The facts are that no trace has been found of him. DNA of hair fibers in the cell where the initials were found did not match. As the Washington Times reported on July 16, 2003, “[the lack of] evidence … casts doubt on the credibility of the defector.” An April 5, 2005, follow-up story confirmed this assessment: “… information from a former Iraqi Special Security Organization informant … later was found to have been fabricated.” A special 15-member Pentagon team was even established to search for Speicher after the war was over, but it was disbanded after coming up empty-handed.
Again, what becomes important is the pattern. It does not seem as if we were getting truth from the podia.
13. Chemical cluster bombs: a quick response
Then there were the chemical cluster bombs. The story didn't linger. It was around only a couple days. It was part of the attack on the second report from Hans Blix. On March 10, 2003, there were releases and statements by administration officials that the UNMOVIC report did not cover the Iraqi chemical cluster bomb program. These statements ran as follows:
“UN weapons inspectors in Iraq recently discovered a new variety of rocket seemingly configured to strew bomblets filled with chemical or biological agents over large areas, U.S. officials say” (New York Times News Service, March 10, 2003).
“Inspectors discovered cluster bombs and sub-munitions that appeared designed to deliver chemical or biological agents. Contrary to initial Iraqi statements, a number of bombs and over 100 sub-munitions were found” (State Department, March 10, 2003).
“Another is a videotape showing Iraq testing a cluster bomb that could disperse chemical weapons over a wide area” (CNN, March 10, 2003).
“Administration spokesmen said that chief inspector Hans Blix did not give details … of the possible existence of a cluster bomb that could deliver deadly poisons” (Boston Globe, March 11, 2003).
“The U.S. is also aware of UNMOVIC's discovery of Iraqi production of munitions capable of dispensing both chemical and biological weapons … “(Ari Fleischer, March 11, 2003).
But there was, according to a 1991 Office of the Secretary of Defense report on Patriot missile use during Gulf War I, “no evidence to conclude that Iraq has a warhead with chemical sub-munitions. No information on testing has been obtained, and experimentation with bursts at relatively high release points has not been seen.” This follows, because these kinds of warheads are technologically very difficult to achieve, and there are better ways of delivering chemical or biological weapons.
Clearly, the information operation or strategic influence effort included attacking and discrediting those who did not support the story. This is also a good example of the concept of responding within the news cycle, although it lacked consistency. It was a “quick turn” response to the Blix report that got carried widely by print and broadcast media. The story did not have legs because it was rather weak, but it still served its purpose at the time.
It was probably worth the minor negative impact of the June 2003 Blix statement that it was part of a campaign to discredit him.
Again, the cluster bomb story fits the pattern and methods.
14. Iraqis in U.S. uniforms
We were told Iraq had acquired U.S. and U.K. uniforms. There was one report from an embedded reporter that a unit “thought” they had seen American uniforms; their fear was partly driven because some of their laundry had been stolen while they were in Kuwait. Since there were uniforms missing, it was assumed that they had gotten to the Iraqis. There is a generally accepted concept in press management that if something bad is predicted in advance, when it does happen the situation won't appear as bad as if nothing had been said. In this case the principle dictated a prediction that Iraqi soldiers were going to attack us wearing U.S. uniforms. My assessment was confirmed when I was told by an individual close to the chairman of the JCS that this story was fabricated. They had some information that Iraq might have some uniforms, so they made up the story to be protected if Iraq were to have used the uniforms to attack coalition forces.
Anyway, the reports went like this:
March 7, 2003: Iraq is acquiring military uniforms “identical down to the last detail” to those worn by American and British forces and plans to use them to shift blame for atrocities, a senior U.S. official said Thursday (statement by Jim Wilkinson, Tampa Florida).
March 26, 2003: “Soldiers in the U.S. 3rd Infantry moving north toward Baghdad say they believe they have been attacked by Iraqis wearing American uniforms. And they say they're worried that some of the uniforms were stolen several weeks ago while the U.S. troops were in Kuwait” (David Bloom, NBC).
But we have no reports of Iraq trying to shift the blame for atrocities. The way it was put by Jim Wilkinson, a name that keeps appearing in these questionable stories, it seems to fit a pattern of pre-blaming Iraq.
Then the story got turned into Iraqis wearing uniforms to get others to surrender, but even Tori Clarke, the Defense Department spokeswoman, cautioned about its validity. Two days later, Rumsfeld announced it as if it were true. Here are their statements, and note well Clarke's “caution.” It all has the feel of being a created story.
March 26, 2003, Clarke: “Well, I remember several weeks ago out here talking about how we knew they were acquiring uniforms that looked like U.S. and U.K. uniforms. And the reporting was that they planned to use them, give them to the thugs, as I call them, to go out, carry out reprisals against the Iraqi people, and try to blame it on coalition forces. So just recently we have seen reports again that they may be wearing or using what looked like U.S. uniforms to confuse people, to confuse our forces, to confuse the Iraqi people.
“Q: Have you seen specific reports about them wearing U.S. uniforms accepting the surrender of Iraqi troops, and then executing them?
“Clarke: I have seen – I have seen at least one report.
“Clarke: I want to caution that and caveat that and say I have seen one report like that.”
March 28, 2003, Rumsfeld: “They put on American and British uniforms to try to fool regular Iraqi soldiers into surrendering to them, and then execute them as an example for others who might contemplate defection or capitulation.”
15. The Scud “threat”
Before the war, we were told Iraq had some number of Scuds left over. This was important because it would have meant the capability to attack Israel. It was a story consistent on both sides of the Atlantic, repeated a half a dozen times between September 2002, and April 2003.
For the first three days of the war, spokesmen were using the term Scud-type missiles to describe the missile attacks. They were not Scuds, and we have found no Scuds, but for three days, they kept the story alive.
A CIA report of October 2002 made the point that there were accounting discrepancies which could mean some hidden missiles. By the time of Powell's speech to the UN the missiles became a fact for the U.S. and U.K. The “Scud” storyline was carried through the war, probably as part of the strategic influence campaign.
Once the story had been created, it was hard to let go. But there were no Scuds.
16. Remotely piloted vehicles
We were supposed to be threatened by “remotely piloted vehicles” that could deliver chemical or biological weapons. In the October 2002 CIA report, these were airplanes: Iraq “attempted to convert some of its J-29 jet trainer aircraft into an RPV … that can be fitted with spray,” it read. The President, in Cincinnati, also in October 2002 referred to drones that could be used to reach the United States. By the time of Powell's presentation to the UN the following year, they had become much smaller.
Later on, a USAF team, the 75th Exploitation Group, conducted “an investigation of reported drones with sprayers.” They concluded that the remotely piloted vehicles were for reconnaissance. Their mission was to take pictures. “They quickly found the 'drones,'” the Los Angeles Times reported on June 15, 2003. “Five burned and blackened nine-foot wings dumped near the front gate. 'It could have been a stu
dent project, or maybe a model,' the team's expert, U.S. Air Force Capt. Libbie Boehm, said with a shrug.”
17. Punishing the French
The evidence points to the French being the focus of punishment in the strategic influence campaign. There are at least eight times when false stories or engineered stories were aimed at them, the majority appearing after their lack of support in the UN for U.S. and U.K. actions.
In September 2002 the New York Times was told that the French (and Germans) had sold high-precision switches to Iraq that could be used for nuclear weapons. Keeping the cross-Atlantic dimension of the strategic influence effort, the same story appeared in the U.K. press. The fact is that although Iraq had requested these switches, they were never supplied.
“American intelligence sources” also leaked to the Washington Post in November 2002 the incorrect story that the French had prohibited strains of smallpox virus.
And in March 2003 a “US intelligence source” told the Washington Times that two French companies had sold spare parts to Iraq. The companies have said they did not. Of course no proof has surfaced.
Later in 2003, someone created a story that French Roland missiles were being used to shoot down American aircraft, and these missiles were new. According to an April 9, 2003, briefing presided over by Brig. Gen. Brooks, there was “found an underground storage facility containing an abundance of food and also Roland-type air defense missiles.” Also, when an A-10 was shot down near Baghdad airport, a “Pentagon spokesman” pointed out they thought it was hit with a Roland missile; this was not mentioned in the Brooks briefing. In the April 21, 2003, Newsweek, it was reported that Lt. Greg Holmes, a tactical intelligence officer with the Third Infantry Division, told the magazine that U.S. forces discovered 51 Roland-2 missiles, made by a partnership of French and German arms manufacturers. One of the missiles he examined was labeled 05–11 KND 2002, which he took to mean that the missile was manufactured last year.
It turns out the story was not very well put together. The production line for the Roland 2 shut down in 1993. It is hard to explain, but this Roland fabrication keeps surfacing. It came up again in early October 2003 when a Polish unit was reported to have found recently manufactured missiles. After it bounced around for a couple of days, a Polish spokesman announced that it was not true.
We were also told that the French were helping Iraqi officials escape to Syria. The May 6, 2003, Washington Times reported that “an unknown number of Iraqis who worked for Saddam Hussein's government were given passports by French officials in Syria, U.S. intelligence officials said.”
This story had some legs, and the Washington Times kept getting fed information to keep it alive. The story appeared in other outlets as well, such as FOX News, Ireland onLine, the Charleston Post & Courier, and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. The May 7 Washington Times reported that “US intelligence officials are intensifying the search in Europe for officials of the Saddam Hussein government who fled Iraq with French passports,” according to “U.S. officials.” When Rumsfeld was questioned, he followed the pattern. When something is on the street that is part of the strategic influence campaign, let it linger. “France has historically had a very close relationship with Iraq,” he said. And when asked specifically about the reports, “I have nothing to add to them.” Clearly, the implication of that kind of answer is that he wanted people to believe the stories. He had nothing to add.
It was publicly reported on May 15 and 16, 2003, that the French had accused the United States of a smear campaign. As the Washington Times later reported, on May 17, 2003: “France's ambassador to the United States accused the Bush administration of starting a disinformation campaign against France.”
Even the White House got into this strategic influence effort. One has to believe the administration knew by mid-May that the stories were not true, but at the White House press briefing, it was not stopped. The brief exchange on this topic on May 15, 2003, runs as follows:
Q: Going back to France, the French have denied selling arms to Iraq and issuing passports to Syria to fleeing Iraqi officials. Are those charges valid?
Mr. McClellan: Well, I think that those are questions you can address to France.
Q: On that point, Scott, do you have any information that the French did, in fact, issue passports to people so that …
Mr. McClellan: I think – no, I think that's a question you need to address to France.
Q: Well, no, it's information the U.S. claims to have. Mr. McClellan: I don't have anything for you.
The technique for this campaign made effective use of the concept of “echo.” Less-than professional journalism repeated the reports on the story as a story in hundreds of newspapers and on television.
I have been told by press sources that most of the leaks during the “armed conflict” that appeared in the Washington Times came from the Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon. Using the kind of methods Admiral Poindexter was going to do on information operations, there would appear to be some validity in this.
The secretary of defense told us before the war he was going to “do” strategic influence. It appears as if the French were a target.
18. White flag incident(s)
My research shows that the white flag story was engineered. Even more, it appears as if it were fabricated to cover a very serious friendly fire event.
Details of two incidents involving white flags have surfaced. The first was reported on March 23, 2003. General Abizaid, the Deputy Commander of Central Command, said that right after some Iraqi soldiers surrendered artillery fire came in on a Marine unit. He called it a ruse. On the surface the explanation seems strange. The Iraqi Army had trouble coordinating artillery fire at all. It is a stretch of the imagination to believe they could put together a plan in which a part of their force would surrender and then they would start firing artillery.
After this incident, however, it seems to have become a matter of policy to talk about white flag killing. It began the next day, with comments made at a briefing by Tori Clarke. Rumsfeld really got into the story on March 25, and it continued on the 27th.
The President came in and picked it up on April 5. The story had so much (many!) legs that it was even given as the reason for the death of a marine at his funeral at Arlington Cemetery.
A disheartening aspect of the white flag story is what might have been the real cause of the Marine casualties near Al Nasiriyah on March 23, 2003. Marines are saying that nine of those killed may have been killed by an A-10 that made repeated passes attacking their position.
We know from a lessons-learned report released early in October 2003 that the death of nine marines is under investigation as a friendly fire accident. From individual reports, we know that at least one of the marines killed on March 23, reported as having been caught in the ruse, was hit directly in the chest with a round from an A-10 gun. We know at least one of the wives of a marine killed that day is asking for the truth of her husband's death. We certainly need more truth on the white flag story.
19. Execution of prisoners
The most significant seemingly fabricated story dealt with the execution of prisoners. Tony Blair was in the United States meeting with the President at Camp David. He came out of the meeting and announced, at a joint press conference with the President, that two British prisoners had been executed. That same day, March 27, 2003, General Pace said almost the same thing on CNN.
That day (March 27) we began seeing statements attributing the story to one report. By the next day, the U.K. press began attacking the story as not true. One of the soldier's sisters reported that his colonel had said he was not executed. She was quoted in the Daily Mirror as saying that “we can't understand why people are lying.”
The U.K. finally pulled away from the story, though the U.S. side stayed with it until April 7.
When Rumsfeld was questioned on April 7, the story began to change. The pattern of the non-answer surfaced. The press briefing at which SECDEF w
as questioned about this ran as follows:
Q: Mr. Secretary, you stated flatly that American POWs have been executed. On what basis do you make that statement? And now that there are at least nine remains that have come back from the ambush in Nasiriyah, how many of those do you believe were American soldiers that were executed?
Rumsfeld: Let me just see precisely what I said. (Looks through briefing materials.) I think I said they have executed prisoners of war. Did I say American prisoners of war?
Q: That was my – that's been the understanding here.
Rumsfeld: I didn't – you just said I said American prisoners of war, and I'm not sure I said that. (To General Myers.) Do you know? Myers: I don't know.
Q: Are you saying that there have not been American prisoners executed then?
Rumsfeld: I'm not saying either. There may very well have been, but I'm not announcing that, if that's what you're asking. Would you check and see if I said that right now? You've got a copy of it; I'd be curious. If I did, I'd want to make it right.
Q: Well-
Rumsfeld: Just a minute. If I did say precisely American prisoners of war, I'd want to correct it, because I don't have the names of anyone who has – any American prisoners of war who we know of certain knowledge has been executed. We do know they executed a lot of prisoners of war over the years. And that's what I -
Q: Do you know if any of the nine sets of remains that have been returned, if the forensics, preliminary forensics have shown any of those to have been executed?
Rumsfeld: I have not heard the report on that. Have you? Myers: I have not seen any of that.
Rumsfeld: (Later in the briefing) Let me correct this. Your question was inaccurate. I had said, “They have executed POWs,” and I did not say from what country.
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