The Situation on the Morning of 30 November
Sometime during the night of 29-30 November, Lt. Col. Henry Becker, the division provost marshal, informed Lieutenant Colonel Holden that he had received information from the 25th Division Military Police that enemy had established a roadblock on the Anju road about four miles west of Kunu-ri. This information proved to be untrue. But at the time, the 2nd Division accepted it. Col. Ed Messinger, executive officer of the 9th Infantry, telephoned Holden to ask why they did not go out the Anju road. Holden told him he had just heard that enemy had cut the road and that in any event they could not use that road except with permission from higher than division authority. Messinger said he thought there were some back roads paralleling the Anju road that they could use. He volunteered to send a reconnaissance patrol to see if 2'/2-ton trucks could get over them. Neither the 9th Infantry Regiment nor the 2nd Division Headquarters received further information that night on the results of the reconnaissance, which Messinger did make. Also, Col. John Hayden, executive officer, 1st Cavalry Division, told Colonel Buys of the 2nd Division Artillery later that the 1st Cavalry Division had improved this secondary road earlier on its way north. On the night of 29-30 November, General Haynes sent two reconnoitering parties in jeeps to check this road. Both parties had no difficulty in getting through on it, but they were unable to maintain radio contact with Haynes. Neither of the two parties returned to report their findings. This negligence may have contributed to the decision to send the bulk of the division artillery down the Sunchon road after dark, when it was under direct attack from the Chinese.11
As matters stood at daylight, the 2nd Infantry Division Headquarters was prepared to go south to Sunchon as soon as the enemy fireblock was cleared. Soon after daylight, however, the Division Headquarters received information that the enemy fireblock had been greatly strengthened during the night. Moreover, this report said the Chinese were trying to extend their position northward to capture and occupy the dominant terrain just south of the division CP. The division CP was on the east side of the road in a small oval valley, opposite Hill 298 on the west side of the road. An cast-west ridge of high ground was immediately south of the CP. The enemy were heading for this ridge.
Map 12. The 2nd Infantry Division situation at Kunu-ri, 30 November 1950.
This east-west ridge had one knob immediately adjacent to the road and another half a mile to the east at the village of Haryong-hyon. This half-mile-long ridge dominated the 2nd Division Headquarters, which was immediately north of it at its base. On receiving the news that the enemy was extending the fireblock toward this ridge, the division sent the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, which had bivouacked near the CP, to occupy the ridge and to hold it until all elements of the 2nd Division had cleared past it on the road, except for the 23rd Infantry, which was to be the rear guard.12
The 2nd Infantry Division on the morning of 30 November was surrounded by CCF on the north and west. The 23rd Infantry Regiment astride the Kunuri-Anju road, just west of Kunu-ri and short of the Sunchon-road junction with the Anju road, protected the division from the north. East of the 23rd Regiment, the 38th Infantry held a hill position two air miles south of Kunu-ri and about two and a half air miles north of the 2nd Division CP, affording temporary protection from the north and northeast. But both these regiments were under crushing enemy pressure, and no one could be sure how long they could hold.
As Colonel Sloane and his modest 9th Infantry force found out when they advanced in the predawn hours that morning to attack the CCF fireblock on the Sunchon road, Chinese were already moving north from it and were only a mile from the division CP. The Chinese had reached a point only half a mile from the east-west ridge south of the CP, which the division now hastily sent the 2nd Engineer Battalion to occupy. The 2nd Division had no time to waste on 30 November. It had to get away quickly.
Chinese Attack 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry
It will be recalled that the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, occupied both sides of the Kunu-n-Anju road at the passage through the ridge west of Kunu-ri. Its key position was at Hill 201, which dominated the road from its south side about two miles southwest of Kunu-ri. The 2nd Battalion was south of the 1st Battalion on the continuing ridgeline. The 3rd Battalion, which arrived there about two hours before dawn of 30 November, took its position on the regimental left, north of the 1st Battalion and curving to the west so that it faced the rice paddies of the Chongchon deltalike area. The ROK 3rd Regiment was supposed to fill in the line east of the 2nd Battalion from Hill 201 to the Kaechon River, but it never arrived. It is possible that it did not receive the order to take this position in the line-that point is not clear. But if the ROK commander had not received his orders for that night, he should, as a responsible commander, have contacted Colonel Peploe. Whatever the facts were, he vanished from the defensive line during the darkness after midnight. As it chanced, the Chinese halted their attack during the night and did not cross the Kaechon River. In this instance, luck was with both the 23rd and 38th infantry regiments.:'
But luck ran out for the 23rd Infantry before dawn. A force of about 100 Chinese, perhaps two companies, attacked B Company on Hill 201 about 4 A.M. on 30 November. Approximately 20 Chinese soldiers got to a point near the top before they were discovered in the darkness. Another 25 enemy reached the northwest lower end of the hill near the road, where they set up machine guns and fired into the battalion's tank-assembly area. The tanks fired back. But the tank fire carved high over the Chinese and into the lines of B Company on the hill, with deadly results there. Lieutenant Colonel Hutchins ran to the tanks to stop their fire. The Chinese near the top of the hill charged into B Company at this time and killed three men and wounded nine others before they were driven off.
During the American tank fire, which hit on the crest of Hill 201, 19 men slid off the southern end of the hill to escape the fire. They were all later missing in action. The 23rd Infantry Command Report for the period states that this friendly tank fire killed about 20 and wounded 70 men in B Company, one of the worst instances of casualties to friendly fire in the Korean War. In effect, B Company was driven from its key hill by its own supporting fires.
Captain Stai with A Company, in reserve behind B Company, counterattacked the Chinese on Hill 201 after Hutchins had stopped the tank fire, killing about 25 Chinese in this counterattack. He regained the lost position after an hour of fighting. Dawn came about 6:30, foggy, gray, and cold.
Lieutenant Colonel Hutchins called for an air strike as the Chinese fell back toward the Kaechon River bank. The air strike came in at 8:30, just as visibility was beginning to clear. The strike dropped napalm on the Chinese and then rocketed and strafed them. The Chinese ran in panic over comrades, some with clothing on fire. Survivors tried to escape to the paddy land. When good visibility developed about 9 A.M., Chinese soldiers were seen almost everywhere to the north, cast, and west of the 23rd Infantry in the Chongchon River valley flat land. As the morning passed, other Chinese formations marched into view."
Had the Chinese successfully penetrated the 1st Battalion line in their predawn attack at Hill 201 and exploited it by sending large forces through to the Sunchon-Anju road junction, they could have cut off the 23rd Infantry and directed a frontal attack against the 2nd Division artillery and the division CP area two and four miles respectively farther south. The Chinese were in Kunu-ri and vicinity in large numbers by this time, and more of their troops were arriving from the north and east with every passing hour.
Colonel Sloane's 9th Infantry Attack the Fireblock
When Colonel Sloane returned to his CP after his meeting with General Keiser on the night of 29 November, he called a meeting of his unit commanders. Sloane told the assembled officers that General Keiser had given the 9th Infantry the mission of attacking the enemy fireblock below the division CP at dawn and destroying it. He ordered the 2nd and 3rd battalions to prepare to march from their assembly areas to a point two miles beyond the 2nd Divi
sion Headquarters, where they would expect to find the enemy fireblock. There they would deploy and attack the ridges on either side of the road.
At 3:30 A.M. on 30 November, the 2nd Battalion moved out from its assembly area, followed by the 3rd Battalion, each with about 200 men. The 2nd Battalion was to attack west of the road; the 3rd Battalion would attack cast of it. Sloane expected to be in contact with the enemy by 7 A.M.
The column stopped about one mile south of the 2nd Division Headquarters. There, Maj. Cesibes V. Barberis, 2nd Battalion commander, intended to send flanking patrols to the nearby ridgelines. Colonel Sloane started toward the head of the column, but before he got there enemy fire hit the leading 2nd Battalion. This was a surprise-the enemy were only a mile from the Division Headquarters, farther north than had been expected! By 7 A.M., Lt. Col. McMain's 3rd Battalion, deploying east of the road, came under enemy fire. The tank platoon of C Company, 72nd Tank Battalion, stayed on the road. It appears that, both on the west and on the east, Sloane's infantry took the ridge closest to the road, only to find that enemy fire from secondary ridges behind the first one then stopped them. In this initial attack, the Regimental Headquarters Company served as an improvised rifle company in reserve. One platoon of the 3rd Battalion's Weapons Company (M Co.) fired the 81-mm mortars and a heavy machine gun in support of the attack. But it stalled. Colonel Sloane called for an air strike on the ridge to the southwest, while men waited on the first ridge east of the road that they had taken. Despite a ground haze that hampered air support, the strike came in quickly. The planes dropped napalm and fired rockets on the enemy position. This sharply reduced the Chinese fire on the 3rd Battalion troops.
After the air strike, four tanks moved through Sloane's position and headed south on the road to meet the Middlesex Battalion, which was supposed to be attacking north from its overnight position north of Sunchon, but south of the Pass. The tanks passed down the road relatively unmolested. They did not meet the Middlesex Battalion, however, but arrived at its defensive position where it had remained overnight. From there they radioed their progress to the 2nd Division. The division understood the message to say that the road was clear-but it apparently was intended to mean that the road was free of physical roadblocks and the enemy fire they received was minor. The Chinese along the road apparently did not choose to make a fight of it with the tanks but waited for more vulnerable prey.
It was about eight o'clock when Colonel Sloane received word from the tanks of their progress. He then ordered his infantry to push south on the ridges, and he put an infantry platoon on tanks and started them south on the road. Enemy mortar and machine-gun fire immediately struck these units, quickly halting their advance.
Shortly after 9 A.M., the 2nd Division Headquarters sent the ROK 3rd Regiment, which had fought with Peploe's 38th Infantry since 27 November, to help Colonel Sloane. These troops had appeared at the Division Headquarters during the night and early morning, after being unaccounted for during most of the night. Colonel Chang, the ROK commander, assembled his men on the west side of the road and told Sloane he was anxious to join the fight. Sloane gave him the mission of passing through the 2nd Battalion and clearing the ridges on the west side. Major Barberis would then bring his 2nd Battalion to the east side of the road to help the stalled 3rd Battalion there. Chang said he would be ready to attack at 10:30.
Chang's ROK soldiers began their climb to the ridges on the right (west) of the road sometime before 11 A.M. An air strike hit the ridge ahead of them with napalm and rockets. The ROKs reached the crest of the first ridge and swept it clear of about 20 Chinese. They then advanced on the second ridge. American officers watching from the road could hear grenades explode as the ROKs closed with the Chinese. Then they saw the ROK line break and run down the slope, with about 50 Chinese in pursuit. The ROKs reformed at the base of the ridge and made a second assault, but not as energetically as the first time.
American tanks had played a role in the ROK failure. Despite the fact that the ROKs were carrying a cherry-red panel in their forward rank, two tanks of C Company, 72nd Tank Battalion, opened fire from the road area to help them reach the top of the second ridge, but their fire fell short and hit among the ROKs. Tank bullets knocked down the two leading ROKs. Two other ROK soldiers just behind them waved the panels at once to let the tank gunners know what they were doing. Then Chinese came out of their holes throwing grenades. Lt. Charles S. Heath, a 38th Infantry officer, saw all this happen and ran to the tanks to stop their fire.
The ROKs dropped their panel just short of the crest and ran down the hill. A ROK officer stopped the men at the base of the ridge and reformed them once again for another attack. The ROK line again approached the top. They were within a few yards of the dropped red panel when, for some inexplicable reason, the same two tanks started to fire and again their automatic fire hit the leading file of ROKs. This time the ROKs simply turned around and walked down the hill, some of them throwing away their weapons.25
The IX Corps Plan for the Middlesex Battalion
Before proceeding with the story of the US 2nd Infantry Division entering the enemy fireblock on the afternoon of 30 November, it is necessary to pause and see what was happening to the British battalion that General Coulter had ordered to assist the 2nd Division in clearing the Chinese fireblock by attacking north along the Sunchon-Kunu-ri road. Both Generals Coulter and Keiser expected the 2nd Division to meet the British force in the enemy fireblock area and that, by attacking it from both the south and the north at the same time, the two forces could eliminate it. At the time the plan was made on 29 November, there seemed a reasonable chance it could succeed. But it could be a reasonable assumption only if it was based on adequate American intelligence of the situation.
At the beginning of Eighth Army's attack on 24 November, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was in reserve at Pakchon, in the I Corps zone. On 27 November General Walker ordered it to move to Kunu-ri, and it arrived there that night. The next day it was ordered to Sunchon, and most of the men marched a large part of the 22 miles, closing there at 2 A.M. on 29 November. There the brigade was attached to the IX Corps and placed in corps reserve. Eighth Army at this time was concentrating just about all its tactical units in the Sunchon area that were not committed at the front, because the CCF flanking movement around the cast side of the army, in a southwesterly direction, would pass through the Sunchon roadnet. The Sunchon area, therefore, was a vital point in any attempt to check the CCF offensive flanking movement and to give Eighth Army time to withdraw its troops from the Chongchon River front. Among the reserves Eighth Army sent there as the battle developed were the 1st Cavalry Division and the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. When the 27th Brigade was relieved at Pakchon it was supposed to leave Korea and sail for Hong Kong. The British 29th Brigade had already arrived in Korea as its replacement. That brigade's advance party, consisting of 94 officers and 1,877 men, had arrived at Pusan on 3 November. The brigade force totaled 540 officers and 8,771 men, and its equipment included 72 Centurion 50-ton tanks, the largest used in the Korean War. The 29th Brigade assembled at Suwon as rapidly as possible and then moved up to Kaesong, where it closed on 24 November. The battle crisis in late November prevented the British 27th Brigade from leaving Korea as planned, since the 29th Brigade had not arrived at the front to take its place.26
On 29 November, IX Corps started the Middlesex Battalion of the British 27th Brigade from the Sunchon area toward Samso-ri, where a strong CCF force held the crossing of the Taedong River against the 5th Cavalry Regiment, behind the Eighth Army front. During its movement toward Samso-ri, General Coulter sent a message to it at 8 A.M. about the enemy fircblock below the 2nd Infantry Division and changed the Middlesex Battalion's destination and mission. Its new mission was to move against the enemy fircblock below the 2nd Division, attack it immediately, and clear it. The Middlesex Battalion at 9 A.M. informed IX Corps that it was out of gasoline and had only seven trucks, not enough to move the battalion quickly
. Half an hour later IX Corps sent it 13 more trucks.
It has already been described how, on 29 November, the Middlesex Battalion approached the Pass area on the Kunu-ri road, was stopped by Chinese fire, and then turned back on the afternoon of 29 November. British sources say the Middlesex Battalion found every ridge and peak under enemy control as it moved toward the Pass, and it was ordered to withdraw to hold a defensive position eight miles south of the Pass. There it was reinforced by a platoon of five American tanks and an American artillery battery of 105-mm howitzers. The Middlesex Battalion then moved up to attack again but had to turn back. In the words of the British source, "the Middlesex returned to the south end of the pass with orders to hold it for the 2nd Division if they could do so without getting cut off." One cannot know just what specific place was meant by "the south end of the pass," but the Middlesex Battalion in fact was some three miles southwest of the Pass, at Hill 127, on 30 November as the 2nd Division soldiers learned later. In its attempt to get control of the Pass area on the afternoon of 29 November the Middlesex Battalion took about 30 casualties in some hard fighting, including 2nd Lt. J. M. Lock of its A Company, killed by a grenade." When the IX Corps asked the 27th Brigade at 6:40 P.M. on 29 November for the location of the Middlesex Battalion, the brigade replied that it did not know, because of communication problems.
The 16th Reconnaissance Company of the 1st Cavalry Division reported on 29 November that it had stopped single vehicles moving up toward the 2nd Division fireblock, holding them until a group had assembled for better protection, and then letting them through. It reported that the last five vehicles it had let through had turned around and come back and that five IX Corps vehicles had also turned back.
Disaster in Korea Page 38