A count of enemy dead after daylight put the number at approximately 400 in front of A Company. And there were 102 Chinese prisoners-an unusually high number under the circumstances. During the night the CCF had evacuated most of their wounded, the number unknown. The 2nd Division had about 200 casualties, killed and wounded, during the night.
An important reinforcement for the 23rd Infantry arrived at Chinaman's Hat. About 2 A.M. on 26 November Colonel Sloane, commander of the 9th Infantry, sent his tanks, B Company, 72nd Tank Battalion, to the area southwest of Chinaman's Hat. They went into the line at once with A Company, 23rd Infantry. Special Chinese assault teams tried to reach the tanks with explosive charges, but they failed, shot down by protecting infantrymen. When morning came, 17 dead Chinese, most of them carrying explosive charges, were found sprawled around one of the tanks. During the night-long battle, artillery concentrated at Kujang-dong (the 17th, 37th, and 15th field artillery battalions), four miles to the south, fired in support of the 23rd Infantry at Chinaman's Hat. They especially tried to knock out enemy mortars on the west side of the river and to interdict enemy approach routes. The 23rd Regimental Tank Company supported B Company in much the same manner that Sloane's tank company fought with and supported A Company."
The elongated, curved high ridge known as Chinaman's Hat was the key position in this battle area. From the river bottom, where the American forces were concentrated, only the southern knob, in the shape of a conical Chinese hat, was visible. But to the northeast the ridge rose in two more knobs, the highest being 329 meters. The Chinese occupied all these knobs and the slopes around them. They were on the ridge in great force before daylight of 26 November. From their positions they could see everything below them and could direct machine-gun and mortar fire on the Americans. The hill had not been a crucial factor in the battles at its base during the night of 25-26 November. The enemy were then only in the process of occupying the hill with elements of the 120th Division, following the initial crossing of its 359th Regiment. From daylight of 26 November on, however, the hill was the dominant geographic factor in the situation.
After daylight of 26 November, the 2nd Division supporting artillery units at Kujang-dong collected members of the 61st Artillery who during the night had fled south to their emplacements. They then marched them back north to the Chinaman's Hat area. There at the 23rd Infantry line, they were ordered to go forward and reclaim their old gun pits. It was an easy task, for the Chinese who had remained there all night during the battle were now nearly all gone. All but two of the artillery pieces were operable or could be made so. After they captured them, the Chinese had failed to destroy or use them.
In the previous chapter the A Company, 38th Infantry, patrol was left on Hill 453, short of Hill 1229, its objective. Hill 1229 was an objective in the 38th Infantry phase line of advance. That morning, 25 November, after A Company was well on its way in the patrol, the 1st Battalion was relieved of its sector on the 38th Regimental left near Sinhung-dong, adjacent to the 9th Infantry right, but its A Company was not recalled from its mission. The 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. James H. Skeldon, replaced the 1st Battalion. Thereupon, the 1st Battalion, minus A Company on its patrol, went into regimental reserve. The 3rd Battalion had extended the 38th Regimental position eastward into higher hills, where its boundary met that of the ROK 3rd Regiment and of the ROK II Corps some miles east of Somin-dong.
According to the records of the 38th Regiment, the A Company patrol reached the southern slope of Hill 625 by dusk of 25 November. This hill is about one and a quarter air miles directly north of Hill 453, but much farther by foot trail. At Hill 625, the trail turned northeast toward Hill 1229, still two and a half air miles distant and possibly two to three times that distance by foot trail. Enemy grenades and small-arms fire on the patrol at Hill 625 indicated that enemy troops occupied it. In radio discussion with the 1st Battalion CP, Capt. Leonard Lowery, 1st Battalion executive officer, who had accompanied Capt. Jack W. Rodarm and his A Company, talked with Capt. John L. Blackwell, the S-3 of the 1st Battalion on the situation. They agreed that A Company should pull back and set up a perimeter defense on top Hill 453 for the night. Accordingly, the company assembled there about dark and went into a defensive position."
The crest of Hill 453 was in the form of a nearly level, rather narrow ridge, which sloped slightly down to the south. North of Hill 453 and across a shallow saddle was another ridge that ran toward Hill 453 at a slight angle from the northwest. This made Hill 453 vulnerable from that direction if enemy occupied the second and higher ridge. As far as the patrol knew, there were no enemy there at dark on 25 November. Captain Rodarm emplaced his A Company in a perimeter formation with his 3rd Platoon west of the crest and extending somewhat forward of it toward the saddle to the north. The 1st Platoon was in a similar position at the crest and eastward from it. At the southeastern part of the sloping ridge and directly behind the 1st Platoon and tying into it at its southwestern comer was the 2nd Platoon, which held that part of the perimeter. A party of about 20 Korean tamers formed a pocket within the 2nd Platoon position. West of the platoon and immediately south of the 3rd Platoon, the Weapons Platoon formed a circular position.
At 11:20 P.M. on 25 November, the 38th Regimental CP received information that F Company, on a hill just south of the Paengnyong River and several miles behind A Company, was under heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. Twentyfive minutes later it received radio information that a platoon of L Company on the right (cast) of F Company was under attack. By midnight, enemy had penetrated between F and L companies far to the rear of A Company on Hill 453. A Company was unaware of this enemy action in its rear.
The enemy in front of A Company and in the Hill 1229 area were probably elements of the Chinese 113th Division of the 38th Army, which was on the left flank of the XIII Army Group with the mission of attacking the ROK II Corps. Major elements of both the CCF 113th and 120th divisions struck the 38th Regiment of the US 2nd Division on the night of 25-26 November. These two enemy divisions were on adjoining flanks of the boundary between two Chinese armies. The 38th Regiment happened to be in their paths, astride their boundary. The 113th Division attacked it from the north; the 120th attacked it from the west."
In the A Company perimeter on Hill 453, the evening and night of 25 November passed quietly until just before midnight. A few minutes before midnight, M. Sgt. Thomas E. Weikel of the 1st Platoon bumped into a man he had not seen in the darkness just in front of his platoon position. When Weikel challenged him and raised his carbine, the man rolled away over the hillside. At the same time on the left front of the perimeter, in the 3rd Platoon area, Cpl. Renaldo Acosta was in front of the outpost when he saw a Chinese soldier standing ten yards from him. Before he could react, the Chinese vanished. There had been no noise of any kind, but an enemy force had moved in close to A Company. In a matter of minutes after these two Chinese had been encountered at the very edge of the forward American position, enemy machine-gun, submachine-gun, and rifle fire came in on A Company from the high ground just north across the shallow saddle. Rodarm could distinguish between the fire from two machine guns, some submachine guns, and many rifles. The enemy fire seemed to come from about 200 yards away.
The 1st and 3rd platoons returned the fire. During this exchange, tracer bullets from a 3rd Platoon machine gun started a grass fire in the saddle about 125 yards in front of it. Wind soon fanned the fire into a bright blaze. Chinese thereupon rushed out to stomp out the fire. They were good targets for the American machine guns, and most of them were casualties to the automatic fire. Others came out to take their places, making no effort to attack A Company-only to beat out the fire. Many of them, also, were killed or wounded, but still others came for the same task. It is not known how many scores or possibly hundreds of Chinese were killed in this one-sided action until the fire burned itself out. All this took place on the left front of A Company.
At the same time, enemy on the right fr
ont moved downhill a bit and started around the flank of the 1st Platoon. When they had moved south on the lower ground far enough to be on the flank of the 1st Platoon, these Chinese started up through scrub growth toward it. The 1st Platoon was unaware of this movement until a bugle downslope on its right flank warned it of what was happening. Then there were other bugle blasts and occasionally the sound of a shepherd's horn. The sound of men's voices in a chant came from downslope. This grew louder as the Chinese drew closer. But none was yet in sight in the direction of the noise. Nevertheless, the 1st Platoon fired down into the thicket that screened observation in that direction. The 1st Platoon fire apparently disorganized the enemy formation. But groups squirmed through the brush and up small gullies toward the platoon. Chinese stick grenades began falling into the platoon from less than 15 yards away, and it still had seen no Chinese. The squad nearest this enemy approach were all casualties within a few minutes.
Increased enemy fire had built up against the front of the 1st and 3rd platoons from the enemy hill to their front. Five instead of two enemy machine guns now were firing. After a while, three Chinese mortars joined the machine guns in firing steadily at A Company. The early mortar salvos struck behind the front platoons in the 2nd Platoon area and panicked most of the Korean carriers into running away. One mortar round critically wounded Lieutenant Claridge, forward observer for the 38th Field Artillery Battalion. Other mortar rounds hit in the Weapons Platoon, causing damage. Perhaps the single most destructive blow from the mortar fire came when a round landed in the 3rd Platoon's machine-gun position, destroying the gun and wounding some of the crew.
Captain Rodarm took stock of the situation and found he had five dead and 26 wounded, including five litter cases. At 1:30 A.M. on 26 November he told Captain Lowery he thought the company would have to withdraw. Lowery got Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher at 1st Battalion by radio and described the situation. Kelleher agreed the company should withdraw.
Rodarm ordered the 1st and 3rd platoons to withdraw through the 2nd Platoon, bringing all their wounded. There were no litter men with the company. Earlier they had taken wounded down to the valley. When they tried to rejoin the company, two had been killed on the way up. None arrived at the company perimeter. Riflemen or mortarmen, therefore, six to a blanket, had to be detailed to carry the blanket litters. There was no blood plasma, nor were any skilled medical personnel present.
In preparing for the withdrawal, the 2nd Platoon swung its machine guns to point north and placed its BAR men to face the same direction. All the withdrawing men left behind their sleeping bags, rations, excess equipment, and some ammunition. The withdrawal benefited when Chinese pursuers stopped at the 1st and 3rd Platoon positions to loot the abandoned food and equipment. The 2nd Platoon was able to take advantage of this to drop into line as tail in the company column without fighting as a rear guard. By 2:30 A.M., A Company had made it back to Hill 526, an E Company outpost, one air mile south of Hill 453. There the E Company platoon was about out of machinegun and BAR ammunition but had a good supply of M-1 bandolier ammunition, which it divided with A Company.
From Hill 526, Cpl. Jack McKnight, now acting forward observer for the 38th Field Artillery Battalion, called in fire against Hill 453, which A Company had recently vacated. The responding barrages on the hill made at least two direct hits, one by high explosive and another by white phosphorus shells that set fire to the ration dump. From Hill 526, A Company men could see these hits and even silhouettes of Chinese moving about against the blaze.
It was not long, however, before Chinese pursuers caught up with A Company at Hill 526. About 3 A.M., four Chinese machine guns began firing on them. This fire killed two men in a short time. Captain Lowery decided it was time for a complete withdrawal back to the 1st Battalion; Rodarm agreed. Lowery was to take most of the company and try to keep it together in the withdrawal. Rodarm was to organize the evacuation of the wounded and, with the 2nd Platoon, which had seen the least action, fight a rear-guard protection of those who were ahead. Rodarm had the machine gun that the E Company platoon had left in position and about 20 small arms to keep up a constant fire on the Chinese while the others withdrew. Later, still firing their weapons, the 2nd Platoon withdrew. The Chinese pursued for about a third of a mile.
In the withdrawal, A Company splintered. Lowery and Rodarm retained control of the two largest groups, but others broke away and were on their own. Lowery with the walking wounded had the largest group from the lead platoons. Rodarm had the fitter cases and part of the 3rd Platoon. The 2nd Platoon, or part of it, seems to have been between the other two main groups.
Captain Lowery with the leading group arrived near a footbridge they had crossed on the way up the morning before. At the edge of some shrubs and trees, they paused on the trail to look over the open ground ahead of them. They stood there immobile and silent for two or three minutes. Then they heard the soft thud of padded feet. A column of Chinese soldiers appeared in the half-moonlight, headed for the bridge. They came at the typical Chinese dogtrot when they were on the move, without any clanking of weapons or metal, in perfect discipline. The awed Americans heard only their heavy breathing and the soft padding of feet in rubber-soled shoes. Lowery estimated the force at about 500 men-a Chinese battalion. He waited 10 to 15 minutes after the Chinese had passed. Then he led his own party quickly across the footbridge and worked his way on down to the 1st Battalion CP.16
Captain Rodarm with his litter cases was the last of A Company to reach the low ground of the Paengnyong, where the regimental positions were having their own nightlong battles with Chinese. He followed the same trail as Lowery before him. The morning light, dimmed by fog, was at hand when he approached the footbridge. In time, he saw an enemy battalion camped adjacent to the bridge site. He swerved his party away from the area and skirted it undetected. Later in the morning Rodarm and his group entered American lines.
After daylight, liaison planes took to the air to try and locate A Company, since battalion and regiment had lost communication with it. One pilot reported he thought he had located it, that scattered groups were surrounded but were trying to fight their way back. By 8:14 A.M., 26 November, A Company stragglers were in F Company's hard-held hill perimeter near the Pacngnyong River. By noon a total of four officers and 92 enlisted men from A Company and the E Company outpost from Hill 426 had entered friendly lines."'
One observation maybe made about the A Company patrol. Although it was a costly and useless march into enemy territory and never came near to its objective (Hill 1229), it did make the farthest penetration of any American tactical unit of Eighth Army north into enemy territory when it reached the base of Hill 625 near dusk on the evening of 25 November. It was then north of Hill 219 along the cast bank of the Chongchon River where Chinese stopped B Company, 9th Infantry-about four air miles east and one air mile north of B Company at its northernmost point at Hill 219. Perhaps theirs was an empty honor.
During the night, F Company had been surrounded on its Hill 383 position in a sharp bend on the south side of the Paengnyong, but it held there after prolonged and bitter fighting. Its fire killed or wounded many Chinese during the night as they crossed the Paengnyong River in front of it. F Company was reinforced during the night by the last of the 2nd Battalion reserve. Everywhere the front-line companies of the 38th Regiment had come under attack and were being forced back, except at the extreme right flank in the I and K Company positions, where there had been no action. An enemy attack had penetrated the 38th Regimental line at Somin-long between the 2nd and 3rd battalions, and an unknown number of Chinese had passed through to the rear of the regiment.
' somin-dong was on the only escape route for the 38th Infantry back to the Chongchon River valley south of the Paengnyong. In this attack through Somindong, L Company was hurt most. I and K companies pulled back to block for it. A platoon of tanks from the blocking line went back into Somin-dong several times to pick up stragglers and to destroy American equipment that c
ould not be salvaged.
After dawn an attack by elements of L and H companies and the Medical Company eastward reopened the MSR to Somin-dong, where the 38th Regimental CP was located. The 3rd Battalion on the right restored its original position. An air-liaison pilot reported, however, that heavy fighting was in progress in the I and K Company positions near the ROK boundary but that he could not locate G Company-that its foxholes were empty." The story of G Company is told in the following section.
A Chinese Flute Serenade at Hill 291
The deployments taking place in the 38th Infantry on the afternoon of 25 November called for Lt. Col. James H. Skeldon's 2nd Battalion to relieve the 1st Battalion on the left side of the 38th Infantry's line east of Sinhung-dong. As part of this action, 1st Lt. Robert H. Rivet's G Company received orders to relieve C Company on Hill 291. This hill lay east of Sinhung-dong, about one and a half air miles southeast of Chinaman's Hat and three-quarters of an air mile south of the Paengnyong valley. A poor trail led to it from the valley of the Chongchon, perhaps three miles or more over broken ground, consisting of a series of ridges and knobs. C Company had had no enemy contact during the short time it had occupied the hill. Learning that G Company was going to relieve it on 25 November, it had dug no positions on the hill. Hill 291 was in the form of a large dogleg. The northern east-west part of the dogleg was about half a mile long with the crest on the east end. From there a mile-long ridge with several knobs ran on a slight slant a little cast of south.
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