by Rory Muir
The Fusilier brigade from the Fourth Division formed on the left of Clinton's line and took part in the assault on the French position, although the distribution of casualties within the brigade rather suggests that the outer half of it may have extended beyond Ferey's main line and consequently encountered little effective opposition. Charles Vere, the Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Fourth Division, describes the part played by the Fusiliers:
The Brigade of the 6th division, under General Hulse, was ordered by Lord Wellington to attack the right of the enemy in his new position, and the Fusilier Brigade of the 4th Division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of the 48th Regiment, was moved forward to the attack, on the left of General Hulse's Brigade.
The attack was spirited, and well executed. The Fusilier Brigade moved up the heights under a heavy fire, without returning a shot; and drove the enemy in its front, from his ground. The Brigade then brought up its left, for the purpose of assisting General Hulse, by a flank and raking movement. But the formation was no sooner effected, than the enemy gave way before the General, and the defeat was completed. As the day had closed, the troops halted and picquets were pushed into the wood.12
Much of this is confirmed by Wachholtz, whose Brunswickers were on the outer or northern flank of the Fusiliers as they wheeled around Ferey's flank. Evidently there was some confusion caused by the growing dark and the fact that the troops were among the trees. Some Portuguese infantry attempted to take Wachholtz prisoner, and tempers flared before the difficulty was overcome. Wachholtz also notes the effectiveness of the British artillery enfilading the French line, and saw some men from the 23rd Regiment capture a French gun. (This was either the 23rd Fusiliers, or the 23rd Portuguese Line from Stubbs's brigade of the Fourth Division: Wachholtz does not specify which, although the former seems rather more likely.)13
Finally, we are fortunate in having a detailed French account of the later stages of the fighting, written by Captain Jean-Baptiste Lemonnier-Delafosse of the 31st Léger. According to Lemonnier-Delafosse, there were two distinct phases in the combat. In the first, Ferey's division checked the advance of the British, but was ultimately forced to withdraw to the skirts of the forest in its rear. In the second, it repelled an attack by Clinton's Portuguese, but finally succumbed to a renewed British assault acting with increased pressure on its flanks. The quotation begins at the end of the first phase:
The cruel fire cost us many lives. Then, slowly, having gained almost an hour's respite for the army, we retired, still protected by the squares, to the edge of the wood which stretched away to Alba de Tormes. Here Ferey halted his half-destroyed division, and formed in line it still presented a respectable front to the enemy. Here he made his stand despite the enfilading fire of the English batteries; here he found the death most desired by a soldier, that caused by a cannon-ball.
The 3rd Division thus formed on the edge of the wood, deprived of its artillery, saw the enemy advance on it in two lines, the first composed of the Portuguese, the second of the English. Left alone to fight, its position was critical, but it awaited the shock. The two lines marched on the division; their order was so regular that we could see the officers in the Portuguese lines maintain company intervals by striking their men with their swords or canes.
We opened fire on the enemy as soon as they came within range, and the fire of our front two ranks was so effective that it halted their advance, and although they tried to return our fire, they melted away completely – but they were Portuguese. The second line, composed of English soldiers, now advanced upon us; we should have tried to receive it like the first, without yielding an inch, despite the fire of the enemy's batteries, but a sudden blow on our left was too much. The 70th Ligne was turned and broken by cavalry and their flight carried away the 26th and 77th [sic – 47th] regiments. My own 31st Léger, although only two battalions strong, held firm and halted the enemy who continued to fire until we finally retired a few hundred yards into the wood.14
Lemonnier-Delafosse then goes on to give more details of the experiences of his own unit, from which it is clear that it suffered much from the enfilading fire of the British artillery:
In my company ten [men] were carried away by the fire of the battery which cut us to pieces. My company was number 4 in the first battalion; all the others, especially the carabineers, had large holm oaks to the right which gave them cover from the flanking fire, so all the cannon shot hit my company, whilst the voltigeurs did not lose a man. A gap opened on my left. In the midst of this carnage a farcical event made us laugh, a soldier was hit twice by one bullet, his pack was full of flour which powdered all our faces.15
After this, it is rather disconcerting to find that Ferey's losses were among the lowest in the French army: of the infantry divisions, only those of Foy and Sarrut, neither of which was seriously engaged, suffered less. According to Lamartinière's return, Ferey's division suffered 1,001 casualties, or 17.4 per cent of its strength. These are not trifling casualties, and Lamartinière's return generally understates the true figure, although in this case Martinien's record of officer casualties tends to support the return. (According to Martinien, the officers of the four regiments in the division lost 19.6 per cent, 13.6 per cent, 25.4 per cent and 10.2 per cent, or 17.5 per cent overall.) Other French regiments who joined Ferey would also have suffered in the action, but the evidence is too uncertain to attempt to estimate their losses.
Several factors contributed to keeping Ferey's losses lower than might have been expected. The fact that most of the allied troops had already been heavily engaged probably reduced the effectiveness of their musketry significantly, and may also have reduced their impetuosity, preventing them from charging through the French fire and so resolving the combat rapidly. The powerful French artillery must also have greatly helped Ferey's cause, while the British guns only played a part late in the action, when a battery from the First Division was able to enfilade the French line. The fading light and the steepness of the slope probably reduced the accuracy of the fire on both sides, although here the advantage lay with the allies, for it was more difficult to fire effectively downhill than up, while the setting sun would have shone longer on the French on top of the westerly facing ridge than on the allies at its foot. More important is Ross-Lewin's statement that in the initial advance the French opened fire at two hundred yards, while Lemonnier-Delafosse implies that in the second round, against both the Portuguese and then against the British, the French opened fire ‘as soon as they came within range’. But Napoleonic muskets were very inaccurate even at two hundred yards, and at that range a musketry duel could be sustained for some time before significant casualties would accumulate; especially as the effectiveness of each round would diminish as the men became dazed by the noise, blinded by the smoke, and began making mistakes in the complicated procedure of loading their muskets. It is significant that Ferey's fresh troops lacked the discipline to hold their fire until the British were at closer range and, equally, that fire at such a long range was sufficient to check the impetus of the British advance. Finally, there was no effective pursuit of Ferey's division after the fighting had finished: it fell back in considerable disorder, but the wood and night covered its retreat, while the Sixth Division was too badly battered to advance any further.
Lemonnier-Delafosse's account raises some other questions. This is the only source which suggests that the combat fell into two distinct phases, or that Rezende's brigade attacked separately from the rest of the allies and was repulsed. This does not mean that his account is not correct: Ross-Lewin was wounded and had to leave the front before the combat was over, and Major Newman may well have conflated two episodes into one. Lemonnier-Delafosse's story is intrinsically plausible and appears convincing, but it should be noted that some details are demonstrably wrong – Ferey was mortally wounded, but not killed outright – while the account of other parts of the day is unconvincing. If his was the only first-hand description of the fighting, one would a
ccept it with gratitude but, as we are faced with a number of conflicting accounts, doubts arise that cannot be dismissed. Even if fresh evidence were to be discovered, it seems unlikely that we would ever know precisely what happened in this combat.
Nonetheless, it is quite clear that Ferey achieved his principal objective. His task had been to cover the retreat of the French army, even if this required the sacrifice of his division. In the event his men suffered heavily – although not as heavily as might have been expected – and fell back in disorder, joining the flight of the rest of the army. But vital time had been gained: darkness had fallen and the main thrust of the allied advance had been halted. Ferey appears to have handled his division with considerable skill, while his regiments fought with resolution, neither disrupted nor demoralized by the flight of the rest of the army. Wellington's men in a similar position might have achieved even more, decisively repulsing Clinton's assault, but defensive linear tactics were not the French forte, and the performance of Ferey's division was certainly among the most creditable of all Marmont's troops on the day. In the end, the fighting could have only one outcome, for Ferey had no choice but to withdraw: his flanks were vulnerable and, once night had been gained and protection afforded against allied pursuit, it would serve no purpose to remain. Indeed, his division had to be across the Tormes by morning or it would certainly be cut off and destroyed.
The handling of the attack aroused some discontent in the allied army, although not enough to cloud the joy of victory. Two issues are involved: the decision to attack frontally rather than operate on Ferey's flanks, which has already been discussed, and the actual execution of the attack. Colonel De Lancey, while criticizing the first, speaks highly of Hulse's conduct in regard to the second, and Major Newman emphatically agrees, ‘Hulse's conduct during the whole of the battle was beyond praise.’ It is not clear why both officers refer to Hulse rather than Clinton: there are no reports of the latter being wounded, nor any other reason for doubting that he remained in command of his division throughout the day. However, Colonel Bingham, of the 2/53rd, said in a letter written soon after the battle that Clinton's ‘conduct on the day of the action, was such as does not add to his popularity’. This is suggestive, but without further evidence – and there is none – it would be dangerous to leap to any conclusions.16
Lieutenant T. H. Browne of the staff also presents a more critical view of the attack, although he names no names: ‘the Troops of that Division [the Sixth] were not quite satisfied with the mode of attack by which they were brought up in front & then halted to fire at an enemy who had better ground.’ And Andrew Leith Hay elaborates with some comments which may disconcert those who still believe that British success in the Peninsula rested on the firepower of their infantry: ‘The 6th [Division] suffered very much having been halted when advanced about half way – which is a system that never will answer, the only way is to get at them at once with the Bayonet, that they can never stand, but as to firing they will do that as long as you like, and fire much better than we do.’ That this was a common view at the time is shown by an anonymous second-hand account of the battle, published in the Royal Military Panorama for December 1812: ‘The Sixth Division … deployed at the bottom of a hill, of easy ascent, and then began to fire regular vollies. In consequence, they suffered very severely, for the French, it is well known, will exchange shots with you as much as you please.’ Even Charles Boutflower, who, as a surgeon, knew how few wounds were ever actually inflicted by bayonets, agreed, remarking of the battle in general: ‘The whole business was performed by the Bayonet, & the most sceptical must now be surely convinced how superior in the use of it is the British Soldier to every other in the world.’17
Whether the Sixth Division was in fact deliberately halted to return the French fire – as Leith Hay implies – must be doubted. Any such order would have been most unwise and most uncharacteristic of British tactics in the Peninsula, which always emphasized the search for a quick decision through a bayonet charge, rather than a prolonged, mutually destructive exchange of musketry. It seems far more likely that the allied advance, made by troops who had already been blunted by hard fighting, simply faltered when faced with an extremely strong position held by fresh, determined troops, sensibly deployed. The wonder is not that the British brigades did not press home their initial attack, but rather that they sustained it so well and eventually forced Ferey to withdraw. Clinton's division and the Fusiliers suffered more than twice as heavily as any other comparable unit in the allied army, except Stubbs's Portuguese brigade from the Fourth Division. But they had borne the brunt of the battle in the centre where the French fought with great courage and resolution – and some skill – and they had triumphed. The cost was high, but probably not excessive.
Commentary
By far the best secondary account of this late stage of the battle is in Jean Sarramon's La Bataille des Arapiles, which adds considerable new information to Oman's narrative. In particular Sarramon sheds light on the hitherto mysterious movements of Sarrut's division, basing his account on unpublished papers and an obscure biographical notice of one of Sarrut's brigadiers, General Fririon.18 Nonetheless, much still remains unclear about the role played by this division, and even more about Taupin's remaining brigade and the related movements of the allied Third and Fifth Divisions. All we can really say with confidence is that the advance of the allied right wing was slower than might have been expected, and that the casualty statistics do not suggest any serious fighting at this point. Sarramon states that when Sarrut's division withdrew from the plateau it took up a position to the left and in the rear of Ferey's division; but if so, it is rather strange that its casualties remained so light and that it did not give Ferey more effective assistance.
Ferey's division was not one of the more distinguished in Marmont's army: only the 31st Léger had played a noticeable role in the campaigns of 1805–7 (at Friedland), while all four regiments had seen long and mostly unhappy service in the Peninsula. Three regiments (31st Léger, 47th and 70th Ligne) had been heavily engaged at Coruña and had gone on to take part in Soult's invasion of Portugal. In the following year all four had again invaded Portugal in Reynier's corps of Masséna's army, and all except the 47th lost heavily at Busaco. The campaign as a whole cost the division between 30 and 50 per cent of its strength, mostly due to illness and famine. The unfortunate 70th Ligne had particular reason to dread the prospect of another encounter with British infantry, for it had been engaged, generally with heavy losses, at Roliça, Coruña, Oporto, Busaco and Sabugal. Admittedly the division had not been in the thick of the fighting at Fuentes, but nonetheless its performance is all the more creditable given its previous experiences.
A minor oddity concerns the strength of the 70th Ligne. Both Oman and Fortescue state that this regiment had two battalions with the army, amounting to 1,163 officers and men, on 15 July. However, it is not clear whether both historians checked the original returns in the Archives de Guerre independently, or whether the return was among the transcripts ‘of French dispatches for 1812’ which Fortescue lent Oman.19 The question arises because the return of 1 July printed by Sarramon, which is based directly on the original manuscript, states that the 70th Ligne had three battalions in the field. There is no disagreement over the numerical strength of the regiment, which Sarramon puts at 1,175 officers and men present on 1 July; it is only the number of battalions which is in dispute. If Sarramon is correct, the battalions would have been unusually weak, averaging fewer than four hundred men each, while the 582 men per battalion implied by Fortescue and Oman is very close to the average for Marmont's army. It thus seems probable that Sarramon is mistaken, and one might believe that this is no more than a misprint if his text as well as his appendix did not refer to Ferey's ten (rather than nine) battalions.
Several sources comment on the allied decision to attack Ferey's position frontally, although none adds much to the question of whether Pakenham really protested against it and advo
cated a turning movement. Wellington says simply: ‘I ordered the 1st and Light divisions, and Col. Stubbs' Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was reformed, and Major Gen. W. Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the [enemy's] right, while the 6th division, supported by the 3rd and 5th attacked in front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division.’20 This makes it fairly clear that the Third and Fifth Divisions advanced in the rear of the Sixth, and that no attempt was made to turn Ferey's outer flank. Captain Campbell, the brigade-major of the first brigade of the Third Division, evidently regretted this decision:
We, however, committed one mistake, in following up the enemy, for we had inclined too much to our left, and had thereby thrown away the advantage we would have had in still acting, even after dark, upon the French left and rear. Had the 3rd Division been kept more to the right, instead of coming at dusk almost in the rear of troops engaged with the enemy upon our left; and had it, supported by our cavalry, continued to act even in the dark, I cannot imagine how the enemy could have been able to recross the Tormes.21
But if Sarramon is right and Sarrut's division had formed in Ferey's left rear, an attempt to turn the French flank may have proved costly and time-consuming. Yet again the information is too vague and uncertain to allow us to judge with confidence.