These movements during the night of 29-30 November placed the 23rd Regiment on line to protect both the Anju and the Sunchon junction roads from the north and northeast and replaced elements of the 25th Division on the Anju road. The 23rd Infantry line had its 3rd Battalion on the left, the 1st Battalion in the center, and the 2nd Battalion on the right. Because it commanded the Kunu-ri-Anju road and its junction with the Sunchon road, the 1st Battalion position was the most critical. It placed its B Company on the highest ground south of the road on Hill 201; its C Company was opposite it at the road pass or saddle and northwest of it. A Company was in reserve south of the road, behind B Company. The rest of the 2nd Infantry Division was by this time south or southeast of the 23rd Regiment. The left flank of the 38th Regiment was on the 23rd Infantry's right flank.
Thus, at dawn on 30 November two regiments held a defensive position in an arc west and south of Kunu-ri, covering the important roadnet that led west and south from it. The 2nd Division CP was about four miles south of them on the division's MSR to Sunchon."
By the afternoon of 28 November, General MacArthur in Tokyo had decided that a crisis existed in Korea. Four days earlier he had confidently launched his attack to the border, which he had thought would result in the unification of all Korea. His Far East Command Headquarters, far from the Chongchon River battlefront, had been slow to realize that the Eighth Army there was being defeated in the series of battles that began on the night of 25 November in the center and eastern end of the army line.
A long message that General MacArthur sent to the joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on the afternoon of 28 November, and a communique he issued late that afternoon in Tokyo both indicated that he had reached a personal decision as to the critical nature of the crisis caused by the stunning success of the Chinese 2nd Phase Offensive against the Eighth Army in the west. Also, the Chinese IX Army Group in northeast Korea, in its surprise attack against the US X Corps on the night of 27 November (described in my East of Chosin) had achieved chilling successes at the very outset. Taken together, these events brought a sense of reality to General MacArthur.
The Chinese in their 2nd Phase Offensive had used no air power in their attacks. But the fear that it might suddenly descend on the UN troops, now not far from the border, had been growing in the minds of commanders. The Soviet MiG-15 fighter had first appeared near the Yalu River on 1 November, four weeks earlier, and rendered obsolete at once every US plane then in the Far East. The MiG easily outclassed the American Mustang and Corsair. It could fly at 660 miles an hour, 110 miles faster in level flight than the F-80C, and climb right away from the old Shooting Stars.
On 18 November, the US Navy's new F9F Pantherjets got into a dogfight with MiGs over Sinuiju on the Yalu. The MiGs were faster, they outclimbcd and outdived the F9Fs, and they could turn inside the Panthers. But the Panthers shot down one MiG. The MiGs were based at Antung, on the north side of the Yalu, opposite Sinuiju. There, two gravel 6,000-foot runways had been converted to concrete, and taxiways were being hard-surfaced. Radar there gave them a 150-mile-radius early-warning system for spotting approaching American planes. The MiGs hugged the Yalu border and seldom made more than two passes before breaking off combat. The American planes were not permitted to follow them across the river. As a token of what might happen in the days ahead, on 28 November a light enemy liaison plane came over the Pyongyang airfield and dropped a fragmentation bomb, killing an American Air Force sergeant and damaging 11 Mustang fighters, three of them so badly they had to be junked.' These facts did not bolster American confidence at a time when their ground forces were everywhere in retreat.
On 29 November the New York Times printed a report from one of its war correspondents, datelined Washington, DC., 28 November, stating that there was surprise at the tum of military events. The account stated, however, that high-level defense officials had confidence that UN forces could hold a line against the Chinese. The article reported that some thought was being given to the possibility of a withdrawal from the present battlefront and that a defense line might be established at the narrow waist of Korea. It purported to reflect the feeling of responsible Defense Department officials on 28 November that events were taking an adverse turn at the Chongchon River front but that there was no real crisis.'
Unknown to the press at the time the above dispatch was printed, a long radio message arrived at the Pentagon from General MacArthur that was utterly pessimistic and jarred the Defense Department. MacArthur's message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 November was important because it showed a marked change in his view on the course of the war in Korea. It posed new problems for the Joint Chiefs and the president. Parts of MacArthur's message follow:
The developments resulting from our assault movements have now assumed a clear definition. All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of NK troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese military forces are committed in NK in great and ever-increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of volunteerism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war. Interrogation of prisoners of war and other intelligence information establish the following enemy order of battle ... comprising an aggregate strength approaching 200,000. The NK fragments, approximately 50,000 troops, arc to be added to this strength....
It is quite evident that our present strength of force is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. The resulting situation presents an entirely new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the theater commander. This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength.
As directed by your JCS 92801, as amplified by your JCS 93709, my strategic plan for the immediate future is to pass from the offensive to the defensive with such local adjustments as may be required by a constantly fluid situation.'
General MacArthur's radio message, apparently sent about 3 P.M. on 28 November, Tokyo time (15 hours' difference between Tokyo and Washington time), was received at the Pentagon about Washington time, 28 November. Col. John R. Beishline, on duty at the Pentagon, telephoned Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, deputy chief of staff for operations, at his quarters at to tell him he had just received a TS flash from the commander in chief, Far East Command. General Ridgway asked that the message be brought to his quarters, and he read it there at 4:45 A.M. Ridgway immediately telephoned Gen. Joseph L. Collins, Army chief of staff and executive agent for the Joint Chiefs on Korean matters. He told him about the message and that Beishline was bringing it to him at once. An hour later, Ridgway telephoned Collins again and said he thought the Joint Chiefs would want President Truman to have the message soon after he had risen that morning. General Collins agreed and said he would telephone Gen. Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Later in the morning, General Ridgway told Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, Army vice-chief of staff, his immediate superior, that he thought it would be necessary to start planning for the possible evacuation of Korea at once but that such action should be confined to a small group. Ridgway suggested that Haislip discuss with General Collins the question of responsibility if disaster overtook Eighth Army and X Corps in Korea. Ridgway argued that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a responsibility to the American people and to history in the matter and should issue instructions to General MacArthur.`
After sending his radio message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur issued his Communique No. 14 at 5:25 P.m. in Tokyo. This communique was issued for worldwide consumption as his explanation of what was happening in Korea. Concerning enemy action of the past four days, it said that a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps, and division strength of more than 200,000 men were now committed against the United Nations in Korea. His communi
que continued in part:
Consequently we face an entirely new war. This has shattered the high hope we entertained that the intervention of the Chinese was only of a token nature on a volunteer and individual basis as publicly announced....
It now appears to have been the enemy's intent in breaking off contact with our forces some two weeks ago, to secure the time necessary surreptitiously to build up for a later surprise assault upon our lines in overwhelming force, taking advantage of the freezing of all rivers and roadbeds which would have materially reduced the effectiveness of our air interdiction and permitted a greatly accelerated forward movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. This plan has been disrupted by our own offensive action which forced upon the enemy a premature engagement.
An hour after the release of the communique, an additional paragraph was added to it.
This situation, repugnant as it may be, poses issues beyond the authority of the United Nations military council - issues which must find their solution within the councils of the United Nations and chancelleries of the world.'
At the same time on the afternoon of 28 November, General MacArthur decided on a third step-to call Generals Walker and Almond, his field commanders in Korea, to Tokyo for a conference on the future course of the war. His summons to them went out that afternoon.
On the morning of 28 November, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander in northeast Korea, flew from his Hamhung CP to Hagaru-ri, at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, and went from there by jeep to the Advance CP of the 1st Marine Division, where he conferred with Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, the marine division commander. About noon he departed from that conference and flew by helicopter to the CP of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, on the east side of the reservoir. There he conferred with Col. Allan D. MacLean, 31st Infantry Regimental commander, and Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr., the 1st Battalion commander. MacLean was then in the process of establishing his regimental Advance CP near the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry. Almond downplayed the seriousness of the heavy attacks of Chinese troops on the 1st Battalion the previous night.
General Almond returned to Hagaru-ri in the early afternoon. About midafternoon he flew from Hagaru-ri to his CP in Hamhung. Upon arriving there, he learned that a message had arrived from General MacArthur directing that he come at once to Tokyo for a conference.
General Almond had a hurried meeting with Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, commander of the 7th Infantry Division at 3:30, and then he spoke briefly with General Robertson, representative for British Commonwealth troops in Korea. At 5 P.M., he departed Yongpo airfield in Korea for Tokyo. Accompanying Almond were Lt. Col. William J. McCaffrey, X Corps deputy chief of staff; Lieutenant Colonel Glass, X Corps staff; Major Ladd, his senior aide; and one or two others. When Almond's plane arrived at Hancda airport, Tokyo, about 9 P.m., Colonel Clarke from General Headquarters, Far East Command, was waiting for the party. He said that General MacArthur was waiting with General Walker and desired him to proceed at once to the American Embassy, General MacArthur's residence.'
There is no comparable source detailing Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker's movements as Eighth Army commander in Korea. In fact, the records of Eighth Army in the National Archives are so devoid of mention of General Walker that one has difficulty in knowing where the general was and what he was doing most of the time. One may presume that Walker received his summons from General MacArthur at a small advance CP he had established adjacent to the 24th Division CP at Anju in North Korea about the same time X Corps received its message for General Almond. In any event, we know that General Walker arrived in Tokyo ahead of General Almond and was waiting with General MacArthur and others when Almond arrived. From his radio message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Communique No. 14, it is evident that General MacArthur had already made his decision to put his forces in Korea on the defense and abandon his offensive to the border, before the commanders' conference began.
The conference got under way about 9:30 P.M. It lasted until 1:30 A.M. the next morning, 29 November. In addition to the Far East commander and his two field commanders from Korea, only a few key members of MacArthur's staff and the top commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were present. Except for a few staff officers, no one knew about Walker's and Almond's flights to Tokyo. Those present at the conference were the following:
Gen. Douglas MacArthur
Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, commander, Eighth Army in Korea
Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commander, X Corps in Korea
Vice Adm. Charles Turner Joy, commander, Naval Forces Far East
Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, commander, Far East Air Force
Maj. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Far East Command chief of staff
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, Far East Command G-2
Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, advisor on MacArthur's staff
Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, Far East Command G-3'
General MacArthur and the eight other officers in the conference talked for nearly four hours, covering the situation in Korea as each understood it. General MacArthur asked many questions, most of them directed to Generals Walker and Almond. Occasionally, someone else would offer a remark or a suggestion or ask a question. Brigadier General Wright seems to have been the most active participant in the conference other than Generals MacArthur, Walker, and Almond. Apparently no official memorandum for record of this conference was made, and details of the discussions are not known. The principal points of view presented by the main participants are known, however, from statements made later by Major General Whitney, some radio messages from the Far East Command to General Almond at X Corps in Korea, and from interviews and conversations with General Almond.
The most surprising thing about the conference was the optimism of both Generals Walker and Almond about their military situations in Korea. Keeping in mind the worsening situation on the Eighth Army front in the west, where heavy fighting had been in progress for a period of three days and nights, it was to be expected that discussion centered on Walker's Eighth Army. When General MacArthur asked General Walker what he thought of the situation on his front and where the Eighth Army could make a successful stand, Walker replied that he expected to hold Pyongyang and to establish a defense line north and east of the city. When General MacArthur asked General Almond a similar question relating to X Corps, Almond euphorically answered that he expected the 1st Marine Division and his 7th Infantry Division to continue their attack west and northwest from the Chosin Reservoir and cut the enemy's line of communications in their rear, below Kanggye and the Yalu River.' That had been the X Corps's main mission in the attack to the border that began on its front on 27 November, the day before the conference was called.
General Walker's optimism is not surprising, given his stubborn and aggressive nature and the fact that not all was disaster when he left the Chongchon River front on the afternoon of 28 November. But it was not a cautious evaluation of the situation on his front, given the course of events and the amount of enemy combat intelligence that had been accumulated from Chinese prisonerof-war interrogations that was in his possession at the time. In any event, five days later, on 3 December, his view had drastically changed, and he then informed General MacArthur that he could not hold Pyongyang and would have to withdraw, probably to the Inchon and Seoul river defense fine far to the south.
General Almond's unrealistic view that he could continue his attack and reach the Mupyong-ni area is hard to explain. Just the day before, he had visited the 1st Marine Division front at Yudam-ni, and just that afternoon he had visited the 7th Infantry Division forward battalion position on the cast side of the Chosin Reservoir, where he had talked with Colonel MacLean, the commander of the 31st RCT, and with Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr., commander of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry. At neither place was there any reason for optimism. Almond had badly misjudged the situation.
General MacArthur seems to have hoped that Walker could hold Pyongyang. But he apparently did not agree w
ith Almond's view that he could continue his attack successfully to Mupyong-ni, although there is no evidence that he said so during the conference. His view was stated in his orders to Almond the next morning, and it also was in his radio message of the preceding afternoon to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
During the conference, there was emphasis on what could be done that would most help Eighth Army. General Walker admitted he needed reinforcements desperately. In Korea, they could come only from the X Corps on the other side of the peninsula. But General Walker said he did not want the X Corps to give up its attack against the Chinese on his distant right flank and on the enemy's rear communications. General Wright suggested that General Almond might use Maj. Gen. Robert H. Soule's 3rd Infantry Division, then in the Wonsan area, to cross the Taebaek Range on a lateral, cross-peninsula road to Pyongyang and attack the Chinese XIII Army forces that were threatening to envelope Eighth Army's right flank.
General Almond strongly objected to this proposal, saying that the road to be used was on the map but did not in fact exist. This was a bit of an exaggeration-the road did exist, but it was a poor mountainous one, in places hardly better than a trail, and would be difficult for winter use by an American infantry division with its equipment and transport. Almond also stressed that there might be strong enemy guerrilla forces along this route and an attempt to move a division across it would be a hazard in which the 3rd Infantry Division might be lost. But he dropped opposition to the idea if the Eighth Army would assume responsibility for supplying the division once it had crossed to the west side of the Taebaek Range. General Walker did not promise he would do this. General MacArthur made no decision in the conference on this proposal. Later, on 30 November he ordered the 3rd Infantry Division or a task force from it to make the effort to join Eighth Army but canceled it before the venture could be started.° One may infer that only General Wright, the Far East Command operations officer, had any enthusiasm for the idea.
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