Third Culture Kids: Growing Up Among Worlds

by David C. Pollock

  The theme of expatriate children has been studied thoroughly all over the world, and these children have been the subject of intense scrutiny in Japan for the past four decades. There they are known as kaigai-shijos while they reside abroad due to their parents’ work and as kikoku-shijos upon their return to Japan.

  Like most TCKs, kaigai/kikoku-shijos experience temporary (if lengthy) stays overseas during their formative years and eventually return to their passport country. They are thus distinguished from immigrant children, who in principle are destined to live permanently in their host society.

  Unlike TCKs, whose parents may be military personnel or religious missionaries, the overwhelming majority of kaigai/kikoku-shijos are children of corporate employees. Kaigai/kikoku-shijos have long been treated as a specific group of children worthy of government support in Japan, whereas TCKs are still in the process of becoming known by the general public as a distinct category of child migrants.

  Who are the kaigai/kikoku-shijos? When and how did they emerge as a major social phenomenon in their home country? What impact does their presence have on Japanese society? This appendix focuses on the societal factors that influence the children’s experience rather than on the nature of the experience itself. It also discusses the need for a “cross-pollination” between various approaches of understanding the children’s experiences in order to shed further light on the issues faced by kaigai/kikoku-shijos and third culture kids.

  Kaigai/Kikoku-Shijos and the “Making” of a

  Social Phenomenon

  DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

  According to 2007 data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, there are now over 740,000 Japanese long-term expatriates and temporary overseas residents worldwide. Of those, 59,000 are school-age dependents (kaigai-shijos) who are concentrated in three geographical areas: Asia (38 percent), North America (32 percent), and Europe (19 percent). Table A-1 shows the shifts in numbers of long-term expatriates and kaigai-shijos over the past 35 years, in 5 year-periods, from 1971 (when kaigai-shijo data was first collected) to 2006. This historical shift in their numbers and geographical distribution mirrors the trends in Japan’s economic activities overseas.

  The number of kaigai-shijos more than doubled between 1971 and 1976, and then rose by approximately 10,000 for each period thereafter before hitting a plateau of 50,000 in 1991. Their number stagnated for the following decade, showing a slight decrease along the way, before rising again in the twenty-first century. Similarly, the overall number of long-term expatriates showed a sharp increase from 1971 to 1976, between 1986 and 1991, and again after 2001.

  TABLE A-1

  Shifts in long-term expatriate and kaigai-shijo populations (1971–2006)

  The first increase in the number of both long-term expatriates and kaigaishijos can be explained as much by a move by Japanese corporations to establish overseas branches, thereby boosting the size of their expatriate staff, as by a worldwide relaxation of regulation regarding immigration and foreign funds transfer. The second increase coincides with the so-called “bubble economy” that Japan experienced in the mid-1980s, understandably bringing about the proliferation of overseas bureaus and personnel. The latest spike in the number of overseas nationals is mostly accounted for by an increase of Japanese corporate expatriates in Asia, especially China.

  The only period during which the two numbers are not synchronized took place in the 1990s: while the kaigai-shijo population remained at around 50,000, the overall number of corporate expatriates continued to increase. This was at the time of the “Heisei recession,” when companies maintained their overseas operations by sending employees without their families in an effort to cut relocation costs.

  Let us now turn our attention to kikoku-shijos (kaigai-shijos who have returned to Japan at the end of their parents’ assignment). Statistics kept by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology suggest that there were approximately 1,500 kikoku-shijos in 1971. This number increased to 5,900 by 1977 and reached the 10,000 mark by 1985. This trend should be understood as part of a cumulative process: although some kikoku-shijos may leave again for another posting overseas, many of them remain in Japan to form an ever-increasing pool of returnees. This demographic trend, which started four decades ago, is at the root of the emergence of kaigai/kikoku-shijos as a conspicuous social phenomenon.

  KIKOKU-SHIJOS AS “EDUCATIONAL ORPHANS”

  As early as 1966, the Japanese government was aware that children who returned from an overseas sojourn presented a challenge to the highly centralized national school system. According to the first large-scale government survey conducted that year, close to half of the returnees of middle-school and high-school age were entering a grade below that which they would normally attend, in order to make up for the (Japanese) school years that they had missed. The study also found that only 40 percent of the minor dependents accompanied their working parent (i.e., the father, in virtually all cases) if he was posted in Africa or Asia, while 70 percent did so if the overseas mission took place in North America or Europe.1

  Two areas of concern were thus identified, which interestingly overlapped with the geographical location of the overseas posting: (1) children who had accompanied their parents abroad (mainly to North America and Europe) had trouble reintegrating into the school system upon their return to Japan, and (2) in the case of a posting in less-industrialized countries, parents felt there was a need for better schooling opportunities if their children were to accompany them overseas. The government set out to address these concerns based on two separate strategies: establishing a system of reentry for the kikoku-shijos, while assisting the kaigai-shijos by building full-time and part-time Japanese schools in areas where parents requested them.

  The trickle-down effects of these ministerial decisions were not felt immediately, however. Kaigai/kikoku-shijo education specialist Gunei Sato conducted a thorough analysis of newspaper and magazine databases, and found that most articles written during the mid-1970s through the 1980s dealt with frustrated and concerned parents of kaigai/kikoku-shijos advocating on their children’s behalf.2

  The first of these articles was authored in 1975 by journalist Junji Kitashiro (himself an expatriate parent). In his inflammatory “Open letter to the Minister of Education, Culture, and Science,” Kitashiro claimed that the government had failed their duty toward kikoku-shijos, making them “educational orphans (kyouiku kimin).” Sato argues that such rhetoric set the tone for a public perception of kikoku-shijos as “poor children in need of rescuing,” a perception furthermore shared by educators as well as government officials and reflected in their policies.

  KIKOKU-SHIJOS AS “SYMBOLS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION”

  Sato’s analysis goes on to show that media reports on kikoku-shijos abruptly changed in the mid-1980s: not only had the number of articles increased dramatically, but they were painting a much more positive picture of the returnees. With the historical signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985, the Japanese yen suddenly found itself almost at par with the U.S. Dollar, prompting a tremendous enthusiasm among businesses and public alike for overseas expansion. International travel, foreign real estate buying sprees, and establishment of factories and plants outside of Japan all were manifestations of that enthusiasm—which would eventually lead to the wild era of its bubble economy.

  However, it was not enough for the Japanese to venture outside of their borders. There was intense pressure exerted by U.S. Politicians on the Japanese government to “open up” and to “internationalize.” Although this pressure was mainly aimed at Japan’s economy to ease its trade barriers to help decrease the United States’ huge trade deficit, the term internationalization became a countrywide slogan that the Japanese took to heart. It is in this social atmosphere that kikoku-shijos, with their overseas upbringing and (presupposed) language and intercultural communication skills, came to be seen as the perfect symbol of a future Japan was aspiring to.

  One c
rucial characteristic in media coverage during this period was that kikoku-shijos themselves, and not their parents, made appearances and talked about their experiences. The public now saw firsthand those internationalized youths on television, expressing themselves with confidence and maturity, and the perception dramatically shifted from the negative “deficient Japanese” image to that of a “new elite.”

  Sato points out that a deliberately skewed sample of returnees was behind the formation of such an image, as the majority were students of prestigious universities, had come back from North America or Europe, and had attended local or international schools.3 Conveniently overlooked was the fact that only a small percentage of actual returnees possessed such a background.

  The turnaround in public perception can also be attributed to a much-improved system of reintegration for kikoku-shijos: a large network of schools all over Japan accepted them and provided special academic and counseling support. Indeed, many private schools rushed to accommodate returnee students in order to qualify for government grants, and boasted their increased kikoku-shijo enrollment as proof of the school’s commitment to “internationalization.”

  Fewer cases of kikoku-shijo maladaptation, bullying, or discrimination were heard of, and in an ironic twist, claims were raised that the special treatment kikoku-shijos enjoyed amounted to “reverse discrimination” toward homegrown Japanese students. It was argued that the otherwise extremely competitive university entrance system was made unduly easy for kikoku-shijos, who were admitted under separate criteria and therefore gained an unfair advantage over students who had toiled all the while in their home country.

  THE KIKOKU-SHIJO STEREOTYPE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

  It should thus be reasonable to conclude that economic and social trends contributed to the construction of a certain image of kikoku-shijos during the 1970s and 1980s. Although initially negative, the image underwent an abrupt shift toward a more positive version, and subsequently stabilized in the eyes of the general public to the point that we can safely speak of the existence of a kikoku-shijo stereotype.

  Kikoku-shijos are almost always perceived as being fluent speakers of a foreign language (i.e., English), having a profound knowledge of the host society and culture, and resulting in some type of “emancipated” personality. Few people realize that approximately one-third of all kaigai-shijos attend a full-time Japanese school and live a secluded life away from the host population, or that a great number of Japanese children in California are classified as “Limited English Proficiency” students even after several years of residence.

  Another common perception is that kikoku-shijos enjoy special privileges in regards to entrance exams into prestigious schools. The Japanese Ministry of Education did establish special kikoku-shijo provisions for national university admissions and encouraged private schools all over Japan to follow suit. However, with the recent influx of foreign workers, the ministry has allocated resources formerly dedicated to kikoku-shijos in favor of more needy, non-Japanese speaking children. Kikoku-shijo education grants were officially ended in 2003, and many schools have since tightened their admission standards and are reluctant to take in any but the most accomplished students.

  At the conclusion of his media analysis, Sato forewarned that a deeply engrained stereotype (as positive as it may be) can lead to the oversight of individual differences and actual needs among returnee children. Not least of the serious ill-effects is that teachers and school administrators put unduly high expectations on a returnee student as to their foreign language (i.e., English) or intercultural communication skills. Many cases of students who hide the fact that they lived overseas are testament to the stress caused by such mismatched expectations. Sato points out that this tendency to hide one’s kikoku-shijo background is prevalent among, but not exclusive to, children who attended a fulltime Japanese school while abroad.

  Currently, the kaigai-shijo population is greatest in Asia, a region where traditionally the overwhelming majority of expatriate children attended the local full-time Japanese school. In recent years, however, the proportion of Japanese school students among kaigai-shijos in Asian countries declined from approximately 90 percent to just over 60 percent, while attendance of local international schools has soared.

  Interviews of kaigai-shijo parents in Asia revealed that they are themselves very much influenced by the “bilingual, bicultural kikoku-shijo” stereotype constructed over two decades ago and wish for their own children to emulate that image. Sending the children to an international school where English is spoken is therefore considered a more desirable and fancier alternative to the full-time Japanese school, even though the latter may ensure a smoother transition into the Japanese school system upon return.

  Consultants in the field of kikoku-shijo education worry that selecting an international school over a full-time Japanese school may backfire on two fronts. First, schools in Japan are no longer so eager to accommodate any returnee student just to appear “internationalized”; as a matter of fact, children who attended full-time Japanese schools (and thus do not need any remedial support) are now the more welcome type of kikoku-shijos. Second, attending an international school for a few years does not ensure a child will become a fluent speaker of English or gain competence in academic subjects taught in English. It could thus be argued that parents may be risking the consistency of their children’s education for fewer returns than hoped for.4

  Comparing Third Culture Kids and Kaigai/Kikoku-Shijos

  SOCIETAl FACTORS

  Why has Japan paid so much more attention to expatriate and returnee children compared, for example, to the United States, whose organizations arguably send out a larger number of expatriates than any other country in the world?

  With the influx of foreign workers that started at the turn of the century, the population of Japan is becoming more diverse in terms of its ethnic composition. Still, the majority of people in Japan rarely question that theirs is an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation. Over three decades ago, when kikoku-shijos’ presence became conspicuous, Japanese society was even more ill-equipped than today to deal with the notion of diversity or how to accommodate that diversity within its institutions. In particular, Japan’s highly centralized educational system was at a complete loss for what to do with children who had acquired cultural values and behavioral patterns different from those of their “home-grown” counterparts.5

  In contrast, the United States has had a long history of immigration, and values (at least in principle) the multiethnic/multiracial nature of its population. Schools are expected to deal with students from various cultural backgrounds, and newcomers are given a chance to adapt into their host society. In such an environment, American children who return after a long absence from their home country may not be paid special attention to, for they might be assumed to not need the attention that is given to all newcomers who are unfamiliar with the U.S. Social system.

  Another factor that contributed to the intensity of the kikoku-shijo phenomenon is the Japanese fascination with things “Western,” especially the English language, which coexists with the conviction that the essence of Japaneseness can only be grasped by “real” Japanese. History proves that Japan has always maintained a complex balance between nationalistic pride and desire for westernization, and this is arguably reflected in the polarized treatment kikoku-shijos receive in their home country. Kikoku-shijos can at times be looked down upon as undesirable outsiders, while at others they are elevated as models to emulate. Being Japanese by nationality and descent, kikoku-shijos do not benefit from the same level of sympathy foreigners enjoy when they step out of bounds of Japanese commonsense. However, by virtue of their life experience overseas, kikokushijos can also claim a quasiforeigner status that so many Japanese envy. This ambiguous positioning within Japanese society can thus be both a curse and a blessing for kikoku-shijos.

  APPLYING A “TCK PERSPECTIVE” TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE KAIGAI/KIKOKU-SHIJO EXPERIENCE


  While TCKs often feel liberated when they learn of the existence of a label for people like themselves, kikoku-shijo is a label that many Japanese returnee children (including those who are now adults) find constricting and mismatched with their own experience.

  The most serious problem with current kikoku-shijo stereotypes is their emphasis on language (mainly English) proficiency and intercultural communication skills. In order to “validate” the experiences of as many children as possible, however, we would argue that we need to focus instead on how these children have learned to view the world around them.

  Most children who experience international mobility acquire a (literally) “global positioning system” and learn to locate themselves in relation to other cultures and societies in a way that cannot easily be achieved by children who never left their home country. This ability can be acquired regardless of how much exposure the child had to the host society’s culture or how much of the local language he or she learned while overseas.

  While not all TCKs return to their home (passport) country, kikoku-shijos are, in that sense, TCKs who are offered the chance to refamiliarize themselves with the society and culture their parents came from. Not only does this double process of departure and return strengthen their ability to navigate through various social systems, it also presents them with the unique opportunity to become an “insider/outsider” in more than one country.