Colonel Freeman was by now obsessed with getting permission to take his 23rd Regiment out of his increasingly difficult position. It would have to be west on the Anju road, he thought. Before noon he reached Colonel Epley, the division chief of staff, by radio and asked for the authority. Colonel Epley refused it, as he felt it would violate a division and a IX Corps order. In the afternoon, Colonel Freeman reached Colonel Sloane of the 9th Infantry on the latter's jeep command radio at the north end of the enemy fireblock and asked him to have General Bradley get in touch with him by radio on the subject. At 2:30 in the afternoon, Colonel Freeman reached General Bradley via Sloane's radio and later reported his conversation with him:
Not only was it appearing highly improbable that the tail of the 2nd Division including my force could withdraw via the main road before dark but [also] that the situation in the rear began to show signs of deterioration. The enemy was pushing hard on the rear guard position. I proposed to General Bradley that when the situation, in my judgment became critical and at least two hours before darkness that I be authorized to attempt to withdraw my force and any other force not clearing on the road. General Bradley replied that he would consider my plan and let me know."
An hour later, at 3:30, Colonel Freeman again reached Colonel Sloane and asked that the 2nd Division give him a decision on his request, as a rapid deterioration was occurring in his situation. Half an hour later, General Bradley reached Colonel Freeman by Sloane's radio, and it was then, Freeman said, that Bradley gave him the authority to withdraw on the Anju road."
It has already been related that, during the afternoon, Colonel Freeman had come to Colonel Goodrich at the 2nd Division Artillery Fire Direction Center and urged him to place all artillerymen under Freeman's command, to fight as infantrymen, and that Goodrich refused to do so. When Goodrich later found Brigadier General Haynes of the Division Artillery in the fireblock and repeated Freeman's request to him, Haynes exploded with an emphatic "No!""
In considering Freeman's attempt to obtain authority to move the 23rd RUT west on the Anju road, rather than follow the division order to move on the Sunchon road as rear guard and the 8th serial in the withdrawal, one must keep in mind what such a move would mean to the 2nd Division units still in place, waiting their turn to enter the fireblock in the withdrawal, expecting the 23rd RCT would be their rear guard. This meant that two battalions of the Division Artillery, the 38th and 105th, and the 2nd Engineer Battalion, the latter still on the hills where they had guarded the division CP all day, would suddenly be exposed. They would have no protection from Chinese that were now massing in front of and to the east of the 23rd RCT position and crossing the Chongchon River to its south side by the hundreds with every passing hour. These enemy troops had only to move south, after the 23rd RUT had gone out on the Anju road, and in two or three miles they would he upon all the abovenamed major units of the rear serials of the 2nd Division. This would happen when darkness was approaching or had already fallen.
There was the almost certain prospect that, in these conditions, the 38th Artillery Battalion would lose all its 105-mm howitzers and vehicles, that the 503rd Artillery Battalion would lose its 155-mm howitzers and vehicles, and that few of the 2nd Engineer Battalion would escape. The personnel losses in these organizations would most likely be heavy. Those who escaped would have to walk out over the hills. Furthermore, there would be no possibility of mounting a division attack or defense on the withdrawal route because the one infantry force strong enough for such an attempt would not be present.
It can hardly be surprising that there existed in the 2nd Division and in Eighth Army for a long time the feeling that Freeman's 23rd RCT should not have been allowed to depart from its planned role as division rear guard. Many participants believed that General Keiser was to blame for the change, because Marshall in his book The River and the Gauntlet, published in 1953, said that General Keiser had given Freeman authority to leave by the Anju route." Marshall's book was widely read after it appeared, both by participants and survivors of the Korean War and by the general public. Placing the blame on General Keiser for Freeman's departure from the division withdrawal plan and order bestowed on Keiser an untrue and unjustified reputation. After reviewing the manuscript for Disaster in Kvrra, one major participant in the catastrophe said that he had thought for the past thirty years that Keiser had authorized Freeman's departure from the division withdrawal order.
Colonel Freeman's withdrawal of his regiment by the Anju road and then south from Sinanju over the I Corps main supply and withdrawal route later caused a welter of charge and countercharge about his failure to withdraw on the Sunchon road as General Keiser had ordered. In the research for this book, an effort was made to uncover the facts of the matter because the 2nd Division, IX Corps, I Corps, and Eighth Army official records contained no data on the issuing of an order authorizing Colonel Freeman to withdraw his 23rd RCT on the Anju road. A letter from then Maj. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley made clear at least one thing-that it was indeed he who authorized Colonel Freeman to take his regiment out on the Anju road. General Bradley wrote in part, "I accept full responsibility for Col. Freeman's actions. It was not what was desired but as presented to me by feeble and interrupted radio and Colonel Freeman's strong recommendation. I authorized him to use his best judgment in extricating himself from what he implied was immediate `suicide to comply with orders. As Colonel Freeman could not reach General Kaiser [Keiser] by radio I felt as his deputy, I had authority to act."
Colonel Freeman, then, finally had authority at approximately four o'clock in the afternoon to withdraw his regiment and any other troops in the vicinity west to Anju instead of south on the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road. Freeman said he informed the units near him of his plan and asked them if they wished to accompany him. Lt. Col. Robert J. O'Donnell, commanding the 38th Field Artillery Battalion, declined and started south on the Sunchon road. Major Hinkley, commanding the remnants of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, rear echelon, told Freeman he had already formed a rear guard to protect the tail of his column, as ordered by Colonel Sloane, and would go south on the Sunchon road. In addition to the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the other units in the vicinity were the 15th Field Artillery Battalion; B Battery, 82nd AAA Battalion; and elements of the 72nd Tank Battalion. Colonel Freeman ordered the 15th Field Artillery Battalion and B Battery, 82nd AAA Battalion, as parts of the 23rd RCT under his command, to accompany him. Tanks of the 72nd Tank Battalion supporting Freeman's regiment decided to accompany him.'6
Freeman throughout the day had conferred closely with Lt. Col. John W. Keith, Jr., commanding officer of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion. Freeman asked Keith how long it would take him to get his artillery battalion ready to move out in a withdrawal column. Keith answered that it would take from one and a half to two hours. Both Freeman and Keith agreed, once Freeman had authority from General Bradley to move out toward Anju, that they did not have much time-not the two hours Keith had stated. Both agreed that the artillery would be a hindrance to a fast getaway and might make the column vulnerable to successful enemy attack on the road. They decided the best thing was to fire all the artillery ammunition at Chinese targets, destroy the 105-mm howitzers, position the artillery vehicles for a fast loading of infantry from the front-line positions, and make a rapid departure. All the operable vehicles were to be stationed in the vicinity of Singham-ni near the junction of the Kunuri-Anju road with the Sunchon road. Freeman then gave the order to Lieutenant Colonel Keith to carry out this plan for the artillery.
It happened that the forward observers for the 15th Field Artillery Battalion were then adjusting fire on three enemy objectives. Two of them were two large columns of Chinese troops approaching the north bank of the Chongchon River opposite the 23rd Regiment's perimeter. An estimated 400 Chinese were in the closest column at a range of just under two miles from the artillery; the second column of about 500 Chinese soldiers was a bit farther away, about two and a third miles distant. The third targe
t was the river crossing at the trail and road junction village of Won-ni (Pugwon) about six and a half miles northeast, a center of enemy traffic for troops bearing down against the 2nd Division. C Battery adjusted on Won-ni at extreme range; A and B batteries adjusted on the two columns of troops approaching the river in front of the 23rd Infantry. For 22 minutes these three artillery batteries fired as fast as they could load. They delivered approximately 3,200 rounds of 105-mm howitzer shells on the enemy, about eight rounds a minute for each gun firing, according to one calculation. The artillery fired all its ammunition and just about burnt out its gun barrels. At the same time, Colonel Freeman sent tanks out onto the flat land up to some dikes, and they also delivered fire on the Chinese approaching the river. The artillery forward observers said the Chinese columns stopped and started digging in frantically as this extreme volume of fire started falling on them. Chinese fire on the 23rd Infantry now fell off."
Colonel Freeman ordered his three infantry battalions to leave their positions in the order of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion. This meant withdrawing the line from right to left. The troops were to hurry to the waiting vehicles on the road and load quickly. The troops did not load strictly by unit, but took any vehicles they could reach. By the time the 3rd Battalion began its withdrawal, enemy troops could already be seen in the 1st and 2nd Battalion positions. The 3rd Battalion was hard pressed in its withdrawal and loaded on 72nd Tank Battalion vehicles. The artillerymen and infantry were all loaded and ready to leave at 4:30 P.M. Everyone was hurrying to get the long column away before dark.
Air cover was still overhead when the column began to move out. A Mosquito plane relaying target messages from the ground to fighter and bomber planes was shot down at this time, three miles west of the Kunu-ri-Anju-Sunchon road junction, in the flat paddy ground north of the withdrawal road. A tank went out and picked up the pilot and observer.
As the men of the 15th Field Artillery were preparing to evacuate their guns and make a run for the waiting trucks, Colonel Freeman sent Second Lieutenant Smith with a platoon of about 34 men from I. Company, which had been on the extreme left of the regimental line, accompanied by two tanks, to guard the withdrawal of the artillerymen. The L Company platoon went south on the Sunchon road toward the 15th Field Artillery position. This platoon never got out; the men were either killed or captured. The last any of the artillerymen saw of them, they were north of the road junction and firing at enemy. Some artillerymen saw Chinese enter the first of their abandoned gun positions as they were making their getaway.''
Sometime between 4:30 and 5:00 P.m., the 23rd RCT column started west toward Anju. Darkness was falling. Freeman ordered drivers to turn on vehicular lights and to keep the column closed up, and shouted, "Get the hell out of here, and don't stop!" A section of tanks, 72nd Tank Battalion, led the way, followed by officers in a jeep. The rest of the column of jeeps, trucks, and tanks followed. There was some scattered small-arms and machine-gun fire against the tail of the column at dark as it pulled out, but no serious damage resulted from this last enemy fire in the Kunu-ri area. Tanks brought up the tail of the column.79
The withdrawing 23rd Infantry had no trouble on the Anju road. After about eight miles, the head of the column came to the 5th RCT, 24th Division, blocking positions at the Chongchon River bridge crossings, five miles east of Anju. On the way, it ran into stragglers from many UN units-Turks and American soldiers. The 5th Infantry held its positions until the last of the 23rd Infantry column had passed westward. The IX Corps Headquarters picked up a radio intercept from the 23rd Infantry at 7:25 P.M. saying, "We are 30 minutes out of Sinanju." The regimental column by this time was strung out over several miles. At Sinanju the 23rd Infantry turned south on the coastal road. It began arriving at Sukchon about 11 P.M., but the last of the column did not arrive until about 3 A.M. on 1 December. There it stopped at fires for warming, hot food, and a little rest. Later in the day it continued on to Pyongyang.D° Freeman had saved his 23rd RCT, but the cost to the rear serials of the 2nd Infantry Division in the withdrawal from Kunu-ri to Sunchon is incalculable.
In the controversy that followed Colonel Freeman's action, he apparently never wavered in his opinion that he did the right thing. He stated his view on 9 December 1950 for the record when he wrote: "I . . . realized . . . that I could not have followed the main body down the 2nd Division withdrawal route. I can also state with every degree of certainty that my force could not have held its rear guard position an hour longer than it did. There is no doubt in my mind that the correct decision was made. I feel that the 23rd RCT made its maximum contribution to the withdrawal of the 2nd Division and could have done no more without annihilation."81 Condemnation of Colonel Freeman for not following the 2nd Division down the Sunchon road as its rear guard, according to General Keiser's orders, was very strong and quite widespread in the 2nd Infantry Division and in Eighth Army in general.83
The 503rd and 38th Battalions of Division Artillery Destroyed in Fireblock
When the 23rd RCT left its rear-guard position, the last major elements of the Division Artillery, the 503rd and 38th artillery battalions, became the rear ele ments of the 2nd Infantry Division on the Sunchon road. They were now open to attack from the gathering Chinese forces to the north and to the east of them. Two miles south of them the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion was still on the hill ridges overlooking the division CP area. The survival of all these units now depended on their getting on the road and moving swiftly toward Sunchon.
The 37th 105-mm howitzer battalion had already moved out in the withdrawal, following the 17th 8-inch howitzer battalion. Next scheduled in the march order to withdraw was the 503rd Artillery Battalion of 155-mm howitzers. It was second only to the 17th Battalion as the most important artillery battalion in the withdrawal. The 38th Artillery Battalion was to follow the 503rd. It was the last artillery battalion in the withdrawal movement on the Sunchon road.
Some elements of K and L companies, 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, had been ordered in the morning to stay with the 503rd Artillery Battalion and to ride out on its vehicles in its withdrawal. There were not enough vehicles to carry all the 3rd Battalion troops when it left earlier in the division column. Lt. Douglas D. Grinnell, of I Company, 38th Infantry, was in charge of these men who had remained behind with the 503rd Artillery. Maj. John C. Fralish, S-3 of the 503rd Artillery, rode out with 155-mm howitzers.
After its entrance into the enemy roadblock area, the 503rd Artillery proceeded south on the road about one mile before Chinese machine guns opened fire on it. Accompanying this enemy barrage of automatic fire, bugles blew and a large force of Chinese soldiers rushed to the road. In the ensuing melee they completely overran B Battery of the 503rd. The enemy soldiers looted the battery, and what they did not want to carry away, they threw on the road. It was stated later that only two officers and 20 enlisted men from B Battery survived passage through the fireblock. After looting the battery, the Chinese vanished back into the brush and hills near the road. They left behind an ammunition truck burning on the road. Several Korean huts alongside the road here were also burning. These large fires illuminated the area around the ammunition truck.
While the attack on B Battery was under way, Major Fralish and Lieutenant Grinnell came forward to the scene. They discussed the grim spectacle. Grinnell knew some quad-50s were in the rear. He wondered if they could be brought forward and blast a way through for the artillery. Fralish hunted up Major Geoffrey Lavell, Lieutenant Colonel O'Donnell, and Major Carl Kopischkie. He put to them the question-should the artillery and vehicles be put to the torch and destroyed with explosives and the artillerymen fight out on foot, or should the column go into a perimeter defense for the night? No one of the senior artillery officers present made a decision-indecision ruled. Some of the artillery began firing from the road to the eastern ridge. Four or five enemy machine guns returned the fire, but it was wild and went overhead.
Major Fralish then got
Major Lavell and Lieutenant Colonel O'Donnell to go with him to the head of the column to the wreckage of B Battery. An enemy machine gun opened up on them from only 40 yards away, dead ahead. O'Donnell went down with five bullets in him. Lavell and Fralish hit the dirt unharmed, except for a bullet that creased Fralish across his upper lip. Lavell crawled to O'Donnell and came back to tell Fralish that he was dead. Lavell still could not give Fralish an answer as to what he wanted to do. Soon afterward Lavell dis appeared, and his men never saw him again. A story circulated in the division later that someone had seen him with a leg wound. There were now four enemy mortars and five machine guns firing at the immobilized artillery column on the road. But the Chinese here did not rush to the road as had the Chinese unit farther down when it overran B Battery. Much later it was learned that Major Lavell died in a prisoner-of-war camp in Korea, 8 February 1951. It appears that he was wounded and captured the night of 30 November."
Lieutenant Grinnell told Fralish he thought the best way to counter the enemy fire was to go back down the line and pull out all the AAA vehicles he could find-he knew there were several back there-and bring them up to a firing position. He found three quad-50s (M16) and two dual-40s (M19). These five AAA gun carriages together had terrific firepower. He put one of the dual-40s at the front, and Major Fralish pointed out its target. It let loose with both automatic guns, and in a few moments it had silenced the closest of the machine guns and killed its crew of six Chinese soldiers. Fralish and Grinnell then put the five AAA vehicles at the front of the column with instructions to keep moving ahead, firing constantly when they met enemy fire-some to the front, others to either flank.
Disaster in Korea Page 43