Of the Cubans, two of those with little experience, Pacho36 and Rubio,37 have not responded well. Alejandro has done extremely well; of the old timers, Marcos38 is a constant headache and Ricardo39 is not up to speed. The rest are doing well. The next phase will be combat, and that will be decisive.
March 21
I spent the day in talks and discussions with Chino, going over some points, and with the Frenchman, Pelao, and Tania. The Frenchman brought news we had already heard about Monje, Kolle, Simón Reyes, etc. He came to stay, but I asked him to go back and organize a support network in France, stopping first in Cuba, which coincides with his desire to get married and to have a child with his compañera. I must write letters to [Jean-Paul] Sartre and B[ertrand]. Russell so they can organize international support for the Bolivian liberation movement. He should also talk to a friend who will organize all channels of support, fundamentally financial, medical, and electronic—the latter in the form of an electrical engineer and equipment.
Pelao, of course, is ready to receive my orders and I proposed to him that he act as a kind of a coordinator, working for now only with the groups led by Jozami, Gelman,40 and Stamponi,41 and sending me five men to begin training. He is to send my greetings to María Rosa Oliver42 and the old man.43 I will give him 500 pesos to send off and 1,000 to get around with. If they accept, they should begin exploratory activities in northern Argentina and send me a report.
Tania made her contacts and the people came, but, according to her, she had to drive them here in a jeep, and although she intended to stay only one day, things got complicated. Jozami could not stay the first time, and the second time no contact was made because Tania was here. […]
March 25
[…] At 18:30 with nearly all personnel present, I made an analysis of our expedition and its significance, reviewing Marcos’s errors and demoting him, and then named Miguel44 as head of the vanguard. At the same time I announced the discharge of Paco,45 Pepe,46 Chingolo,47 and Eusebio,48 telling them that they would not eat if they do not work; I suspended their tobacco ration and redistributed their personal things among other compañeros more in need. I referred to Kolle’s plan to come here and hold discussions at the same time as those members of the youth organization who are here with us are being expelled, saying that we are interested in action—words are of no importance. I announced we would look for a cow and that study classes would be resumed.
I informed Pedro49 and El Médico [Ernesto] they have almost achieved full status as guerrilla fighters, and gave Apolinar50 some encouragement. I criticized Wálter51 for being too soft during the trip, for his attitude in combat, and for the fear he showed of the planes; he did not react well. I went over some details with Chino and Pelado, and gave the Frenchman a long oral report on the situation. In the course of the meeting, the group adopted the name National Liberation Army of Bolivia, and a public statement about the meeting will be made.
March 27
[…] Communiqué No. 1 was drafted, which we will try to send to journalists in Camiri (D. XVII).52
March 29
A day of little action but an extraordinary amount of news: the army provides a wide range of information that, if true, could be very valuable. Radio Habana already reported the news, and the Bolivian government announced its support for Venezuela in presenting the case against Cuba before the OAS. […]
Analysis of the month [March 1967]
This month was full of events, but the general panorama is characterized as follows:
The phase of consolidation and purging of the guerrilla force—fully completed.
The phase of slow development with the incorporation of some Cuban elements, who do not seem bad, and Guevara’s people, who are generally low level (two deserters, one “talking” prisoner, three cowards, and two quitters).
The initial phase of the struggle, characterized by a precise and spectacular blow, but marked by gross indecision before and after the fact (the withdrawal of Marcos, Braulio’s53 action).
The beginning of the enemy’s counteroffensive, characterized to this point by a) a tendency to take measures to isolate us; b) a clamor at a national and an international level; c) total ineffectiveness, so far; and d) mobilization of peasants.
Evidently, we will have to hit the road before I expected and move on, leaving a group to recover, saddled with the burden of four possible informers.
The situation is not good, but now begins a new testing phase for the guerrilla force that will be of great benefit once surpassed. […]
April 13
[…] The announcement by the North Americans that they are sending advisers to Bolivia corresponds to an old plan and has nothing to do with the guerrillas. Perhaps we are witnessing the first episode of a new Vietnam.
April 14
[…] Communiqué No. 2 was written for the Bolivian people.54
April 29
[…] After a long delay, we completely decoded Message No. 35, which had a paragraph asking for me to add my signature to a call in support of Vietnam, organized by Bertrand Russell.
April 30
[…] Radio Habana broadcast a report from Chilean journalists stating that the guerrillas are so strong that they can threaten cities and that they recently captured two military trucks full of supplies. The magazine Siempre interviewed Barrientos who, among other things, admitted that he had Yankee military advisers and that the guerrilla movement arose due to the social conditions in Bolivia.
Analysis of the month [April 1967]
[…] Of the points on military strategy noted above, we can emphasize:
a)The measures taken to control us have not been very effective to date, and while they bother us, they allow us some movement, given the army’s weakness and lack of mobility; besides, after the last ambush against the dogs and the trainer, we can presume they will be more careful when entering the woods.
b)The clamor continues, but now from both sides; after the publication of my article in Havana,55 there can be no doubt about my presence here.
It seems certain that the North Americans will intervene heavily here, having already sent helicopters and apparently the Green Berets, although they have not been seen around here.
c)The army (at least one or two companies) has improved its technique; they surprised us at Taperillas and were not demoralized at El Mesón.
d)The mobilization of peasants is nonexistent, except as informers, which is somewhat troublesome; but they are neither quick nor efficient, and of no consequence.
Chino’s status has changed and he will be a combatant until the second or third front is established. Dantón and Carlos56 were victims of their own haste, almost desperation, to leave and of my lack of energy to stop them; now communication with Cuba is cut off (Dantón) and the plan of action for Argentina (Carlos) is lost.
In summary: A month in which all has developed normally, considering the inevitable contingencies of a guerrilla force. Morale is good among all the combatants who have had their preliminary test as guerrilla fighters.
May 1
[Juan] Almeida spoke in Havana, applauding the famous Bolivian guerrillas and me. The speech was rather long but good. […]
May 13
All the radio stations are constantly covering news that some Cubans landing in Venezuela were intercepted. The Leoni57 government presented two of the men with their names and ranks; I do not know them, but everything suggests that something has gone wrong.
Analysis of the month [May 1967]
[…] The most important features are:
1)A total loss of contact with Manila, La Paz, and Joaquín, which reduces the number of our group to 25.
2)A complete failure to recruit peasants, although they are losing their fear of us and we are gaining their admiration. It is a slow and patient task.
3)The party, through Kolle, offers its collaboration, apparently without reservation.
4)The clamor surrounding Debray’s case has given more momentum to
our movement than 10 victories in battle could have.
5)The morale of the guerrilla movement is growing stronger and, if handled well, will certainly guarantee success.
6)The army remains disorganized and its technique has not significantly improved.
News of the month: The arrest and escape of Loro,58 who now should be rejoining us or heading to La Paz to make contact.
The army reported the arrest of all the peasants who collaborated with us in the Masicuri area; now comes the stage in which the peasants will be afraid of both sides, although in different ways; our triumph will signify the qualitative change necessary for their leap in development.
June 12
[…] The radio broadcast some interesting news: the newspaper Presencia announced one dead and one wounded for the army from Saturday’s clash; this is great and almost certainly true, and means that we have maintained our pattern of clashes resulting in casualties. Another report announced three dead, among them Inti, one of the guerrilla leaders, and noted the foreign components of the guerrilla force: 17 Cubans, 14 Brazilians, four Argentines, and three Peruvians. The Cuban and the Peruvian count is true; we will have to find out where they got this information.
June 13
[…] The political upheaval in this country is fascinating—the incredible number of pacts and counter-pacts that are in the air. Rarely has the potential for a guerrilla catalyst been so clear.
June 14
[…] I turned 39 [today] and am inevitably approaching the age when I need to consider my future as a guerrilla, but for now I am still “in one piece.”
June 21
Paulino59 promised to take my message to Cochabamba. We will give him a letter for Inti’s wife, a coded message for Manila, and four communiqués. The fourth outlines the composition of our guerrilla force and clears up the rumor about Inti’s death; it is the [blank in the original]. We will see if we can now establish contact with the city. […]
June 25
[…] An Argentine radio station broadcast the news of 87 victims at the mining area of Siglo XX […]
June 30
[…] In the political arena, the most important development is the official announcement by Ovando60 that I am here. Moreover, he said that the army is facing a perfectly trained guerrilla force that includes the Vietcong commanders who have defeated the best US regiments. His information is based on statements made by Debray who apparently talked more than was necessary, although we cannot tell what implications this has, or what the circumstances were under which he talked. It is also rumored that Loro was murdered. They attribute to me a plan for insurrection in the mines, to coincide with the one in Ñacahuazú. Things are turning out beautifully, so very shortly, I will no longer be “Fernando Sacamuelas” [Tooth-puller].
A message was received from Cuba reporting on the low level of development of the guerrilla movement in Peru, where they scarcely have any men or weapons, but have spent a fortune and are talking of a supposed guerrilla force involving Paz Estenssoro, a colonel Seoane, and a certain Rubén Julio, a very rich man belonging to the movement in the Panda region; this will take place in Guayaramerin. […]
Analysis of the month [June 1967]
[…] The most important features are:
1)Continued total lack of contact, which reduces us now to 24 men, with Pombo wounded and with reduced mobility.
2)Continued lack of peasant recruitment. It is a vicious circle: to recruit we need to maintain constant activity in populated territory, and to do this we need more people.
3)The legend of the guerrilla force is growing like wildfire, now we are invincible superhumans.
4)The lack of contact extends to the party, although we have made an attempt through Paulino that could bring results.
5)Debray is still in the news but now he is linked with my case, and I have been identified as the leader of the movement. We will see the result of this move by the government and if it is positive or negative for us.
6)The morale of the guerrilla fighters continues to be strong and their commitment to the struggle is increasing. All the Cubans are exemplary in combat and there are only two or three weak Bolivians.
7)The army continues to be useless in its military tactics, but is doing work among the peasants that we cannot ignore, transforming all members of the community into informers, either through fear or by fooling them about our goals.
8)The massacre in the mines greatly improves our outlook; if we can get our statement circulated, it will be a great clarifying factor.
Our most urgent task is to reestablish contact with La Paz, to replenish our military and medical supplies, and to recruit 50 to 100 men from the city, even if the number of active combatants comes to only 10 or 25.
July 1
[…] Barrientos held a press conference in which he acknowledged my presence, but predicted that in a few days I would be wiped out. He spoke his usual stream of nonsense, calling us rats and snakes and repeated his intention to punish Debray. […]
July 10
[…] [T]he statements from Debray and Pelado are not good; on top of everything, they have admitted to the continental aims of the guerrilla movement, something they did not have to do.
July 14
[…] The PRA [Revolutionary Authentic Party] and PSB [Bolivian Social Democratic Party] have withdrawn from the Revolutionary Front61 and the peasants are warning Barrientos about an alliance with the Falange.62 The government is disintegrating rapidly. Such a pity that we do not have 100 more men right now.
July 19
[...] The political news is of a tremendous crisis and no one knows how it will be resolved. For now, the agricultural unions in Cochabamba have formed a political party of “Christian inspiration” that is backing Barrientos, who is asking to be “allowed to govern for four years”; it is almost a plea. [Vice-President] Siles Salinas is threatening the opposition that our rise to power would cost everyone’s head and is calling for national unity, declaring the country to be in a state of war. On the one hand, they seem to be pleading, and using demagogy, on the other; maybe they are planning a takeover.
July 24
[…] We are trying to decode a long message from Manila. Raúl [Castro] spoke at a graduation ceremony for officers at the Máximo Gómez School; among other things, he refuted criticisms the Czechs made about my article on Vietnam. Our friends are calling me a new Bakunin and are sorry about blood that has been spilled and blood that would be spilled if there were three or four Vietnams.
July 26
[…] In the evening I gave a little talk about the significance of July 26, the rebellion against oligarchies and against revolutionary dogmas. Fidel made a brief mention of Bolivia.
Analysis of the month [July 1967]
[…] The most important features are:
1)Total loss of contact continues.
2)Continued sense of the lack of peasant recruitment, although there are some encouraging signs in the reception from peasants whom we have known for a while.
3)The legend of the guerrilla force is acquiring continental dimensions; Onganía63 is closing the borders and Peru is taking precautions.
4)The attempt at contact through Paulino failed.
5)The morale and combat experience of the guerrilla fighters is increasing with each battle; Camba64 and Chapaco65 remain the weak ones.
6)The army continues to be ineffective, but there are units that appear to be more combative.
7The political crisis of the government is growing, but the United States is giving small loans, which are of great assistance in tempering the level of Bolivian discontent.
The most urgent tasks are: To reestablish contact, to recruit combatants, and to obtain medicines.
August 8
[…] I gathered everyone together tonight to make the following speech: We are in a difficult situation; Pacho is recuperating, but I am a complete wreck and the incident with the little mare shows that at times I am beginning to lose c
ontrol; this will be corrected, but we are all in this together and anyone who does not feel up to it should say so. This is one of those moments when great decisions have to be made; this type of struggle gives us the opportunity to become revolutionaries, the highest form of the human species, and it also allows us to emerge fully as men; those who are unable to achieve either of those two states should say so now and abandon the struggle. All the Cubans and some of the Bolivians committed themselves to stay until the end. […]
August 10
[…] Fidel made a long speech in which he attacks the traditional parties, especially, the Venezuelan party; it appears there was a big behind-the-scenes row. […]
August 14
A bad day. It was dreary as we carried out our daily activities without incident, but at night the news bulletin reported in precise detail that the cave where the men were sent had been discovered, so there can be no doubt. I am now condemned to suffer from asthma indefinitely. They also seized all kinds of documents and photographs. This is the worst blow they have delivered; someone must have talked. Who? That is the question.
The Awakening of Latin America Page 50