Eighth Army's uncertainty of what the enemy's next move might be seemed to be clarified in a broadcast picked up from Moscow on 12 December. The broadcast said Kim II Sung of North Korea had ordered his forces and the Chinese fighting with them to push the American army into the sea.'9 With the hastily devised Eighth Army line in the center of the peninsula running through a concentration of North Korean forces, and many of them in the rear of the ROK troops just sent there, the Far East Command on 12 December evaluated the situation on the army's right flank as a threat to its entire defense position, and unless this threat could be eliminated, further withdrawals would be necessary.J° To strengthen this part of its line, Eighth Army on 14 December ordered the ROK II Corps to assume command of the ROK 9th Division on the east coast, and the ROK 3rd Division was ordered to Wonju to strengthen the ROK II Corps."
The US 2nd Infantry Division's first entry into potential future action on the central front came on 14 December when its 23rd Regiment, the only combatready part of the division, received orders to send a patrol to contact the ROK 5th Division and to report on the condition of roads and bridges in the sector. The motorized patrol reached Chunchon just after noon on 15 December. There it contacted KMAG representatives of both the ROK 5th and 8th divisions, who reported that both divisions had been under daylong attack by an estimated four North Korean divisions. These divisions were about half strength. The North Koreans had penetrated the left flank of the ROK 5th Division, but it had just been restored in counterattack."
On 16 December, the 2nd Infantry Division G-2 Section reported that there were many indications of a rapid North Korean buildup. It thought the NK II Corps could mount a heavy attack on the Eighth Army right flank and that the NK V Corps could start a deep envelopment in conjunction with any CCF resumption of a frontal attack. It found from previous CCF prisoner interrogations that the Chinese preferred to fight American soldiers "because they abandoned so much usable equipment during retreats, including personal clothing, weapons, and many luxury items.""
On 17 December a new development occurred on the east coast of Korea. The South Korean Capital Division of the ROK I Corps, which earlier had almost reached the Soviet border in the X Corps zone in northeast Korea, came ashore from sea transport at Samchok below the 38th Parallel. There it was on a fine almost due east of Seoul. In landing the division there, Eighth Army hoped to build up an eastern flank anchored on the sea to tie in with the ROK forces it had hurriedly moved to the central part of Korea. If this could be done, Eighth Army would then have a defense line across the width of Korea, roughly following the 38th Parallel. On this same day Eighth Army reported there was still no word of CCF contact on the Eighth Army front, nor had it been able to confirm that CCF forces in strength had moved south from the Pyongyang area. But it had by this time identified five reconstituted North Korean divisions on the central front. The next day, 18 December, Eighth Army abruptly changed its evaluation to say that intelligence reports indicated that CCF units were beginning to displace south and cast from Pyongyang."
It appeared by 20 December that North Korean forces on the central front were carrying out a systematic probing of the UN positions trying to locate its main line of resistance, particularly in the Ichon-Kumhwa-Hwachon area, and covering the three main routes leading south to Seoul. These routes followed the Yonchon-Uijongbu axis, the Kumwha-Uijongbu axis (these two coming together at Uijongbu), and the Hwachon-Chunchon axis, which struck the Pukhan River and could then follow it downstream southwest to Seoul. The latter axis could also continue south from Chunchon through Hoengsong, Wonju, Chechon, and Chungju, along the spine of the Lower Taebaek Range toward Pusan, bypassing Seoul entirely. It appeared that the NK V Corps was now moving into this front to reinforce the NK II Corps already there. Aerial observers saw many horses and some camels in the vicinity of Hwachon, south of the reservoir of the same name, and by 21 December all enemy roadblocks previously in place between Ichon and Hwachon had been removed."
In a night attack on 21 December an enemy regiment hit the ROK 8th Division and by 7 A.M. the next morning had cut the lateral road between its 10th and 16th regiments, gaining a penetration about two miles deep. The ROK 8th Division sent its reserve 21st Regiment into the gap and stopped the advancing North Koreans. These enemy troops were wearing American overcoats and were armed with American M-1 rifles (apparently all captured recently either by CCF or themselves). Elements of the ROK 3rd Division helped stop this enemy penetration near Chunchon. The enemy troops were not identified, but they were undoubtedly North Korean. Also on 21 December, just before noon, aerial observers counted 20 camels, not loaded, and about 400 troops near Chorwon. The presence of so many camels led to the speculation that these troops were Chinese. Other reports, not confirmed, placed Chinese troops in Ichon and Yonchon on 19-20 December.36
It was clear by the end of the third week of December that reorganized North Korean divisions, most of them at about half strength, were taking over a section of the enemy line, generally south and east of where the CCF had operated in late November and in early December. Signs indicated that, in any renewed offensive, the CCF would move south to form the western end of the line north of Seoul, and the North Koreans would pick up the line somewhere in the vicinity of the Iron Triangle and carry it on eastward into the central mountains in a sector that might he called the central front.
ROK Army Reorganization in December 1950
In December 1950 the ROK Army needed reorganization and training almost as much as did the North Koreans after the fall of Inchon and Seoul and their defeat in South Korea. Of the ROK divisions, the 1st was generally considered the best, and indeed it had been so considered from the beginning of the war. Gen. Palk Sun Yup's division had been part of I Corps after American forces entered the war, and it had been placed between American divisions. It had held its own, had good discipline and high morale, but it had more firepower than the other ROK divisions. The two ROK divisions of I Corps on the east coast had performed well most of the time. These divisions, the Capital and the 3rd, moved from the X Corps area of northeast Korea to join Eighth Army in South Korea on its extreme eastern flank. The 7th and 8th divisions of the ROK II Corps had been virtually destroyed in the opening days of the CCF 2nd Phase Offensive in the vicinity of Tokchon in late November. Several other ROK divisions were then being organized but were untrained and had no combat experience. As the Eighth Army went into its Imjin River line at midDecember, the entire central and eastern parts of Korea were held, and only recently, by largely inexperienced ROK divisions, except for the two of the I Corps on the east coast. It made for an insecure situation in the central part of the new UN line.
Much has been said and written about the basic qualities of the Korean soldier. With proper training and good leadership, the South Korean was a good soldier, as was the North Korean soldier. But after the near destruction of the South Korean Army following the North Korean invasion across the 38th Parallel in June, just about all the experienced noncommissioned officers and junior officers of platoon and company level had been lost. There were no adequate replacements for them on short notice. The training of such leadership required establishment of the proper schools and several months of training by competent supervisors. The United States took a leading part in establishing such a system of schools and training schedules, but it was not until the summer of 1951 that young officers with such training were filling the ranks of the Korean divisions. During the first half of 1951, the early difficulties with ROK soldiers in large part continued. Maj. Eldon B. Anderson, who had been the Korean Military Advisor (KMAG) in artillery to the ROK 9th Division from November 1950 to December 1951 gave a debriefing report at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in March 1952. In it he summarized rather well the qualities of the ROK soldier in the first year of the war and the limitations under which he fought. Major Anderson answered the question, Does the Korean soldier do as well as other nations' soldiers if given the fire support? In the course of his respo
nse he said:
Given the fire support, the training, and the leadership, the Korean soldier can't be beat. . . . He is a wonderful soldier. He is obedient, intelligent .. . and they have a good fighting spirit. They lacked leadership and still do to quite an extent, and they lacked training. A year ago, the infantry soldier got only 7 to 10 days training before being assigned to an outfit. They lack fire support. Even in the infantry regiment they didn't have nearly as much fire support as we do. They have only three squads per platoon; they don't have the fourth squad that the American Army does which has the machine guns. Until recently they had no recoilless 57s or 75s; they don't have the 4.2" mortar company in the regiment that we have; they don't have any tanks; they don't have any antiaircraft. As a consequence, the Korean division should be considered as no more than an American combat team [regiment reinforced]. That was a source of a great deal of trouble in Korea. The Americans could not understand, even on a higher level apparently, that the Korean division represented a unit only as large [not in numbers but in effective firepower and combat effectiveness] as one-third of an American division. Many times,
Korean divisions were given missions similar to those given American divisions and naturally they could not accomplish them."
Another side of the coin is that ROK soldiers in the first part of the war did not have the technical knowledge to use much of the communication equipment, the artillery, the tanks, and other weapons the American divisions possessed. Nor did they have as much transport as the American division. Usually every ROK division had an American battalion of 105-mm howitzers attached to it for fire support, and some had tank battalions attached to them. As the war progressed and their competence to use and protect the more sophisticated and technical weapons improved, they got them. But this condition did not prevail at the end of 1950 and on into much of 1951. The United States Army tried to remedy the situation for the ROKs and to make them more combat effective in the winter of 1950-51 by placing an ROK division between two American divisions, so that each of the latter could deliver fire support for the ROKs from either side.
Of the new ROK divisions being put into the line by mid-December 1950, the 2nd and 5th lacked combat experience. The others were being filled with relatively untrained recruits. When General Collins returned from his trip to Korea in early December to assess the situation for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he reported to them that, among the ROK divisions, the 5th was in fair shape, the 6th was being reassembled after the battles along the Chongchon, the 7th was being reassembled in the vicinity of Suan, and the other ROK forces in the Eighth Army sector could not be depended on except for outpost duty. This did not include the ROK Capital and 3rd divisions in the X Corps sector of northeast Korea, where they had given a good account of themselves. These two ROK divisions were subsequently put ashore, as already stated, at Samchok on the east coast to form the eastern anchor of the Eighth Army line at the end of December 1950.38
The ROK divisions that were being put into the line in central Korea were disappointingly slow in reaching and taking up their positions. Frequent enemy ambushes slowed their progress, but the main difficulty was the lack of adequate transportation.
The east coast of Korea was still undefended by any troops when Eighth Army went into its defense positions at the Imjin River on 14 December. The ROK 9th Division had been relieved of its security mission in South Korea and had been started for the coast, but the rough terrain and lack of transportation slowed its progress. On 18 December the situation changed for the better on the east coast when 12,000 troops of the ROK I Corps made an unopposed landing from the sea north of Samchok. The ROK I Corps headquarters and the Capital Division composed most of these troops; the ROK 3rd Division soon joined them. In the meantime, the ROK 9th Division arrived at the coast. The ROK I Corps deployed the Capital Division along the coast and placed the 3rd and 9th divisions on its left flank inland in high mountains. Maj. Gen. Kim Pac II commanded the ROK I Corps at this time. Brig. Gen. Song Yo Chan commanded the Capital Division, and Brig. Gen. Rhee Chong Chan commanded the 3rd Division. On 19 December the ROK I Corps passed to the operational control of Eighth Army.J9
Nearly every day in December the Fifth Air Force flew between 300 and 400 sorties, trying to observe enemy movements and, by its repeated strikes, to delay or prevent them from advancing south. On 16 December, however, it flew only 54 sorties, because of heavy snow.
UN Reinforcements in December 1950
The 11th Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the first half of December 1950 to the Security Council stated that ten nations were then represented by combat forces in Korea: Australia, France, Greece, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Combat forces of four nations arrived in Korea in the first half of December, at a time when Eighth Army sorely needed their additional strength. These were from France, the Netherlands, Greece, and Canada.
The French force was in battalion strength, including 39 officers, 172 noncommissioned officers, and more than 800 enlisted men-approximately 1,250 men altogether.'° It departed Marseilles, France, on 25 September and arrived at Pusan, Korea, on 30 November. It was not entirely ashore until the first days of December. This battalion was to have an enviable combat record in Korea.
The advance party of the Dutch, or Netherlands, Battalion arrived in Korea on 24 October, but the full battalion did not arrive until early December. It consisted of two rifle companies and a heavy weapons company, for a total of about 600 men. It came from Indonesia, where it had been fighting, and its combat effectiveness was considered high. But it had come from a warm climate to a cold one in December 1950.
The Greek Battalion of 840 infantrymen arrived in Korea on 9 December. The officers of the battalion were specially chosen for their knowledge of English. The rest of the battalion was taken from one of the Greek Brigades. The Greeks also distinguished themselves in Korean combat.
The 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry sailed from Seattle on 25 November, when the Korean War seemed to many to be about over. Its troopship entered Yokohama's harbor on 14 December, when the situation in Korea had changed drastically. The battalion consisted of 45 officers and 873 enlisted men. The Princess Pat Battalion began disembarking at Pusan on 18 December."
On 10 December Eighth Army issued a letter that listed the permanent attachments of major UN units then in Korea or due to arrive soon, to become operational on Eighth Army order:
No time was wasted concerning the French and Netherlands battalions. On 12 December, Eighth Army attached them to the US 2nd Infantry Division, which in turn on 15 December attached the French Battalion to its 23rd Infantry Regiment, and the Netherlands Battalion on 13 December to its 38th Infantry Regiment.'' These two battalions of infantry, comprising together more than 1,800 men, helped considerably in building up the strength of the division and in shortening the time before it could once again take its place in the battle line.
One of the most important tasks confronting Eighth Army after the battles along the Chongchon was the rehabilitation of the US 2nd Infantry Division to combat readiness. The division was transported as quickly as possible to the south side of the Han River opposite Seoul, where it went into assembly areas to take in replacements, receive new equipment, undergo retraining, and, it was hoped, be able to take its place in Eighth Army's combat-effective forces at an early date. By evening of 8 December all divisional units had completed their moves to the rear and were in their assembly areas. The 2nd Division established its CP at Yongdong-po on the south side of the Han River on 7 December. The next day its 23rd Regiment received a defense assignment in guarding the Han River bridge. At 1:45 P.M. on 7 December Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure assumed command of the division."
On 10 December, the 2nd Division received an Eighth Army order to reconnoiter the roadnet from Seoul to Chunchon and Chungju. The next day, Col. John G. Coughlin became the Divi
sion G-3, replacing Lt. Col. Holden. Throughout December the division had sent details to Pusan to drive back vehicles in reequipping its transportation. In early December the Far East Command had relayed to the Pentagon an urgent request to ship the weapons and equipment for a full division to replace losses in the X Corps and in Eighth Army.
The losses of the 2nd Infantry Division and in the Turkish Brigade were uppermost in mind. On 4 December General Larkin, Department of the Armv G-4, ordered the immediate loading of needed equipment. On 5 December four ships were to dock at San Francisco and another four were to dock at Seattle to load the equipment, with departure dates for the Far East set for 9 December. Deadline for arrival of cargo at the two ports was 8 December. It developed that only three instead of four ships were needed at each port. All were loaded and sailed on the scheduled date, 9 December, except one ship. It remained an extra day to await arrival of an air shipment from the cast coast. Some liaison planes, general purpose vehicles, some ammunition, and certain items that technical chiefs said were not needed for combat were stricken from the regular table of organization and equipment in the loading of the six ships. Some items included in the loading were:"
Meanwhile, General MacArthur ordered the immediate shipment to Korea from depot stocks in Japan of major equipment for two regimental combat teams.
Nearly all the replacement personnel arriving for Eighth Army from the United States in December went to the 2nd Infantry Division or the 25th Infantry Division. Most of the replacements went to the 2nd Division because it had the greatest need, having lost 4,163 men, according to Army figures, between 27 November and 2 December. Units of this division began taking in replacements as soon as they arrived. On 7 December, for instance, the 23rd Regiment took in personnel replacements as well as replacement equipment. The 9th Regiment took in more than 500 replacements at Ascom City between 8 and 14 December. On 11 December, Eighth Army G-3 Section stated it made liaison visits to the 2nd Division daily to check on the progress in replacing personnel and equipment. On that day it placed the strength of the three infantry regiments at 2,180 (9th Infantry), 2,450 (23rd Infantry), and 2,650 (38th Infantry). The division's total strength on that day was 12,813, and it had 90 of 134 tanks authorized. It was then considered to have a capability of two regimental combat teams, but one of them at 50 percent combat effectiveness.`8
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