In the 1990s, CIA covert action programs assisted in the capture of major international terrorists such as Che Guevara, Abimael Guzman (head of Peru’s Sendaro Luminoso), and “Carlos the Jackal.”6 CIA officers engineered the capture and extradition to the United States of over fifty major terrorists between 1983 and 1995 and disrupted literally hundreds of acts of terrorism over the past thirty years, including some from Osama bin-Ladin’s Al-Qaeda organization. CIA paramilitary elements supported the United States’s military operations and evacuations of American citizens in danger zones in Somalia, Liberia, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans.7
But even the most cursory review of the media and literature on intelligence reveals that the public is much more likely to hear about the CIA’s failures (real or otherwise) than it is of the Agency’s successes.8 This unbalanced emphasis on failure is harmful as it stimulates a misleading impression that covert action always and inevitably leads to folly. It also contributes to an inaccurate public record of the programs themselves and of the overt foreign policies they supported. Perhaps not as noticeable but still of import, the concentration on failure to the exclusion of success (or even of factors legitimately mitigating failures) has undermined the institutional reputation of the CIA and of its cadre of professional intelligence officers who, at presidential behest, managed the programs and conducted the operations.
With respect to the reputations of the Agency and the dedicated civil servants who work there, it matters greatly that the historical record shows the meaningful and often courageous contributions they have made to American national security. Further, for the sake of their professional reputations, it is important that history reflects that many of the most controversial covert action programs and worst failures of the Agency occurred not because the Agency proposed flawed programs, urged their inception, and then ineptly managed them, but instead because presidents insisted on pursuing politically risky—or, in a few instances, utterly foolhardy—programs against the sound and repeated advice of the intelligence professionals.9 That said, the reader may be assured that this volume is not exculpatory of every allegation against the Agency or of covert action. Like any large bureaucratic organization, the CIA has made and will continue to make regrettable, and in many cases avoidable, errors. However, it should not be required to shoulder the burden of blame for programs and events for which others rightfully bear the responsibility, or for programs that have been wrongly characterized.
Arguably, many of the Agency’s alleged missteps have occurred (and more will occur in the future, to be sure) because the intelligence business is at heart the business of taking risks. No matter how closely calculated or thoroughly analyzed these risks are, unforeseen—and often unforeseeable—complications that limit the odds of success inevitably insert themselves into even the best planned operations. Another inherent, often overlooked characteristic of the intelligence profession is the human factor. Murphy’s Law, the inability to guard against the arbitrary, looms over every intelligence program and leaves case officers in the field to cope with random events they cannot control. Furthermore, the nature of the presidential directives that generated these programs in the first place should not be ignored. When political figures direct that ultra-sensitive, exceptionally high-risk programs be undertaken against the studied advice of the career intelligence professional, then ultimate failure should surprise no one.
There is one last reason for this book. I am able to add, however marginally, to the understanding of covert action as a tool of presidential statecraft through personal experience with covert action programs and policy. In the late 1980s, at the acme of the CIA’s cold war covert action experience, I spent two years on the Evaluation and Plans Staff (renamed the Operations and Management Staff during that period) of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO), where my principal responsibility was to oversee, on a continuing basis, every covert action operation run against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This oversight included analyzing the programs’ operational effectiveness by assessing compliance with the policy set forth by the White House and by joint CIA-State Department guidelines, evaluating observance of relevant federal laws and internal CIA regulations, and determining whether budgetary requirements were being satisfied.
I remained informed in detail by reading the daily operational activity in command-channel and, upon occasion, back-channel cable traffic. I talked daily, often several times each day, to the headquarters desk officers running the covert action operations; met frequently with the senior managers of the operational line component responsible for managing the operations; and sat in meetings with the most senior officers of the DO. I attended policy-oriented meetings and read memoranda for the record of many other such meetings, including those that occurred at the White House and on Capitol Hill. I perused memos on congressional interaction with Agency officers on such issues as program budgets and operational successes, problems, and future plans. I wrote annual reviews of the individual programs and of the component responsible for managing the programs for the associate deputy director of operations (ADDO).
My final assignment in the Agency, in 1995 and 1996, also dealt with covert action, this time from a policy and process perspective. I was privy to all of the current covert action programs then in progress, maintained a repository of all Presidential Findings present and past, and provided guidance to officers faced with responding to White House requests for new or proposed covert action programs. I arranged and participated in all internal reviews of current and proposed programs; attended numerous other discussions of these programs at the division, directorate, and director of central intelligence (DCI) level; and represented the Agency at the White House on the Interagency Working Group for Covert Action. I gave numerous briefings to various military elements and other U.S. government agencies on the intelligence discipline of covert action. In sum, then, in this volume I believe I have something relevant to contribute to the understanding of covert action and its relationship to foreign policy and statecraft.
GENERAL COMMENTS ON CONTENT
AND RESEARCH
This work focuses generally on the nature of the intelligence discipline of covert action and the decision-making processes post–World War II presidents employed to approve and review covert action programs. By necessity, the book offers merely a cursory overview of selected covert action programs, which are intended to serve only as examples of how individual presidents employed covert action as a tool of foreign policy statecraft. An astute reader might notice that a number of (alleged) covert action programs that have appeared in public sources (e.g., newspaper articles and books) have been omitted from this work. As a retired CIA officer, I was obligated to submit the manuscript to the CIA’s Publications Review Board to insure that it did not include any classified data. Beyond that, as covert action programs are truly presidential programs, further review by the National Security Council (NSC) staff was mandated, rendering the review process doubly exacting. As a consequence, only programs that have been officially acknowledged by the U.S. government were permitted to be included, regardless of the publicity, or notoriety, of (alleged) programs that have appeared in open sources. No effort was made either to include or exclude programs based on their success or failure, or whether they were a credit to a president or an embarrassment. I have referenced as many programs as I was permitted to do by the review process; it’s just that simple.
The requirement to submit the manuscript for multiple reviews also precluded the use of interviews from current, former, or retired intelligence and policy-level officials about individual covert action programs. Those most knowledgeable of particular programs would, for the most part, have had to contribute anonymously if they were to go beyond what little has been officially disclosed; otherwise, the material would have been excised and their careers possibly jeopardized. While academics and journalists may use anonymous sources with impunity, none of this material would survive a review of a manuscript by a f
ormer Agency officer. Due to a shortage of officially cleared documentary sources from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, in 2001 I placed requests for the declassification of more than five thousand documents through the Freedom of Information Act. The request to the CIA was flatly and quickly denied. Requests to the Bush and Reagan presidential libraries are still in the queue awaiting the time when the overworked staffs can cull the documents from the files—following which time the CIA and NSC will review the documents for declassification. I do not expect to see the requested material anytime soon.
The reader who is looking for details of covert operations from the Korean and Vietnam wars or other conflicts will find only disappointment. Likewise, those seeking information on covert technical programs, like the U-2 and SR-71 or the MKULTRA project, will have to look elsewhere, for the scope of this book is limited to traditional peacetime covert action operations managed by the Directorate of Operations. Readers interested in covert operations in Southeast Asia, the Studies and Observation Group, and OpPlan 34-A are directed to the many books and articles on these subjects that have appeared during the past decade. Likewise, readers should seek additional information on technical programs from other sources, for these programs were neither covert action nor were they products of the Directorate of Operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to a number of people who assisted in various ways with the preparation of this manuscript. First, I wish to extend my immense gratitude to the wonderful folks at the University Press of Kentucky, present and past, who had a hand in the publication of this work. Included are Directors Ken Cherry and Steve Wrinn; Acquisition Editors John Zeigler, Joyce Harrison, and (especially) Gena Henry; and Manuscript Editor Nichole Lainhart. I am grateful to Nichole for passing me along to Robin Roenker, who did an absolutely masterful job as copy editor for the manuscript; I cannot thank her enough for her contributions, which were many and significant, to this effort. The talents and vision of the graphics department are manifestly obvious in the terrific dust jacket design. Working with the UPK has been a uniformly wonderful experience, and I feel very lucky to have had the opportunity to do so.
There were some two dozen academicians, former intelligence officers, and some who are both who read either parts or all of the manuscript at various intervals depending on what portions had been cleared at what times. They know who they are and that I appreciate their contributions.
At Armstrong Atlantic State University’s Lane Library, research librarian Caroline Hopkinson again worked her magic in locating articles and documents that were essential to this volume, doing so with her inevitable cheerful enthusiasm and exceptional professionalism. I am, as always, grateful to Caro, and I am already looking forward to working with her on my next book.
Overdue thanks go to Matt Easterwood, a gifted baseball player and genuinely excellent student who steered his independent study courses on the presidency and American foreign policy in the direction of valued research for this book. Matt is one of the finest students whom I’ve had the privilege of mentoring, and I hope he learned as much from me as I did from him. I wish him all the best as he faces the rigors of law school.
I am especially indebted to the following: Hayden Peake, who may know more about the CIA than any living person. Hayden not only plowed through the manuscript in record time, providing insights and details that no one else could have, but also graciously reread portions of it in follow-up and was kind enough to answer what must have seemed to be a series of never-ending questions from the important to the trivial. Dr. Jeffery T. Richelson, of the National Security Archives at George Washington University’s Gelman Library, interrupted his own full schedule several times to send useful documents and identify errors, adding much to the finished product. Jeff also provided much appreciated encouragement and support at every step. Dr. Roy Godson of Georgetown University likewise took time out from his busy agenda and generously proffered advice and encouragement. And Dr. John Stemple from the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce reviewed the manuscript several times, providing essential guidance and enthusiastic support. The inspiration, assistance, and goodwill I received from these four eminent intelligence scholars will be valued long after the life of this book.
Needless to say (but I will anyway), I am deeply appreciative of the love and support received from my lovely wife, Susan, who accepted her all-too-frequent status as a “book widow” with great good humor—usually. I would promise that my next book won’t be so demanding, but it probably will be. I apologize in advance. Visits from Kelly and Amy, while too infrequent, were always welcomed and fun respites from the computer; they never fail to bring joy into my life, and I am so immensely proud of them.
This is normally the place where the author accepts full responsibility for any and all errors in the manuscript. I would have no hesitation in doing that, but Stafford Thomas, in an astonishing act of unparalleled generosity, has blithely offered to serve as “the fall guy.” At least that’s how I remember the e-mail, so please direct all criticisms to him. What a sport.
INTRODUCTION
We have come to two basic conclusions. Our first is that covert action inherently conflicts with . . . our democratic aspirations, not merely because it is secretive and deceptive but because it is intended to avoid public accountability. . . . At the same time, the world remains a dangerous place in which threats to the United States, its interests, and its citizens continue to exist. . . . Therefore, we also conclude that covert action may be justified when a prospective threat creates a compelling national interest that cannot be met prudently by overt means alone.1
Twentieth-Century Fund
The intelligence discipline known as covert action has been employed as an instrument of statecraft by our nation’s leaders since Revolutionary days. It added significantly to our nation’s growth and security in the early years; served both ably and poorly as a tool to contain the expansion of communism and to counter Soviet adventurism on four continents during the cold war; and enabled some peoples of the world to remain free and, undoubtedly, kept others under the foot of dictators for the four decades that were the cold war, albeit in the cause of a greater good. Covert action has been used cleverly and effectively by some presidents, accomplishing much. It has also been used poorly—even ineptly—for the wrong reasons and in the wrong places by presidents who did not understand its limitations and weaknesses, creating disaster for the United States and its image as a world leader. This has resulted in Americans’ understandable confusion about the value of covert action: “For a nation whose birth was assisted by successful covert operations—the secret provision of arms by the French . . . and brilliant deceptions by George Washington—America has traditionally evinced a profound ambiguity towards the hidden dimension of statecraft.”2
There are well-meaning supporters who urge the application of covert action to an expansive range of foreign policy problems, and there are detractors who call for it to be banned, statutorily or otherwise, claiming that it is ineffective, counterproductive, immoral, or some combination thereof.3 Both sides are wrong, simply because neither group fully understands what covert action is, what its limitations are, and when it is appropriate to employ it and when it’s not. Unfortunately, adherents of both sides have also included more than a few senior U.S. government officials, whose lack of precision regarding covert action has led, at the least, to embarrassment for the United States and, at the worst, to crisis.4
Since the overthrow of the government of Iran in 1953—the first major post–World War II covert action program to become openly known—this tool of presidential statecraft has been the subject of a vast number of books, articles, and editorials. While this mountain of literature has attempted to enlighten—or to proselytize to—the American public about the positive or negative sides of covert action, the main result has been to generate a public record replete with errors and misconceptions about this
intelligence discipline. There are understandable reasons for this problem (e.g., materials that remain classified), as well as reasons more perfidious. Some critics have deliberately distorted the record or facts in order to support their personal, anti-CIA agenda, despite clear and convincing evidence contrary to their assertions. This introduction will, inter alia, put forth some of the myths, mistakes, and misconceptions found in the literature on covert action, laying the foundation for the detailed examination of selected events in later chapters, so that they may be accurately and honestly evaluated. It is intended that when the reader reaches the end of the book, a balanced and infinitely more correct picture of covert action as a tool of presidential statecraft will have emerged.
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