by Rory Muir
Other sources provide some further corroboration. For example, John Aitchison of the Guards wrote: ‘At one point the first line was attacked after gaining the summit of a hill and driven back, but the second line moved up into its support and the 61st Regiment made one of the most brilliant charges ever recorded.’ And Edward Brackenbury, an officer in Spry's brigade of the Fifth Division, wrote home describing the wounds suffered by his brother, Lieutenant William Brackenbury of the 61st,
which he received when having grasped the Colours of the 61st Regt. within 25 yards of the French Column. He received the first ball through the Left foot, which passed through the bone, but as it has neither touched the ankle Joint, nor the Joints of his toes, his foot is safe, nor will he (I hope) be lame in consequence of it, although the cure may be tedious: the second ball he Received in the left side of his Face which broke the Jawbone; it is now setting; the wound is suppurating. He converses freely and takes nourishment without much pain.22
William Brackenbury survived, but retired from the army in 1816 (aged twenty-six) owing to the lasting effects of his wounds. He was awarded a pension of £70 per annum in 1815, which was increased to £140 in 1824.23
However, this was clearly not the whole story. Bonnet's three regiments had over 1,200 casualties between them, even according to Lamartinière – the true figure is probably rather higher, perhaps 1,500 or a few more. In other words, they lost between one-quarter and one-third of their strength, and the great majority of these casualties must have been suffered at this time. Most accounts suggest that they lost heavily when they pressed their attack close to the British batteries on the Lesser Arapile and the Teso de San Miguel. But even so, Bonnet's nine battalions can hardly have been defeated simply by the 1/40th and the two remaining regiments of Hulse's brigade (leaving out the 2/53rd). Unfortunately, there are no first-hand accounts from either Hinde's or Rezende's brigades which appear to relate to fighting at this time. However, it seems probable that at least the Portuguese, and perhaps both brigades, were engaged, albeit less heavily than Hulse's gallant regiments.
Whatever the details, the French counterattack in the centre collapsed and Bonnet's infantry followed Boyer's dragoons in headlong retreat. Clinton's division followed in their wake, still in good order, despite the heavy losses which they surely must have suffered. Their advance exposed the right flank of Clausel's division, which already had more than enough troubles to deal with. Clausel seems to have limited his pursuit of the Fourth Division, presumably because he felt that his own left flank was threatened by the defeat of Maucune and Leith's advance. The danger was real, for Beresford, who was riding in the rear of Leith's division, reacted quickly to Cole's defeat, taking personal command of Spry's brigade and wheeling it round at a right-angle so that it faced almost due east. Thomas Henry Browne describes what happened:
The Portuguese Brigade of the 5th Division from being on the left took these Battalions of the enemy completely in flank; but there was so much hallooing that instead of charging they began firing which was as dangerous to the British as to the French. Marshal Beresford & his staff put a stop to this firing, and he was making a disposition to charge the enemy in flank, which these Regiments, the 3rd and 15th Portuguese[,] were not very willing to try – a few companies made a sort of shabby charge which these French troops would scarcely have regarded but that the 4th Division again attacked & the 5th took them in rear. They then moved off & the greater part were killed or taken prisoners.24
Yet Edward Brackenbury, who was serving in the 15th Portuguese Line, told his parents: ‘I fought with my Portuguese Regt. who behaved well and bayonetted a Column of French, you will scarcely believe how I could have Escaped when I assure you I was cutting away in a Solid Column with my Common regulation Sword: but Providence protected me as it did at Badajos.’25 However a letter written by William Warre, Beresford's ADC, tends to support Browne's account, although his main concern is with his chief:
It was near sunset, and in endeavouring to make a Portuguese Brigade charge the enemy, (who were driving the 4th Division back with 5 Battalions) in flank, that our excellent Marshal was wounded, while exerting himself, as he always does with the greatest zeal and gallantry, and by his noble example, to cover the 4th Division by this flank charge. But they soon rallied and regained the ground they had lost by the sudden attack of the enemy, and the heights were retaken just as the Marshal was hit.26
Spry's brigade lost only about 150 casualties, or 6.7 per cent, in the whole battle, only a marginally higher proportion than Pringle's brigade (the other unit in Leith's second line); so despite Brackenbury, it does not appear to have been engaged heavily against Clausel. Nonetheless, it probably helped to gain time for Cole's infantry to rally, and many accounts suggest that the Fourth Division returned to the fray and eventually drove Clausel's men from the plateau. This seems superficially implausible, but Clausel's division was driven back, and if it was not done by Spry, nor by the Fusiliers, it is hard to see who did do it, for we must assume that the Sixth Division was fully occupied with Bonnet. Clausel's losses were not slight: even Lamartinière admits 1,700 casualties, although about a hundred of these would have occurred on the 18th.
The memoirs of a French officer in the 59th Ligne, in Clausel's second brigade, suggest an alternative explanation which is worth considering, even though there is no support for it in other sources, and many of its details are obviously wrong. The author was Captain Alphonse d'Hautpoul:
General Clausel led us in a charge on the troops of General Hill who was facing us. The English opposed us resolutely when we began firing at half musket range; they fired battalion volleys on us with the same precision as if on manoeuvre. Their flag was in the centre of their line; we could hear the orders of their officers. The divisions of Ferey and Clausel were not halted by this first fire although more than 800 men had been killed or wounded. We charged the enemy with the bayonet; his line was broken; the regiments of Scots Guards who were facing us could not rally. We pursued them vigorously over ground covered with their dead.
In the centre, we believed that the battle was won, but Wellington, seeing Marmont's mistake in overextending his line, had sent all his reserves and cavalry to his right flank and made an all-out charge with eight thousand cavalry on our left wing. The cavalry of General Curto could not stand the shock and were broken. Thomières's division on the extreme left was charged in the flank without having time to form squares, and could resist no longer. Whole regiments were put to the sword and General Thomières was killed. The divisions of Taupin and Maucune were charged in turn and broken. General Clausel, who was pursuing General Hill, seeing that his left was outflanked by numerous cavalry, halted his line and tried to form it in squares, but he lacked time, and his regiments, taken by surprise, were broken. General Hill, reinforced by a corps of Portuguese, resumed the offensive and a frightful melee ensued. At this moment I received from a Scottish sergeant – whom I'd just dealt a sabre blow – a musketball in the hip and at the same time a bayonet which pierced my right arm. I fell covered in blood.
A few moments after I received my two wounds the English cavalry rode over our line, taking it in the rear. Monsieur de Loverdo, my colonel, who had succeeded Colonel Caste, saved the regiment's Eagle by carrying it at a gallop into the squares of Ferey's division, behind which the debris of Clausel's division tried to rally. Stretched on the ground I lay at the mercy of the enemy. During the charge, two squadrons passed over but the horses instinctively leapt over me. I saw their feet almost crush me: my position was critical, but I was powerless to do anything and had to resign myself.27
It is hard to know what to make of this: d'Hautpoul's many mistakes about the allies – General Hill, the ‘eight thousand’ cavalry, fighting the ‘Scots Guards’ – are all disconcerting, but do not really discredit his account. It is one thing to mistake a regiment of Fusiliers for a regiment of Scots Guards, and not to know the name of the enemy general who commanded them; but being rid
den over by enemy cavalry was direct personal experience, unlikely to be imagined even in a wound-induced fever. If the story was self-serving, designed to show how heroic d'Hautpoul had been in action, it would be easy to dismiss it; but it is relatively free of bombast, while Colonel de Loverdo's saving of the Eagle by abandoning his regiment was far from the tales of glory often associated with such incidents. And yet it is hard to believe that Le Marchant's charge really penetrated this far, breaking Clausel's division in addition to those of Thomières and Maucune and half of Taupin's. If it did, why does no British account claim it? D'Hautpoul's uncorroborated testimony is insufficient basis on which to re-write the history of the battle; but equally his account is too credible to be dismissed out of hand. The question, like so many others, must remain open.
Commentary
The experiences of the Fusiliers at Albuera (16 May 1811) are well known, but it is worth giving some details of their losses. The three regiments began the day with five battalions in the field (not all brigaded together), amounting to 2,964 officers and men, and suffered 1,668 casualties, or 56 per cent of their strength. As a result, the surviving men of the 2/7th and 2/48th were drafted into their first battalions and the cadres sent home. The 1/7th, and probably the other regiments, also received substantial drafts of fresh recruits from Britain (ten officers and 370 men sailed to join the 1/7th in July 1811); while many of the men wounded at Albuera would have rejoined their units in subsequent months. Nonetheless, the brigade had only 1,413 officers and men on 15 July 1812, less than half its strength on the morning of Albuera. Such losses were, of course, extraordinary, but the constant attrition caused by sickness led to a high turnover of men even in units which did not see much fighting.28
The sources for Cole's initial advance at Salamanca are thin, but pose few major problems. Several accounts say that the division suffered much from flanking fire from French batteries on the Greater Arapile, but the western end of the hill is extremely rocky and precipitous, and it is not easy to see how any guns could have been positioned there to fire on the allied flank. In any case the French troops on the hill were more likely to be preoccupied with Pack's brigade. However, there may have been a battery deployed behind the hill, facing north-west, whose fire would have taken the Fourth Division in the flank.
Vere says that Cole was wounded ‘soon after the line passed through the village of Arapiles’; but this seems too early in the advance, for Colonel Wade states that it occurred when Cole ‘was leading his division on to storm the heights’, and also that the wound was caused by a ‘musquet ball’. Clausel's division does not seem to have been in position early enough to send out skirmishers to harass the allied advance, so unless the musketball came from a canister fired by the French artillery, Cole probably suffered his wound in the fighting on the plateau.29
It is not certain whether the initial clash between Cole and Clausel occurred on the hillside a few hundred yards to the south of the village of Arapiles (that is, on the north face of the Monte de Azan), or at the crest on the further side of the plateau, perhaps a thousand yards to the south. However, the latter seems more probable: descending the steep slope of the Teso de San Miguel and passing through the village would inevitably cause some confusion, which would be risky if the main body of the enemy was so close. Moreover, there are hints that Clausel's advance had been delayed and that Cole came into action well after the initial clash between Leith and Maucune. Not everything fits this hypothesis perfectly: Clausel's limited pursuit of Cole, the ineffectiveness of Boyer's dragoons and the rapid intervention of the Sixth Division would fit the more northerly ridge better; but weighed against all this, Cole's left flank would not have been much exposed by such a limited advance, while it would have been highly vulnerable had he crossed the breadth of the plateau. The intervention of Spry's brigade also points to the fighting occurring further south, as does the retreat of Bonnet's 122nd Ligne, which would otherwise be inexplicable.
By a curious chance, there is no good description of the first round of fighting, in which Clausel's leading brigade was broken, but there are no fewer than five accounts of the second round, in which Clausel's reserve brigade broke Cole's disordered line. Three of these descriptions are quoted in the main narrative; the other two present a problem, for they suggest that Cole's flank was threatened by French cavalry, and that this was the reason it broke. However, this is not supported by the other, earlier sources, and may be owing to no more than some confusion regarding the sequence of events. Whatever the explanation, these two additional descriptions are quite interesting. Thomas Henry Browne writes that the Fourth Division,
after driving the enemy from a hill, which he had warmly contested, were in their turn charged by five Battalions of Infantry drawn up six deep, & probably would have withstood even this tremendous fresh formation, had not some Squadrons of French dragoons charged the Portuguese in flank, & broke them, which also for a moment, disordered the Fusileers [sic], & the five French Battalions succeeded in retaking the hill.30
Lieutenant Cameron of the 7th Fusiliers recalls:
We were at this moment ordered by Colonel Beatty to retire and form square, a most hazardous movement when the enemy's Infantry were advancing, and within thirty yards of us. The order was only partially heard and obeyed on the right, while on the left we kept up a hot fire on the enemy, who were advancing up-hill, and within a few yards of us. The Companies on our right having retired in succession we found ourselves alone, but the ground the enemy were ascending was so steep that we got off without loss and joined the rest. Luckily while we were forming square to receive the cavalry, the 6th Division came up and received the charge intended for us.31
What happened next is also open to debate. Burgoyne claims that the Fusiliers rallied at the foot of the hill and immediately returned to the fray:
No sooner had they arrived at the bottom, than they came to their senses, and were furious with themselves for having allowed the enemy to gain the advantage. In about five minutes, they were formed in perfect order at a short distance below, and they then reascended the hill most gallantly, and drove the French down the other side as quickly as they themselves had been driven before.32
This seems unlikely, as even the best troops would take some time to rally and regain their order, while Burgoyne's version of events leaves no time for Beresford to intervene on Clausel's flank with Spry's brigade. Wachholtz provides a more plausible account of this phase of the combat. When Clausel's division delivered its counterattack, he found himself with the 7th Fusiliers and was surprised when the allied line crumbled and broke. ‘Before I could decide if I should remain or go with them,’ as he quaintly puts it, ‘I found myself instinctively already at the fastest gallop which I have ever made in my life. I covered an enormous distance at each stride. … Finally, when we reached the valley, the shouting of the officers began to have an effect, particularly as everyone was out of breath.’ But then the disordered infantry caught sight of the French cavalry, supported by Bonnet's infantry. Hastily they formed square, British and Portuguese mingling together. Fortunately, the squares were not put to the test, for the Sixth Division advanced to support Cole's men before the cavalry could charge. Wachholtz records that Clinton's men said as they passed, ‘Be ashamed, Fusiliers!’, while the two accounts from Hulse's brigade both make clear that the Fourth Division did not rally until the Sixth had driven off their pursuers.33
It would be interesting to know why Beresford was riding in the rear of the Fifth Division when he took command of Spry's brigade and led it against Clausel. Similarly, what were De Lancey and Bainbrigge doing behind the Fourth Division when it collapsed in front of them like a wave of the sea? Where was Wellington: at the head of the Sixth Division, or on the Lesser Arapile or some other convenient observation post? We simply do not know. The sources give us glimpses of these figures at memorable moments, but not enough information to construct a continuous narrative of their movements, let alone analyse their ac
tivities. And naturally the sources are even less helpful for the French generals.
The account by ‘Major Nott’ is printed in H. A. Bruce's Life of William Napier; however, as R. E. R. Robinson points out in his history of the 11th, no such officer appears in the Army List. The full text of the letter makes clear that the author took command of the regiment when Lieutenant-Colonel Cuyler was wounded, which strongly suggests that it was written by Major Frederick Newman, the second-in-command. Presumably the signature was unclear, and Bruce – or his printers – hazarded a guess.34
Most elements of the French counterattack are uncertain to a greater or lesser extent, and any account of this episode must include some guess-work. Oman memorably describes how the defeat of Cole and Pack gave Clausel the choice between risking all in the hope of victory, or admitting defeat and withdrawing what could still be saved of Marmont's army. ‘Being an ambitious and resolute man’, Clausel preferred the former, and it is evident that Oman sympathized with his choice, even though he later admits that it proved unwise – indeed, it is noticeable that almost all British accounts are distinctly well disposed towards Clausel. Other historians, even Jean Sarramon, have followed Oman's lead, with only Young and Lawford questioning whether Clausel would have seen his decision in these stark terms. But unless Oman is drawing on some unmentioned source, we do not even know that Clausel made any decision, for Boyer's dragoons and Bonnet's infantry may have been acting independently in seizing the tempting opportunity presented by Cole's exposed flank and Pack's defeat. Oman's description superbly captures the state of the battle as a whole at an important moment and fixes the reader's attention – which is why it has so often been repeated – but it appears to be based on no more than supposition.