by Rory Muir
Most of the questions arising from the descriptions of the climax of the clash between Leith and Maucune are fully discussed in the narrative, while the role of the cavalry must be left to the next chapter. One incidental point remains. Oman's account of this combat consists largely of a lengthy quotation from Leith Hay which makes splendidly dramatic reading. Unfortunately, this is partly because Oman has gently improved the original, mostly by slightly condensing it, correcting the grammar and making it flow more smoothly. No violence is done to the sense of the original, but no indication is given of these changes. Scholarly conventions were less rigid when Oman was writing than they have subsequently become, but even so such practices would have been regarded as surprising and undesirable. Nor is this the only occasion, even in his account of Salamanca, in which Oman's quotations are ‘better’ than the original.33 Here are the two versions:
Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, vol. 5, pp. 448–9 Leith Hay, Narrative of the Peninsular War, vol. 2, pp. 54–9*
‘The ground’ writes Leith Hay, ‘between the advancing force and that which it was to assail was crowded by the light troops of both sides in extended order, carrying on a very incessant tiraillade. The general desired me to ride forward, to make our light infantry press up the heights to cover his line of march, and to bid them, if practicable, make a rush at the enemy's guns. Our light troops soon drove in those opposed to them: the cannon were removed to the rear: every obstruction to the general advance of our line vanished. In front of the centre of that beautiful line rode General Leith, directing its movements. Occasionally every soldier was visible, the sun shining bright upon their arms, though at intervals all were enveloped in a dense cloud of dust, from whence at times issued the animating cheer of the British infantry. [T]he ground between the advancing force and that to be assailed was also crowded with light troops in extended order, carrying on a very incessant tiraillade. The general desired me to ride forward, make the light infantry press up the heights to clear his line of march, and if practicable make a rush at the enemy's cannon. In the execution of this service, I had to traverse the whole extent of the surface directly in front of the 5th division: the light troops soon drove back those opposed; the cannon† were removed to the rear; every obstruction to the regular advance of the line had vanished. In front of the centre of that beautiful line rode General Leith, directing its movements, and regulating its advance. Occasionally every soldier was visible, the sun shining bright upon their arms, while at intervals all were enveloped in a dense cloud of dust, from whence, at times, issued the animating cheer of British infantry.
‘The French columns, retired from the crest of the heights, were formed in squares, about fifty yards behind the line at which, when arrived, the British regiments would become visible. Their artillery, although placed more to the rear, still poured its fire upon our advancing troops. The confident presence of the enemy was now exchanged for the quiet formation proceeding in his ranks, as preparatives for resisting the evidently approaching shock. His columns, retired from the crest of the height, were formed in squares, about fifty yards removed from the ground, on which, when arrived, the British regiments would become visible. The French artillery, although placed more to the rear, still poured its fire on the advancing troops. In the act of urging forward the light infantry, a ball struck the horse I rode, and passing through his body, laid him dead on the spot. In this dilemma, I waited until the* line approached, and having dismounted an orderly dragoon, proceeded with the general, who continued in the same situation he had occupied when the division commenced its advance; namely, in front of the colours of the 1st battalion of the 38th regiment. That corps, numerous and effective, had joined the army on the previous day, and, being the junior regiment, formed the centre of the first line; its commanding officer, Colonel Greville, having charge of the brigade, in the absence of General Hay.
The second line of the division was about a hundred yards in rear of the first; and between these, during the march towards the enemy, Lord Wellington at one time was observing the progress of the attack.
We were now near the summit of the ridge. The men marched with the same orderly steadiness as at the first: no advance in line at a review was ever more correctly executed: the dressing was admirable, and the gaps caused by casualties were filled up with the most perfect regularity. General Leith and the officers of his staff, being on horseback, first perceived the enemy, and had time to observe his formation, before our infantry line became so visible as to induce him to commence firing. He was drawn up in contiguous squares, the front rank kneeling, and prepared to fire when the drum should beat. All was still and quiet in these squares: not a musket was discharged until the whole opened. Nearly at the same instant General Leith ordered our line to fire and charge. At this moment the last thing I saw through the smoke was the plunge of the horse of Colonel Greville, commanding the leading brigade, who, shot through the head, reared and fell back upon his rider. In an instant evey individual present was enveloped in smoke and obscurity. No serious struggle for ascendancy followed, for the French squares were penetrated, broken, and discomfited, and the victorious 5th Division pressed forward no longer against troops formed up, but against a mass of disorganized men flying in all directions … We were now near the summit of the ridge. The men marched with the same orderly steadiness as at first: no advance in line at a review was ever more correctly executed: the dressing was admirable, and spaces were no sooner formed by casualties than closed up with the most perfect regularity, and without the slightest deviation from the order of march.
General Leith, and the officers of his staff, being on horseback, first perceived the enemy, and had time to observe his formation, previous to the infantry line becoming so visible, as to induce him to commence firing. He was drawn up in contiguous squares,* the front rank kneeling, and prepared to fire when the drum beat for its commencement. All was still and quiet in these squares;† – not a musket was discharged until the whole opened. Nearly at the same moment General Leith ordered the line to fire, and charge: the roll of musketry was succeeded by that proud cheer that has become habitual to British soldiers on similar occasions – that to an enemy tremendous sound, which may without exaggeration‡ be termed the note of victory. At this moment, the last thing I saw through the smoke was the plunge of Colonel Greville's horse, who, shot through the head, reared, and fell back on his rider. In an instant every individual present was enveloped in smoke and obscurity. No struggle for ascendancy took place:§ the French squares were penetrated, broken, and discomfited; the victorious division pressed forward, not against troops opposed, but a mass of disorganised men, flying in all directions.
When close to the enemy's squares Leith had been severely wounded and reluctantly forced to quit the field; at the same moment I was hit myself, and my horse killed by a musket-ball: thus removed, I cannot detail the further movements of the division. [Nearly two pages follow describing the rest of the battle; Oman indicates its deletion by ellipsis marks.] When close to the enemy's squares in the commencement of the battle, General Leith was severely wounded, and reluctantly compelled to quit the field; nearly at the same moment the author of these pages was also wounded, and his horse killed by a musket-ball. Captain Dowson, another of the general's aides-de-camp, had his foot shattered by a shot,* and remained all night without assistance on the field. Colonel Berkeley, Major Gomm, Captain Belshes, and Captain George Hay, acting aide-de-camp in the absence of his father, composed the remaining officers of the divisional staff on this occasion, and, by their activity and gallantry, greatly conduced to the result of the successful service it had the good fortune to perform.
Having been removed from the field, I cannot detail the future movements of the 5th division on the night of the battle.†
* This is quoted from Oman's own copy of the first edition, now in the Ward Collection, Hartley Library, University of Southampton (pp. 258–61 of the third edition, that generally used in this book).<
br />
† Changed to ‘the French cannon’ by the third edition.
* Changed to ‘a line’ by the third edition.
* Changed to ‘contiguous columns’ by the third edition.
† Changed to ‘columns’ by the third edition.
‡ Changed to ‘without doubt’ by the third edition.
§ Changed to ‘No struggle for ascendancy now took place; resistance was vain: the French squares …’ by the third edition.
Changed to ‘overpowered and flying in all directions’ by the third edition.
* Changed to ‘a bullet’ by the third edition.
† As well as the textual changes noted above, there was some alteration to the punctuation and an increase in the use of capitals between the first and third editions. The changes do not affect the meaning, nor generally bring it closer to Oman's version of the text.
Chapter Six
Le Marchant and the Destruction of the French Left
Wellington did not ride straight from Pakenham to Leith: on the way he stopped near Las Torres, where Le Marchant's formidable brigade of heavy cavalry was waiting. He told Le Marchant
that the success of the movement to be made by the Third Division would greatly depend on the assistance they received from the cavalry; and that he must therefore be prepared to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity to charge the enemy's infantry. ‘You must then charge,’ said Lord Wellington, ‘at all hazards.’ After some brief remarks on the chances of the day, Lord Wellington rode towards the centre, having desired the Dragoons to remain in the same position until the time of action was come.1
The heavy brigade was halted in low ground in front of Las Torres, out of sight of the enemy and beyond effective artillery range, although enough long shots came bounding towards it to make the men uneasy, and Le Marchant made them dismount and lie down to be out of harm's way. During the thunderstorm of the previous night many of the brigade's horses had broken their pickets and stampeded through the ranks of sleeping troopers, injuring eighteen men. Most of the horses had been recaptured, but thirty-one from the 5th Dragoon Guards had escaped and galloped towards the French lines. Now one of these prodigals returned, neighing and snorting with satisfaction at having found its accustomed comrades after a night of adventures. Lieutenant Miles recognized it as his charger and rode it for the rest of the day; nor did his luck desert him, for he was unscathed in the fighting.2
Such incidents helped fill the time before the brigade could begin its advance; and Le Marchant put this interval to good use, sending Lieutenant William Light of his staff and Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Dalbiac, 4th Dragoons, to reconnoitre the ground over which the brigade would advance and to post videttes to give warning of difficult points.3 At last, the moment arrived and the heavy brigade moved gently forward in two lines at a walk. It advanced to the south-west, heading for the northern face of the Monte de Azan and the tempting gap between Thomières's troops at the western end of the plateau and Maucune's division a mile or so to the east. It suffered little from the French artillery in its approach, partly because Light and Dalbiac had chosen a route which gave it some cover, but also because there were no guns immediately opposite it, and those with Maucune were preoccupied by Leith's steady advance, while those with Thomières were under fire from Bull and Douglas's batteries and threatened by Pakenham.
Plan of Le Marchant's charge (all troop positions approximate, many conjectural).
Le Marchant kept his men well in hand and did not hurry his advance, for he knew that the cavalry would be most effective after the initial clash of infantry. By the time his regiments were climbing the gentle slope of the Monte de Azan, Thomières's leading brigade had already been defeated, while Leith was rapidly closing on Maucune. Colonel Wallace, with the foremost brigade of Pakenham's division, had rapidly pushed along the plateau in the wake of Thomières's retreating infantry, but in doing so he had outdistanced his supports. Wallace's men were breathless and in some disorder, and their advance was checked by the appearance of a new force of French infantry. This was the 1st Ligne, the remaining regiment of Thomières's division – a strong regiment, 1, 700 men in three battalions, and of good quality. Under its protection, the 62nd and 101st began to collect together and rally, while a little to the rear the leading regiment of Taupin's division, the 22nd Ligne, was rapidly approaching. Pakenham, Wallace and their officers hastily tried to restore their men to order, and both sides began firing. There must have been considerable confusion, with many men out of their ranks on both sides, cries from the wounded, shouted orders, drums beating and trumpets blowing, while the dry grass caught fire, adding to the clouds of smoke and dust billowing across the scene, and the late afternoon sun shone directly into the eyes of the French infantry, dazzling them. A better opportunity for cavalry would be hard to imagine.4
Le Marchant's brigade advanced behind and to the left of Wallace's infantry. The three regiments of British cavalry each consisted of three squadrons, but one squadron of the 4th Dragoons under Major Onslow had been detached to the far right about noon and had not rejoined.5 The remaining eight squadrons advanced, six in the front line, with a squadron of the 3rd Dragoons and one of the 5th Dragoon Guards held some distance back in reserve. Each squadron was formed in two-deep line, so that the brigade had a frontage of about six hundred yards. Sir Stapleton Cotton, commander of all the allied cavalry, had either accompanied the brigade in its advance or now joined it, and ordered Le Marchant to attack. Relations between the two men were not comfortable, and when Le Marchant asked what direction the charge should take, Cotton lost his temper and replied sharply, ‘To the enemy, Sir.’ More furious words were exchanged and the quarrel might not have ended there if both men had survived the battle. As it was, the incident added to Cotton's unpopularity among the heavy cavalry.6
State of the battle when Le Marchant's brigade begins its charge (all troop positions approximate, many conjectural).
Still seething from this insult, Le Marchant led his brigade forward along the plateau. Unfortunately, the sources are so fragmentary and confused that any account of their charge needs to be heavily qualified, for we cannot be certain of the sequence of events, although the final result is clear. But it seems that the regiments in the centre and right of the brigade approached Wallace's line from behind at a canter. Grattan describes how the British infantry were startled by their sudden appearance, and at first mistook them for the enemy and began to form square. In a moment they were recognized, however, and the order was quickly given to ‘Open right and left’, creating gaps in the line through which the cavalry passed.7 Le Marchant's men then quickly re-formed their line, and charged forward at full speed. The French infantry facing them had little time to react: blinded by smoke and dust, dazzled by the sun, they had scarcely recognized the threat and begun to form square before the heavy dragoons were upon them. The men of the 62nd and 101st Regiments had already suffered in Pakenham's initial attack and had not yet properly regained their order or composure. Faced with a determined charge of well-formed heavy cavalry – probably the most frightening spectacle on a Napoleonic battlefield – their nerve broke and they fled in all directions. But the men of the 1st Ligne, who had as yet suffered little, appear to have maintained their cohesion and succeeded in withdrawing relatively unscathed.
Meanwhile, Le Marchant's left regiment – probably the 5th Dragoon Guards, although even this is uncertain – took a slightly different course. It advanced, not through Wallace's brigade, but through the mingled light infantry of the Third and Fifth Divisions which had extended to fill the gap between Leith and Pakenham's main lines. Gathering pace as it swept forward, the regiment came upon the exposed flank of Maucune's division just as Leith's men had broken the second French line. The 66th Ligne suffered the most, but at least one battalion of the 15th seems to have been cut to pieces; meanwhile even the second brigade did not escape completely, for the regimental history of the 82nd Ligne describes how Captain Mottie
r defended his Eagle against the British horsemen and only got away with difficulty, the staff broken by balls and sabre blows. Maucune's division had already been defeated, but this charge added enormously to its losses and ensured that it could not hope to rally again that day.8
Maucune and Thomières had been put to flight, but the charge had yet to spend all its energy. The regiments of the centre and right still pressed forward at full speed. They had become mixed together and were crowded into a solid line, officers riding where they could and the supporting squadrons joined with the front line; but if there was some confusion, they were full of confidence and élan. Soon they spied fresh enemies, for the 22nd Ligne, the leading regiment in Taupin's division, was not far away. The horsemen swept forward and the infantry – whether caught by surprise, disrupted by fugitives from Thomières's division, taken while trying to form square, or simply overwhelmed by the impetuosity of the cavalry – were broken and put to flight with very heavy losses.
With this triumph the scene dissolved into complete confusion. The whole plateau was covered with scattered parties of French, some maintaining good order and bent on escape or further resistance, others fleeing in wild panic. ‘The dragoons, excited by the struggle, vied with each other in the pursuit, and galloped recklessly into the crowd of fugitives, sabring those who came within their reach. To restrain them at such a moment was very difficult.’9 In fact they were completely out of control and vulnerable to a French counterattack, although even the destruction of the entire brigade would not have offset the immense damage they had done to Marmont's army. But there were no French cavalry reserves to exploit the opportunity, and so the British dragoons did not pay the normal price for their reckless impetuosity.