When Germany swept into France almost effortlessly trampling over the much-vaunted Maginot Line, the French were gripped with disbelief and utter inability to mount an adequate defense. This crisis of self-confidence within the French society led a significant percentage of the young men to evacuate decaying and conquered France to join the triumphant Germans. The tall, blond, very fit, black uniformed, disciplined SS troopers with their double lightning flashes (runes) on their uniforms became an irresistible draw. Rather than joining De Gaulle and the Free French, those malcontents elected to leave Vichy France with all its weakness and failure altogether and to join the winning side: the new world of the Third Reich.
The French world was ambiguous during this time of confusion. Contrary to revisionist history which cast the French as determined insurgents or at least subtle saboteurs against the Nazi puppet administration of General Pétaine, the popular Service d’Ordre Legionnaire (SOL) enthusiastically supported the official stance and actions of the Vichy government in the belief that the occupying German army was the last bulwark of protection against the evils of Bolshevism. Many young SOL members chose to join German forces outright. As early as October 1940, Marshall Pétain spoke to the nation of “collaboration,” a practical necessity since nearly two million French soldiers were residing in German POW camps by that time.
As revenge for the egregious Versailles Treaty which ended WWI, the Germans made everything French subordinate to Germany. But even among the conquered French, there was a surprisingly large amount of sympathy for Germany post-Versailles; many people felt they had been harshly treated. Viewed through the prism of the times, as difficult as it is to comprehend in the second decade of the twenty-first century, there was popular and vigorous support for Nazi ideas. Anti-Semitism was common in France, and Hitler was admired there for fixing Germany’s Jewish problem.
Not unlike the view of big business currently, the power elites in most Western countries, viewed communism or any brand of socialism or push for improvement in the lives and status of the working class as threatening to their ownership of the means of production. Then as now, the capitalist elites believed that if this populous ideology took over, they would lose their businesses and financial empires. So, in France—and, indeed, most Western nations—National Socialism with its vicious racism and Aryan Supremacy may have been unsavory to many and not fit conversation for the dinner table; but a considerable number of those moguls did not perceive this ideology as something that threatened their bottom lines; so, they really did not care. The prospect of war looming in Europe, in fact, was perceived by many business leaders in France and elsewhere as being potentially highly positive for their profit making. They were considerably more afraid of the Communists than the Nazis as a result.
In France and many other Western countries, socialists—with their social justice agendas—were already threatening the business class of the 1930s and 1940s. They were gaining influence by attracting working class voters, and in some instances—as occurred in Germany—there had been attempts at Soviet-style revolutions which met with more approval than was comfortable to the moguls and the workers they controlled. From the 1920s on, Socialism was supported by millions of people—probably the majority of working-class Germans—and this Soviet-style incursion into the culture of Germany and its neighbors was most unsettling. The defining line for the moguls was that these socialist revolutions, whether through the ballot box or on the streets, had almost succeeded in Europe and one did succeed in Russia. The moguls and bankers—the one percent—were alarmed by the potential for spread of this—to them—poisonous doctrine, which was obviously so appealing to an expanding number of oppressed workers. The excesses and the massive crimes of Stalin had not yet been fully recognized to begin to discredit the ideology of communism. At the less oppressive end of the socialist continuum—the end favored by the moguls and their polictical supporters—lay the fact that the largest political party in Germany in the years before the Nazis took power was the Social Democratic Party which aimed to install a socialist economic system, albeit by democratic means. It—the Weimar Republic—was an epic economic failure.
The juggernaut of Nazism, even in its naked physical form, moved in an incremental fashion which was not particularly alarming to the moguls, the bankers, and their politicians. The Anschluss in Austria took place with wild cheering in the streets and a smooth transition to the Greater Germany under the Nazi policies. Alsace-Lorraine—a set of provinces bordering France and Germany had a strong intermingling of the two languages, family relationships, commerces, and political preferences—historically was once French, then German, then French again. When Germany consolidated its victory over France, it absorbed Alsace and Lorraine into Greater Germany and applied all German laws to the region, including conscription of soldiers. When France became part of the Allies victorious over the Germans, Frenchmen in German uniforms were imprisoned and tried for atrocities while serving Germany—often having been drafted into the armed services of the country then controlling the region. The ambiguity led to a movement to quash the convictions and sentences passed upon the soldiers and to avoid the embarrassment of having to explain away how it is that Frenchmen fought on the side of the Nazis. This was an important face-saving measure by De Gaulle’s new France, and it resulted in hiding the past of the war which included collaboration—a fact the new France would rather have relegated to the misty past. History was rewritten to eliminate mention of the uncomfortable facts, and the mythology became simplified to an untruth—all, or most, Frenchmen fought the Germans as underground partisans.
The true French partisans conducted a war of attrition by murdering supporters of groups favoring the concept that the Nazis were protectors of true French values, and that drove still more young Frenchmen to defect to the German side. Many Frenchmen were torn in their loyalties and rationalized that active collaboration with the Germans did not mean full adherence to the Nazi ideology and cause, but collaboration was an acceptable alternative to the decadent downhill slide into Bolshevism. The Right-wing families shared the fear expressed by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon that “Communism is exploitation of the strong by the weak,” and that was antithetical to the traditions of those families.
The more zealous of those who had even that lukewarm tilt towards the Nazis found it only logical to pursue their deeply held convictions to the logical conclusion of joining with the putative enemy of official France. Defection was a process: French veterans aligned with the official French forces, became disillusioned at the growing strength of communism as it was pitted against the nationalistic forces, and moved forward to the next logical step of actually joining the Nazi heroic fight against the seemingly unstoppable and corrupting ideology and strength of Bolshevism. In many instances, the individual and group choice to align with the forces of anticommunism was greeted with fairly widespread and strongly supported enthusiasm by the populace. The anticommunism attitude was visceral as put by Ernest Renan: “Communism is in conflict with human nature.” Adlai E. Stevenson said, “Communism is the death of the soul. It is the organization of total conformity—in short, of tyranny—and it is committed to making tyranny universal.” And that sentiment was almost worldwide except for the frankly communist countries. Even Karl Marx himself said,
[The Communist Manifesto, Chapter One] “There is a specter haunting Europe, the specter of communism.”
Germany’s attitude appealed to a significant minority of the French at the time. The sentiments of Heinrich Heine resonated with them: “Communism possesses a language which every people can understand—its elements are hunger, envy, and death.” Farsighted politicians and businessmen were pragmatic about the situation, however much they might have disliked the excesses of the occupying regime. They were Francophiles to the core, but worked to have France be a part of what they viewed as an inevitable German-dominated future in Europe, and perhaps the rest of the world. They might have disapproved of Hitler’s tactics, but
at least they could communicate with the man and his minions with a shared background of experience. He was—as they said—“A man we can do business with.” They provided material and psychological support to the youth who were abandoning France to fight for the winning side and for the common good of France in the new world that was coming.
Germany—for its part—viewed conquered France as an inferior nation with inferior people, which should be plundered of its farm produce, manufactury, and its labor force. The Germans kept two million French soldiers in Germany as prisoners doing forced labor as hostages to ensure that Vichy France would reduce its military forces and pay a heavy tribute in gold, food, and supplies to Germany. While they did not for a moment consider the French as equals in the struggle against communism, they willingly exploited the French people to accept their best young people into their military machinery.
That provided enticing incentives which further increased the exodus into German collaboration and service. Even the very young, chaffing at the indecision and ineffectiveness of French efforts to curb the advance of communism, flocked to German recruiting offices to volunteer to serve in the Wehrmacht and even more enthusiastically to become part of the respected elite Waffen SS. At first the regular German army and naval forces became aware of the value of the French conscriptees, but later—as German successes increased—the SS targeted the young French devotees. Early on, the idea was to volunteer for the glory of France. Soon, however, the French volunteers became frank German soldiers fighting for the Reich, for Europe, for France’s inclusion in the greater German sphere of power and control, and for a national-socialist German victory.
In September 1941, a unit of volunteers was mustered into the Wehrmacht’s Infantrie-Regiment 638 under the command of a former colonel of the French colonial forces. They were strongly influenced to do so by their Roman Catholic padre, Monsignor de Mayol de Lupé, an ardent national socialist enthusiast, like many of his coreligionists. Outside France, the unit wore German uniforms with a French tricolor patch on their sleeves, and inside France, they were allowed to wear their French uniforms. Military awards were presented after parades in Les Invalides in Paris and a march to Notre Dame and a celebration of mass.
The Waffen SS became symbolic of the right wing values of courage, fearlessness, endurance, fitness, toughness, and ruthlessness in battle that harked back to a mythical time of the Teutonic Knights for the Germans and to the time when France was one of the greatest military forces in the world for the Frenchmen. They sent home glowing reports of the rigors and successes of the SS training program and the seemingly unstoppable advances of the SS which was seen to be the savior of French values. That enthusiasm contributed to even more fervor among rightests to join the SS ranks. The old values of battle success at any cost, complete devotion to leaders, and great personal conviction that they were fighters—not just soldiers—engaged in a righteous cause stirred a deep emotional center in the minds of the youth. The recruitment by Germany—capitalizing on that propaganda—was eminently successful. In training, the ideal of becoming an officer candidate became the paramount goal for many aspirants, such as this author’s fictional characters, and spurred even more zeal.
The young French farmers and working class boys came to see from reports filtering back into France—from their fellow Frenchmen now actively engaged with the SS—a meritocracy unlike the decadent French society where family status and wealth gave preference even to inferior men. The SS was their chance to excel, and the Nazis used that conviction to their significant advantage. Unlike the aristocracy top-heavy French forces, popular opinion in the right wing of France saw in the SS an organization where officers were respected by noncoms and privates because of their fairness, merit, and identification with their men. Rank was earned, and a good man could advance despite his family’s lowly status. It was a way up and out of the stagnant world of the France which still clung to antiquarian notions of aristocratic superiority. Early on, a powerful incentive to join the SS lay in the knowledge of the fact that the Waffen SS had the best discipline among the fittest men who were supplied with the best military equipment of any armed force in the history of the world.
SS recruits had to meet rigid standards: to be of excellent character, to be free of any criminal record, to be of strict Aryan descent, to be between seventeen and twenty-two years of age, to be of greater than average intelligence, to have good dental health, and excellent physical fitness. They were carefully screened for “Nordic” features, and that—like the other attributes of the men chosen to be in the SS—appealed to the latent or even overt anti-Semitism among the French who sought admission. However, it was not until later when the war was well underway that French were allowed into the officer candidate schools because early on they were not considered Aryan enough. Of the initial 13,400 who signed up at the recruitment office in Paris, only about 6,000 were accepted—largely due to dental issues.
The inclusion of foreigners into the Waffen SS came about because the Wehrmacht became unable to provide men meeting the exacting requirements of the SS schools, and they agreed to the inclusion of foreigners of superior qualifications. Himmler’s dream was to unite Aryans from all over the world into the Third Reich’s unstoppable forces—to separate them from the untermenschen in those countries. The kindred Aryans were welcomed as part of the “family” as what were termed the “Freewilligen.” After the Nazis fought their way to control in Western Europe in 1940, they found highly willing legions ready and waiting for recruitment, such as the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling, the Swedish Svensk Socialistik Samling, the Flemish Volunteer Legion Flandern, the Dutch Volunteer Legion Niederlande, and the Danish Freikorps Danmark. The French army sponsored what they called the French Legion des Volontaires Française contre le bolchevisme, or LVF which—wittingly or unwittingly—vetted Frenchmen for duty and led to those men being diverted to Nazi service. These legions were promptly sent to war on the Eastern front after training. The inclusion of the foreign legions allowed for rapid expansion of the Waffen SS and decidedly increased its importance in the German military machine.
Despite that almost exponential growth, the SS could not keep up with the unprecedented level of slaughter on the Russian front. Between 1941 and 1944 with Operation Barbarossa, almost 1.5 million Germans were killed, another million were MIA, and 3.5 million were wounded. That Russian enterprise resulted in more KIA and MIA than Great Britain and the United States suffered in the entire war put together. Despite the terrible carnage, the French were both fully accepted into the German ranks and were fully dedicated to service because of the close-up fight against their mutual enemy, the Red Menace.
The French served the Nazi cause in the SS as the Charlemagne Division, but also in the Heer [the German army or Wehrmacht], the Kriegsmarine [Navy], and the Luftwaffe [Air Force]. They were drivers, mechanics, logistics personnel, sailors, ground support staff for the air force, and some were in the secretive German special forces.
Those Frenchmen and other officer candidates received a remarkable education—two sets of Charlemagne men were sent to the officer candidate school at Neweklau, some directly from the POW camps where they had been held since the invasion of France—which included such mind and body-improving classes as golf and tennis, and attended operatic, musical, and theatrical performances. Strangely enough, the French were allowed to keep their French identity throughout training and service with a French flag on their sleeves, and were not required to adopt the stringent German attention to discipline and uniforms. Because there were so many former French soldiers among the recruits with actual combat experience, the French LVF units were ready for service after only two months of the hard German and self-imposed rigorous French training. The LVF’s first blooding took place outside Moscow in the winter of 1941. Two French battalions took part in the drive to capture Moscow. Twelve men were killed and fifty-five were wounded, a small but clear harbinger of things to come. They—like their German comrades—were
very ill-equiped to endure the terrible cold, and they suffered serious hardships.
In 1942 the LVF was assigned to antipartisan duties in the Byelorussian SSR (Belarus). By the end of December 1942, the unit had lost half of its men. In February, the second battalion was almost completely wiped out. By that summer, the Vichy government recognized the battlefield decoration of the LVF—the Croix de Guerre Léé gionnaire—despite a widespread push inside France among the moderates and the left wing to charge the French who joined the Germans with treason and a dreadful violation of the patriotism of France.
In June 1944, after the significant victories by the LVF in the battle over the Bohr, the unit was disbanded and sent back to France. They achieved a conspicuous number of medals for bravery, and had withstood their withering standoff against the better manned and equipped Russians. They carried that esprit de corps with them into the newly-formed SS Charlemagne Division. The total number of men accepted into the LVF during its existence had been just under 6,500. More than ten percent of them were buried in Russia. Most—but not all—volunteered to serve in the SS, some were pressed into service, and a few refused and were sent to labor camps to suffer out the war.
In 1943, Hitler ordered the establishment of an SS recruiting station in France with an eye towards keeping a steady flow of men coming into his rapidly depleting armed forces. He was not nearly as dainty about recruitment as Himmler or the Wehrmacht: he needed the men. Initially, they decided on a regiment-sized unit with the name of Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Frankish emperor. They wanted to call it the Karl der Grosse, the Germanic rendering of the Frenchman’s name and title, but the French prevailed in the naming at least. On January 30, 1943, Pierre Leval—the most senior minister of the Vichy government—made public for the first time a law which sanctioned direct enlistment of French citizens into the Waffen SS.
The Charlemagne Murders Page 67