by Hew Strachan
The Munitions of War act did not, however, resolve the main bone of contention between Lloyd George and the trades unions, that of dilution. Lloyd George harangued the TUC on the issue in September 1915. On 23 December a speech he made in Glasgow was so heckled that he used the powers of the Defence of the Realm act to suppress an accurate report of its contents. The ministry argued that the aim of dilution was not the reduction of skilled jobs but their redistribution and reallocation so that they helped to create opportunities for unskilled workers. Although the ministry established a central labour supply committee in September, progress was limited. By the summer of 1916 about 10,000 unskilled women had replaced 7,436 unskilled men in 150 controlled establishments. Furthermore, for all his talk Lloyd George was much more in the thrall of the unions than he could afford to admit. Confrontation could suspend production; conciliation tended to mean concession.301
Lloyd George staked all, therefore, on raising output to meet demand. His policy was to budget for a surplus, to set orders sufficiently high and to enter into contracts sufficiently far into the future to sustain the stimulus to industrial conversion and enhanced production. Arguably, Kitchener’s orders in themselves would not have resulted in deliveries in the medium term without the security to industry which Lloyd George’s commitment provided.302
Furthermore, Lloyd George made a second major contribution. His programmes were dominated by heavy artillery. In the year that Lloyd George was at the Ministry of Munitions the production capacity of lighter guns was reduced 28 per cent, that of medium guns was increased 380 per cent, and that of heavy guns 1,200 per cent.303 In 1915 both Germany and France were concentrating on field artillery in order to meet immediate crises; they thus postponed consideration of their heavy-gun output until 1916, and saw no significant increases until 1917. In Britain 134 60-pounders were delivered in 1915, and 640 in 1916. Total output of all calibres apart from the 13-pounder, 18-pounder, and 4.5-inch howitzer (i.e. the principal field guns) was eight in 1914, 200 in 1915, and 1,714 in 1916.304 Britain led the way in changing the balance in artillery armament and thus equipping itself for the Materialschlachten of 1916.
The fact that this shift was achieved was a reflection of the capacities of the private arms firms—of Armstrong (primarily responsible for the 60-pounder) and of Vickers (primarily responsible for the other workhorse of the heavy artillery, the 6-inch howitzer). The pressures on them to maximize production in too many directions simultaneously, multiplied in 1914, were relaxed in 1915. Of 10 million shells ordered by the end of 1914, 6.25 million were due from arms firms although their manufacture lay within the competence of many less specialized engineering businesses.305 In 1915, not least thanks to the network of national shell factories, this responsibility was spread more sensibly. Similarly, orders for field guns could level off as those in place early in the war were met. By the end of 1914 contracts for 3,628 18-pounders had been signed, principally with Vickers and Armstrong, and for 812 4.5-inch howitzers, principally with Coventry Ordnance Works. The army had received 2,672 and 601 of these respectively by the close of the following year; deliveries of 18-pounders could therefore fall to 1,492 in 1916.306 The pressure on field-gun manufacture also relaxed as production of the Stokes mortar developed in the summer of 1915.
But the heavy-guns programme was a matter of doctrine as well as of capacity. In this respect it was the fruit of Lloyd George’s relationship with General Du Cane. In 1914 Du Cane was appointed by French to head an experiments committee with the BEE. Thus, as was to happen in other areas of policy, GHQ set up an alternative source of wisdom to that of the War Office. Lloyd George was not slow to exploit the division, using Du Cane to advise him at the Anglo-French munitions conference in Boulogne on 19 June 1915, and bringing Du Cane in to head design within the ministry when that function was transferred from the Board of Ordnance in November. At Boulogne Du Cane told Lloyd George that the army needed as many heavy guns as light, and that before an attack was launched each heavy gun should have 1,000 rounds, all high explosive with delayed-action fuses. Each field gun would need 2,000 rounds, three-quarters of which should be high explosive.
The programme developed at GHQ on the back of the Boulogne conference called for an additional 400 60-pounders, 400 6-inch howitzers, and 290 8-inch and larger howitzers. This, ‘gun programme A, set a total for the army of 8,881 guns of all calibres, both existing and new, of which 7,240 were to be in the field by March 1916. The programme assumed an army of fifty divisions. But by July the War Office was reckoning on an army of seventy divisions. ‘Gun programme B’ therefore increased French’s targets for additional heavy guns to 641, 458, and 316 respectively. In August Lloyd George argued that production should be geared to 100 divisions. ‘Gun programme C’ now aimed for 920 60-pounders, 980 6-inch howitzers, and 925 larger howitzers by December 1916. The implication was the production of 1,035 more guns than were required for an army of seventy divisions. Kitchener said he could not possibly find the 4,980 officers and 119,198 other ranks that would be required to fire these guns.
Training artillerymen was a more complex and lengthy process than training infantrymen. Thus, at the end of 1915 the British army was actively trying to slough off guns rather than clamouring for more.307
As complex a consequence of Lloyd George’s programmes as gun crews was ammunition. The shift to high-explosive shell favoured by Du Cane conformed to the pressures to widen the circle of shell manufacturers, as the production of high explosive was simpler than that of shrapnel. But four problems were generated by the change. First was the propellant. Shrapnel used gunpowder, but high explosive—principally thanks to the navy’s needs for a more stable propellant—used cordite. Cordite was made of nitroglycerine and gun cotton, the two being gelatinized by the incorporation of acetone, a distillate of wood. In 1914 most acetone came from the United States. Secondly, the switch from lyddite to the more stable TNT as the bursting charge for high-explosive, foreshadowed in trials in 1908, had been confirmed by TNT’s effectiveness against the Belgian forts in 1914. But TNT production was still in its infancy, and one-and-a-half tons of TNT required 1 ton of toluene, which itself needed 600 tons of coal. Third was the lack of a reliable fuse for high explosive shells: the fuse in use in 1914 had been designed for the high-angle fire of howitzers and was not adapted to ricochet and grazing fire. And, finally, the shift in favour of high explosive did not automatically rule out all uses of shrapnel for field guns: in determining a long-term munitions programme it was essential that the proportions of the two be fixed, but this was difficult when each day brought fresh and not necessarily convergent experiences of trench warfare.
The domination of the Nobel Dynamite Trust, an Anglo-German cartel, in the private production of propellants meant that research and development had been concentrated in Germany. Germany too produced the phenol which went into lyddite. Nonetheless, the narrowly chemical problems were resolved more speedily than the technical gunnery ones. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist and professor of chemistry at Manchester University, developed a process for producing acetone from maize mash, as a by-product of his research on synthetic rubber. The alternative method of synthetic production depended on large quantities of potatoes to manufacture inadequate amounts of acetone.308 The shortage of TNT was circumvented, as in Germany, by its incorporation with ammonium nitrate to produce amatol. Although Britain knew of the Haber process in outline, its access to Chilean saltpetre relieved it of the pressure to develop the process’s industrial application. In May 1915 approval was given for the same 60 : 40 mix of TNT and ammonium nitrate as used by the Germans. But experiments with loading shells by pressing rather than melting got over the problems in filling encountered by the Germans, and allowed the British to use TNT and ammonium nitrate in a ratio of up to 20 : 80. To maximize the production of toluene the government requisitioned all toluol manufactured by coal-tar producers in November 1914. The raw material constraints on TNT production, as well as the navy’s appropr
iation of the purest TNT for its guns, meant that the army continued to use lyddite for the time being. The production of picric acid only ceased in 1918, ironically just after large-scale phenol factories came on stream. In this fashion Britain resolved the problem of filling shells before that of making empty shells. The total output of high explosives and propellants, 434 and 5,298 tons respectively in the last four months of 1914, reached 20,206 and 25,973 tons in 1915. In the spring of 1915 Britain had accumulated stocks of TNT and picric acid, and was already able to pass over its surpluses to its allies. The build-up to Lloyd George’s three successive gun programmes of 1915 created worries in May and June, but by August and September Moulton could again face the future with equanimity.309
Fuses proved much more difficult. As with chemicals, Britain had become accustomed to rely on others’ expertise, as it lacked the skills’ base for fuse-production, an indigenous clockmaking industry. The no. 44 fuse, that designed for howitzers, could not be relied on to detonate when fired at low angles. It was adapted for air explosions, but this was not much use against entrenchments and field fortifications. In February 1915 a graze action fuse, the no. 100, was adopted, but it caused premature explosions both in the gun and in flight. By December 1915, although only one 18-pounder was being destroyed for every 27,650 rounds fired, the rate of premature explosions for the 4.5-inch howitzer was one round in 5,000. Even when the no. 100 performed as expected there was still a delay between impact and detonation, with the result that the shell had begun to bury itself before taking effect. The no. 106 fuse, which gave much better results, was introduced in July 1916, but was not widely used in the field until 1917.310
The fact that the fuse was at the base of the high-explosive shell was what gave rise to the danger of premature explosions. But delayed detonation, after the shell had penetrated its target, also depended on the fuse. The best use of TNT, therefore, depended on the development of a satisfactory fuse. The difficulties of doing so prejudiced gunners against the use of high explosive. Indeed, at one stage the high incidence of premature explosions was attributed not to the fuse at all but to amatol: its 80 : 20 mix required the fuse to have a greater force on explosion than did the 60 : 40 mix. Amatol was also unpopular because its detonation produced little smoke and it was therefore difficult to observe the fall of shot. Eighteen-pounder high-explosive shell was only of value in field guns for its destructive effect when it burst on graze, and for its man-killing effect when it burst after ricochet. Thus, the army’s demand, so insistent for more high explosive at the beginning of the war, changed in the second year of fighting. On 6 November 1914 GHQ had requested that 25 per cent of its field-gun ammunition should be high explosive, and in June 1915 Sir John French raised this to 50 per cent. But as early as January 1915 some gunners were arguing that shrapnel was better at cutting wire, and after the experience of the battle of Loos in September 1915 the view gained ground that a 50 : 50 split was mistaken. With the initial assault completed, fighting had been sufficiently open to make shrapnel the more valuable ammunition, and its use also left the ground less broken up and therefore more passable for advancing infantry. In April 1916 GHQ requested that future production be set at 70 per cent shrapnel to 30 per cent high explosive. The effect of this reversal of opinion was, of course, to make the fuse issue less pressing.311
Both problems—the quality of the fuse and the most appropriate ratio of shrapnel to high explosive—provided fuel for the continuing acrimony between the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions. The latter blamed the former for not adopting the high-explosive shell and fuse used by the French in the 75 mm gun:312 the Ministry of Munitions, in its enthusiasm for all things French, overlooked the high rate of premature explosions in their allies’ field guns. The former blamed the latter whenever it ran short of high explosive, conveniently neglecting the variations in scales preferred by the army itself.
The battle of the Somme, which began on 1 July 1916, made it clear that Britain had not yet surmounted its munitions problems. Twenty-five per cent of guns were put out of action owing to design faults and inferior materials, as well as to poorly trained gun crews.313 Thirty per cent of shells were reported as duds. In particular, the process of pressing amatol into shells did not give the density required for detonation.314 Undoubtedly some of the defects were the consequences of the rapid expansion of production—the lowering of inspection standards, the incorporation of ill-qualifed firms, the dilution of skilled labour. Equally, however, these were the penalties of any massive industrial conversion, and the tendency to heap responsibility on the Ministry of Munitions should not obscure the point that whoever presided over shell production confronted a short-term choice between quality and quantity.
More telling is the criticism that quality had been forfeited without a sufficient increase in quantity. Some divisions, for at least some of the time, still experienced shell shortage. Those guns not engaged at the Somme were restricted to one or two rounds a day in order to feed the main battle.315 Such shortages, however, were no more susceptible to global explanations than those of 1914. Total orders for field gun and 60-pounder shell exceeded 10 million rounds by June 1915, and these contracts were fulfilled by July 1916. But the constraints in perfecting the field-gun high-explosive shell meant that 8.6 million of the total were shrapnel. Furthermore, 8.4 million were for field guns, because the heavy-gun programme had not been completed.316 The dominance of shrapnel and of field artillery were key explanations for the failure to inflict greater damage on German defences. While the BEF lacked sufficient heavy guns it relied disproportionately on the 18-pounder, and while it did that it elevated shrapnel over high explosive. But it could not get the specialist arms firms to produce more heavy artillery when they were still being chased for shrapnel, and the new firms could not maximize output for 18-pounder high-explosive shell until its design problems were overcome. Not until mid–1917 would British shell production overhaul that of France, and not until 1918 would shells be available in abundance. By then too, improving tactics would make more effective use of the shells that were provided. Thus, the remedies lay on both sides of the equation.
In the short term one solution was to place contracts overseas. Three million of those shells ordered by June 1915 were due from North America. On 24 August 1914 Kitchener wrote to the minister of militia in Ottawa asking him to get 18-pounder empty shrapnel shell, with or without fuses, from the American trade. The War Office’s action both pre-dated any direct British experience of shell shortage and gave the lie to the accusation that it was reluctant to explore alternative sources of production.
Kitchener’s presumption was that the United States would provide shell. It did: in 1915 imports of finished munitions from the United States totalled 54,500 tons, and in 1916 547,500.317 But Canada responded to Kitchener’s query by saying that its own manufacturers reckoned they could produce 4,000 rounds a week. It had the raw materials—apart from zinc and copper, which it could get from the United States—and by the end of October it had identified the capacity to manufacure 80,000 shells a month, assuming round-the-clock working. Gauges arrived on 31 October, and in December the master general of the ordnance accepted that Canadian basic steel could substitute for British ‘acid’ steel. By the close of 1914 Canada had orders for 400,000 18-pounder empty shrapnel shells and 1,100,000 complete shells. The production of TNT began in April 1915, as soon as Canada had taken receipt of the plant to recover the waste gases from coke. By June 10 million rounds were on order, including 4.5-inch and 60-pounder high-explosive shells.
The expansion of Canadian production was in the hands of a shell committee set up at the instigation of the minister of militia, Sir Sam Hughes, and formed of those with industrial, technological, and military backgrounds. Its policy from the outset was not to place orders for whole shells but for components. Thus, manufacturers were able to tender for those elements for whose production their plant was best suited. By 31 March 1915 155 factories and 25,000 emplo
yees were engaged in shell production, and five new industries had been established in Canada. The shell committee’s policy made sense of the fact that Canada lacked an indigenous arms industry while enabling the rapid conversion of the plant which it possessed. But in June 1915 it ran foul of the Ministry of Munitions, and from London it received not orders (no fresh contracts were placed between 21 June and 2 September) but a visitation.
D. A. Thomas, the ministry’s emissary, criticized the shell committee for failing to concentrate its orders on the larger firms, so as to encourage them to invest in plant. Underpinning his comments was a wider agenda. The shell committee saw ‘themselves as contractors selling to the British Government [rather] than as government agents’.318 It had rejected competitive tendering on the grounds that Canadian manufacturers did not know enough about shell production to quote sensibly, and instead had fixed prices. But it was therefore accused of allowing subcontractors excessive profits, and of awarding contracts on the basis of political favouritism. Fundamental to the whole inquiry was the fact that in Canada, as elsewhere, orders had stacked up while deliveries had not yet come on stream. By the end of November 1915 the shell committee had only shipped 1 million complete 18-pounder rounds out of 8.6 million under contract. In all, it had placed orders for 22 million shells, but had only 3 million dispatched or ready to go.319
The committee of investigation established as a result of Thomas’s visit gave the Canadian government two options: either it should itself take over the supply of munitions and emulate Britain by establishing its own ministry for the purpose, or it should allow the British Ministry of Munitions to create its own agency in Canada. The Canadian government opted for the second alternative, and the Imperial Munitions Board was formed at the end of November. Publicly the new structure was justified on the grounds that the work was now administrative rather than technical; in reality the philosophy was commercial. The manufacturers of the shell committee were replaced by bankers. The board was divided into five departments—contracts and purchasing; technical; inspection; secretarial; finance and accounting—and it emulated its London parent in establishing national factories for fuses, explosives, and shells. Also like the Ministry of Munitions, it drew credit for the groundwork done by others. When the shells committee was wound up the monthly output of empty shells had reached 700,000 and of complete rounds 400,000. In 1916 Canada shipped almost 20 million shells, and for a time it was responsible for the production of between a quarter and a third of the British army’s entire munition supply.320