Salamanca, 1812

by Rory Muir

  The French did not retreat far. Clausel's other brigade (25th Léger and 27th Ligne, also five battalions and slightly over three thousand men) was only a couple of hundred yards to the rear and seized the perfect moment to counter-attack. Taken at a disadvantage, the allied line hesitated, stood firm for a moment, then broke and fled. Fortunately, we have two good descriptions from close observers of what happened, which are all the more interesting as few memoirists or diarists linger over episodes in which they were worsted. The first comes from a letter written five days after the battle by an unknown British officer:

  The Fuzileers on the left [sic] of the 4th Division had gain'd the most commanding point of the position where they immediately found themselves exposed to a heavy fire from the ground mark'd as the 2d Position & a French Regt. of 4 Battalions (about 12000 [sic] men) below at a very short distance & regularly formed. The Fuzileers in this situation unsupported at the moment commenced firing without forming after its first attack. The French regiment form'd close column with the Grenadiers in front and closed the Battalions. (I was very close on the right flank of the Fuzileers, & witnessed the whole proceeding). They then advanced up the hill in the most beautiful order without firing a shot except a few individuals in the rear of the column. When about 30 paces distant our men began to waver, being still firing & not properly formed. The Ensigns advanced two paces in front & planted the colours on the edge of the hill & Officers stept out to encourage the men to meet them. They stopt with an apparent determination to stand firm, the enemy continued to advance at a steady pace & when quite close the Fuzileers gave way: – The French followed down the hill on our side.8

  The second description comes from John Burgoyne, the engineer officer, who was with the Fusiliers in their attack. He wrote to his sister on 25 July:

  Our troops had but just gained [the height], and had not had time to form again in order, but even then they did not give it up, although ours was a much smaller regiment, until the enemy's column was close to them. The French regiment came up the hill with a brisk and regular step, and their drums beating the pas de charge; our men fired wildly and at random among them; the French never returned a shot, but continued their steady advance. The English fired again, but still without return; they stood their ground however with great courage. But men in such confusion had no chance against the perfect order of the enemy, and when the French were close upon them, they wavered and gave way. The officers all advanced in a line in front, waving their swords, and cheering their men to come on, but the confusion became a panic, and there was a regular sauve qui peut down the hill.9

  These accounts make clear that the Fusiliers were broken by Clausel's counterattack, but this was not the only blow which Cole's regiments suffered at this moment. Bonnet's division sallied forth from behind the Greater Arapile and fell on Cole's exposed flank, easily overpowering the 7th Caçadores, despite gallant resistance. Some British witnesses attribute the defeat of Cole's attack to this sudden new threat, and Bonnet's advance would probably have made Cole's position untenable, even if Clausel had not gained the upper hand.

  A column of French Grenadiers with hairy caps from the right of their line came on at a run with drums beating, and charged the left of the Portuguese, taking them obliquely in the flank. Nothing could be better done on the part of the French. The Portuguese gave way like a wave of the sea, first on their left, then by degrees all the way to the right. It then became a question of whether the Fusiliers would stand it, but, finding their friends on the left gone, a tremendous fire directed upon them in front, and the victorious French column coming on with shouts on their left flank, taking them also in flank, and perceiving that their own fire did not bear upon these fellows close to them, they, in like manner, gave way.10

  At about this time Pack was also repulsed in his ambitious attack on the Greater Arapile (see chapter eight). These two defeats tore a great hole in the centre of the allied line, and appeared to offer the French a chance of gaining an advantage which might offset the defeat of their left. It is not clear whether Clausel consciously determined to grasp this moment and gamble on a slender hope of victory, rather than use the opportunity to withdraw, salvaging all that could be saved of Marmont's army, but admitting defeat. It is just as likely that the French units acted independently, with little co-ordination, carried forward by their own momentum and striking wherever they saw an opportunity. Indeed, Clausel's own division – showing admirable discipline – only made a limited advance and soon halted its pursuit, probably because its commander realized that the defeat of Maucune exposed his left flank.

  The French counter-attack (all troop positions approximate, many conjectural).

  The sense of danger on the allied side at this moment is well conveyed in the recollections of a staff officer, Philip Bainbrigge, who, with his chief, Colonel De Lancey, the acting Quartermaster-General, was riding in the rear of the Fourth Division when it broke:

  they … gave way like a wave of the sea; I can compare it to nothing else. My heart was in my mouth, and they all came down into the hollow in the rear, where they halted.

  Colonel Delancey said to me ‘For God's sake bring up the 6th Division as fast as possible,’ then dashed in amongst the Portuguese, seized the colour of one of the regiments and endeavoured to rally them. I galloped off to the rear; as to restoring order and reforming the regiment it required some time and the work of regimental officers.11

  But in fact the danger was less real than it appeared. The Sixth Division was well placed to fill the gap in the allied line, and beyond it, behind the Lesser Arapile, the First Division lay untouched in reserve. The French counterattack would not be defeated without hard fighting, but the odds were always heavily against its success.

  Wellington ordered the Sixth Division forward even before he saw Cole's attack falter. Clinton's regiments advanced in two lines of columns – that is, each battalion in column and enough space between them for the whole to deploy into line – the British brigades in front, Rezende's strong Portuguese brigade (almost half the division) some distance behind them. No mention is made in the sources of sending the light infantry forward as skirmishers, and they may well have remained in the ranks. Hinde's brigade (2nd Foot, 1/32nd and 1/36th) was on the right; Hulse's (1/11th, 2/53rd and 1/61st) on the more exposed left flank, with the 2/53rd on the extreme left. They were generally good troops and had had plenty of campaign experience in recent years, but, by a quirk of fate, only the 1/61st had been seriously engaged in battle (at Talavera). More recently, the division had been responsible for the costly attacks on the Salamanca forts.

  Meanwhile, on the French side, Clausel's division had not advanced very far, and the 120th Regiment in Bonnet's division remained on the Greater Arapile. The thrust of the French counterattack came from Bonnet's other three regiments, the 118th, 119th and 122nd Ligne, all strong, three-battalion units, amounting to 4,500 men when the battle began. They were supported by three regiments of Boyer's cavalry, 6th, 11th and 25th Dragoons, perhaps 1,100 horsemen, more than in Le Marchant's brigade, but much inferior in quality.

  Boyer's men took the lead at first and did some damage to the broken men of Cole's division; but the bulk of the Portuguese and Fusiliers rallied and formed hasty squares, or gained the protection of the advancing Sixth Division before they had suffered much. The dragoons had more success further east, where they attacked the 2/53rd, the regiment at the eastern end of Clinton's line. It is not clear, precisely, what happened, but it seems that this battalion had been slightly detached from the rest of the division, and two first-hand accounts show beyond doubt that it got into serious difficulties. ‘Our regiment was formed on the left of the line,’ wrote its adjutant, Lieutenant John Carss, on 25 July,

  and a little from the division, to support a pass in order to prevent the enemy from flanking us. We had fired about 10 rounds … when about two or three hundred of the enemy's cavalry supported by infantry made a charge and totally surrounded us. They
called out ‘Surrender’. We answered ‘No’. Our brave fellows kept up such a blaze on them that in about five minutes we drove them off after killing and wounding nearly one half; in this charge we had about five officers wounded and about 40 rank and file killed and wounded. We formed line and advanced.12

  The commander of the battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel George Bingham, wrote on 24 July:

  our left was uncovered just as the French gained a temporary advantage on our right. In this situation, unsupported, we were attacked by the enemy's Heavy Dragoons; we retired in good order, in line, and twice stopped their advance by halting and firing. At last a circular rocky hill, about two hundred yards in the rear, offered an advantage; I determined to profit by it; the Dragoons being too near, and the ranks too much thinned to attempt a square, we made a dash for the hill. The Dragoons came thundering on the rear, and reached the hill just as our people faced about. The fire checked them and it was soon obvious that they would make no impression. At this moment I saw a part of the Regiment which had not reached the rock, running down the hill in great confusion, without however being pursued by the Dragoons. Giving the charge of the hill to Mansell, I dashed through the Dragoons, who made way for me, and succeeded in rallying the men round the Regimental Colour that I had with me. The several attacks of the Dragoons on the mass failed, although at one time they seized the end of the King's Colour, and there was a struggle who should have it; when a sergeant of grenadiers wrested it from the Dragoon who held it, or rather tore the silk from the pole, which I rather think remained with the enemy; at the same time our people gained ground on the right, and the Dragoons retired in confusion.13

  The 2/53rd was not a strong battalion: on 15 July it had twenty-five officers and 316 men, and in the battle as a whole it lost twenty-six men killed, and eleven officers and 105 men wounded, or 142 casualties in all – more than 40 per cent of its strength. No doubt the great bulk of these losses occurred in this incident, for although the 2/53rd rallied, it does not seem to have taken any further part in the battle.

  This was the limit of Boyer's success. If the dragoons charged any of Clinton's other regiments, they made little impression, nor do they reappear later in the battle. The three regiments lost quite heavily: about two hundred casualties or almost one-sixth of their strength; but they had made little impact on the course of the battle. Stubbs's Portuguese brigade, already broken and fleeing – the perfect target for cavalry – probably suffered five to six hundred casualties (about 20 to 25 per cent) – and many, perhaps most, of these losses were inflicted by Clausel's and Bonnet's infantry. The Fusiliers suffered proportionally more (28 per cent, or 380 casualties), but as they were further from the cavalry, and went on to play a more active part later in the battle, it seems unlikely that the French dragoons were responsible for more than a fraction of their casualties. Only a single weak battalion, the 2/53rd, was knocked out of action for the remainder of the day. The contrast between the results achieved by Le Marchant and Boyer is striking, yet both charged when the infantry facing them were already disordered and broken. The good discipline of the allied infantry and the advance of the Sixth Division no doubt helped limit Boyer's success, and he might have done better if he had charged rather later, after Clinton's line had been weakened and disrupted by fighting Bonnet's infantry, but the crucial difference lay in the quality of the two brigades of cavalry. One was well mounted, full of confidence and eager for action; the other was intimidated by the knowledge that for once the allied cavalry were clearly superior.

  Bonnet's infantry advanced in the wake of Boyer's dragoons. They had already broken Stubbs's 7th Caçadores, and they next encountered the 1/40th from William Anson's brigade of Cole's division. Anson had kept the 3/27th on the Lesser Arapile as a garrison, but had detached the 1/40th – possibly on Wellington's orders14 – to help fill the gap between Pack's attack on the Greater Arapile and Cole's advance. With Pack and Cole both defeated, the 1/40th was left exposed. Unfortunately, the sources for what followed are again inadequate, for neither Sergeant Lawrence nor Charles Boutflower, who are usually so helpful for the affairs of the 40th, shed light on this incident. Instead we must rely on a letter written to Napier many years later by Major J. Scott Lillie, who was with the 7th Caçadores in the battle.

  I happened to be at the time with some companies of the Caçadores and the 40th Regiment … This was one of the few occasions on which I saw the bayonet used; the 40th under the late Colonel Archdall, having come into close contact with Bonnet's French brigade in consequence of this movement, which was directed by General William Anson in person; he was moving on with the 40th, leaving the [Greater Arapiles] on his left and in his rear, on which a corps moved from behind the hill in rear of the 40th for the purpose of attacking it, the regiment being at the time engaged in front. I happened to be between the 40th and the enemy, and rode after the former to tell Colonel Archdall of his situation, on which he wheeled round and charged the enemy's column with the bayonet and this terminated the contest at that point.15

  This is hard to follow, for Lillie seems to be saying that the 40th singlehandedly drove back Bonnet's advance, which is manifestly absurd. Charles Vere, on the other hand, says that the regiment was ‘overpowered’ and forced back to its original position near the Lesser Arapile, but gives no details.16 It is even possible that some mixture of the two is correct: that the 40th repulsed a threat to its flank as described by Lillie and so secured its retreat; or that it advanced a second time on the left flank of Clinton's division and that Lillie's description belongs to this phase of the combat. All that we can really state with confidence is that it was heavily engaged, for it lost twelve men killed, five officers and 115 men wounded: 132 casualties in all from an initial strength which would have been considerably below the 582 officers and men present on 15 July, owing to its losses on the Guarena on the 18th.

  French accounts of this part of the battle often tell the story of the heroic Sous-Lieutenant Guillemot of the 118th Ligne, who is supposed to have sprung into the enemy ranks, seized a flag, cutting off the arm of the man who held it, and made his escape despite a severe bayonet wound.17 It is hard to know what to make of this tale. The only British colour arguably lost was that of the 2/53rd, whose fate has already been described, and it is possible that Guillemot ended with the credit for its capture. Oman suggests that the 7th Caçadores may have lost a colour; however, it appears that the caçador battalions, like many other light troops, did not carry standards in the field.18 This leaves the possibility that the flag belonged to a line regiment in Stubbs's brigade or, less plausibly, in Rezende's brigade. However, the failure of Marmont and the other French writers who make so much of Guillemot's exploit to so much as mention the dragoon's capture of the pole and some of the silk of the 2/53rd's King's Colour leaves the impression that only one allied flag was taken, and that the credit for the incident was misdirected. On the other side, J. Scott Lillie claims to have personally captured a French flag. This was presumably the fanion of one of Bonnet's battalions and, as the allies captured half a dozen of these in all, there is no real reason to doubt Lillie's claim.19

  Meanwhile, the 11th and 61st Regiments of Hulse's brigade, forming the left of Clinton's division, took a prominent part in repulsing the French counter-attack. An unpublished contemporary account of the services of the 61st states that the division was ordered forward at the double even before the Fourth Division had been broken. As they were forming line from column, a confused mass of fleeing men mixed with some pursuing French descended upon them. The leading companies of the regiment which had deployed opened fire and checked the French advance, although not without hitting some of Cole's men as well. This gained time for the brigade to complete its deployment and for the broken allied units to pass behind it. The French, their confidence high, now made an impetuous assault on the two British regiments, but ‘being met with 3 cheers, a volley and an instant charge’ were driven back in disorder. Hulse pursued them, but halted h
is line before his men could get completely out of hand. This enabled the French to rally (or perhaps they had fallen back on supports), and their skirmishers and artillery opened a heavy fire on the brigade. When the British battalions had caught their breath and regained their order, they renewed their attack and were again successful.20

  Many of these details are confirmed, with a few variations, in an account written many years later by ‘Major Nott’ (in fact, probably Major Frederick Newman) of the 1/11th:

  our brigade advanced in contiguous columns ascending a rising ground, you may recollect that, just before we reached the top, the 4th Division came over in a state of disorder, the enemy close upon them, the French officers in advance, and actually making use of their swords against our retreating men: our brigade was immediately halted and began to deploy. By the time three companies had formed, the portion of the 4th Division opposite to the 11th passed round the right flank; these companies at once opened their fire and swept away nearly the whole of those officers; this checked them, and after some firing they turned about and fled … The brigade now advanced in line, and when we rose the hill a body of French cavalry was coming up at a hand canter, either to cover their retreating infantry, or to put a finishing hand to the 4th Division; we at once halted and gave them a volley which sent these cavaliers to the rightabout in much quicker time than they came, leaving several horses and men on the ground. The brigade then again advanced in line and entered the plain in front of the enemy's position, and within range of their batteries, which commenced a fire upon us. We advanced but a short distance before we were halted by Headquarter Staff, and in this situation remained considerably more than an hour.21