantry Division sector; the road southwest led to Pakchon, ten miles away. By dark on 27 November, the ROK 1st Division was being pushed back at a rapid rate, and its 11th Regiment was hardly combat effective."
The worst was still ahead for the ROK 1st Division when darkness came on the evening of 27 November. The ROK 12th Regiment was on the west side of the division front, about five miles south of Taechon, next to the 5th RCT of the 24th Division. In the center, 10 to 12 air miles southeast of Taechon, the reorganized remnants of the ROK 11th Regiment were in position a few miles northwest of Yongsan-dong to cover the road from Taechon. The ROK 15th Regiment was centered at Yongsan-dong, with its headquarters in that town and adjoining the 35th Regiment of the 25th Division immediately on its right (east). The 35th Regiment had to pass through Yongsan-dong to reach safety eastward across the Kuryong River. The Chinese after midnight pressed everywhere between the Taeryong and Kuryong rivers-against the 5th RCT of the 24th Division, all of the ROK 1st Division, the 35th Infantry, and Task Force Dolvin of the 25th Infantry Division. At 1:45 A.M. on 28 November a Chinese attack penetrated the ROK 12th Regiment and, after two and a half hours of battle, forced the regiment to withdraw through the 11th Regiment to a defensive position on the Chongchon River bridgehead line, south of Pakchon.
Even earlier, the coordinated attack of the CCF 66th Army, using all three of its divisions, started against the ROK 1st Division just before 1 A.M. The attack initially struck the ROK 15th Regiment on the division right and broke through it after only 15 minutes of close combat. The regiment carried on a fighting withdrawal of two miles to Yongsan-dong. The Chinese force followed up fast and got behind all three battalions of the regiment. They surrounded Yongsan-dong. The ROK 15th Regimental CP in the town was overrun, but some of the staff escaped. Either a part of this Chinese assault force or another from the west cut the road to Pakchon, southwest of Yongsan-dong. In the hours before dawn of 28 November it appeared that the Chinese had just about encircled the ROK 11th and 15th regiments and were in a position to destroy the division as a fighting force. The ROK 15th Regiment's surviving units were trying to hold positions approximately two miles southeast of Yongsan-dong on the Pakchon road.
The CPs of both the ROK 11th and 15th regiments were overrun during the night, and both regimental commanders were lost or missing. The artillery supporting the two regiments had to make quick decisions and act rapidly to save themselves. The 78th AAA Battalion received orders to go to Pakchon from its exposed firing positions to the northwest, from which it had been supporting the ROK 12th Regiment. The 9th Field Artillery Battalion of 155-mm howitzers moved to positions just northeast of Pakchon, and the two northernmost ROK batteries of the 17th Field Artillery Battalion also moved quickly to the vicinity of Pakchon. Pakchon was the crossroads in this vital area just north of the Chongchon River crossing a
reas near its mouth and around which a defense line had to be maintained if I Corps troops were to escape southward across the river.
In the critical hours before daylight on 28 November, Gen. Paik Sun Yup "accomplished the impossible," as one participant wrote later. With the 11th and 15th regiments cut off and without their regimental commanders, their strength critically reduced by killed, wounded, and missing, Paik went forward, found most of the scattered units, reorganized them, and brought the two regiments into positions where they once again confronted the victorious Chinese. He ordered counterattacks, which reestablished part of the line around Yongsan-dong, and recaptured the town. It is said that the ROK infantry who recaptured Yongsan-dong on 28 November counted 400 dead Chinese in the town, most of them killed by 90-mm artillery fire.
Acting on an Eighth Army order an hour earlier, I Corps at noon on 28 November ordered its units to withdraw to the Chongchon River bridgehead line. The ROK 1st Division was charged with initially holding the critical road junctions and areas around Yongsan-dong and southward long enough to permit the 24th Infantry Division to get through below Pakchon and establish a defensive line north of the Chongchon River. The ROK Ist Division was then to pass through the 24th Division and take over its defensive positions. In accordance with this order, the ROK 15th Regiment withdrew southwestward from Yongsan-dong at 9 P.M. that night."
On 29 November, the ROK 1st Division held its positions around Pakchon while the 24th Infantry Division withdrew through the town and turned south toward the Chongchon River. The ROK 1st Division then began its own withdrawal southward, with the CCF 39th and 66th armies pressing hard against it. The ROK 11th and 15th regiments withdrew through the ROK 12th Regiment to the Chongchon River crossing sites. The ROK 12th Regiment held rear-guard defensive positions. When the 11th and 15th regiments had cleared to the south side of the river, the 12th Regiment followed. All these withdrawals were greatly aided by air strikes on an estimated 5,000 Chinese pursuing the ROKs and trying to break through on them. Heavy artillery fire of the 10th AAA Group in front (north) of the withdrawing ROKs also played a role in keeping the Chinese from closing in and driving through to the Chongchon River. This artillery fire against the advancing enemy was continued during the night.
The 10th AAA Group had remained uncomfortably close to the massed enemy in laying down their heavy and steady interdiction fires. But after dark the artillery began its withdrawal to the river. The 78th Battalion was the first to move, followed by the 17th, the 9th, then the 10th Group Headquarters, the Rocket Battery, and finally the 68th Field Artillery Battalion. This latter battalion maintained its fires against a major enemy crossing site of the Taeryong River just north of Pakchon, where the Chinese repeatedly massed battalion-sized groups for a crossing. The artillery in each instance broke up these attempts, with heavy loss of life for the Chinese. The 68th Battalion fired on this crossing site until 4 A.M. on 30 November, when it left its firing positions to withdraw. At that time the 78th and 9th field artillery battalions took up the barrages against the Chinese from the south side of the Chongchon. Observers reported the Chinese were still on the other side of the river north of Pakchon when the 68th Battalion began its withdrawal."
At the end of the day on 29 November, the ROK 1st Division was south of the Chongchon River and moving to assembly areas southwest of Sinanju. The 10th Group Artillery Headquarters left Maengjung-dong at 7 A.M. on 30 November, and two hours later it was south of the river and on its way to Sukchon. I Corps withdrawal south of the Chongchon River had been accomplished.
The heavy fighting in the I and IX corps areas beginning the night of 25 November caused an increasing number of casualties to be brought to the K-29 airfield near Sinanju for evacuation, mostly to hospitals in Japan. On 28 November, 1,283 casualties were air evacuated from K-29. The Medical Battalion reported that never before in Korea had wounded been admitted to the Clearing Stations in such large numbers so quickly. Ambulances evacuated the wounded from the Clearing Stations. They included men from the 2nd, 25th, and 24th divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, and Turks and ROKs. Since there were not enough ambulances to transport all the wounded to the Sinanju airfield, 2'/:-ton trucks were used to supplement them. On 29 November, 1,200 additional casualties were evacuated from K-29 airfield. " These figures of nearly 2,500 casualties evacuated by air rivaled figures for the evacuations by air from Hagaru-ri in the Chosin Reservoir fighting in the X Corps area of northeast Korea at nearly the same time. 'I
The US 2nd Infantry Division held perhaps the most pivotal position in the Eighth Army line. It straddled the Chongchon River in its advance north from Kunu-ri into the heart of the enemy area along the main highway and rail line that led northeast to the border area of Kanggye and Manpojin. The Chinese were certain to concentrate here, if anywhere, against an attack to the border.
The 2nd Infantry Division had no opposition in its advance on 24 and 25 November except that, on the twenty-fifth, its B Company, 9th Infantry, ran into stubborn enemy resistance when it tried to occupy Hill 219, just north of Sinhung-dong, on the east side of the Chongchon River. The Chinese screening force there still held the hill at dark when B Company, badly used up, withdrew down the slope to positions near its base. This was an unexpected setback.
Col. Paul L. Freeman's 23rd Infantry was to move up that evening to pass through the 9th Infantry the next morning, to lead the advance on Huichon, the division's immediate objective. But 2nd Division troops never got beyond Hill 219 on the river road. Hill 219 marked the place where the CCF 2nd Phase Offensive began against the 2nd Infantry Division.
The 9th Infantry, which led the 2nd Division up the Chongchon River on the first day of the advance, was split by the Chongchon River. The Regimental Headquarters and the 1st Battalion were grouped on the east side of the river near Sinhung-dong. The 2nd and 3rd battalions were west of the river. The 3rd Battalion was the farthest west, with I Company adjacent to the 25th Infantry boundary, approximately four miles from the river. K and L companies were on hills east and northeast of it on opposite sides of the Dry Creek bed that led to the Chongchon River a mile below Sinhung-dong. There was no communication between the three companies or the 3rd Battalion CP on the evening of 25 November.
The 2nd Battalion Headquarters and its E Company were on the east side of the river at Sinhung-dong, along with the 1st Battalion headquarters. The rest of the 2nd Battalion was in position on Hill 180 across the river from Sinhungdong, on its west side. Hill 180 was just north of Dry Creek at its juncture with the Chongchon. It would seem that K and L companies of the 3rd Battalion together with the bulk of the 2nd Battalion on Hill 180 would dominate and control any enemy approach along Dry Creek to the Chongchon.
As described earlier, the 38th Infantry Regiment had requested and had been granted permission to move ahead of the rest of the division to a jump-off line that it felt would improve its starting point. It was on the right, or east, of the 9th Infantry, holding a series of hill positions along the Paengnyong River, which flowed from the cast and emptied into the Chongchon just south of Sinhungdong. The 38th Regiment's western boundary with the 9th Infantry was at Hill 291, one and a half air miles southeast of Sinhung-dong. The Paengnyong River, a key feature in the 38th Infantry's zone of action, rose eastward near Tokchon in the divide between the Chongchon and the Taedong rivers.
Several hours before B Company of the 9th Infantry found enemy holding Hill 219, north of Sinhung-dong, the 38th Infantry before dawn on 25 November had started a company-sized reconnaissance patrol from the valley of the Paengnyong toward massive Hill 1229, five air miles north of the valley. A Company of the 1st Battalion drew this assignment. Its mission was to investigate aerial and other intelligence reports that a large enemy force had concentrated there. The twisting and steep mountain trails that led toward the crest of Hill 1229 from the Pacngnyong valley must have been about three times the aerial distance-perhaps 15 miles. This patrol was the first unit of the 38th Infantry to encounter en
emy and engage in hostilities-in the hills bordering the Paengnyong cast of Sinhung-ni. At dark on 25 November, the patrol had made only about one-third of the distance to Hill 1229, harassed most of the way by enemy screening forces. The probability that it would ever reach the crest of Hill 1229 looked slim.
Meanwhile, the bulk of the 38th Regiment and its attached units continued their deployment eastward on the road leading from Kujang-dong toward Tokchon. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion of 105-mm howitzers, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert J. O'Donnell, the regular support for the 38th Infantry Regiment, with A Battery of the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm howitzers) attached, followed the infantry regiment eastward on the Kujang-dongSomin-dong-Tokchon road and went into position south of Col. George B. Peploe's 38th Regimental CP at Somin-dong.'
About 6 P.M. on 25 November, Col. Paul L. Freeman, Jr., and his 23rd Regimental Headquarters Company, with Lt. Col. Claire E. Hutchins, Jr.'s 1st Battalion and the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion (minus A Battery), came up behind the 9th Infantry elements on the east side of the Chongchon River at Sinhung-dong and went into bivouac along the west side of Chinaman's Hat for the night. Freeman did not at that time have control of his 2nd and 3rd battalions, but it was expected they would be available to him that night or the next day.
The CCF 40th Army Strikes Swiftly
The 40th CCF Field Army, composed of the 118th, 119th, and 120th divisions, had remained hidden for more than a week in assembly areas near Unsan and Kan-dong about 10 to 12 air miles north and northwest of Sinhung-dong and Kujang-dong. The 40th Field Army's mission was to attack any force that advanced up the Chongchon River toward Huichon. This Chinese Army was considered to he perhaps the best on all-around offensive and defensive capa bilities of any army in the CCF XIII Army Group that confronted Eighth Army.
Chinese prisoners captured during the night of 25 November and the next morning on the east side of the Chongchon River in the vicinity of Chinaman's Hat provided a good description of how the CCF 40th Army moved into action against the US 2nd Infantry Division. It first hit the 9th Infantry Regiment on the division left because that regiment was athwart its approach march to the Chongchon River. The fast-moving enemy columns of the 120th Division, the lead division of the Chinese 40th Army, accidentally ran right into the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, was virtually destroyed that night, and the rest of the regiment was decimated in the following 24 hours.
Disaster in Korea Page 24