Which raises the question: what about the “other” insurgents, simply “hostile to the presence of U.S. troops”? Kenneth Katzman, an analyst with the Congressional Research Service, thinks they make up the predominant part of the conflict.3 “I still think 80 percent of the insurgency, the day-to-day activity, is Iraqi: the roadside bombings, mortars, direct weapons fire, rifle fire, automatic weapons fire.”4 It is this kind of activity since the January 2005 “election,” beyond the sensational “Zarqawi-style” attacks, that has led observant commentators to speak more candidly and realistically about how well (or poorly) things are going in Iraq, illustrating by contrast the flights of fancy indulged in by Bush administration spokesmen when they speak of seeing a light at the end of the tunnel. Indeed, if the sampling of voices which follows is to be believed even reservedly, that light may very well be an oncoming train.
“In 2003, [the attacks] were random small-arms fire,” writes Sharon Behn in the Washington Times for May 23, 2005.
Then they escalated to roadside bombs – sometimes command-detonated or with tripwires. Then they escalated to car bombs that would run a ramp and pull into a convoy or traffic circle. And now they are very well organized, rehearsed, orchestrated, using a combination of rocket-propelled grenades, [roadside bombs] set in a daisy chain to get the wounded as they exit the vehicles, heavy machine guns, small arms and hand-thrown grenades.5
Writing for Newsday on May 12, 2005, Timothy Phelps said,
With security experts reporting that no major road in the country was safe to travel, some Iraq specialists speculated that the Sunni insurgency was effectively encircling the capital and trying to cut it off from the north, south and west, where there are entrenched Sunni communities. East of Baghdad is a mostly unpopulated desert bordering on Iran.6
Phelps quoted a number of experts who offered stark assessments. Professor Noah Feldman of New York University said of the insurgency that it has been “getting stronger every passing day. When the violence recedes,” he continued, “it is a sign that they are regrouping I have not seen any coherent evidence that we are winning against the insurgency.”1
Judith Kipper of the Council on Foreign Relations had the same view. “Everything we thought we knew about the insurgency obviously is flawed. It was quiet for a while, and here it is back full force all over the country, and that is very dark news.”2
Tod Robberson's May 26, 2005, piece for the Dallas Morning News offered a similar perspective.
Iraq's insurgents, described earlier this year by U.S. officials as a dwindling force, have resisted military efforts to halt their attacks and have an apparent new bombing strategy to inflict headline-grabbing casualties, according to diplomatic and academic experts …. The experts said the insurgents have shown patience as they regrouped, devised new strategies and repeatedly demonstrated an ability to thwart U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Iraq. The persistent campaign of attacks has demoralized the population while proving the insurgents can withstand repeated military offensives designed to defang them.3
These sentiments were echoed by John Yaukey of Army Times on June 6, 2005.
The insurgent stronghold of Fallujah fell in November. The parliamentary elections of January 30 came and went. Iraq's new elected government took power in April. Each was touted as a major victory against Iraq's insurgents. And yet Iraqi forces, backed by U.S. troops, are now conducting the largest offensive in Iraq since Baghdad fell two years ago. The mission is to root out what has become an insurgency with proven staying power and evolving sophistication especially capable of exploiting political vulnerabilities.4
Patrick Seale, whose Al-Hayat piece from May 12, 2005, we noted earlier, spoke of the “conclusion reached by most military experts, whether American, European or Israeli”:
[T]here is no prospect of a quick U.S. military victory in Iraq. One informed British view is that it will take the Americans at least five years to train an Iraqi force strong enough to take on the insurgents. Another view, by a former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, is that the U.S. will have to maintain a strong military presence in Iraq and the region for at least a decade.1
A recent comment from Professor Juan Cole puts it this way: “[t]he guerrilla war in Iraq is far more active, professional and effective now than it has ever been. It routinely assassinates important government officials.”2And Maj. Gen. Joseph Taluto, head of the U.S. 42nd Infantry Division, which covers “hot spots” like Baquba and Samarra, was quoted in a Gulf News piece for June 9, 2005, offering his thoughts on the size of the resistance.
I stay away from numbers …. We can make estimates by doing some kind of guesswork …. Who knows how big these networks are, or how widespread? I know it's substantial enough to be a threat to the government and it will be for some time.3
In case the testimony of these voices is not sufficiently persuasive, one might consider a couple of recent, revealing incidents in order get a sense of the long arm of the Iraqi resistance.
In October 2004, the puppet Interior Ministry set up a new group called the Wolf Brigade, under the leadership of Abu Walid, a Shiite, whose real name is Maj. Gen. Mohammed Qureishi. It is variously described as a police commando unit, a counter-insurgency outfit, and a special-forces team, that is claimed to have 2,000 commandos (though many say its forces number in the hundreds). It has garnered substantial publicity in the Western media for its contribution to the GWOT; a Council on Foreign Relations expert called it “the most feared and effective commando unit in Iraq.”4 It is comprised of Shiites (though there are a number of Sunnis in its officer corps) who are considered “folk heroes to some Shiites, but an object of fear and mistrust for Sunnis.”5 Aside from being “at the centre of controversy about aggressive methods and accusations of a sectarian 'dirty war' on minority Sunnis,”1 the brigade is unique because its commander has its own nightly reality-TV program, “Terrorism in the Grip of Justice,” on al-Iraqiya TV, the State-run, U.S.-funded channel in Iraq. The program features confessions of alleged “terrorists,” many of whom appear to be physically mistreated.2 Whether they are guilty of anything is anyone's guess – but since the show is nightly one suspects that the “rules” are pretty flexible, if only to ensure a constant stream of “guests.”
A recent attack on the Wolf Brigade by the resistance illustrates the lat-ter's tenacity. It was targeted by a suicide bomber on June 12, 2005, in what press reports called “a failed bid to assassinate the leader of the anti-insurgent Wolf Brigade [that killed] three other policemen in the process.”3 The bomber was a member of the unit itself, and the Interior Ministry says that it is searching for two other former members in conjunction with the bombing. How many other members of the unit are linked to the resistance is an open question. The resistance missed its target – this time. But it will be back.4
I make that claim by extrapolation from a second incident. On June 9, 2005, Maj. Gen. Ahmad Jaff, the General Director of the puppet government's “Unit for Combating Terrorism” was killed by a suicide bomber – along with his accompanying officers – just after he had completed an inspection of a military post at ar-Ridwaniyah, southwest of Baghdad.1 The bombing, which was not the first attempt on his life, received almost no publicity, no doubt – at least in part – because it does not reflect well upon the Iraqi “government” when leading figures in its counter-insurgency force can be so easily targeted. Indeed, when the anti-resistance forces lack “intelligence” on the rebels to this degree, what trust can be placed in anything they say?
Incidents of this kind provide credibility to the opinions of various experts who have been less than optimistic about the situation in Iraq. As Michael O'Hanlon of the Washington, D.C.-based Brookings Institution put it, “We are not winning, and the security trend lines could almost lead you to believe that we are losing.”2 Former NATO commander, Gen. Wesley Clark, was even more forceful, saying, “[T]here is no basis for the administration to crow that the guerrilla war is winding down.”3 Gen. John Abizaid's June 23, 2
005, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) – where he admitted that “the overall strength of the insurgency was 'about the same' as six months ago”4 – was similarly, and thankfully, realistic. Toby Dodge, a senior fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, maintains that there is no “viable exit strategy,”5 and, bringing this whole discussion to a focused conclusion, Professor Feldman said simply that “[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that they cannot win.”6
Truth or Consequences
Can the “superpower” lose this war?
One of the most germane questions, two years into the war in Iraq, is what remains of America's “superpower” status. No doubt the pre-war perception of American power is wholly different from the post-war perception of that power, and the difference is recognized the world over. While the Bush administration keeps on with its hectoring tone towards Syria, Iran, North Korea, and even Russia, can it really believe that its performance in Iraq has instilled greater fear into the armed forces of these more powerful countries?
We can admit that before the war there was a certain unknown quality about the military technology available to U.S. forces. Who could say for sure what the Pentagon's colossal budget had brought into being, out of view of even the most astute observer? The Bush regime could play upon the “be very afraid” theme so beloved of Hollywood screenwriters precisely because of that intangibility. The fear of something happening, however, is often more frightening than the actual event. The fear of “shock and awe” no longer exists. Iraqi rebels have shown its very real limits; and what Iraqis can do, others better armed and better trained can do too. There is now an undercurrent of quiet discussion that is nevertheless resonating all over the world, exploding the myth of American invincibility: “America can be defeated.”1
It was therefore premature for Bush to declare before the invasion that “time is running out for Saddam.” The entire Iraqi nation with its President had even at that point suffered over a decade of Anglo-American aggression, so the threat of “shock and awe” would not likely have seemed any more menacing than the dozen years of murderous sanctions and routine illegal bombing in the U.S.-U.K. “patrolled” no-fly zones. The probable Iraqi approach to Bush's threats reminds me of a scene I witnessed on TV of a foreign television crew filming a group of Iraqi military chiefs huddled over a table with a map of Baghdad as the March 2003 invasion approached the city. The nondescript room they were in had a heavy curtain over the window to avoid the attention of American planes bombing the city at night. When, with a deafening roar, the window blew in so that the curtain was blown up parallel to the ceiling, the television crew hit the floor, mouthing involuntary expletives. After they regained their composure, they looked around the room and found the Iraqi officers still huddled over the table discussing their moves as though nothing had happened. This scene, too, perhaps, they had seen before.
But what the world hasn't before seen is the U.S. Army with its 21st-century technology and multi-billion dollar equipment budget faced down by “poorly trained villagers.” The world has seen it now, however, and insofar as the American place in the world is guaranteed by its military, we may speculate that its place is somewhat less certain than before.
The testimony of a wide range of intelligent commentators provides more than persuasive evidence for this interpretation. Late last year, Scott Ritter called the war one which “the United States cannot win, and which the interim government of Iyad Allawi cannot survive.”1 At much the same time, Professor Toby Dodge, an Iraq analyst at Queen Mary University, London told the BBC:
[The Americans] have been saying that Fallujah is the source of and therefore the solution to their problems. The violence in Mosul has shown that to be a crassly stupid thing to say. Insurgency is a national phenomenon fuelled by alienation. I don't think this war is winnable because they have alienated the base of support across Iraqi society.2
The following month, Georgie Ann Geyer wrote in her column about “truth no one really wants to deal with,” namely, that
this war could very easily be lost by the United States. All the insurgents have to do is hang on another year. All we have to do is what the French and the British did in their colonies: let themselves be exhausted and finally destroyed by their hubris, their delusions, and their arrogant lack of understanding of the local people.3
Jim Lobe, Washington correspondent for Inter Press Service, wrote the next day that it must even now be “clear to friend and foe alike that … the American Colossus is not up to global domination.”4 For his part, Paul Craig Roberts, a former Republican assistant secretary of the treasury, seconded Lobe's understanding in a piece from the beginning of this year.
The world is a vast place. The U.S. has demonstrated that it cannot impose its will on a tiny part known as Iraq. American realism may yet reassert itself, dispel the fog of delusion, cleanse the body politic of the Jacobin spirit, and lead the world by good example. But this happy outcome will require regime change in the U.S.1
Sadly, the authority of these writers (with the numerous others who could be quoted) and the somber contents of their message don't seem to have sunk in with the career hacks or the legions of “Joe Sixpacks.” Perhaps it will only be when they or their sons and daughters are drafted to “free the Iraqis” that they will get their heads out of the glue bag.
Effects of the resistance on the American military: Recruiting
Beyond the threat of the Iraqi resistance to the perception of so-called “American hegemony,” other voices of warning have been raised about the effect of the Iraq misadventure upon other aspects of American national power, one aspect of which is the military which the Pentagon and Congress are struggling to maintain.
As of this writing, there are some 150,000 American troops in Iraq-that means that there are between 17 and 20 U.S. brigades in the country.2Of that number, some 40–50 percent are drawn from the National Guard and the Army Reserve. Many of those are at, or near the end of, their second consecutive year of active duty, and are soon due to return home and take up their civilian lives, unless the Pentagon comes up with something – more of the “back-door draft,” or perhaps even outright conscription. Thus far, the U.S. has dealt with the pressure of keeping the Army together through a combination of financial incentives3 and stop-loss initiatives, which force soldiers to stay in the army beyond their contractual obliga-tions.1 Thus, even now, the troops are being virtually press-ganged by the government with the hope that these “grunts” in the field will save Bush's bacon.
The incentives don't quite seem to be attractive enough, however. “The Army is coming up short in its recruiting of National Guard forces,” an AP wire story indicated early this year, “and staffing the next rotation of guardsmen and reservists to serve in Iraq will be difficult,” according to what top military officials told lawmakers.2 The wire referred to an important meeting of a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, where officials from the Army National Guard and Reserve appeared to explain the situation to politicians. Lt. General Roger Schultz, Chief of the Army National Guard said that “recruiting is the area where we are falling short,” and added that the Army National Guard was currently 15,000 soldiers below its normal strength, with the recruiting total for January 2005 only 56 percent of the necessary target. Nor has the situation improved over the last six months. A Reuters wire story described recent Pentagon recruiting figures, showing that
two-thirds through the fiscal 2005 recruiting year, which ends September 30, the regular Army was 17 percent behind its goal, the Army Reserve was 20 percent behind and the Army National Guard was 24 percent behinds its end-of-May plans. The Army, which provides most of the U.S. ground troops in Iraq, had missed its fourth consecutive monthly recruiting goal in May.3
An Army Recruiting Command spokesman, Douglas Smith, commented: “We're having a really tough fight [to recruit] this year, and we're going to have an even tougher fight next year.”
No
ne of this bodes well for the Army Reserve's continued ability to meet the operational demands being placed on it. As a Washington Post correspondent noted gravely, “If the recruiting trends and the demand for forces persist, the Pentagon under current policies could eventually 'run out' of reserve forces for war-zone rotations.”1 Citing information supplied on February 2, 2005, to the House Armed Services Committee by Derek Stewart, director of defense capabilities and management for the Government Accountability Office, the correspondent noted that the Pentagon projects that some 100,000 reservists will have to be kept continuously mobilized over the next 3 to 5 years, something clearly problematic.
Regular Army statistics are not any better. A recent UPI wire story summarized them as follows:
Defense Department figures at the end of April showed that 35,926 recruits had signed up this fiscal year, which began last October 1. This gives recruiters four months to sign up another 44,000 to meet their goal. Even worse is the number of reserves. Statistics show that 7,283 reserves have signed up. The goal is for 22,175 by the end of the year.2
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