Denikin, meanwhile, was not wasting time. While Kolchak was suffering defeat after defeat—a series of misfortunes that ended in his execution by Bolsheviks at Irkutsk in January 1920—Denikin was gaining great victories. At the Seventh Congress of Soviets on 7 December 1919, Trotsky declared that ‘Denikin was undoubtedly far more of a danger to us than Kolchak. Kolchak depended on the slender thread of the Siberian railway, whereas Denikin could spread across the wide Russian plains with his horses.’58 The summer and autumn of 1919 saw Denikin’s greatest successes. At the end of June in Tsaritsyn, which his forces had taken, he issued the order for three major groups ‘to seize the heart of Russia—Moscow’. Overcoming the unorganized resistance of the occasional Red Army unit, Denikin’s troops moved towards the capital. Maintaining his outer calm, while rejoicing inwardly, he read the reports sent by cavalry corps commander Mamontov, who had broken through far to the north in an audacious attack.
In October Denikin’s headquarters staff felt that their goal was at hand. Only a couple of hundred kilometres remained. Voronezh was captured, then Oryol, and Tula must be next. The question was, would Denikin replace Kolchak as ‘Supreme Ruler of Russia’? He had already formed a Special Convention, later transformed into a government, but while he was anticipating the pleasure of imminent victory, he failed to observe that the Bolsheviks were regrouping and creating major cavalry formations in readiness for a mighty counter-attack.
Speaking to a meeting of Party workers in Penza on 29 July 1919, Trotsky remarked: ‘Our retreat in the south took place because Denikin had greater force than us. Now we’ve got greater force than Denikin. He has no reserves, we have inexhaustible reserves. We have more cavalry than our adversary, and we are adding to it at a rapid rate … Denikin has outreached himself. Having seized a vast territory, he now has to create a regime to hold onto it, but since Russia has broken into two camps, Denikin is compelled to invite into his government the old landowners, former governors and land captains … That’s the best propaganda against Denikin … One cavalry army is not enough for Denikin to consolidate his extended front, so he has had to resort to forced mobilization of workers and peasants, and this means he is sowing the seeds of disintegration in his army. I think this autumn we shall deliver the decisive blow against Denikin.’59 Both the analysis and the prognosis were correct.
General A.S. Lukomsky later recalled in Berlin that no one in the White camp had noticed the rise of discontent among Denikin’s troops in the rear: ‘Thieving and requisitioning, the excesses of the old bosses who had returned, and the deterioration of conditions for the poorest sections of the population, all this undermined Denikin’s rear.’ The order making units responsible for their own supplies led to a hunt for ‘the spoils of war’. Intelligence reports also told Trotsky that Denikin’s position had become insecure. At the end of June 1919 in Voronezh Trotsky wrote: ‘The Denikin bands that are moving up from the south are not the vanguard of Anglo-French troops, no, they are the entire army that the counter-revolution is capable of deploying against us. Behind Denikin’s back there is nothing but a hostile rear.’60
The horrified local population saw their ‘saviours’ as little more than marauding gangs. The Volunteer Army, stretched along a broad front, was unable to withstand the powerful blows of the Red divisions, and its retreat southwards was more rapid than its advance on Moscow had been. Denikin rushed about giving orders and threw his last reserves into the most threatened sectors, but to no avail. By the end of 1919 the Red Army was already in Rostov on Don and Novocherkassk, and was approaching Novorossiisk. Denikin, who did not expect to be forgiven by the White movement for his failure, wrote an order, in tone something like a testament to his followers. It called for Russia to be restored to its former unity and indivisibility, for order to be restored and the struggle against Bolshevism to be continued to the end; all resistance to the authorities, whether from left or right, should be punished, by extreme means if necessary; the form of government, although a matter for the future, must not be imposed by force; foreign policy must be based solely on Russian national interest; Russian territory must never be offered in exchange for help; the government must treat all classes equally; the press, if cooperative, should be helped, if dissident, tolerated, if destructive, eliminated.61
These views reflected the outlook not only of those actively engaged in opposing the Bolsheviks, but also of a broad section of liberal and democratic opinion. It was a theme to which Denikin was to return. In the autumn of 1921, by now an émigré in Brussels and ‘despite the difficulties and inadequacy of working in refugee conditions, without archives, materials or the opportunity to exchange views face to face with participants in the events’, Denikin decided to write his five volumes of memoirs. In his preface he wrote:
After the overthrow of Bolshevism, along with the enormous work of restoring the moral and material strength of the Russian people, the question of the preservation of Russia’s existence as a state will arise with an urgency unknown in the history of the fatherland. For already outside Russia’s borders the gravediggers are rattling their spades. They will not wait. The Russian people will arise in strength and reason from the blood, the dirt, the spiritual and physical poverty.62
Only eighteen months before writing these words, Denikin had watched the utter destruction of all his hopes and plans. He had seen Novorossiisk packed as contingent after contingent of his troops had retreated southwards under the blows of the Red Army. General Kutepov, who had been in charge of defending the city, had told Denikin that his demoralized forces could not hold out for more than another twenty-four hours. Denikin could not forget the sight of men being crushed in the stampede for the ladders onto the evacuation ships, or of the officers who shot themselves in desperation when they failed to get on board: ‘Many animal instincts surfaced in the face of the impending danger, as naked passion overcame conscience and man became ferocious fiend to man.’ Denikin was one of the last to embark on the British destroyer Captain Sacken with his chief-of-staff General Romanovsky, on 22 March 1920.
About 40,000 soldiers had managed to get into the Crimea. Denikin had tried to regroup and to raise their morale, but their dissatisfaction with him mounted rapidly. To have been almost within reach of Moscow and now to be stranded in the Crimea and doomed to defeat meant someone had to be blamed. Among the best elements of the Russian officer corps military honour was the highest value, and Denikin was not one to wait until the War Council expressed its lack of confidence in him. He wrote to the chairman, General A.M. Dragomirov:
Respected Abram Mikhailovich, For the three years of the Russian troubles I have led the struggle, devoting all my strength and bearing authority like a heavy cross laid on me by fate. God did not bless with success the troops I led. And although I have not lost my faith in the viability of the Army and its historic calling, the inner link between the leader and the Army has been broken. I can no longer lead it.
In his last order, Denikin appointed Lieutenant-General Baron Peter Wrangel as his successor, and ended: ‘To all who have accompanied me honourably in this hard struggle, I humbly bow. God, give the Army victory and save Russia.’63
A sworn enemy of Bolshevism to his dying day, Denikin never grasped the fact that it was not the ‘socialists’ who had made the revolution as much as the tsarist regime which had dragged the country into a senseless war, exhausting the people and creating the conditions for revolution. The February revolution had not succeeded because it failed to give the people either land or peace. The Bolsheviks exploited this fact and gave the people both, while taking away the liberty acquired in February. The value of land and peace without liberty, of course, was altered. Denikin failed to understand this great paradox, and explained the Russian tragedy purely in terms of Kerensky’s tolerance and Lenin’s deceit.
The death throes of the White movement continued for a long time. Denikin learnt that following Soviet amnesties of 1921 and 1924 for the lower ranks, many soldiers retu
rned to Russia. Officers who found emigration too painful and who returned to Russia met a harsher fate. For instance, at the end of 1921 former commander of Crimea corps Lieutenant-General Ya.A. Slashchev, artillery inspector Major-General Milkovsky, Colonels Gilbikh and Mizernitsky and Captain Voinakhovsky returned voluntarily to Soviet Russia. Reporting this to the press, Trotsky added: ‘Whoever tries to use the magnanimity of the toilers’ state against the Soviet Republic will be severely punished … The Soviet Republic must remain vigilant.’64
During the purges of the 1930s, the last of the White officers who had returned home were liquidated. Large numbers of participants in the movement, however, remained beyond Soviet borders. In 1925 Wrangel’s Russian Council calculated that the number of Russian refugees who were capable of being mobilized in Germany, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, China, Latvia, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria amounted to 1,158,000 men.65 All of them, according to a document obtained by Red Army intelligence, considered themselves to be loyal to the ‘White idea’—no doubt this was an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the ‘Russian All-Army Union’, which combined various elements and committees of former Volunteers, survived a long time, and the publication of newspapers and magazines gave evidence that there was life in the White émigré community.
Despite their strong anti-Communist attitudes, the Whites abroad did not identify Bolshevism with the regime. In the latter part of the 1930s, when war was looming, many émigrés saw that Germany and the Western democracies would try to settle their differences at the cost of the Soviet Union. In Paris, Milyukov organized a ‘defence movement’ which included a number of White leaders, among them Denikin. Its aim was ‘to unite the émigrés and cooperate to the best of its ability in the defence of Russia’. In Moscow such patriotism, coming from former Russian citizens, was incomprehensible, and the chief of Red Army intelligence, Corps Commander M.S. Uritsky, reported to the leadership: ‘One can see this movement as a sign of the disintegration of the émigré milieu.’66 During the upheaval of Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, only a handful of White émigrés found it possible to offer their services to Fascism.
If Denikin’s explanation of the White defeat ignored the deep social causes of Russia’s disintegration, at least he was able to face the fact that the monarchy could not be restored and that democracy was an inevitability. He believed that ‘a host of Russia’s problems cannot be solved by revolution. What is needed is evolution.’ For many years the Whites lived with the memory of a Russia long gone. There were others who took a different view. Berdyaev, for example, in his book Self-Awareness, wrote: ‘I never believed in the White movement and had no sympathy for it … I put my trust only in Bolshevism being overcome internally. The Russian people would liberate itself.’67 Denikin’s last words before he died in Paris in 1947 were, ‘Alas, I shall never see a rescued Russia.’
Within the Noose
On 2 June 1919 Trotsky published an article entitled ‘The Ninth Wave’ in the newspaper V Puti (On the Road), which was printed on board his special train. In it he wrote: ‘What we are experiencing at the moment is the ninth wave of the counter-revolution. It presses on us on the Northern and Southern Fronts. It threatens Petrograd. But at the same time we know for sure that the counter-revolution has gathered its last forces, it is committing its last reserves to battle.’68 Stating that ‘the counter-revolution was greatly strengthened during the past year by the lethal weapons supplied by the Anglo-French bandits’, he declared: ‘We now know for certain that when we have dealt with Kolchak and Denikin, we shall make the Soviet Republic completely inviolable and give a mighty push to the revolution in Europe and the whole world. Behind the forces Denikin, Kolchak, the White Estonians and White Finns have fielded against us, the counter-revolution has nothing more to give. It is staking everything on the Southern Front, on the east and on Petrograd, and so is the world counter-revolution.’69 What he omitted to say was that this was just as true for the revolution itself.
An understanding of how it was that Trotsky’s mere presence at the front raised the troops’ morale and led to the meteoric rise of his reputation may lie in an account of a tour he made in September 1918 which is to be found among the papers of 4th Army, eastern front senior headquarters adjutant Savin. The notes were written on 22 September 1918 in the village of Pokrovsk, Samara province, during one of Trotsky’s whistle-stops. They give an exhaustive description of Trotsky’s behaviour among the troops, and help to explain his popularity, his modus operandi and the political and military consequences of his visits.
Having been told that Trotsky’s train was due to arrive next day at Saratov, 4th Army HQ sent a commander and a commissar by boat to meet him there. Savin’s account continues:
9.37 a.m., to sounds of brass band playing national anthem, Trotsky’s train pulls in, troops of Saratov garrison lined up. Trotsky greeted by thunderous ‘Hurrah!’ … Reception committee introduced; Trotsky inspected troops and thanked everyone for coming (local Soviet chiefs absent) … Convoy of automobiles drove to quay … Boat arrived at Pokrovsk 12.15 … Guard of honour. Headquarters chief Bulgakov gave report. At HQ Trotsky inspected every section. The commander reported on position (pointing out poor supply). Trotsky gave instant orders to improve supply. He spent 1 hour and 45 minutes at HQ. Left for quay. Greeted by Marseillaise. Gave speech from deck. Thunderous ‘Hurrah’.
Trotsky left for Volsk. Again met by national anthem. Gave speech. Called for earliest possible capture of Samara. Thunderous ‘Hurrah’. Arrived at Balakovo. Again speech. Again troops lined route, gave speech from automobile. Ordered each Red Army man present should receive month’s pay (250 roubles) as gift. We arrived at Khvalynsk. Again parade. Trotsky gave speech. We drive to Volsky Division at front in village of Popovka. Formed international regiment. Trotsky gave speech in Russian, Lindov in German. Trotsky’s remarks: 1. Divisional chief Gavrilov has gone to pieces and behaved like a disorderly soldier; 2. The regiments have no sentries; 3. The international regiment mustered slowly, practice ‘alerts’ are needed; 4. Communications are bad; 5. There is too much independence in the units, they don’t follow HQ’s orders; 6. HQs are too far from the troops; 7. They want automobiles and warm clothing. But on the whole the revolutionary spirit and discipline in Volsk division are strong, it has no place for disintegrating units.
We set off (19 September, 9 a.m.) down Volga to Pokrovsk … [We] arrive in Saratov at 1.45 p.m. Trotsky makes speech to large meeting in People’s Palace. Commissar Sharskov reported. Dealt with supply problems of provincial military committee. Left for Nikolaevsk (arrived 20 September 11.15 a.m.). Guard of honour, lined route, ‘hurrah’. Decided to form new division and call it 2nd Nikolaevsky with Comrade Chapaev as chief. As commander of 1st brigade, Chapaev dug in his heels and refused command of 2nd division: ‘I’ve got used to this, I’ve settled in.’ People said: ‘The fact is Comrade Chapaev, steppe eagle that he is, has used purely partisan tactics since the front opened.’ He doesn’t obey HQ orders. On occasion he has set off with his detachment and disappeared, only to turn up after a while with booty and prisoners. According to eye-witnesses, wherever Chapaev showed up, the local population were terrorized. His savagery is well known to many. A legendary personality. Trotsky persuaded Chapaev [to take the post].
Trotsky spoke at meeting in theatre in the evening. Doled out 250 roubles to each soldier in village of Raevskoe. Exclaimed: ‘Forward, to Samara!’ Also gave cigarette-cases to distinguished soldiers.
In Bogorodskoe troops reported there were turncoats. They’d been captured. Comrade Trotsky at once ordered a revolutionary tribunal within twenty-four hours to try the turncoats: ‘All those found guilty of desertion are to be shot on the spot.’ 3rd and 4th Regiments lined up outside village. All dressed anyhow, one even in a top-hat. They included some old men. ‘So, you want to fight?’ Trotsky asked one. ‘Yes, I do!’ Trotsky made a speech with the call ‘On to Samara!’ Talked about desertion in 1st and 2nd Regiments, said they’d be shot t
oday.
Asked who had distinguished themselves in battle. Told there were twenty men. They stepped forward. But it turned out there were only eighteen gifts. Trotsky gave one of the last two the watch off his own wrist and the other got his Browning. All the rest were promised 250 roubles each. They shouted ‘hurrah’. We had travelled 200 [kilometres] in the car that day.
[Trotsky] made following remarks: the division is strong and is burning to take Samara. But they carry out orders and commands badly. Chapaev says: I don’t trust HQ and don’t intend to recognize their bits of paper.
Accompanying Comrade Trotsky on his journey were a photographer and film cameraman who captured on film important episodes of the trips and individual people of interest to the Russian Soviet Republic and who can serve as a political example for other countries to show the proletariat are struggling against the capitalist yoke.70
Savin’s notes suggest that Trotsky was not primarily concerned to enhance his own popularity, but rather to stress the significance of the new central authority, the significance of the supreme command of the Republic, as well as his own confidence in the triumph of the revolution. He used every stopover as a chance to meet ordinary soldiers. His brief, twenty-thirty-minute speeches helped to raise general awareness among the soldiers, but he took every opportunity to give them a concrete target, e.g. to capture Samara. In Trotsky, ex-peasants, now bearing arms, saw not merely their own ‘boss’, but also one of the highest representatives of the new authorities. Savin’s notes show Trotsky as an astute demagogue who recognized the need to deliver something against the larger promises: silver cigarette-cases—looted, incidentally, from tsarist stores—his own wristwatch and personal revolver helped to build his image as a legend of the revolution. A thorough-going populist, he knew that his fame enormously enhanced whatever he said to the semi-literate troops. There was something very un-revolutionary, even commercial, in the hand-out of cash—perhaps the price of a bottle of moonshine or a packet of cheap cigarettes—but he knew his public, the poorest peasants, who valued a kopeck earned. The order to shoot deserters, issued in the same businesslike way as the distribution of the cigarette-cases or instructions to improve supplies, taught the people that violence and coercion were not the products only of war, but also hallmarks of the new regime.
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