by Daniel Wrinn
Operation Stalemate
1944 Battle for Peleliu
Daniel Wrinn
Contents
Get your FREE copy of WW2: Spies, Snipers and the World at War
Seizing “The Point”
The Japanese Defenders
D-Day Center Assault
The Umurbrogol Pocket
Peleliu’s Eastern Peninsula
7th Marines in the South
Northern Peleliu Seizure
5th Marines Northern Attack
Seizure of Ngesebus
Fight for the Pocket
Subduing the Pocket
Securing the Eastern Ridges
Mopping up Peleliu
Conditions on Peleliu
III Amphibious Corps
Divisions and Commanders
Japanese Fighting Tactics
Naval Gunfire Support
Reef-crossing Tactics
Conquest of Peleliu
Price of Peleliu
Referrences
Also By Daniel Wrinn
About the Author
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Seizing “The Point”
On September 15, 1944, five infantry battalions of the 1st Marine Division embarked in amphibian tractors. They clambered across 700 yards of coral reef to smash into the island of Peleliu.
Marines in the amphibian tractors (LVTs) were told the operation would be tough but quick. A devastating amount of naval gunfire had been unleashed before their landing.
The 1st Division Marines still had grim images of their sister division, the 2nd’s bloody attack across the reefs at Tarawa—two months earlier. But the 1st Division Marines peered over the gunwales of their landing craft and saw an incredible scene of blasted and churned earth along the shore.
Geysers of smoke and dust caused by exploding bombs and large-caliber naval shells gave the Marine’s hope. Maybe the enemy would become quick casualties from the pre-landing bombardment. Or at least, they’d be too stunned to react and defend against the hundreds of Marines storming the beach.
Ahead of the Marines were waves of armored amphibian tractors mounted with 75mm howitzers. They were tasked to assault any surviving enemy strongpoints or weapons on the beach before the Marines landed. Ahead of these armored tractors, naval gunfire was lifted toward deeper, more dug-in targets. Navy fighter aircraft strafed north and south along the length of the beach defenses—parallel to the assault waves. Their mission was to keep the enemy defenders subdued and intimidated on the beach as the Marines closed in.
Naval gunfire was shifted to target the ridge northeast of the landing beaches and used to blind enemy observation and limit Japanese fire on the landing waves. This ridge would later be known as the Umurbrogol Pocket (or just the Pocket) and was one of two deadly unknowns to command planners.
The other unknown was the natural traits of the Pocket. Aerial images showed it as a gently rounded north-south hill that commanded the landing beaches 3,000 yards distant. From these early images, this elevated terrain was camouflaged in jungle scrub, almost entirely unaffected from the preparatory bombardment and artillery fire directed at it.
But instead of a gently rounded hill, the Pocket was a complex system of sharply uplifted coral knobs, ridges, valleys, and sinkholes. It rose 300 feet above the island and offered superb positions for tunnels and cave defenses. The enemy had made most of what this terrain provided during their extensive occupation and defensive preparations before the Allied assault.
Another problematic issue for the Marines was the plan developed by Colonel Nakagawa, the Japanese commander of the force on Peleliu and his superior, General Inoue on Koror Island. The Japanese defense tactics had changed considerably from their defeats on Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester.
Instead of depending on spiritual superiority, Japanese defenders would use their bushido spirit and banzai tactics to throw Allied troops back into the sea. Japanese forces would delay and try to bleed attacking Marines as long as possible. The enemy planned to combine the devilish terrain with a resolute discipline. Japanese soldiers would only relinquish Peleliu at a horrible price in blood to the Marine invasion. This wicked surprise marked a new and vital change to Japanese defensive tactics compared to what they employed earlier in the war.
Nothing during the trip to the beach revealed any elements of the revised Japanese tactical plan. They bounced across a mile of coral fronting the landing beaches. Amphibian tractors passed several hundred mines intended to destroy any craft approaching or running over them. These mines were aerial bombs detonated by wire control from observation points on shore. But the preliminary bombardment had disrupted the wire controls and the mines did little to slow or destroy any assaulting tractors.
As the LVTs neared the beaches, they came under fire from mortars and artillery. This fire against moving targets generated more anxiety than damage, as only a few vehicles were lost. But this fire did show that the preliminary bombardment had not eliminated the enemy’s fire capability. Even more disturbing was when the leading waves of LVTs nearing the beaches were hit by heavy artillery and anti-boat gunfire from concealed bunkers on the north and south flanking points.
Enemy defenses on White Beach 1 were especially deadly and effective. The 3/1 Marines under Colonel Steve Sabol were in a savage beach fight with no means of communication to understand the situation. Japanese guns knocked out several amphibian tractors carrying essential control personnel and equipment.
The mission of seizing “The Point” had been given to Captain George Hunt (a decorated veteran of the New Britain and Guadalcanal campaigns). Hunt developed his plans, which entailed specific assignments for each element of his company. These plans were rehearsed until every Marine knew his role and how it fit into the company’s strategy.
H-hour on D-Day brought heavier than expected casualties. One platoon was pinned down all day in beach fighting. Survivors wheeled left as planned, onto the flanking point. While they advanced, they pressed their assault on several enemy defensive emplacements. Pillboxes and casements were carpeted with small arms fire, and smoke from demolitions and grenades.
The climax came when a rifle grenade hit the gun muzzle and ricocheted into a casement, setting off explosions and flames. Enemy defenders ran out of the rear of the block house with their clothes on fire and ammunition exploding in their belts. Marines waited in anticipation of the enemy’s flight and cut them down with small arms fire as they burned alive.
Captain Hunt’s Marines held the Point, but his company was reduced to platoon strength with no other nearby units. Sketchy radio communications got through to bring in supporting fire and a desperately needed resupply. One LVT made it to the beach before dark with mortar shells, grenades, and water—evacuating casualties as it departed. This ammunition made all the difference in that night’s brutal struggle against a determined enemy’s attempt to recapture the Point.
The next afternoon, Colonel Raymond Davis of the 1/1 Marines moved his Company B to establish contact with Captain Hunt to help hold the desperately contested positions. Hunt’s company regained the platoon survivors that were pinned down on the beach fight during the day.
The newly reinforced company recovered their artillery and naval gunf
ire communications, which proved critical during the second night. That evening the enemy counterattacked the Marines at the Point. The Japanese were narrowly defeated. By midmorning, survivors of the two Marine companies had secured the Point and looked out on 500 dead Japanese soldiers.
On the right of Colonel “Chesty” Puller’s struggling 3rd Battalion, Colonel Russell Honsowetz, commanding the 2nd Battalion, took artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire from still effective enemy beach defenders during their landing.
The 5th Marines’ two assault battalions also took heavy enemy fire as they fought through the beach defenses toward the clearing’s edge, looking out eastward over the airfield.
On the right flank, the 3/7 Marines crossed in front of an imposing defensive fortification flanking the beach. Luckily, it wasn’t as close as the Point position and did not suffer heavy damage. But its enfilading fire, along with natural obstructions on the beach, caused Company K to veer off their planned landing and end up out of position and out of contact. After the confused and delayed battalion regrouped, they used a line of large anti-tank ditches to guide their eastward advance.
Any further delay would be a disaster to the division. Momentum was the key to success. The divisional plan on the right called for the 7th Marines to land two battalions in a column on Orange Beach 3. As the 3/7 advanced, it would be followed by the 1/7. These units would tie into the right flank and attack southeast on the beach.
After a bloody hour of fighting, all five battalions were ashore. The closer each battalion got to the Pocket, the more tenuous its hold was on the shallow beachhead. For another two hours, three more of the division’s four remaining battalions joined the attack and pressed the momentum that General Rupertus had ordered.
Colonel Puller landed his forward command group close behind the 3/1 Marines. He was ready to fight, even if his location would deny him the best position for supporting fire. With reduced communications and inadequate numbers of LVTs to follow in waves, he struggled to improve his regiment’s situation.
His left flank had two platoons desperately struggling to gain control of the Point. Puller landed the 1st Battalion behind the 3/1 to reinforce the fight for the left flank but was hindered by multiple losses in the LVTs. The 1st Battalion companies had to be landed singly and committed piecemeal into the action.
On the regiment’s right flank, the 2/1 Marines recaptured the west edges of the scrub, looking out to the airfield.
In the beachhead’s southern sector, the 1/7 Marines were delayed by the heavy LVT losses. This successful early opposition was felt throughout the rest of the day. Most of the 1/7 eventually landed on the correct beach, but many Marines were driven leftward from heavy enemy fire and landed in the 5th Marines’ zone.
This caused the 1/7 to join in with the 3/7 and advance east to assault prepared enemy positions.
The battle raged with heavy opposition from both east and south. In the midafternoon, Marines ran into a blockhouse (supposedly destroyed by pre-landing naval gunfire) but had not been touched and put up a strong resistance.
The cost in Marine lives and lost momentum by having to assault these heavily defended blockhouses was harsh and unnecessary.
The Japanese Defenders
General Sadae Inoue, a fifth-generation warrior with a robust military reputation, commanded the 14th Infantry Division. He’d just arrived from the Kwangtung Army in China. In March 1944, Inoue met Japanese Premier Tojo in Tokyo to discuss the war.
Tojo decided Japan could no longer hold the Palaus against the Allied naval dominance in the Western Pacific. Tojo gave General Inoue command of all Japanese forces in the Palaus. His orders: take the 14th Infantry and kill Americans while denying its use to the Allies for as long as possible. He ordered Inoue to sell the Palaus at the highest possible cost in blood and time.
As the enemy sailed for the Palaus, Inoue flew ahead and surveyed his new locale for two days before deciding Peleliu was the key to his defense. The earlier Task Force 58 strikes confirmed his decision. Peleliu had been under the administrative command of a rear admiral. The admiral used his forces to build blockhouses and reinforced concrete structures above ground while improving the existing caves and tunnels under Peleliu’s rich natural camouflage of jungle, scrub, and vines.
In these underground installations, the admiral and his troops survived the March attacks from Task Force 58. The above-ground structures and planes were demolished. when the Japanese emerged, they repaired what they could with a focus on the underground installations. Together with Korean labor troops, their numbers swelled to 7,000 (most lacking training and leadership for any infantry action).
Colonel Nakagawa arrived on Peleliu with his 2nd Infantry Regiment—a 6,500-man reinforced regiment. They were veterans from the war in China and had two dozen 75mm artillery pieces, a dozen tanks, fifteen 81mm heavy mortars, over a hundred .50-caliber machine guns, and thirty dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns. There were many heavy 141mm mortars and naval anti-aircraft guns already on the island.
Colonel Nakagawa had been awarded nine medals for his leadership against the Chinese. His regiment was regarded as elite veterans within the Japanese Army.
Immediately upon arriving, Nakagawa reconnoitered his battle position from the ground and air. He identified the western beaches (the White and Orange Beaches) as the most likely landing sites. Nakagawa ordered his troops to dig in and construct beach defenses. But a conflict arose when the senior naval officer, Admiral Itou, resented taking orders from a junior army officer.
From Koror, General Inoue sent General Murai to Peleliu. Murai assumed command and maintained a liaison with Nakagawa. Murai was a highly regarded, personal representative of General Inoue and considered senior to the admiral.
Murai left the mission firmly in Nakagawa’s hands. Throughout the campaign, Nakagawa exercised operational control and was assisted and counseled but not commanded by General Murai.
Nakagawa fully understood his objective and the situation and firepower the Allies possessed. He turned his attention to making the fullest use of his primary advantage—the terrain. Nakagawa deployed and installed his forces to inflict all possible damage and casualties at the landing. Then his troops would defend in-depth to the last man. Peleliu offered a vertical and a horizontal dimension to its defense.
Nakagawa registered artillery and mortars over the width and depth of the reef on both eastern and western beaches. With a planned heavy concentration along the fringe of the western reef, he expected the Allies need to transfer follow-on waves from landing craft to the reef crossing amphibian vehicles. He registered weapons from the water’s edge to subject landing troops to a hellish hail of fire. Offshore, he laid over 500 wire-controlled mines.
Nakagawa ordered the construction of beach obstacles using logs and rails and ordered multiple anti-tank ditches dug. He put troops in machine-gun and mortar pits along the inland from the beaches supported by all available barbed wire. He constructed concrete emplacements to shelter and conceal anti-tank and anti-boat artillery on the north and south beaches.
Inland, he used the already built blockhouses with adjacent reinforced buildings. He made them into mutually supporting defensive complexes and added communication lines in the trenches.
Nakagawa believed the western beaches were the most probable route of attack. But he did not leave the southern and eastern beaches undefended. He committed one battalion on each beach to organize defenses. The eastern beaches were thoroughly prepared with contingents of defenders to move into central Peleliu if the battle expanded from the west as he expected.
Colonel Nakagawa assigned 600 infantry and artillery to defend Ngesebus and 1,100 Naval personnel to defend northern Peleliu. The only troops not under his command were the 1,500 defenders on Angaur.
The central part of his force and effort was committed to the 500 tunnels, caves, and firing embrasures in the coral ridges of central Peleliu. The naval units’ prior extensive tunneling into limestone
ridges rendered the occupants mainly immune to any Allied bombardments. Only an occasional lucky hit in the cave’s mouth or a point-blank direct fire could damage the hidden defenses and the enemy troops.
Tunnels were designed for several purposes: command centers, hospitals, barracks, storage, ammunition dumps, and cooking areas with freshwater springs and basins—and of course, firing embrasures. He added elaborate concealment and protective devices including a few sliding steel doors.
Nakagawa expected an intense pre-landing bombardment. He believed his troops would endure it and carry out their mission of delaying and bleeding the Allies for as long as possible before Peleliu fell.
General Inoue was busy with his troops on Koror. He prepared for expected Allied attacks against Babelthuap. The Allied plan, Operation Stalemate, also called for the invasion of Babelthuap. As the expected invasion drew closer, Inoue made a statement to his troops, reflecting Tojo’s instructions to bleed and delay the American forces. He pointed out the necessity to expect and endure the naval bombardment and how to use terrain to inflict casualties on the attacking force.
General Inoue said: “Dying and losing the territory to the enemy would contribute to opening a new phase of the war. We are ready to die honorably.”
D-Day Center Assault