by Rory Muir
Appendix IV
Letter Describing the Battle, Possibly Written by Major-General Henry Campbell
Among the Hope of Luffness Papers in the National Archives of Scotland in Edinburgh, there is a contemporary copy of a letter to Colonel Herbert Taylor from a senior officer in Wellington's army. Taylor had been private secretary to both the Duke of York (1799–1805) and King George III (1805–12) and remained an important, though discreet, figure at Court and at the Horse Guards. The copy of the letter is written in a clear clerk's hand and is signed only ‘H. C.’, but it is headed ‘Copy of a Letter from M. General Henry Clinton, Commanding the 6th Division of Lord Wellington's Army, to Colonel Taylor’. However, there are several reasons for believing that this was a mistake – presumably made by the copyist – and that the letter was actually written by Major-General Henry Campbell, commander of the First Division. Here is the full text of the letter:
Cantaracillo, Saturday 25th July 1812
I cannot let the Mail go without a line to tell you that I am quite safe and well after the Action which has terminated a week of almost incessant Marching and Manoeuvring by the most complete defeat and total deroute of Marmont's Army. I have seen a Person who passed through them Yesterday, when they were still running as fast as weakness, fatigue, and hunger would allow them, not merely along the Road, but in Crowds on each side of it, and all in the greatest hurry and disorder, a very large proportion having thrown away their Arms. I cannot attempt now to give you an account of the Battle, but I will try a short sketch of the events of this highly interesting week.
On Sunday last our whole Army was collected near Canizal, and on the south side of the River Guarena (only a muddy ditch) in the Evening we moved out to a Position with our Left towards Canizal, and our rear to Vallesa.
On Monday morning both Armies were in sight opposite each other the French did not begin to move till long after Daylight, when they filed off to their left in high style, Bands playing etc etc. We formed in two Lines and offered them Battle, but they heeded us not, and walking quietly and steadily, yet rapidly round us made a great Circuit, and got on some very Commanding Hills on our right. We then wheeled our two Lines into Columns & moved along the Valley parallel to them, making a much smaller Circle within theirs, at one place where the Valley narrowed, they Cannonaded us, and several Shot fell over and near our Column but did no harm, soon after, we separated more, kept away to our Right and halted at the Village Cabeza Vellosa [Cabezabellosa], they bore away to their left down towards the Tormes.
The new Day at daybreak we also moved down to the Tormes, and halted on the right bank a very little above Salamanca; in the Evening we crossed the River at the Ford of St Martha and took up a Position with our Left on the River, our Right on high strong Ground, Salamanca being in our rear. We had a dreadful night of Thunder, Lightning, and Rain – The Horses of the Heavy Cavalry frightened at the Thunder, broke away and linked together as they were went directly over the Men who were asleep and maimed a great many – 50 Horses were missing in the Morning.
On Wednesday all was again quiet till long after daylight, but then a popping began in front, and kept increasing for some time. About 9 O'Clock we got an Order to quit the Ground we had occupied in the night, and the whole Army moved gaining Ground to the right, and to the front also; the French in the meanwhile had got on a very Commanding Hill close in our front, from which they could see all that we did, and behind which they were playing the old Game again and stretching away to turn our right. Lord W. at one time determined to attack them, and sent for me, and told me to move forward in two Columns up a Hill in front of our Right, where this Division then was, and attack their left, while the 4th Division was to attack them in front, but I had hardly put the Columns in motion, before I recd. a Counter Order and moved back to the Ground I had quitted. We remained there some time and then got an order to Countermarch and move quite to the left to occupy some high Ground that other Divisions were quitting; but by the time we got there, the French shewed a large Force on the Hill we were to have attacked and opened a great many Guns there and kept advancing them from one point to another & Cannonading us in a very bullying way, treating us exactly like a beaten and retreating Army. This at last roused the Earl's indignation, and he determined to shew them, it was not come exactly to that, and attack them which was done as soon as thought, they were driven from all the strong Ground they had occupied on our Right in high style and their Left completely beat back, they then made a stand in their Centre, where the Portuguese giving way, made things look a little awkward for a time, but they were driven back from that by the 6th Division; their Right then formed on a Hill and made a last effort, where they were attacked just as the Moon was rising by the Light Division in two Lines supported by the 1st. They kept up a smart fire as we ascended the Hill, but on some Guns opening from a Hill on our Left they turned and ran for it, and must have made very good play for we followed them in the same order, the Light Division in two Lines, and the first in two Columns, one on each of its Flanks to support it till near 1 O'Clock in the Morning, going all the time at the rate of near 4 miles an hour, without overtaking more than a very few stragglers and wounded, but as a great deal of our way was thro' a very thick wood, we must have passed a great many that were picked up by others in our Rear. It is the first time I suppose, that ever Troops marched in Line for four hours across Country in the night, and they were in a very good Line when they halted, and our Columns also were in order to have wheeled into Line directly. We halted about one near the Village of Calvarrasa de Abajo.
At 5 we marched again and crossed the Tormes, a little below Alba de Tormes, and soon after near the Village of La Serra; the Cavalry that led our Columns came up with their Rear Guard, which they attacked in the most brilliant style, and made about 1,500 Prisoners at one haul [?]; as we got to one brow we could see them going up in the greatest disorder, but too far ahead to get up with them; the Peer tried to get them to stop, by showing only one Brigade, but they knew better & after following for nine Hours, we halted at Coca [Coca de Alba]; we moved from thence here yesterday, and today we halt to get up Stragglers that had been left with the wounded &c and Provisions; we are also nearly all barefooted, and want a day's rest or two.
The Guards have suffered but little. Two Officers Wounded, Captn Whyte, 3rd Regiment badly; Ens[ign] Hotham, Coldstreams, slightly and about 10 Men killed and 40 Wounded. Germans about the same. I believe Poor Le Marchant's death is most unfortunate, with so large a Family. All the Guardsmen safe and untouched, Clinton, Anson, Hulse, Wheatley, and all their Staff God bless you, I have not time to say more – say every thing for me to all & Believe me
most truly Yours
H. C.
If Marmont had not rode the Winning Horse too hard & bullied us, we should have gone quietly back, over the Agueda; he has paid dearly for it.*
There are a number of reasons for believing that this letter was written by Campbell and not Clinton, some comparatively trivial, others more compelling. Both Clinton and Campbell were Guardsmen, and both would almost certainly have known Taylor, but Campbell's connection to Taylor and the Court was much stronger: Clinton had been aide-de-camp to the Duke of York, 1793–5, but Campbell had been aide-de-camp to the King in 1803 and a groom of the bedchamber from about 1809 to 1812, and went on to hold other Court appointments.†
The letter is dated from Cantaracillo, two or three miles east of Peñaranda. Wellington's headquarters on this day were at Flores de Avila a few miles further east, but John Mills and John Aitchison, both of the Guards brigade of the First Division, date letters of 25 July from Cantaracillo.‡ Unfortunately, we do not know where the Sixth Division was on this day: the only relevant source for the division is a letter from Lieutenant Robert Garrett, dated ‘Camp near Penaranda, July 25th 1812’,* so it is possible – although unlikely – that both the First and Sixth Divisions were in the same village on this day.
Turning to the text of the letter,
there is nothing surprising in the account of the campaign, which is too general and impersonal to provide any evidence of the identity of the author. However, the description of the day of battle is more fruitful. The detailed account of Wellington's plans for an attack on the Greater Arapile, which was then cancelled, is particularly significant. Many other sources state that this operation was to be undertaken by the First and Fourth Divisions, while they give no hint that the Sixth Division was to take part.† As it is clear that this letter was written by the commander of the division which – with the Fourth Division – was to lead the attack, we must either attribute it to Campbell, or completely recast our understanding of the episode.
The letter continues by saying that the division ‘move[d] quite to the left to occupy some high Ground that other Divisions were quitting’. This fits neatly with the strange movement of the First Division from behind the village of Arapiles to the left, where it replaced the Fifth Division behind the Lesser Arapile. It is not compatible with any known movement made by the Sixth Division.
Consider next the brief, bare description of the fighting in the centre: ‘[the French] then made a stand in their Centre, where the Portuguese giving way, made things look a little awkward for a time, but then were driven back from that by the 6th Division.’ Is this really all that the commander of the Sixth Division would have to say of its advance to fill the yawning hole in the centre of the allied line, its deployment under heavy fire, its succouring of the broken units of the Fourth Division, and then of its checking and finally breaking Bonnet's counterattack? Such reticence surely goes beyond the limits of soldierly modesty.
What follows? An account of the Sixth Division's heroic – if costly – assault on Ferey's position? No, that is passed over in silence and instead we have a lengthy account of the advance of the First and Light Divisions in pursuit of the French. Furthermore, this account is full of the first person plural: ‘we ascended the hill … we followed them in the same order, the Light Division in two Lines, and the first in two Columns … a great deal of our way … we must have passed. … We halted about one …’ (emphasis added). No excessive modesty here: the account is detailed, confident and proud, although not unpleasantly boastful. Its final sentence leaves little room for argument: ‘We halted about one near the Village of Calvarrasa de Abajo’ – so did the First Division, while the Sixth remained near El Sierro, some six miles to the south-west.
The letter ends with comments on the losses of the Guards and German brigades (both in the First Division) and on the safety of various senior officers who had served in the Guards, which was a subject of particular interest at Court. This list includes ‘Clinton’ – odd if the letter was written by Henry Clinton, but perfectly natural if the author was Henry Campbell, commander of the First Division.
* Hope of Luffness Papers, NAS GD 364/1/1224.
† Biographical details for both from Thorne, ed., The History of Parliament, The Commons, 1790–1820, vol. 3, pp. 372 and 451.
‡ Aitchison, Ensign in the Peninsular War, p. 178 spells it Contaracilla; Mills, For King and Country, p. 183: his letter is dated 24 July but is continued: ‘July 25th. The whole army halted this day …’ (p. 185).
* Garrett, ‘A Subaltern in the Peninsular War’, p. 10.
† See chapter three, pp. 56–8, 77.
Appendix V
The Battlefield Today
The battlefield of Salamanca is generally well preserved; there have been relatively few changes since that bloody July afternoon almost two hundred years ago. It is easily accessible to visitors to Spain, being only a few miles south of the beautiful city of Salamanca, whose glorious cathedrals, ancient university and magnificent Plaza Mayor, all built in honey-coloured stone, attract thousands of tourists every summer – which in turn means that there are many excellent hotels and other facilities. The most convenient way to tour the battlefield is by car, but the most dedicated could do so on foot, by bicycle or even, conceivably, on horseback. Moving generally from west to east, one can follow the unfolding of the battle fairly well, although it means that the heights of Calvarrasa de Arriba, the scene of the skirmishing in the morning, come at the end rather than the beginning of the tour.
Start by leaving the city on the C512, which ultimately goes to Tamames. After only a few miles one reaches the village of Aldea Tejada, near which Pakenham's division, D'Urban's Portuguese dragoons and Arentschildt's light cavalry rested for an hour or two in the middle of the day. The substantial hills around the village provide ample cover, and Pakenham and his staff may have taken advantage of the extensive views from the top of the steep height immediately to the east – although this is speculation, for we do not even know exactly where the troops halted. A little unsealed country road leaves the village to the south-east: like most of the by-roads which cross the battlefield, it is quite rough but perfectly negotiable provided one is careful and remembers that there may be deep gutters on either side. This road will take one along the route probably followed by Pakenham's division in the first part of its advance. The low north-south ridge which screened the allies is clearly apparent, but the track which used to run along its foot to the south has disappeared. Instead, the by-road crosses the ridge and joins the main N 630 (E-803) road from Salamanca. Go south along the main road for less than a mile then turn right at a crossroads on to the sealed road to Miranda de Azan.
In approaching Miranda de Azan, the road runs between two steep hillsides with barely the width of the road separating them. The one on the left (south) is the Pico de Miranda, the western extremity of the Monte de Azan; the one on the right is the end of the north-south ridge – the batteries of Bull and Douglas were stationed a little way north along this rise. The village of Miranda de Azan lies a few hundred yards beyond this pass, and it is difficult to see how the five thousand infantry and thousand cavalry under Pakenham, D'Urban and Arentschildt could have deployed in such a confined space. The slopes of the Pico de Miranda are steep but not unmanageable. Climbing them with fifty pounds of equipment on one's back, under enemy fire, while maintaining one's place in close formation would be less easy, but all part of a day's work for Napoleonic infantry. The summit is flat but narrow: only fifty yards across, although it broadens considerably to the east.
Pedestrians can continue walking along the ridge, but those with cars or other means of transport need to return to them and leave Miranda de Azan the way they came, heading now north-east. Back at the main N 630 (E803) road one can turn south and follow the road up the north face of the Monte de Azan, but it is probably better to cross it and continue east towards the village of Los Arapiles. Just before the village there is a minor road turning off sharply to the south-west leading to a large, modern industrial farm. If one parks on the side of this road, one can climb across open fields to the top of the Monte de Azan due south of Las Torres. (But remember, there is no right of trespass, however innocent one's motives, and do nothing which could disturb stock or damage crops.) The land here accords perfectly with Leith Hay's description of his advance. It is very tempting to say to oneself at the top, ‘Yes, this was the very spot on which he fell wounded.’ More seriously, one can note that, while the forward slope is wide and open, there are ripples and irregularities in it, some caused by water running down it, which would have created difficulties for troops advancing in line. Equally, the summit, though broad and expansive, is not perfectly flat: there is a slight reverse slope, almost a lip, at the northern edge, then a wide expanse of open ground rising gently to another skyline perhaps half a mile away. Undulations in the ground on either side obscure the view to the east and west: one can easily see how Maucune and Clausel fought in separate compartments of the plateau, and also (although less easily) how Maucune may not have noticed the advance of Le Marchant's cavalry or Pakenham's infantry.
On returning to your car, drive into the village of Arapiles. Like all the villages on the battlefield, it has grown considerably and is not particularly picturesq
ue or beautiful. An unsealed road heads south from the centre of the village, soon ascending the steep slope which is the north face of the Monte de Azan at this point. Beyond the slope the land is again wide, open and rolling, with another hillside perhaps a thousand yards to the south. This is probably the line of advance of Cole's Fusilier brigade – Stubbs's Portuguese were further east – and it is uncertain whether their clash with Clausel occurred at the first or second crest, although the latter seems more probable. Beyond this second crest (where this is a good view of the rear of the French position) the road becomes private so one must return to the village.
From Los Arapiles one heads east along the narrow strip of bitumen for about a mile until it reaches the railway line and divides into a number of unsealed roads. Here one is at the foot of the Lesser Arapile: those with a superabundance of energy can climb it. An equally useful digression is to take the track north-west parallel to the railway line for a few hundred yards, then turn left (west) and drive or walk across the gap between the Lesser Arapile and the Teso de San Miguel, and then up the surprisingly steep eastern slope of the latter hill and look out across the shallow valley to the rolling country of the Monte de Azan to the south. Viewed from either the Greater or Lesser Arapile, the Teso de San Miguel appears insignificant, but closer inspection shows that, while it is far from being a mountain, it would have had considerable military importance.
However, there is no denying that the Greater and Lesser Arapiles dominate the battlefield, and that few visitors will be able to resist the temptation to climb the former, survey the view and examine the obelisk. The ground is rough and the slope steep, but it is not difficult to climb the northern face, although stout shoes and long trousers are clearly advisable. As one climbs one cannot help but think of Charles Synge's experiences, and sympathize with him and even with the Portuguese soldier he mentions who shammed death rather than face the French at the summit. The view from the top is superb: wide, bare and open. The hill itself was severely vandalized a century ago when the railway was built and it was used as a quarry. Fortunately, the north face, western end and overall profile remain unaffected: the destruction was on the southern side, where it ate away two-thirds of the width of the hill. One can only hope that such desecration would not be allowed today, although the fate of the battlefield of Talavera does not give much grounds for confidence.